



# The First Committee Monitor

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## NGO Reporting on the General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security

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Since 2000, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) based in New York have been working together to share monitoring and reporting responsibilities in an attempt to make the work of the UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security more transparent and useful for those not based in New York.

These services include:

- \* Posting statements, draft resolutions, and First Committee background information on line at:

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1comindex1.html#2003>,

- \* Preparing weekly reports summarizing statements and discussions in the First Committee and tracking key themes,
- \* Providing information as requested to individuals by email or phone, and
- \* Distributing to the First Committee the materials of NGOs who are not in New York.

*The First Committee Monitor* is edited and coordinated by Reaching Critical Will, a disarmament project of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. The opinions expressed herein are not necessarily those of the Editors, WILPF, or RCW.

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**The contributing groups to The First Committee Monitor include: The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom; The Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy; The NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security; Global Action to Prevent War; Amnesty International; The Global Resource Action Center on the Environment; Franciscans International; and Quakers International.**

## Introduction

The five days devoted to Thematic Debate in the GA First Committee have concluded, and the delegations will soon finish their consultations and will vote on draft resolutions this coming week. As the hot-topic of "revitalization" and "reform" of the First Committee has elucidated, this recently concluded phase of the First Committee's work is perhaps misnamed. Far from an actual debate- an event in which ideas are proposed, argued for or against, and rebutted- the third week delivered predictable resolutions with minimal changes from last years versions, , introduced by yet more prepared statements, and almost completely devoid of "interactivity" between Member States, at least not in the open.

The United States has been one of the most vocal proponents of First Committee reform, issuing both a non-paper and a resolution, 58/L.15. (See "First Committee Reform" report, page 12).

The U.S. efforts at revitalization are another component of its campaign to situate "terrorism" as the priority of the international security agenda, a prioritization warned against by the Indonesian delegation in their statement on Friday, when it called attention to the danger of disarmament being "overshadowed by nonproliferation and the terrorist acquisition of WMD." If the U.S. draft resolution is adopted, the General Assembly would be: "Expressing grave concern at the emergence of new threats to international peace and security in the post-September 11 period." The urgently relevant question this resolution begs of the First Committee is: Should these "new threats" eclipse the "old threats" of nuclear warfare, the abundance of conventional weapons, and the perpetuation of militarism?

The security of the African continent, for example, is not dependent upon the eradication of terrorism, a phenomenon which in itself is most always a symptom of underlying causes, rather than a naturally occurring condition that can be wiped out with force. For Africa and much of the global South, security is defined in eco-

nomic and social development, in political stability and in a secure, effective, and empowered civil society. For this reason, then, we applaud the sponsors of the conventional weapons resolutions, especially draft resolution 58/L.1.

For South Asia, the greatest threat to peace and security is surely the nuclear warheads that lie poised in opposite directions, the usage of which becoming ever more likely with each missile test fired, each hostile verbal exchange or brash military incursion in the precarious Kashmir region. This reality necessitates the implementation of such as draft resolutions 58/L.10 and 58/L.18, among others.

This critique of the United States' proposal should not overshadow some of the very positive and welcomed suggestions put forth in their non-paper and resolution. Time could certainly be more wisely managed, and some resolutions could be combined, as suggested in both the U.S. non-paper as well as in those of Norway and the European Union

Yet when all is said and done, it is not time management or collapsing resolutions that will revitalize the work of this Committee - it is only actual disarmament itself that will achieve this - of weapons large and small. The reason the majority of the world's governments are required to maintain positions and repeat demands for nuclear disarmament year after year in resolutions and debates, is because other governments, in particular the Nuclear Five, have not fulfilled their solemn obligations and unequivocal undertakings in disarmament treaties and resolutions. Who then is really to blame for thrusting inefficient tedium upon the International Community? The lack of disarmament, despite the commitments, the signing of treaties, the passing of resolutions, seems to require this remedial repetition on the part of the majority of the world's governments and people.

-Rhianna Tyson,  
Reaching Critical Will

## Missiles

The best legal tool to counter the threat of missile proliferation is arguably the newly established Hague Code of Conduct against Missile Proliferation (HCOG). Yet even this widely-accepted multilateral agreement falls short of meeting disarmament concerns, as it does not call for the destruction of a single missile or other delivery system.

Missile *reduction* does not even appear to be on the radar of most Member States. In fact, a resolution on missiles was not even introduced until 2000, when the Islamic Republic of Iran sponsored A/C.1/55/L.1, which requested the Secretary General to draft a report, with the assistance of a Panel of Governmental Experts, to be submitted to the 56th session of the General Assembly in 2001.

Since that original resolution, the international community has succeeded in establishing a Code of Conduct, widely regarded as "a positive step" if not a solution to the threat. (See previous Monitor reports on missiles:

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com03/FCM/wk2.htm#Missiles> and

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com03/FCM/wk1.htm#Missiles>.) The HCOG remains an agreement between States on how they should "conduct" their trade in missiles. Completely absent is any commitment to reductions or halting production or stockpiling.

This year's draft resolution, A/C.1/58/L.4, minimally updated to acknowledge the report of the Secretary-General, calls again for another Panel to be established in the coming year, and for another report from the Secretary-General, who shall consult again with Member States.

The resolutions on missiles in the past were adopted, but with large numbers of abstention. (In 2000, 90 voted in favor, 60 abstained, and no State voted against. Similarly, in 2001, 88 voted in favor, 57 abstained, and no State voted against.)

If approved, the item will again be included on the agenda for the 59th session.

To stay updated on the work of the new Panel, be

## Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

Six resolutions on nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) and one on a zone of peace, were introduced this week. With the exception of the resolution introduced by Mexico calling for a conference of NWFZ States, all were repeats from last year with only minor text variations.

Nigeria introduced "African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba)" (A/C.1/58/L.11) calling on states that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the 1996 treaty. To date 20 African countries have ratified the treaty. 28 ratifications are required for the treaty to enter into force.

Uzbekistan introduced a draft decision on "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in Central Asia" (A/C.1/58/L.14). A draft treaty has been agreed in principle by the five central Asian countries. However, conclusion of the treaty has been delayed due to incompatibilities between the security relationships of individual Central Asian States with nuclear weapon States, and the protocols which the NWS would be required to sign. The draft resolution calls for no action on the issue this year, but to include it on the agenda of the 59th session.

Mexico introduced a resolution calling for a conference of States parties and signatories to nuclear-weapon-free zones (A/C.1/58/L.19). The objective of the conference would be to promote "...coordination and convergence in the implementation of the provisions of the treaties and of strengthening the regime of nuclear non-proliferation." The resolution calls for the conference to be held before the NPT Review Conference in 2005, and also includes plans for two preparatory meetings for the conference. In this way it is more specific than previous calls for international conferences on nuclear weapons issues (such as the proposal for a 4th Special Session on Disarmament, and the UN Secretary-General's call for a conference on nuclear dangers).

The resolution envisages the participation of Nuclear Weapon States (as signatories to the NWFZ protocols) and non-governmental organizations in the conference.

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*NWFZ continued*

Egypt introduced a draft resolution calling for the "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East" (A/C.1/58/L.22). This resolution is usually adopted by consensus. Egypt also introduced a related resolution entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (A/c.1/58/L.2), which calls on Israel to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The US and Israel usually oppose this resolution, and a small number of other countries usually abstain.

Malaysia, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, introduced draft resolution (A/C.1/58/L.24) which calls for "Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace". When this resolution was considered in 2001, the US, UK and France opposed, most European countries abstained and most of the rest of the world supported. Since the nuclear tests by Pakistan and India in 1998, Pakistan no longer introduces a resolution calling for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. Implementation of the 1971 declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace remains as a possible confidence and security building measure in the region. However, little in the way of concrete proposals for developing the zone have emerged from the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, and thus the resolution merely calls for further consultations and to report back in 2005.

Brazil introduced a resolution on "Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco),"

(A/C.1/58/L.6). The resolution highlights the work of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) and supports its work to promote cooperation with the agencies of other nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Brazil also introduced a resolution on "Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas" (A/C.1/58/L.38). In previous years, the US and UK have opposed the resolution on the belief that it sought to restrict the transit of nuclear armed vessels through international waters included in the zones. On the other hand, Philippines has explained that they could not co-sponsor because the resolution does not prohibit such transit, but that it should in light of the International Court of Justice 1996 decision on the general illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The resolution is ambiguous on the matter, referring only to "the applicable principles and rules of international law relating to the freedom of the high seas and the rights of passage through maritime space, including those of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea."

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*Missiles Continued*

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<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/missiles/missilesindex.html>.

-Rhianna Tyson  
Reaching Critical Will



## Fissile Materials

While the vast majority of discussion on fissile or radiological materials the past weeks focused on the highly-anticipated Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), the draft resolution on the treaty (A/C.1/58/L.49) remains substantively unchanged since from last year's (A/C.1/57/80), which was adopted without a vote.

Nigeria, acting on behalf of the Group of African States, submitted a resolution on the "Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes" (A/C.1/58/L.12). Although this resolution was not submitted last year, the 2003 version remains relatively unaltered since it was last tabled in the 56th session (56/24) and also adopted without a vote.

Although a relatively short resolution, with 9 operative paragraphs preceded by 11 preambular paragraphs, the prohibition on "dumping" is broadly defined.

In operative paragraphs 1, 4, and 5, the prohibition on dumping is reinforced by a "future convention" prohibiting radiological weapons and waste, to be negotiated in the CD.

The resolution also "takes note" of the Organization of African Unity's resolutions on the transboundary shipments of such materials in operative paragraph 6, and "expresses hope" for the "effective implementation" of the IAEA's Code of Practice on shipment, as a way to fortify the prohibition.

Perhaps the most contentious definition of "dumping" can be found in operative paragraph 2, in which the GA "expresses grave concern regarding any nuclear wastes that would constitute radiological warfare and have grave implications for the national security of all States." One nuclear waste that is used in warfare is the controversial weaponized depleted uranium (DU).

DU munitions are not generally considered radiological weapons because the purpose of the DU is to

strengthen weapons, not to cause injury or death from the radiation.

However, there is increasing concern about the radiological impact of DU as the health effects of its use in Iraq and Bosnia are now coming to light. The regime change in Iraq since 2002 has meant that the resolution they usually introduce on the effects of DU was not introduced this year, leaving little opportunity for this issue to be raised.

Military spokesmen continue to deny that the DU has any serious or long-term health or environmental effects. Studies to determine the true effects of these weapons continue, by both international organizations and private scientific and medical groups.

The Nuclear Policy Research Institute estimates that 12 countries currently possess DU weapons in their arsenals: the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Thailand, Israel, France, China, Jordan, and Taiwan. (see: [http://www.nuclearpolicy.org/Documents/DU\\_report\\_final\\_7\\_6.pdf](http://www.nuclearpolicy.org/Documents/DU_report_final_7_6.pdf)) DU has been used in the Gulf War, the former Yugoslavia, in Afghanistan, and in the most recent Iraq war, reportedly in unprecedented quantities.

The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) conducted studies in the former Yugoslavia, one of the first arenas in which DU was used in battle. The study found traces of radioactive uranium in the groundwater of Serbia and Montenegro, and that wind or human activity can also result in the re-suspension of the radioactive particles.

The debate over DU is sure to continue with the continuation of studies on its effects, and draft resolution 58/L.12 might be regarded as another tool for activists and DU-opponents in the future.

-Rhianna Tyson,  
Reaching Critical Will

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## Nuclear Testing

Throughout the past three weeks of the First Committee, a majority of States who all agree that a cessation to nuclear testing is critical to the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime have voiced the urgency of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty's Entry into Force (EIF). (See Nuclear Testing report, week 2). The exigency of the EIF is so pressing that the States Parties convened a Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force this past Vienna, on September 3-5 of 2003, under the auspices of Article XIV of the Treaty.

In his speech on Thursday, Finnish Representative Tom Grönburg, speaking on behalf of the Presidency of the recent Vienna conference, highlighted some of the noteworthy recommendations provided in the Final Declaration, adopted by consensus.

Two of the twelve items designed to accelerate the EIF utilize the willing cooperation of the ratifying States to attain universalization. In addition to appointing a Special Representative to promote the Treaty's EIF, they will establish a trust fund, "financed through voluntary contributions, to support an outreach programme."

Regional seminars will be organized with the purpose to "increase the awareness of the important role that the Treaty plays." The Preparatory Committee of the CTBT will also continue promoting an understanding of the Treaty by demonstrating the civil and scientific benefits of its entry into force.

In addition, the Declaration also acknowledges the importance of non-governmental organizations and other elements of civil society in helping to raise awareness and support for the CTBT.

However, none of these measures were integrated into the draft resolution 58/L.52. All of the operative clauses remain unchanged from last year's version of the resolution (57/100). Since last year, three new States signed onto the CTBT and nine have ratified, decreasing the amount of Annex II states still needed for entry-into-force to 32 out of 44, one less than last year.

Several other draft resolutions introduced this week, including 58/L.40 "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: a new agenda," 58/L.47 "Nuclear Disarmament," and 58/L.53, "A path to total elimi-

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## Disarmament Machinery

Disarmament machinery is still being discussed primarily in regards to a Fourth SSOD and the stalemate in the CD, this week with resolutions or other documentation to reinforce the statements of the last weeks. Additionally, there has been talk floating around the UN about creating a new body to investigate compliance with WMD and non-proliferation regimes.

France said that so far, responses to the proliferation problem are ad hoc and lacking institutional memory, and it is therefore calling for a "permanent corps of inspectors" to retain the knowledge and experience collected through UNSCOM, UNMOVIC and others. This body, as proposed by France, would be placed under the Security Council and it would report to both the Security Council and the Secretary-General. The United Kingdom noted it would support fact-finding missions on a more ad-hoc basis, keeping resource constraints in mind. However, he was in favor of maintaining UNMOVIC institutional memory. Canada also noted with support this new idea of "fact-finding teams" but in the Department of Disarmament Affairs, not the Security Council. (For more on UNMOVIC this week, see "Biological Weapons" report)

Many states reiterated their calls for a Fourth SSOD, including Nigeria on behalf of the African Group of States. Malaysia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement has tabled Resolution A/C1/58/L.25, "Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament" (SSOD IV), in which an open-ended working group, working on the basis of consensus, would be formed. It calls for a report from this working group to be submitted before the end of the 60th session. South Africa tabled a similar resolution last year, A/C1/57/L.8. According to Malaysia, an SSOD would be a strong reaffirmation of multilateralism in disarmament and security issues.

Japan, as the current President of the Conference on Disarmament, discussed the report of the CD (A/58/27) and introduced the draft resolution on the report of the CD (A/C1/58/L.5). The report and resolution are similar to previous years, and highlight the need for cooperation and substantive work.

## Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space

The need to prevent an arms race in outer space (PAROS) is apparent to many States, which have vocalized their support for a treaty prohibiting the weaponization of space within- and outside of- the First Committee these recent weeks.

Demonstrating this increasingly universal awareness to preserve space for peace, the First Committee draft resolution on PAROS was passed overwhelmingly last year. (159 States voted in favor of resolution 57/57 in the GA and only 3 abstained. No State voted against it. See: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com02/res/resindex.html> for all voting records in the 57th session.) Yet despite growing concerns of a new arms race in space, the draft resolution this year has not diverged in any substantive way from 57/57.

China, whose compromise in the CD is widely viewed as the first major step to breaking the Geneva deadlock, expressed this week that it will continue to work with other countries to prevent the weaponization of space. The "risk," said Ambassador Hu Xiaodi on Tuesday, "is mounting with each passing day" that a treaty remains unrealized.

Until August of this year, China had rejected the A5 proposal so long as it did not include "a view to negotiate" a PAROS treaty. In the closing weeks of the CD, China announced that they would accept the proposal of the five ambassadors. The proposal, amended in June by Belgian Ambassador Lint, calls for a PAROS Ad Hoc Committee "to identify and examine" the issue, rather than to negotiate a treaty.

Russia, the other leading proponent for a PAROS treaty, pointed to the many peaceful uses of space technology that must be developed and benefited by all of humankind, a view held by many. Both China and Russia reminded the audience of Russia's vow on September 25, 2003, that it will not be the first to deploy weapons in outer space and asked the other space-capable States to join them in this promise.

Canada noted that a prohibition on the weaponization of space would be just one aspect of a PAROS

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## *Disarmament Machinery Continued*

Japan urged Members to solve the stalemate by "find[ing] a balance between different priorities in (the CD's) program of work." The 7th paragraph of the preamble of the L.5 resolution "stressing the urgent need for the conference to commence on its agreed agenda items at this juncture" is somewhat more forceful than previously, and Ambassador Inoguchi (Japan) believes it sends a "clear political message." A paragraph requesting Member States to cooperate with the CD President in order to achieve consensus was also added. Austria noted that the GA gives the opportunity for non-CD members to express dissatisfaction with the CD stalemate.

The Report of the Disarmament Commission (A/C1/58/L20) is very similar to what we saw last year, with 2004's substantive agenda yet to be determined.

-Jennifer Nordstrom,  
Global Action to Prevent War  
and  
Rhianna Tyson  
Reaching Critical Will

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## *Nuclear Testing continued*

nation of nuclear weapons," all contain preambular clauses that recognize the importance of obtaining the signatures and ratifications required to achieve the early entry-into-force of the CTBT.

Secretary-General Kofi Annan highlighted the near universally-accepted sense of urgency of the CTBT when he stated in Vienna, "The entry-into-force of the CTBT would be a victory for the cause of peace. It cannot come too soon. The United Nations remains firmly committed to helping the world community to achieve that goal."

The Final Declaration of the Vienna conference can be found here: [http://www.ctbto.org/reference/article\\_xiv/2003/afc2003\\_report\\_conference.pdf](http://www.ctbto.org/reference/article_xiv/2003/afc2003_report_conference.pdf)

For more on the CTBT, see: <http://www.reaching-criticalwill.org/legal/ctbt/ctbtindex.html>

-Marisa Tugultschinow and Rhianna Tyson,  
Reaching Critical Will

## *PAROS Continued*

treaty, which would include technology transfers and access, as well as transparency measures on the part of space-capable States. Canada also suggested the integration of CD efforts with the UN Committee on Outer Space "as building blocks" to the negotiation of a treaty.

In the Fourth Committee on Special Political and Decolonization Affairs, many States voiced their desire to keep space for peace. Pakistan, Malaysia, Chile, Ecuador, Japan, and others discussed the importance of space technology in the modern world and the need for transparency and universal access to technologies for communications, weather, disaster management, and others. Pakistan suggested that the IAEA as the appropriate forum for a new space treaty, as "the only competent body to address the issue."

Egypt, while supportive of multilateral action in developing peaceful uses of outer space, cautioned against ideas that do not yet enjoy consensus, a view also shared by Croatia last week. (See "PAROS" report Week 2).

Others in the Fourth Committee session on Thursday noted the importance of the First Committee draft resolution 58/L.44, despite its redundancy of resolutions past. Another vote on the issue would reaffirm the urgency of preventing such an arms race as well as demonstrate the readiness all States to contribute to that common objective.

While a PAROS treaty may indeed be far from a reality, this resolution, in addition to civil society efforts and the continued discussions in the CD, the GA Committees, and the UN Committee, are all contributing to the body of norms that constitute the international legal regime.

For more on the PAROS campaign, see: <http://www.space4peace.org/> and <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/paros/parosindex.html>.

-Rhianna Tyson, Reaching Critical Will  
and  
Emma McGregor-Mento  
Abolition 2000





## Negative Security Assurances

A resolution calling for the conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (A.C.1/58/L.8) is sponsored by Bangladesh, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Malaysia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka and Sudan. Similar to last year's resolution (A/RES/57/56, at [www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com02/res/L40.html](http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com02/res/L40.html)), it recommends intensive negotiations in the CD on such arrangements "taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention" on the security assurances. Introducing the resolution, Pakistan identified a number of circumstances it contended make the provision of credible assurances more urgent, including "new doctrines of possible use of nuclear weapons" and the failure to comply with the NPT Article VI obligation of complete nuclear disarmament despite the 2000 "unequivocal undertaking". Pakistan did not explain its own policies regarding use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states, or whether it considers that it is entitled to assurances of non-use from the NPT nuclear-weapon states or rather would provide such assurances.

Last year's resolution drew a large number (55) of abstentions, perhaps due in part to the complications raised by the fact that Pakistan, Israel, and India are members of the CD. In a working paper on security assurances submitted to the 2003 NPT PrepCom (NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.11), the New Agenda Coalition contended that legally binding security assurances should be negotiated within the context of NPT. Such assurances, according to the paper, "would provide a significant benefit to the Treaty parties and would be seen as an incentive to those who remain outside the NPT. Security assurances rightfully belong to those who have given up the nuclear weapon option as opposed to those who are still keeping their options open."

-John Burroughs,  
Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy



## Chemical Weapons

This week, Poland put forth a resolution titled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction" (A/C.1/58/L.41), emphasizing the universality of the Convention and underlining that the Convention and its implementation contribute to enhancing international peace and security.

As "a crucially and increasingly important element in the legal framework to strengthen international security," according to Ambassador Jakubowski of Poland, the first Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention was a certain success. There had been consultations with 140 countries and bilateral meeting with 57. As Ambassador Jakubowski also concluded, "Nowadays, as we all know only too well, its effective and full implementation acquires additional significance as it constitutes in itself an important contribution to the global fight on terrorism."

The 2002 resolution on the subject, 57/82, was passed without a vote. This year's draft contains decidedly major changes in six operative paragraphs stressing universality, implementation and, in operative paragraph 10, the fostering of international cooperation. Poland hopes that L.41 will also be passed without a vote.

Sweden said the following in its statement: "Events this past year have demonstrated that there is a need for enhanced tools at the global level for verification, inspection, and analysis with regard to weapons of mass destruction," mentioning the fact that it is the CWC that mandates the OPCW to carry out verification and inspection of chemical weapons.

The Republic of Korea pointed to the need for key countries in the Middle East and the Korean peninsula to become parties to the treaty. South Korea also referred to the Secretary-General's statement that if the CWC were fully implemented, it would be a powerful tool against chemical terrorism. Indonesia similarly referred to the treaty in the context of terrorism.

Canada expressed its belief that the CWC has strong verification mechanisms as is.

-Wyatt Matthews  
Franciscans International

## Biological Weapons

As he did last year, Ambassador Tibor Tóth of Hungary introduced the resolution on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction, 58/L.37.

L.37 notes that there are 150 States parties to the Convention. It calls upon those states that have not ratified or signed the BWC to do so. It calls for the implementation of the recommendations of the Review Conferences, including the exchange of information and data agreed to in the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention and to provide such information and data in conformity with the standardized procedure to the Secretary-General annually no later than 15 April.

It also recalls the decision reached at the Fifth Review Conference to hold three annual meetings of the States parties of one week duration each year commencing in 2003 until the Sixth Review Conference and to hold a two-week meeting of experts to prepare each meeting of the States party. The 2003 annual meeting will take place this November. It asks for continuing assistance from the Secretary-General.

This resolution is likely to be adopted by consensus because there is nothing in it that any government is likely to object to. Further discussion on verification will occur in other arenas, such as the Security Council which will have to come to a decision on a new mandate for UNMOVIC. The reason for this is, as mentioned in prior reports, that Hungary (as well as the other parties to the convention) knows that there is no political will in the current US administration to take such steps.

Also on Tuesday, Australia gave its support to the draft resolution, as did Indonesia and the Republic of Korea, who underlined the importance of national implementation of the BWC. Indonesia also stressed the need for a verification protocol.

On the afternoon of October 23 a panel discussion was held by the NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security, in cooperation with DDA and UNDP, entitled "Reducing the Risks Posed by Biological Weapons." It focused on a potential role for UNMOVIC which would require a new mandate. Discussion also centered around strengthening controls on dangerous pathogens. Elisa Harris, a senior research scholar the University of Maryland who in the Clinton Administration was Director for Nonproliferation and Export Controls on the National Security Council, presented the proposal of the Center for International and Security Studies for a Biological Research Security System. Also presented was the report of the National Academy of Sciences on "Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism: Confronting the Dual-Use Dilemma."

Elisa Harris said that after September 11th 2001, administrations world wide have made it more difficult for people to get hold of possible dangerous biological agents. But there have been few legal restrictions in respect to what kind of research can be done and none at all on government research. She said it was essential both nationally and internationally to change this, giving several examples of the already existing dangers. New York-based scientists have, for instance, managed to develop the polio virus "from scratch," mainly by using DNA. In other words, it has been proven possible to develop dangerous biological weapons without access to any of the pathogens.

The capabilities of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC to investigate possible development of biological weapons were discussed by Terence Taylor, now President and Executive Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and a former UNSCOM Commissioner, and Barbara Rosenthal, Director of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Project of the Federation of American Scientists. Members of UNMOVIC also answered questions. Other experts, such as Jonathan Tucker from the Monterrey Institute, and delegates from France and Canada participated in the

*continued on page 11*

## *Biological Weapons Continued*

discussion. Canada earlier that day in the First Committee had focused on the importance of verification.

Rebecca Johnson, Executive Director of The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, gave a speech at the panel discussion earlier that morning entitled, "The Future of Disarmament and Arms Control: Civil Society's Role." (See "Panel" Report). She underlined how extremely dangerous biological weapons are, not only because of their physical extension - worldwide - but also because of their extension in time. Some biological agents may be almost impossible to get rid of, once used in a war or by a terrorist.

Both the panel discussion, as well as Ms. Johnson's presentation, will soon be available on the NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security web site: <http://disarm.igc.org/>.

Ann Lakhdhir and Arild S. Frick,  
NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security

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
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## **Culture of Peace and Human Security**

In 2002 the General Assembly adopted by consensus a biennial resolution, "United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education" ((A/C.1/57/L.7/Rev.2). Reporting on its implementation, Canada announced that the International Security Research and Outreach Program (ISROP) recently launched the Graduate Research Awards for Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation in partnership with The Simons Centre for Peace and Disarmament Studies at the University of British Columbia. Canada noted that the longstanding ISROP provides "up-to-date, objective information and encourages the exchange of views on international security matters through web-based and other publications accessible to the public." In partnership with the United Nations Association of Canada, Canada also plans to create a "comprehensive disarmament education programme intended for students and teachers at the secondary school level across Canada." As last week's Monitor reported, New Zealand has already begun implementation of the recommendations of the UN Disarmament Education study. In cooperation with NGOs, New Zealand distributed to schools an attractive and thought-provoking brochure on peace education. India was another country referring to the importance of the study, calling for action on its recommendations and emphasizing the essential role of NGOs.

- Nya Gregor Fleron, Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy



## First Committee Reform

After the closed sessions on the "revitalization" of the First Committee last week, (see "First Committee Reform" report week 2), discussions on reform seemed to have petered out, given way to the introductions of resolutions during the Thematic Debate. Sierra Leone joined the United States, the European Union and Norway and submitted its own non-paper on the subject early this week. In addition, the United States followed up on its own proposals and introduced resolution A/C.1/58/L.15, "Enhancing the contribution of the First Committee to the maintenance of international peace and security." Chairman Sareva also made good on his promise and provided civil society with a de-briefing of the closed sessions.

As a self-described Finnish pragmatist, the Chair claimed that the efforts of these weeks- the consultations, non-papers, and the first resolution on the subject- are merely "modest steps" with the immediate purpose, "to get the horse out of the stable," as explained by the Vice-Chair.

In order for these formative consultations to be productive in their small, modest way, the Chair had urged the Member States to keep the debate as constructive as possible, to strip it of polemics and cynicism. Although he was pleasantly surprised at the adherence to these requests, he had been hoping for more concrete proposals for revitalization.

Among the concrete proposals that were offered, most of which were already contained in at least one of the four non-papers, was the inclusion of this item on the 2004 agenda. This was one of the more controversial proposals among a crowd looking to lessen their agenda, not add to it. It was also suggested that the Secretariat could make better use of technology by putting drafts online in a more timely fashion. (Note to diplomats: all statements and resolutions actually *are* up online the day they are available:

[www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1comindex1.html](http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1comindex1.html)). Clustering, integration of resolutions into each other, prolonged thematic discussions, re-

organization of time management, and limiting the number of resolutions allowed were also discussed.

The US draft resolution 58/L.15, if adopted, would re-focus the international community's conceptual framework of peace and security on to the terrorist threat. Indonesia, in its statement on October 24, called attention to the danger of disarmament being "overshadowed by nonproliferation and the terrorist acquisition" of WMD. (See "Introduction")

It also calls on the Secretary-General "to seek the views of Member States" to improve the effectiveness of the Committee and "to prepare a report recommending appropriate options for consideration".

Sierra Leone, as the only Member State from the global South to submit a non-paper on this topic, warned against changing the Rules of Procedure or "involv(ing) substantive political issues." Sierra Leone's paper is also the only one of the four that did not mention the need for the forum to reflect the so-called "new security environment."

Many of the smaller States, while in favor of time management, more consultations, and more inter-activity in the spirit of GA revitalization, are fearful that a reframing of the First Committee agenda and of its working methods may strip them of one of the only global, equitable fora at which they may broach the issues most important to them.

Follow-up on these efforts may transpire slowly over the course the next year, or the past few weeks may prove to have been yet one more "exercise in futility," as the Chair had hoped against. To stay updated on these developments, be sure to subscribe to Reaching Critical Will's General News list, which follows all international disarmament news. Send us an email at: [gensubscribe@reachingcriticalwill.org](mailto:gensubscribe@reachingcriticalwill.org).

-Rhianna Tyson and Julika Erfurt  
Reaching Critical Will



## Verification and Transparency

### *Verification*

In its October 23 statement during the thematic debate on verification and compliance, Canada offered some "reflections and ideas" to stimulate exchange in the coming year leading up to its submission next year of the biennial resolution "Verification in all its aspects" (to be placed on the 2004 agenda by draft decision L.48). Among Canada's ideas are a "review of the role of the Security Council" addressing questions like: "[S]hould there be a set time frame for responding to referrals to the Council by treaty organisations? Is there a need for new 'rules of the road' to clarify situations where treaty-based verification and compliance efforts have been exhausted and Security Council roles and responsibilities are unclear? Would it be useful to enhance the practical ability of the Security Council to deploy its own fact-finding or investigative teams at short notice?" Canada also addressed the role of the Secretary General, asking for example, "are there areas of monitoring or verification of international [non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament] accords that might be conferred on the Secretary General?" Canada also asked whether "the specialized expertise and capabilities that have been built up by UNMOVIC be retained by the UN as an internal capacity, perhaps in the form of designated posts within DDA and/or a roster of previously identified experts on call to support verification or monitoring requirements?" Sweden similarly commented upon possibilities for use of UNMOVIC, noting it could be a "permanent resource of the UN Secretariat" or a "regular subsidiary organ of the Security Council." For more re UNMOVIC and a permanent inspectorate, see Disarmament Machinery and Biological Weapons. Draft decision 48 received support from South Africa, Belarus, Sweden, Nigeria, EU (Italy), South Korea, France, and New Zealand.

### *Transparency*

On October 20 and 23, a number of countries including Argentina (Chair of the group of experts), Japan, Canada, the Netherlands, the United States, South Africa, and Germany praised the just released

consensus report of the governmental experts on the UN Register of Conventional Arms. The report recommends broadening the scope of the Register to include smaller artillery systems (thus introducing some overlap with the category of small arms and light weapons) and shoulder-fired missiles known as man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS). Draft resolution L.45 "Transparency in Armaments," introduced by the Netherlands, endorses the recommendations of the report.

The Netherlands spoke optimistically of progress in transparency, noting that this year 118 states have submitted reports for 2002, including four states reporting for this first time. According to The Netherlands, "[i]ncreased participation by states demonstrates the growing confidence that transparency can help prevent excessive accumulation of arms, also by encouraging self-restraint in military production and transfer of arms." In the view of The Netherlands, the "Register has established a 'de facto' norm of transparency in armaments." Japan stated that "the Register managed to capture the great bulk of global trade in seven categories of conventional arms," by some estimates covering "more than 95% in monetary value of such trade." Transparency, of course, remains far from regulation, a condition perhaps unintentionally highlighted by Japan in its remark that "success" in reporting "owes not a little to the United States of America who exports about a half of such arms and regularly reports to the Register about such trade." South Africa commented the group of experts recognized gaining broader support for the Register requires "strengthening of the Department for Disarmament Affairs" which "needs the necessary financial support".

### *Other Transparency Resolutions*

Draft resolution L.32, "Objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures", co-sponsored by 70 states, was introduced by Germany. Like resolution 56/14 of 2001 (56/L.42 at <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/2001res/2001resindex.html>), it calls for the introduc-

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## **Panel: The Future of Disarmament and Arms Control: Civil Society's Role**

This week's briefing about civil society's role in the issue of disarmament and arms control was put together by the UN Department of Public Information and the NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security. The panel included Nobuyasu Abe, Under-Secretary-General of the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs, Henrik Salander, formerly the Permanent Ambassador of Sweden to the Conference on Disarmament, currently the Secretary General of the new International Independent Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Rebecca Johnson, Executive Director, of the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy.

Under-Secretary-General Abe talked about the current challenges to the disarmament and nonproliferation regime. He stated that these challenges stem from two major events: the end of the Cold War which caused many to forget about the threat of nuclear annihilation, and the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. which has given priority to the suppression of terrorism over disarmament and nonproliferation. Mr. Abe also talked about the renewed concern about compliance with disarmament and nonproliferation norms. He specifically mentioned Iraq, Iran and the DPRK, but did not specifically mention the DPRK announcement of withdrawal from the NPT. Mr. Abe suggested several ways that NGOs and civil society could support a disarmament and nonproliferation regime, including: funding, education, advocacy, persuading politicians, research, mobilizing experts, and keeping countries honest by holding governments accountable to their international agreements.

Ambassador Henrik Salander spoke mostly about

the new Swedish sponsored Independent Commission on WMD. The commission will be chaired by Hans Blix, and will hold the first meeting of all 13 commissioners (12 + Blix, each from a different country) in early 2004. The Commission will have a broad mandate which will include nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, their delivery vehicles, terrorism related aspects, and the lack of enforcement for multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation agreements. The Commission will host open meetings and seminars and outreach to Universities not just in the United States and Canada but all over the world.

Rebecca Johnson's speech touched on the difference between civil society and NGOs; that civil society includes broader movements like the women's movement, environmental and peace movements. She spoke of the wide and varied tactical toolbox that is used by NGOs and about the successes that NGOs have had influencing the UN- specifically mentioning the work that was done by NGOs that got UN Security Resolution 1325 passed. Ms. Johnson spoke about how most weapons of mass destruction are really transnational threats- their impact knows no border. She spoke of three ways that civil society can act to create and highlight political opportunities- elite activism (academics, experts, and scientists), grassroots public movements, and nonviolent direct action (upholding laws that states have agreed to). Ms. Johnson noted that "civil society is the moral conscience needed to speak truth to power."

-Yujin Ha and Susi Snyder,  
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

### *Verification and Transparency Continued*

tion of "a standardized reporting of military expenditures" to "promote further openness and transparency in all military matters".

The Netherlands introduced draft resolution L.16, "National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology." Like last year's version (A/C.1/57/L.18/Rev.1, <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com02/res/L18rev1.html>), it calls for more effective national control of transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology and for information on such control to be provided on voluntary basis to the Secretary-General.

-Nya Gregor Fleron and John Burroughs, Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy

## The New Agenda Coalition

Brazil re-introduced, "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: a new agenda" (A/C.1/58/L.40) on behalf of The New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden). The resolution is part of the efforts of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) to preserve and strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The 2000 version of this resolution mirrored the 13 practical steps agreed by NPT States Parties at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and was adopted with only India, Israel and Pakistan opposing. The 2002 version expanded on the 13 steps to include practical measures for their implementation – resulting in opposition also from the US, UK and France and abstentions by most NATO countries (except Canada which supported).

Since 2002 NAC countries have been holding intensive consultations with NATO States in Geneva and New York in the hope of securing support for the 2003 resolution. As a result numerous changes have been made in the text including:

- removal of criticism of the high number of nuclear weapons remaining
- stronger focus on non-proliferation including the link between non-proliferation and disarmament and specific criticism of North Korea, India, Israel and Pakistan
- referring to the threat of nuclear terrorism

There are indications that these changes might not be enough to secure support from NATO and thus a revised text including further changes is expected.

Brazil also re-introduced "Reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons." (A/C.1/58/L.39) on behalf of the NAC. The resolution has significant changes from the resolution NAC introduced in 2002, including in particular a call for centralized storage of tactical weapons as a step towards their removal and elimination. This addresses the concern from NATO States that the resolution last year did not adequately reflect their concerns about the number of Russian tactical weapons (about 4000) and uncertainties regarding their location and operational status. US tactical weapons in Europe (about 180) have already been taken off alert and placed in central storage sites. The resolution also calls on States with tactical weapons not to increase the number or

## Nuclear Disarmament

In its statement introducing the resolution "A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons" (L. 53, sponsored by Australia, Côte d'Ivoire, Japan and Switzerland), Japan stressed that the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the NPT, adopted at the 2000 Review Conference, retain their relevance despite the "sea change" since 2000. The draft resolution itself is virtually identical to last year's version, focusing mainly on the 13 steps, with some new preambular language expressing "deep concern" about the proliferation of WMD and warning that recent challenges to the Treaty can only be addressed if there is confidence in compliance by all states parties – an apparent reference to Iran and North Korea. The preamble also adds language endorsing the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in preventing terrorists from obtaining nuclear weapons or related materials and technologies.

While the resolution centers on the 13 steps, the only real urgency expressed seems to concern compliance with the nonproliferation obligation. By comparison, "Towards a nuclear weapon free world: a new agenda" (L.40, sponsored by the New Agenda Coalition of Brazil, Sweden, Mexico, Ireland, South Africa, New Zealand, and Egypt), is substantively updated from last year's version, expressing a forward-looking sense of urgency about the need for tangible progress on nuclear disarmament, and incorporating a much broader agenda. (See "New Agenda report" page 15.) Unlike the Japanese resolution, the New Agenda resolution expresses "deep concern at the limited progress to date" on implementing the 13 steps. In particular, the Japanese resolution, "recognizes" the recent entry into force of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions ("the Moscow Treaty") by the United States and Russia as "progress" on reduction of their nuclear weapons. In contrast, the New Agenda resolution "acknowledges" that the reductions in the numbers of deployed strategic nuclear warheads envisaged under the Moscow Treaty "represents a positive step" in the relationship between the United States and Russia, and goes on to call on them to make the Treaty "a disarmament measure," by making it verifiable and irreversible and by addressing non-

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### *Nuclear Disarmament Continued*

operational warheads. Other contrasts between the two resolutions include the New Agenda provisions regarding non-strategic warheads, its expression of concern in the preamble regarding the possible effects of development of missile defenses in causing arms races on earth and in outer space, and its deep concern "about emerging approaches to the broader role of nuclear weapons as part of security strategies, including rationalizations for the use of, and the possible development of new types of, nuclear weapons" these last two in apparent reference primarily to the United States. It is unfortunate that Japan and Australia, two important U.S. allies, cannot find a way to simply support the New Agenda resolution. The result of this failure is that there continue to be two resolutions addressing the 13 steps in depth.

On behalf of 46 co-sponsors, Malaysia introduced the resolution, "Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice" (L.31), adopted annually by the General Assembly in substantially unchanged form since 1996 (51/45 M). The resolution underlines the Court's unanimous conclusion that there exists an obligation to bring to a conclusion negotiations on nuclear disarmament, and calls for the immediate commencement of multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention providing for the elimination of nuclear arms. Malaysia stated that the opinion remains an historic and resolute decision. Further, there is a

#### *New Agenda Continued*

types of weapons deployed and not to develop new types of these weapons or rationalisations for their use. This addresses concerns about Russia possibly redeploying tactical weapons and about the US work on new types of nuclear weapons.

See also "Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: Strengthening the Centre: A Middle Powers Initiative Memorandum in support of the New Agenda Coalition 2003 UN General Assembly Resolutions" at <http://www.middlepowers.org/mpi/index.shtml>. For a more complete textual analysis of the NAC resolutions contact [urs@gsinstitute.org](mailto:urs@gsinstitute.org).


-Alyn Ware,  
Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy

"crisis of confidence" in the area of nuclear disarmament fueled among other things by a disheartening lack of progress. Accordingly, the co-sponsors felt the need to reiterate the international commitment to the total elimination of nuclear arsenals.

Myanmar on behalf of 50 countries introduced the resolution "Nuclear disarmament" (A/C.1/58/L.47) (see the Monitor, week two, for a description). Speaking in support of the resolution, Algeria called for the creation of a system of collective security which would enable liberation from the theories and doctrines of nuclear deterrence.

Underlying the debate on nuclear disarmament this week and earlier has been a tension concerning the relative priority to be given non-proliferation and disarmament. During the rather dispirited thematic discussion this week, in which the nuclear weapon states did not even see fit to participate, Australia stated that it "is simply not possible to conceive of a world free of nuclear weapons in the absence of complete and permanent assurances of nuclear non-proliferation." By contrast, the New Agenda resolution reaffirms "that nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are mutually reinforcing processes, and that a fundamental pre-requisite for promoting nuclear nonproliferation is continuous irreversible progress in nuclear arms reductions." Indeed, were entirely feasible steps being taken now to marginalize nuclear weapons, by dealerting nuclear forces and changing policy and doctrine regarding their use, and multilateral negotiations commenced on the different aspects of their reduction and elimination, the world would have an entirely different environment in which to respond to efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, should they even occur.

- Jacqueline Cabasso, Western States Legal Foundation, and  
John Burroughs, Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy





## Conventional Weapons

Colombia, Japan and South Africa sponsored a resolution on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (A/C.1/58/L.1). This resolution emphasizes the importance of the speedy and full implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects and states that the Assembly would decide to convene a United Nations conference to review progress made in implementing it, in New York from 26 June to 7 July 2006. The draft resolution also states that the Assembly would hold a session of the preparatory conference in New York from 9 to 20 January 2006 with another session if necessary. This resolution also states that the Assembly would determine that it would be feasible to develop an international instrument to enable States to identify and trace illicit small arms and light weapons and would decide to set up an open ended working group to negotiate such an instrument. The working group would hold an organizational meeting in New York on 3 and 4 February 2004. Another issue that the draft touches on is that of brokering, requesting the UN Secretary-General to hold broad based consultations on that issue and to report to the Assembly at its next session on the outcome of those talks, in order to provide more in-depth consideration of the matter, at the appropriate time by Member States.

Bangladesh, Nepal, Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru and Spain sponsored a resolution on Conventional Arms Control at the Regional and Sub-regional Levels (INSERT). This resolution would call on the Conference on Disarmament to consider the formulation of principles that would serve as a framework for regional agreements on conventional arms control. It anticipates a report of the Conference on this topic.

A large cross regional group of states sponsored a resolution on Regional Promotion in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe of the UN Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (A/C.1/58/L.46).

Nigeria on behalf of the Group of African States sponsored a draft on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (A/C.1/58/L.13) in which the Assembly would appeal to all states as well as to international governmental and non governmental organizations and foundations to make voluntary contributions in order to strengthen the programmes and activities of the Regional Centre. This was co-sponsored by a

large cross regional group of states.

A large cross regional group of states sponsored a draft resolution on the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed To Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects (A/C.1/58/L.50) calling on all States that have not yet done so to become parties, as soon as possible, to the Convention and its annexed protocols.

A large group of European and African states sponsored a draft resolution on Assistance to States for Curbing the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Collecting Them (A/C.1/58/L.51) calling on the international community to provide technical and financial support to strengthen the capacity of civil organizations to combat that trade.

Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon sponsored a resolution on Activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa (A/C.1/58/L.54).

Statements by member states:

South Africa, Japan and Colombia spoke mainly about their draft resolution on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (A/C.1/58/L.1). The representative of South Africa said that she hoped this resolution could again be adopted without a vote. Both the representative of Japan and Colombia stressed the importance of work done by non-governmental organizations in this field and the importance of the strong partnership between governments and civil society groups on the issue of small arms and light weapons, the representative of Colombia asserting that it is hard in fact to find a better collaboration between states and civil society than on this question.

The representative of Colombia stressed the importance of maintaining political pressure to tackle this problem and quoted figures from the 2002 Small Arms Survey to underline the magnitude of the problem. Canada underlined that the work of the UNGA first committee goes beyond traditional arms control, much being impelled by human security, humanitarian concerns and humanitarian law.

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*Conventional Weapons continued*

Canada described SALW, from small handguns to automatic assault rifles as "instruments of social and economic destruction" which have moved beyond the traditional battlefield and war torn regions "into our streets and into our homes" affecting developed and developing countries alike. Switzerland along with Colombia and Canada underlined the need to recognize the human security dimension of SALW, along side the state security dimension.

Canada stated that time and resources must be used wisely if actual progress is to be made on curbing the availability and misuse of small arms in advance of the 2005 biennial meeting and 2006 review conference on SALW. Canada stated that increased attention should be given to transfers between states and non-state actors as well as to issues such as the misuse of those weapons by law enforcement officials.

Nigeria and Rwanda spoke for some time strongly in support of better arms controls, arguing that the failure of the international community to hold their manufacturers, agents and brokers to account has been largely responsible for the uncontrolled proliferation of SALW in Africa.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo called for negotiations on a legally binding convention prohibiting the illicit trade and trafficking of small arms and light weapons arguing that implementation of such a convention would bring added value to existing mechanisms.

Nigeria spoke in support of the proposed convention on marking and tracing, as did Rwanda, Norway and Sierra Leone.

Norway spoke of how with the Netherlands it is seeking to take the issue of brokering forward, underlining that only about twenty countries worldwide have legislation that regulated brokering and arguing that regional organizations should play a crucial role in helping to establish such legislation. Norway stated that it supports the proposal by South Africa, Japan and Colombia, particularly operative paragraph 10 of the draft on the subject of

brokering.

Australia welcomed the development of a protocol to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons to reduce the humanitarian impact of explosive remnants of war, stating that the draft framework paper developed by Ambassador Sanders of the Netherlands had provided a sound basis for consensus on a legally binding instrument. Norway, Lithuania, India, Canada, Sweden and the Republic of Korea supported the development of this protocol also.

Australia, Norway, Lithuania, Canada, Sweden and the Republic of Korea expressed support for a protocol on mines other than anti-personnel mines.

Many countries underlined the ongoing importance of addressing the impact of landmines. Australia stated that universalisation of the Ottawa Convention and mine action remained one of its key priorities. It urged that all states in Asia and the Pacific that had not yet done so should accede to the Convention. Lithuania stated that earlier in 2003 it ratified the Ottawa convention, being the first amongst its region to do so. It stated that in 2004 it would host a regional seminar to advance the goals of the Ottawa Convention. Turkey updated the Committee on its country's landmine activities, having declared a three year renewable moratorium on mine transfers and trade Turkey has also engaged in demining activities on his close to border areas. Turkey also briefed the Committee on the fact that after negotiations Turkey and Greece had joined the Ottawa Convention together and had simultaneously deposited their instruments of ratification on 25 September 2003.

-Sarah Sullivan, Amnesty International  
Eliza Kretzmann, Quakers International  
Jennifer Nordstrom, Global Action to Prevent War