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

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Reaching Critical Will

FIRST COMMITTEE MONITOR
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Reaching Critical Will is a programme of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

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Cover image: Art representing the novel *1984* by George Orwell

Reaching Critical Will is the disarmament programme of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), the oldest women's peace organization in the world. Reaching Critical Will works on issues related to disarmament and arms control of many different weapon systems; militarism and military spending; and gendered aspects of the impact of weapons and of disarmament processes.

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- News and information about civil society engagement on disarmament and arms control.

In this edition:

EDITORIAL: SANCTIMONY AND SMOKESCREENS

Allison Pytlak | Reaching Critical Will of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

Sarin gas. Explosives. Ammunition. Small arms. During the third week of the First Committee, delegates addressed all of these highly diverse weapon types. They are similar in their ghastly and inhumane effects, but what was also similar across thematic clusters was a lot of double speak from member states. Among other things, some states continue to juxtapose the "dangerous" possibility of non-state actors acquiring and using weapons with the right of "responsible" states to possess them.

This is nothing short of hypocritical. Weapons are, by design, tools of death and destruction no matter whose hands they are in. The notion that there are some actors in the international community that can be "trusted" to possess or "responsibly use" weapons is undermined by countless examples of state-sponsored armed violence. It also plays to dangerous double standards among and between states such, as we've seen for decades in the context of nuclear weapon possession.

Let's begin with other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). At least half of the countries that spoke in this cluster expressed worry about non-state actors, usually referred to as terrorists, obtaining biological or chemical weapons. The presumed logic is that such actors are difficult to control, more likely to deploy these weapons, and nearly impossible to punish. Yet, would the use of chemical or biological weapons by a state really cause less, or a different type of harm than if deployed by a non-state actor? The people who died in Halabja or in the Idlib province of Syria were no less precious or innocent that those who were lost when a doomsday cult distributed sarin gas in the Tokyo subway system over 20 years ago.

A parallel double standard is also emerging in the growing interest from states to address improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Undoubtedly such devices are a problem. They are, however, prohibited by the Ottawa Convention on Anti-personnel Landmines, which includes victim-activated IEDs. The Convention applies to any device that explodes due to the presence, proximity, or contact of a person, even when it is made from improvised materials. Yet some states seem eager to pursue a separate tract of work against IEDs exclusively in the hands of non-state actors, while state actors remain outside of the Convention. Efforts against these horrific weapons need to focus on all use, not particular users.

Some states assert that they are responsible while their neighbours are dangerous, which apparently justifies the use of weapons against civilians or the trade of weapons to be used against civilians elsewhere. Israel stated that arms should only be in the "hands of responsible states," highlighting itself as such as a state—but this overlooks the country's use of weapons against civilians or its exports to contexts of concern, such as war-torn South Sudan and Myanmar in the midst of the Rohingya crisis. Meanwhile other countries in the region, such as Syria, Iraq, and Yemen are engulfed in conflicts where civilians are dying or fleeing en masse both from state and non-state armed violence, with weapons provided by predominantly by Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom.

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is likewise experiencing double standards in its implementation. There is ample evidence that states parties such as the United Kingdom and France, and signatories like the United States, are continuing to authorise arms transfers to recipients that should raise red flags per their ATT (as well as regional and national) obligations. The most well known example is transfers to Saudi Arabia that are being used to destroy Yemen and to oppress civilians domestically. Canada, which said that it is in the process of preparing to accede to the ATT, has provided Saudi Arabia with armoured vehicles that were used to suppress riots in the country's Eastern Province as recently as a year ago. It's not a good sign that these violations are occurring, particularly only a few years after the ATT entered into force. It sends the message that it is acceptable for some states to break the rules. It plays into criticisms being leveled by other states, such as Ecuador, which noted in its statement that the ATT is politicised and used as a political tool. France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, all of which are transferring weapons to Saudi Arabia, declined to comment on this in their conventional weapons statements.

This is not say that pushing back against hypocrisy is to advocate for non-state actors obtaining weapons, or that use by any actor is more acceptable than any other. But if states want to talk about responsibility and weapons, they need to look at their own responsibilities as well, and face up to shortcomings. The weapons that were illegally trafficked out of Libya and are being used by non-state actors to wreak havoc in Mali, Cote d'Ivoire, and elsewhere had their origins as military aid and state supply. Most explosive weapons are held by state militaries; their use in populated areas is one for national governments to take up. The over-emphasis on the actions of non-state actors is a smokescreen and a distraction.

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And when it comes to nuclear weapons, the tiny handful of states have decided they have the right to threaten the world with annihilation need to get serious. This small minority of states assert themselves as responsible enough to possess nuclear weapons—even though there is clear disagreement among that group over who should actually possess the weapons, and obvious dissent from the majority of the world that no one should possess them. The handful of states possessing nuclear weapons demands that the rest of the world "create conditions" for them to disarm by "strengthening the security environment," when they are the only ones that have the power to exterminate us all. Japan's revised resolution on nuclear disarmament feeds into this paradigm of hypocrisy (see the "nuclear weapons" on page 4 for details), but the problem is engrained across the spectrum of weapons issues discussed at First Committee, indicating that perhaps it's time for "united action" against double speak at the UN. •

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

Last Monday's plenary featured a few remaining statements in the nuclear weapons cluster—including from three nuclear-armed states. In addition, states tabled 18 resolutions related to nuclear weapons. One of these, Japan's annual resolution on "United action with renewed determination for the total elimination of nuclear weapons," has created controversy for its significant watering down of both its "united actions" and its "renewed determination" for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

During the last of the nuclear weapon cluster debate, France, Russia, and United Kingdom continued the nuclear-armed state assault against the recently adopted Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. All three also doubled down on their stated "need" for nuclear weapons in the current "security environment" and criticisms of the Treaty as ill suited for this perceived environment. These criticisms have already been dissected and dismissed by thoughtful responses from the delegations of Austria and New Zealand (see last week's edition of the *First Committee Monitor*). The bottom line, as both TPNW supporters and detractors understand, is that the TPNW challenges the perceived legitimacy of "nuclear deterrence" policies. This is what the drafters of the Treaty intended, as a means of enhancing, not undermining, international security.

Those supporting the TPNW, as Ghana expressed last week, are concerned "that the pursuance of disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation is cloaked with security doctrines underpinned by nuclear weapons, and commitments blurred by lack of good faith and political will." In response to the nuclear-armed states' critiques of the TPNW, the delegation of Ghana urged them not to try to undermine the Treaty "with their misperceptions". Pointing out that no multilateral legal instrument is perfect—including the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—Ghana called on all states to join this "landmark achievement".

One key mischaracterisation of the TPNW by the nuclear-armed and some of their allies is that the Treaty somehow undermines not just the NPT but also the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). France expressed concern that the TPNW does not refer to the CTBT's verification regime and establishing a "less comprehensive norm" that competes with the CTBT," which "could compromise the universalization and entry into force of the CTBT." This reading of the TPNW is not consistent with its spirit or letter, but aside from that it's interesting that France would raise this concern while Japan, another state that rejects the TPNW, tables a resolution that explicitly undermines entry into force efforts for the CTBT.

Resolution L.35, which is examined in detail below, deletes calls for all states to ratify the CTBT, to maintain moratoriums against nuclear weapon tests, and to promote the Treaty's entry into force. Instead, it only calls on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to join the Treaty.

This shift away from recognizing the responsibility of all nuclear-armed states to just focusing on one single state is clear throughout the rest of the resolution. The elimination of nuclear arsenals is no longer the goal, it seems—instead, it's all about "creating the conditions to facilitate" future actions towards this goal. Language about building trust, creating conditions, and the right security environment appears in four places in this revised text, while language calling for specific undertakings or reflecting agreed language about disarmament or about the humanitarian impact of any use of nuclear weapons has been stripped away.

Many states have reacted strongly to the revisions. The resolution has lost many cosponsors and will likely struggle when action is taken up on it this week or next. Japanese media has even highlighted the resolution, with Mainichi Shimbun and Kyodo News both

running articles about the weakening of the text. Both articles highlight potential pressure from the US government in its redrafting of the resolution.

In introducing the text on 12 October, Japan said the resolution "provides a common denominator on a wide-range of issues related to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation." Yet the text drops language agreed at previous NPT conferences and joint statements Japan has signed onto in the past; deletes references to legal and political obligations; and focuses single-mindedly on the pursuit of vague "conditions" instead of specific actions.

The Mainichi editorial concluded that by "backtracking on nuclear disarmament, Japan cannot avoid a decline in trust." It seems that delegations at First Committee are already signaling that those demanding the strengthening of trust above all us, as the nuclear-armed states and nuclear-supportive allies such as Japan have been demanding, need to consider their own efforts to that end.

Resolutions

L.1, "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East," contains only technical updates from previous years. The resolution urges further action on establishing this zone and to act in accordance with the spirit of such a zone in the meantime. It is typically adopted without a vote.

L.2, "The risk of proliferation in the Middle East," contains only technical updates from previous years. It calls for Israel's accession to the NPT and IAEA safeguards and for implementation of the 2005 and 2010 NPT outcomes related to the Middle East. This resolution is usually more controversial, with European states abstaining and Israel, the United States, and a handful others opposing.

L.4, "Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," was last tabled in 2015 and only contains technical updates from that version. The resolution focuses on nuclear-armed states to implement their commitments from previous NPT review conferences.

L.5, "Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons," was first introduced in 2015. It contains only technical updates from last year. The resolution highlights the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons and calls on all states to prevent any use or proliferation of nuclear weapons and to achieve nuclear disarmament.

L.6, "Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations," has a number of significant changes. This was the resolution that last year established negotiations for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).

It has a new preambular paragraph (PP), "Stressing that the only way to guarantee that nuclear weapons are never used again is through their complete elimination and that a legally binding prohibition of nuclear weapons constitutes an essential contribution towards that end, as well as towards the implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons." It deletes a PP reference to "the absence of concrete outcomes of multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations within the United Nations framework for two decades." The preamble also welcomes the report of the open-ended working group (OEWG) in 2016.

Most significantly, the resolution welcomes in operative paragraph (OP) 1 the adoption of the TPNW. It calls on all states to sign and ratify the Treaty; reiterates that additional measures for disarmament are needed; and recognises the value of civil society and international organisations in multilateral negotiations, including of the TPNW. It also recommends that states consider implementing other recommendations from the 2016 OEWG report. It also looks forward to the entry into force of the TPNW and its first conference of states parties, and requests the UN Secretary-General to "render the necessary assistance and to fulfill the tasks entrusted to him" by the TPNW.

L.10, "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons," contains only technical updates from previous years. It reaffirms the need for negative security assurances and appeals to nuclear-armed states to work "actively towards an early agreement on a common approach" that could result in a legally-binding instrument.

L.17, "Ethical imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free world," was first introduced in 2015 by South Africa. It has been updated to welcome the adoption of the TPNW. This text calls upon all states to acknowledge the humanitarian impacts and risks of a nuclear weapon detonation, and makes a series of declarations about the inherent immorality of nuclear weapons underlying the need for their elimination.

L.18, "Nuclear disarmament," remains focused on the Conference on Disarmament and its failure to proceed with substantive work. This year's text adds an expression of concern about the humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and welcomes the

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adoption of the TPNW. The operative paragraphs remain the same as last year, urging nuclear-armed states to take effective disarmament measures.

L.19, "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments," is the annual New Agenda Coalition resolution. It has been updated to welcome the adoption of the TPNW and the discussions at the first NPT preparatory committee for the 2010 review cycle. OP 12 has been adjusted from expressing disappointment at the failure to convene the 2012 conference on the WMD free zone in the Middle East to urging the co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution on this subject to "present proposals and exert their utmost efforts" to achieve the zone.

A new OP (20) has been added encouraging NPT states parties "to discuss options, including tools such as a set of benchmarks or similar criteria, to improve the measurability of the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments, in order to ensure and facilitate the objective evaluation of progress." A second new OP (23) has been added recommending "that measures be taken to increase awareness among civil society of the risks and catastrophic impact of any nuclear detonation, including through disarmament education."

L.22, "Reducing nuclear danger," only contains technical updates. Tabled by India, this resolution calls for a review of nuclear doctrines and the de-alerting and de-targeting of nuclear weapons.

L.28, "Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas," has been updated to welcome the adoption of the TPNW and the Treay's support for nuclear weapon free zones.

L.35, "United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons," is tabled annually by Japan. This year, it is the most controversial nuclear weapon resolution. Its references to nuclear disarmament have been significantly watered down, its language on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) undermine that Treaty's entry into force, and it fails to mention the adoption of the TPNW.

Changes to the preamble include:

- The addition of a paragraph recalling the final documents of the 1995, 2000, and 2010 NPT conferences;
- The addition of a paragraph "Emphasizing the crucial importance of rebuilding trust and enhancing cooperation among all States in order to make substantive progress in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, bearing in mind that there are various approaches towards the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons;"
- The addition of two extensive paras focusing on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK);
- Changing a reaffirmation that "advancement in nuclear disarmament will contribute to consolidating the international regime for nuclear non-proliferation" to a reaffirmation that the consolidation of such a regime is essential to international peace and security (i.e., removing the importance of nuclear disarmament to this regime);
- Removing language about meetings held in support of the CTBT; and
- Changing internationally agreed language from the 2010 NPT Review Conference expressing "deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons" to "nuclear weapons use".

Changes to the operative portion include:

- OP1: Eliminating a reference to the elimination of nuclear weapons as relating to "achieving a safer world for all and a peaceful and secure world free of nuclear weapons" and changing it to a reference suggesting that the elimination of nuclear weapons will happen "through the easing of international tensions and the strengthening of trust between states ... in order to facilitate disarmament, and through strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime;"
- OP2: This paragraph maintains the reference to the "unequivocal undertaking" of NPT nuclear-armed states but no longer references this in relation to the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. Now it only connects this vaguely to full implementation of the NPT;
- OP3 no longer calls upon states to implement the steps agreed to at the 1995, 2000, and 2010 NPT conferences—only to comply with their obligations under the articles of the Treaty;
- OP8 changes the agreed language on humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons to "the use" of nuclear weapons, and reduces this to "a key factor" underpinning efforts for disarmament;
- OP9, which used to encourage Russia and the US to commence negotiations for reductions of their nuclear weapons, now only encourages them to "take steps to create conditions that would allow for the commencement of" such negotiations;
- OP10 adds more language calling on states to "ease international tension, strengthen trust between states, and create conditions that would allow for further reduction of nuclear weapons;"

- OP12, which used to encourage the NPT nuclear-armed states to continue convening regular meetings "with a view to facilitating nuclear disarmament actions," now only encourages them to meet "with a view to creating necessary environment for and thereupon implementing further nuclear disarmament";
- OP13 reiterates again language calling on all states to "ease international tension and strengthen trust between States, and create conditions that would allow for further consideration of" their military and security concepts, rather than just simply calling on all state to review these concepts;
- OP13 further caveats this call by adding a reference to "taking into account the security environment";
- OP14 limits the recognition of the "legitimate interest" of non-nuclear-armed states to those that are party to the NPT and "in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations";
- OP19, instead of urging all states, especially those listed in the CTBT's annex 2, to "take individual initiatives to sign and ratify the Treaty without further delay and without waiting for any other State to do so," now only "stresses the vital importance and urgency of universal adherence to the moratoria on nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions in light of the tests conducted by the DPRK; recognizing that the DPRK is an Annex 2 States and the entry into force of the CTBT will not be possible while such testing by the DPRK continues"—and then only urges the DPRK to sign and ratify the Treaty;
- OP19 deletes the call on states to maintain existing moratoriums on nuclear weapon tests and to promote entry into force of the Treaty;
- OP20, rather than urging all states concerned to negotiate a fissile material cut-off treaty, now just stresses the importance of states declaring and maintaining moratoria on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons use, pending commencement of FMCT negotiations. It also now welcomes the recent efforts of the high-level expert preparatory group to attain recommendations in this regard.
- OP21 is a new paragraph acknowledging the "widespread call" for entry into force of the CTBT and negotiation of an FMCT; and
- OP24 and OP25 update further condemnations of the DPRK's nuclear and ballistic missile tests.

L.36, "International Day against Nuclear Tests," was first tabled in 2009, establishing 29 August as the International Day against Nuclear Tests. This text reiterates that decision, invites its commemoration, and requests an annual UN General Assembly high-level plenary to promote the day.

L.37, "African-Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty," only includes technical updates. It calls on all African states to ratify the Treaty and on nuclear-armed states to sign the protocols if they haven't already.

L.42, "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty," is updated to welcome "the completion in June 2017 of the hydroacoustic part of the International Monitoring System" and to recognise the "civil and scientific benefits provided by the CTBT global monitoring system." OP5 also now reflects the DPRK's latest nuclear weapon tests and "urges full compliance with the obligations under the relevant resolutions" and reaffirms "support for the goal of complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner, including through the Six-Party Talks."

L.45, "Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament," has added a PP "noting the adoption, with a vote," of the TPNW. This NAM resolution, which previously called for the convening of a high-level meeting on nuclear disarmament not later than 2018, now sets the dates for that meeting as 14–16 May 2018 in New York. It also sets out an organizational meeting for 28 March. It asks the Secretary-General to convene the meeting and invite high-level participation, and encourages participation of civil society.

L.47, "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons," has been updated to tacitly reflect the fact of the existence of the TPNW. The resolution states "that a legally binding prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons is not contrary to but in fact contributes to international efforts for the achievement and maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons." However, the TPNW already prohibits the use of nuclear weapons, thus India's continued tabling of this resolution seems counter to the recognition of that Treaty's adoption.

L.50, "Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices," tabled by Canada, Germany, and the Netherlands is a draft decision this year. It welcomes the commencement of the work of the high-level expert preparatory group on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). Last year, this resolution established this group, which is tasked with "making recommendations on substantial elements" of a future FMCT. •

BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Allison Pytlak | Reaching Critical Will of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

The thematic cluster on "Other weapons of mass destruction" included over 40 statements referencing biological and chemical weapons and tended to expand on themes and positions that came up during the general debate.

Chemical weapons

The European Union, Nordic Group, Switzerland, United States, Australia, Turkey, Germany, Canada, France, Japan, Ireland, Republic of Korea, Spain, United Kingdom, and South Africa were clear in their condemnation of recent use of chemical weapons in Syria. Some others, like China, referenced that situation but in a more neutral way.

Going beyond condemnation, some states made specific calls to action and accountability. "To safeguard against impunity those responsible for these war crimes and crimes against humanity must be referred to the International Criminal Court to face the appropriate consequences," said Ireland. Netherlands favoured inclusion of "firm language" in the resolution on the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Around a dozen states reiterated support for renewing the mandate of the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM). Unsurprisingly the Russian Federation took a different view and commended Syria's ability to remove its chemical weapons despite a context of domestic terrorism and instability. Syria did not make a formal statement about this issue.

Germany, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom expressed frustration with the inability to verify the declaration of Syrian chemical weapons stocks. "We are not talking about some technical issues and a couple of isolated cases of alleged use," said Germany. "We are talking about grave concerns due to Syria's declaration that can still—after four years—not be verified as accurate and complete," said Germany.

The Nordic Group, Switzerland, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom also referenced recent chemical weapon use in Iraq. Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, and the United States referenced the attack on Kim Jong-nam in a Malaysian airport.

Australia, India, Cuba, Germany, Ecuador, Thailand, China, Poland, Ireland, Iran, Japan, Ecuador, and Nepal congratulated the Russian Federation on having completed its stockpile destruction. India, Turkey, Germany, Japan, and Thailand welcomed similar progress in Libya on removing its Category 2 chemical weapons, under the CWC, for destruction abroad.

The Russian Federation, in a veiled reference to the United States, noted that some of the states that helped develop the CWC still hold the largest arsenals.

Japan and China described the safety challenges related to abandoned chemical weapons (ACW). There are over 90 locations in China that have ACWs. Japan has destroyed 48,000 such items; earlier this year the two countries jointly invited an OPCW delegation to visit a destruction facility. Iran described its "painful experience" resulting from over 400 attacks by chemical warfare agents during its war with Iraq.

Biological weapons

The references to biological weapons related mostly to the outcomes of the Eighth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) held in 2016, where division between states prevented agreement on a substantive outcome document. Some countries reflected their positions in the context of this divide during their First Committee statements. Australia, Germany, France, Indonesia, Ireland, United Kingdom, and United States reiterated that their preference would have been for the conference to have established a strengthened intersessional programme of work; while India, Cuba, Indonesia, Thailand, Algeria, Mexico, and Nepal, among others stated the view that the BTWC would benefit most from a legally-binding verification protocol.

Netherlands identified four steps that it feels would strengthen the BTWC: universalisation; better incorporation of developments in science and technology (something noted by a few other delegations); strengthening the intersessional process; and expanding the Implementation Support Unit by adding two staff members.

Non-state actors and WMD

Cutting across all types of WMD were concerns from a handful of delegations such as CARICOM, Turkey, India, Bangladesh, Ecuador, Japan, Thailand, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, and Qatar about the acquisition of WMD by non-state actors often with specific reference to terrorists and sometimes in the context of UN Security Council Resolution 1540. While it is imperative that such materials do not fall into the hands of non-state actors, this should not be used as an excuse to avoid addressing state use and continued ownership of other WMD or as a decoy for slow to no progress on destruction.

Resolutions

India introduced its draft resolution **L.23, "Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction"**, which, it says, has enjoyed strong support since it was first introduced in 2002. It expressed hope that, as in previous years, the First Committee will adopt this resolution by consensus.

Poland is the lead sponsor on resolution **L.26 "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction"**. In 2016 this resolution was adopted by vote that included paragraph votes and amendments, some of which reflected developments in how the issue was being handled in other fora such as the Security Council. Some updates for 2017 include:

- A new preambular reference to the Nobel Peace Prize and legitimacy of the OPCW;
- A new operative reference to the findings of the OPCW with respect to the Malaysian incident in February 2017; and
- A new operative reference to the 4 October 2017 findings of the Technical Secretariat about its inability to verify the declaration of Syria.

Hungary is the lead on resolution **L.49 "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction"**. This text was adopted without a vote in 2016. The 2017 resolution incorporates new paragraphs to reflect decisions taken at the Eighth Review Conference and an acknowledgement that the Ninth Review Conference must take place before 2021. •

ARMED DRONES

Elizabeth Minor | Article 36

This year so far during the conventional weapons debate at First Committee, four states have mentioned armed drones in their statements: Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, and Ireland. Cuba did not raise drones in their statements to First Committee during 2016; the other states spoke on this issue last year.

This week, Costa Rica called for "concrete action" on the use of armed drones "outside areas of active hostilities," expressing agreement with concerns raised by others over the lack of transparency and accountability that has characterised the use of drones, as well as the lack of redress for victims. Costa Rica noted the erosion of democratic control and international scrutiny of the use of force this constitutes.

Cuba also called for the regulation of attacks using military drones, noting the civilian casualties that have been caused with the use of drones. Ecuador called for continued international debate on drones to examine the range of concerns and legal implications associated with these systems.

Ireland emphasised that any use of drones must be "in accordance with international law, including international human rights and humanitarian law," welcoming continued discussion on the issue of drones in relevant forums including those relating to conventional weapons and human rights.

Also this week, PAX and UNIDIR hosted a side event on "Addressing Armed UAVs: Next Steps for the International Community" (see side event report). The panel highlighted the human costs of armed drones and the lack of justice to victims, as well as key principles of legality, transparency and accountability that states should apply in the use and transfer of these technologies.

It was noted that any new international process must not lower standards or undermine existing agreements—as is the danger with the current US-led process to develop political standards on the export and subsequent use of armed drones—and should be inclusive of states and civil society. UNIDIR will soon be bringing out a study on transparency, accountability and oversight with respect to armed drones, based on a series of expert meetings with states and others held during the past year. This will contain recommendations on how states could take this issue forward.

No resolutions address the issue of armed drones at First Committee this year, however, and no state has yet raised the US-led process or UNIDIR's work in their interventions. In 2016, the only relevant resolution related to the UN Register of Conventional Arms, the report of whose Group of Governmental Experts recommended the inclusion of armed drones in the Register. •

FULLY AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS

Mary Wareham | Campaign to Stop Killer Robots

At least 30 countries and three regional groups raised autonomous weapons in their statements as of 20 October. Several of these raised this topic during the conventional weapons debate.

Ambassador Amandeep Singh Gill of India spoke in his capacity as chair of the first meeting of the Group of Governmental Experts, which will finally take place at the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) in Geneva on 13–17 November. To lay the ground for progress, he described a "continued substantive mandate, adequate financial resources and the participation of all stakeholders" as "essential in this regard."

Cuba and Ecuador reiterated their long-standing call for a ban on lethal autonomous weapons systems, while Russia warned against "attempts to impose preventive limitations or prohibitions on this type of prospective weapons and relevant technologies." The group of Nordic countries urged that further consideration be given to the notion of "human control over new weapons" and affirmed that "humans should always bear the ultimate responsibility when dealing with questions of life and death."

The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots has repeatedly raised concerns relating to the CCW process on lethal autonomous weapons systems. The implementation of a UN financial management system combined with funding shortfalls may result in the loss of the two-person CCW implementation support unit at the end of this year and could curtail planned meetings on the fully autonomous weapons in 2018. The campaign is intensifying its national outreach and considering other international mechanisms to pursue its objective of a preemptive ban on fully autonomous weapons. •

EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS IN POPULATED AREAS

Laura Boillot | International Network on Explosive Weapons (INEW)

In the conventional weapons debate. Austria, Canada, Guatemala, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and the European Union all recognised the harm from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas.

The European Union stated that it recognises "the challenges associated with the use of explosive weapons and munitions in densely populated areas and their potential impact on civilians." Austria noted that in 2016, more than 32,000 civilians were killed or injured by explosive weapons, and also emphasised that most refugees and internally displaced people fleeing conflict today are driven out by the humanitarian impacts of explosive weapons. Guatemala stated that when explosive weapons with wide area effects are used in populated areas, the effects are indiscriminate. Germany described the harm from this practice as "huge" and Ireland spoke about the long-term impacts on recovery and development, as well as gendered impacts.

Austria, Ireland, and New Zealand all spoke of the importance engaging in a process of work that will result in the development of an international political declaration, as a tool to address this harm. Austria stressed that there was a moral obligation to tackle this issue, with over 90% of the casualties being civilian. It outlined that this process of work is best undertaken with UN agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), civil society, and likeminded states. New Zealand recalled its commitment on this theme at the World Humanitarian Summit.

At a side event last week, Austria, the International Network on Explosive Weapons (INEW), and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) described how operational policies and practices have been developed by militaries to restrict the use of explosive weapons in populated areas in order to better protect civilians. OCHA also launched its Compilation of Military Policy and Practice on this issue (see: http://bit.ly/2yWw7KW). INEW described its vision of a political declaration including a commitment that will stop the use of explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas (see: http://bit.ly/2vhFbot). A separate report on this event is included in this edition of the *First Committee Monitor*.

Several states spoke about the use of explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas, and resulting challenges around compliance with international humanitarian law. Canada suggested that civilian harm results from indiscriminate attacks using explosive weapons. However, as the ICRC has stated, even when attacks are launched against legitimate military objectives in populated areas, the use of explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas has devastating effects on civilians and should be avoided. •

LANDMINES

Amelie Chayer | International Campaign to Ban Landmines

The debate on conventional weapons offered rich exchanges on the topic of landmines, with almost 40 delegations covering the matter in their statements, some of which included detailed articulations of many facets of the issue. This summary captures some essential points of convergence.

Australia, Austria, Canada, the European Union, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Spain recalled the goal of full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty by 2025. Algeria, Colombia, Sudan, and Thailand, among others, explained their efforts towards this goal. Australia, France, Ghana, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom encouraged all states to join the Treaty.

Fifteen delegations explained the support they provide for landmine clearance and/or assistance to victims of the weapon: Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Nordic Countries, the Russian Federation, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) called for the provision of assistance to affected countries, and for further cooperation from user states. This call was echoed by Egypt and by the African Group. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) explained its "strong commitment to regional mine action" and called for international cooperation on clearance and victim assistance.

Senegal asked for a special attention to be placed on the socio-economic inclusion of victims, while Italy called for assistance to take into account gender and diversity issues, and Spain emphasised the need to respect the rights of victims. Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, and Ireland mentioned the links between humanitarian demining and development. Italy also announced that its parliament has approved a new law prohibiting financial investments in anti-personnel landmines, cluster munitions, and explosive munitions.

Bangladesh quoted a report by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), stating a belief that landmines were recently laid by the armed forces of Myanmar at the border, resulting in severe injuries to civilians. Bangladesh called for investigations, clearance of the mines, support to victims and their families, and for responsible persons to be held accountable. Austria, the current President of the Mine Ban Treaty, mentioned its previous call for Myanmar to consider an independent fact-finding mission. Ireland condemned "the use of landmines on the Myanmar-Bangladesh border."

Ukraine expressed strong concern with the laying of antipersonnel mines by armed groups in certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk, and highlighted their indiscriminate impact on civilians. The Russian Federation deplored that "no one even tried" to question Ukraine's compliance with the ban on use.

Improvised explosive devices that are designed to be activated by the proximity, presence, or contact of a person fit the definition of an antipersonnel mine and fall under the scope of the Mine Ban Treaty. Delegations stating their preoccupation with the risks posed by such devices included Australia, Austria, China, Colombia, France, the European Union, India, Israel, Lithuania, the Nordic Countries, Norway, Pakistan, Switzerland, Turkey, and Ukraine. Colombia's statement outlined important nuances, distinguishing improvised landmines from other types of improvised explosive devices.

States not party to the Treaty also shared their views. India supported the goal of a world free of landmines. The Republic of Korea and Lao People's Democratic Republic stated their support for the objectives and purpose of the Treaty. Myanmar also expressed its support for the Treaty and mentioned taking initiatives to avoid the indiscriminate use of landmines. The Russian Federation said that it shared the goals and principles of the Treaty, and that it did not exclude a possible accession in the future. Singapore mentioned its indefinite moratorium on the exports of landmines.

This year's resolution L.40 on the Mine Ban Treaty has been updated with an expression of strong concern about antipersonnel mine use, and with a mention of the "individualized approach" that offers mine-affected countries a platform for presenting their challenges. •

FINISH THE JOB 2025

CLUSTER MUNITIONS

Amelie Chayer | Cluster Munition Coalition

All delegations that spoke about cluster munitions during this week's debate on conventional weapons supported the Convention on Cluster Munitions or its purpose—except for the Russian Federation.

In 2016, cluster munitions were used in Syria and Yemen, and the number of recorded casualties from cluster munition attacks and remnants worldwide doubled compared with 2015. The Netherlands and New Zealand expressed concern with this increasing number of casualties.

Ecuador said that the international community condemns the use of cluster munitions in any location and by any actor. Ireland condemned the use of cluster munitions in Syria and Yemen. The Netherlands and New Zealand condemned any use of cluster munitions by any actor. South Africa said that "concerns remain" about the use of cluster munitions, and that these weapons cause unacceptable harm to civilians even long after the cessation of hostilities.

The European Union stated its deep concern about "the reported indiscriminate use of cluster munitions affecting civilian populations." The Nordic Countries expressed deep concern about the use of cluster munitions and recalled that the Convention on Cluster Munitions has set "a strong norm against this indiscriminate weapon."

Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), the world's most affected state, reiterated that it has adopted an 18th national Sustainable Development Goal on the clearance of unexploded ordnance, and requested international support to reach this goal.

Australia, Ecuador, Ghana, Ireland, Japan, Lao PDR, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and Spain issued calls for further universalization of the Convention. Canada said that "the large number of States that are already party to the CCM reflects a growing awareness of the devastating humanitarian impact of these weapons." Senegal shared its view that the Convention represents a significant progress for international humanitarian law and the protection of civilians.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) spoke about the work of its Regional Mine Action Center. The Non-Aligned Movement recognised the adverse humanitarian impact of cluster munitions, a statement that the African Group supported.

Italy mentioned its new law that prohibits investments in the production of cluster munitions and landmines. Trinidad and Tobago said that investments in the production of cluster munitions undermines their eradication and contradicts the Convention.

Four states not party mentioned the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The Republic of Korea said it is fully committed to the objectives of the Convention. Myanmar expressed support for the Convention, and Singapore mentioned its indefinite moratorium on exports of cluster munitions. The Russian Federation said that the Convention is a politicized document that "only proclaims the 'ban' on CMs but in fact does not prohibit it."

Germany, which presided over the Convention for a year until September 2017, explained two initiatives it undertook: a country-specific approach on cooperation and assistance, and a dialogue with states not party. The resolution on the Convention on Cluster Munitions (L.41) includes updates on these initiatives and, for the first time this year, expresses strong concern with the use of cluster munitions and related civilian casualties. A side event on cluster munitions is scheduled for 26 October at 13:15, at the German House. •

INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRADE

Raluca Muresan | Control Arms

This year, the debate on conventional weapons included over 35 references to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) from delegations and regional bodies that recognised the Treaty's role in regulating and preventing the illicit trade in conventional weapons. Switzerland noted the Treaty's "crucial role in establishing shared rules on transfers of weapons." Over 15 statements also recalled the recent third Conference of States Parties (CSP) which took place in Geneva from 11–15 September 2017, as well as key decisions taken there, including the establishment of the standing working groups. New Zealand aptly stated "the time has come, however, to start shifting our focus from institutional arrangements to ensuring that the Treaty delivers on its humanitarian and security promise."

In its statement to the Committee the week before, Control Arms welcomed the thematic discussions on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), noting that "the links are very clear, and go way beyond the immediate link with Goal 16, to the role of arms control in reducing poverty, inequality, ensuring gender equality and reducing corruption." The Nordic countries, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Spain, Turkey, and Myanmar also referenced the linkages between the ATT and the SDGs. CARICOM in particular highlighted the links between the gender-based violence provisions of the ATT and SDG 5.2, which calls for the elimination of violence against women and girls.

14 delegations noted the importance of the Treaty's universalisation. Japan, the President of the fourth CSP, stated its commitment to promoting the Treaty's universalisation and engaging with states not yet party to the Treaty, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. Positively, Haiti, Canada, Turkey, and Colombia provided updates on their domestic ratification processes, expressing hope of becoming states parties soon.

South Africa noted "full and effective implementation of the ATT will promote peace and security by reducing human suffering caused by armed violence." Many other delegations used this opportunity to call for the Treaty's implementation. Republic of Korea, which ratified the ATT last November, announced its commitment to work with neighbouring authorities to ensure effective implementation while Jamaica shared progress on legislative changes in order to become compliant with the Treaty's provisions, particularly on transit and transhipment.

The EU, Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, Trinidad and Tobago, and New Zealand welcomed the establishment of the Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF). Senegal and Guatemala shared that they were awarded implementation assistance through the VTF. Germany, the Netherlands, and Australia stressed their commitment to the Treaty's implementation by noting their contributions to the VTF. The Netherlands also highlighted its contributions to the Sponsorship Program ran by the UN Development Programme, the Control Arms ATT Monitor Project, and the Stimson Centre's ATT Baseline Assessment Project.

Several delegations raised the issue of transparency, many of which called on states parties to fulfil their reporting obligations. Most notably, Samoa stated that the ATT, "if effectively implemented, can contribute to transparency in the arms trade and can make it substantially more difficult and more expensive for weapon buyers and suppliers to defy rational and common sense standards."

This year, the "Arms Trade Treaty" resolution (L.27), which is already co-sponsored by 73 countries, includes only a few minor changes to the 2016 version. Preambular paragraph (PP) 7 now highlights the linkages and synergies with the SDGs while, a new PP 9bis welcomes the latest ratifications of the Treaty. Operational paragraphs (OP) 1 and 2 welcome decisions taken by CSP3, including the establishment of the standing working groups. OP 3, which has to do with the institutional framework of the Treaty, calls upon states that have not done so to address their financial obligations under the Treaty. OP 9 welcomes the successful operationalisation of the VTF and encourages eligible states to make best use of the Fund. •



SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS

Evan Peters and Rose Welsch | International Action Network on Small Arms

The start of thematic debates on conventional weapons gave member states an opportunity to express their concerns about a wide range of issues related to small arms and light weapons (SALW), including the emergence of new technologies, growing threats from terrorism and criminal networks, diversion, the undermining of development, humanitarian harm, control of ammunition, porous borders, gender dimensions, and the need for greater cooperation and assistance.

Attention to gender and small arms has been growing over the years. The Nordic Countries emphasised that equal participation of both men and women in disarmament policy would increase the legitimacy, quality, and effectiveness of disarmament as a whole, adding that improving gender aspects in "disarmament is not soft policy, it is smart policy." Numerous other states, including Zambia, Ghana, and those of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) also stressed the importance of including women in confronting the illicit flow of SALW. Ghana noted that the role of women in combating SALW deserves equal attention in the 2018 Review Conference (RevCon3) of the UN Programme of Action on small arms (UNPoA), as envisaged under Security Council resolution 2422 (2015). Ghana also called for the issue of survivors of gun violence to be brought to the fore for discussion at RevCon3—a concern that has largely been overlooked by member states.

Though there is not yet consensus on efforts to explicitly include ammunition in the UNPoA. Many states have called for its greater control, and Germany has taken a strong lead on the topic. Stating that there is a need to acknowledge that diversion of conventional ammunition is a driver of armed conflicts, Germany called on states to to support its proposal to convene a new Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on ammunition in 2020. The last GGE on the topic of ammunition was held nearly ten years ago, and led to the formulation of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATGs).

To fully implement the UNPoA and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI), numerous countries stressed the need for increased international assistance and cooperation at both the national and regional level. Acknowledging its limited success in fully implementing the UNPoA, Samoa called for a regional rather than individual approach to combating SALW-related problems as a more effective solution. Noting its own porous borders, Zambia also welcomed regional approaches based on strong interstate cooperation that fosters sharing of intelligence and information. CARICOM praised the support it has received from the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC), which has helped to improve stockpiles and destroy more than 54,000 weapons and 67 tons of ammunition. Jamaica joined the Secretary-General in calling for funding and contributions that would allow the regional centres to provide support not just in limited regions, but all around the world. While the focus of the topic was primarily on states and the United Nations, Ghana expanded it to include civil society. "We would like to appreciate the critical role and contribution of civil society in the SALW process and reiterate our call for increased technical and financial assistance to enable them to continue their work," its delegate stated.

In the margins of First Committee, numerous side events on SALW were held this week, including one held by France, which will preside over RevCon3, on operationalising the ambitions of the UNPoA. France also held several consultations to receive input on priority issues for RevCon3. Through its Group of Interested States (GIS) programme, Germany brought together a diverse panel of speakers to discuss curbing arms flows from a field perspective in Africa. Ghana, Colombia, Albania, Germany, UNLIREC, and the Guatemala-based NGO IEPADES joined IANSA in a side event discussing the consequences of failing to dispose of surplus weapons and ammunition, as well as cases of hope and success. The Center for Armed Violence Reduction launched a new guide to implementing both the UNPoA and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), and distributed copies of it at its side event on the topic. The rich array of side events expanded discussions on SALW frameworks, and helped to build greater momentum toward RevCon3.

Furthermore, several resolutions focusing on SALW and ammunition were released last week, including:

L.21, "Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them," contains only technical updates from last year, when it was adopted without a vote.

L.43, "Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus," contains some updates. New preambular language reflects the dangers posed by unplanned explosions at munitions sites and of diversion of materials, emphasising that " thousands of people have died and the livelihoods of entire communities have been disrupted

as a result of accidental ammunition depot explosions and that diversion from ammunition stockpiles has contributed to the intensity and duration of armed conflict and sustained armed violence around the world." The resolution calls on states to evaluate the extent to which they may have surplus ammunition stocks and recommends consideration of options for dealing with surplus stocks, including destruction. Significant changes include:

- An updated operative paragraph (OP) 3 provides specific recommendations related to using the "Safe*r*Guard knowledge resource management programme";
- A new OP12 encourages states to consider ammunition management as part of their work on achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs);
- A new OP13 asks the Secretariat to assist states with developing relevant indicators in this regard;
- A new OP14 encourages states to develop voluntary national action plans on the management of ammunition;
- A new OP15 encourages states to participate in "open, informal consultations" to identify "urgent issues pertaining to the accumulation of ammunition ... that may constitute a basis for conveneing a group of governmental experts;" and
- A new OP16 requests the UN Secretary-General to convene a group of governmental experts in 2020 on this topic.

L.56, "The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects," contains a few updates:

- Preambular paragraph (PP) 7 now "recalls" instead of "welcomes" the second open-ended meeting of governmental experts on the implementation of the UNPoA;
- PP 8 now "recalls" instead of "welcomes" the adoption of the SDG agenda;
- A new PP 6 welcomes the early designation of France as the chair of the Third UNPoA Review Conference;
- A new PP 9 welcomes the consensus outcome document of Working Group of the UN Disarmament Commission adopted in 2017, which is focused on recommendations on practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons;
- OP 7 is updated to reflect the dates chosen for the Third UNPoA Review Conference as 18–29 June 2018, preceeded by a preparatory committee meeting from 19–23 March 2018;
- A new OP 8 underlines the importance of implementing the UNPoA and ITI to achieve Goal 16 and Target 16.4 of the SDGs; and
- OP 9 is updated to be "mindful of the need to ensure the adequacy, effectiveness and sustainability of international cooperation and assistance." •

OUTER SPACE

Jessica West | Project Ploughshares

Sri Lanka and others again tabled L.3, "Preventing an arms race in outer space" (PAROS), which calls on the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to establish a working group on this subject. Noting that it has been on the agenda of the CD for over three decades, Pakistan called the time "ripe" to negotiate a treaty. Time, however, does not seem to be propelling the issue forward so much as entrenching divisions.

More worrisome, a shift in tone suggests that time has caught up to a debate that used to be focused on future prevention. Many statements explicitly referenced concerns about existing development of anti-satellite weapons (ASAT), the dual-use of anti-ballistic missile systems, and their potential deployment in outer space. Potential for proliferation and parallels to nuclear weapons were raised by Kazakhstan and Pakistan, with the latter asserting that this time the burden of non-proliferation will not be borne by developing countries.

In a move intended to advance stalled arms control efforts, China and Russia proposed a new resolution L.54, "Further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space". This text seeks to "establish a United Nations group of governmental experts ... to consider and make recommendations on substantial elements of an international legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, including on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space." However, tying it to consideration of the existing draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) tabled by Russia and China in 2008 and 2014 may limit its appeal, with the European Union (EU) already expressing regret that it does not have a broader mandate.

A majority of speakers during the thematic cluster on outer space supported efforts to advance multilat-

eral negotiations of a new arms control treaty, with Kazakhstan, members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Pakistan, Algeria, South Africa, Cuba, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Venezuela specifically supporting the PPWT. But others such as the EU, Australia, France, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (UK), while not opposed to a treaty in principle, hold reservations about this specific text. They have been particularly concerned about the lack of a definition of space weapons, lack of verification, and silence on use of terrestrial ASATs. In response, China claimed that prohibiting the use of force against space objects de facto includes ASATs. Others expressed support for a non-binding approach to behaviour in outer space, in reference to the previous attempt to develop a Code of Conduct. Specifically, France stressed that there is no alternative to such a Code, while Pakistan warned that it cannot substitute for a treaty.

Although divisions on the PPWT and alternative approaches including a Code of Conduct are long-standing, they emerged more pointedly this year. Russia asserted that Western desire is the only element missing from the draft PPWT, calling for on Western states to stop being insincere. Meanwhile, the United States called for "voluntary, near-term measures rather than pointless and hypocritical posturing that fails to address real concerns." Both China and the EU lamented that the other had not sufficiently included the views of other countries in the PPWT and Code of Conduct processes respectively.

Various references of support were also made in favour of political statements to support resolution L.53, "No first placement of weapons in outer space," which Russia noted has 17 co-sponsors this year; however the EU and Switzerland questioned its effectiveness as a transparency and confidence-building measure (TCBM) in ways that suggest it could do more harm than good.

Support is most diverse for advancing efforts to implement the TCBMs recommended by the 2013 Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), with China, Russia, and the US once again tabling draft resolution L.46 on this subject. Although the resolution is unchanged, in April 2017 the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) held informal discussions on practical implementation measures; support for the body to formally take up this topic was expressed by a number of states including the co-sponsors. This approach seems to be the most viable path forward, with Australia suggesting that the process could lead to recommendations to the CD. But growing accusations and evidence of mistrust mean that the ability of this path to bridge such a wide gulf is tenuous. •

DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

Kathyrn Balitsos | Pace University

In the thematic debate on conventional weapons, many states recognised the connection between disarmament and development, often in relation to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 2030 agenda, small arms and light weapons (SALWs), and overall military expenditures.

Nordic Countries, CARICOM, European Union (EU), Italy, Australia, India, Paraguay, Mexico, Germany, Costa Rica, Haiti, Ireland, Cuba, Trinidad and Tobago, Spain, Guinea, Togo, Turkey, Samoa, South Africa, and Ghana highlighted the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Specifically, most cited the relevance for disarmament efforts for achieving Goal 16 and Target 16.4, which they see as crucial to effective implementation of the 2030 agenda. The Nordic Countries, Australia, Mexico, Costa Rica, and Haiti also noted reduction in the amount of conventional arms and SALWs as a step to achievement of the SDGs. Mexico specifically mentioned the role the First Committee can have in helping with practical elements for designing indicators for Goal 16.

A number of delegations also discussed how the illicit trade in SALW undermines and impedes development. These weapons are responsible for fueling conflict, disrupting communities, causing millions of deaths, and for putting global financial and economic security at risk. The Nordic countries, EU, India, Guatemala, Canada, Cuba, Singapore, Ghana, Togo, Samoa, and Guinea acknowledged these concerns in their statements.

Similarly, Lao's People Democratic Republic remarked upon the influence explosive remnants of war (ERW) have on the economic development of its country, given the extent to which unexploded ordinances (UXO's) contaminate the country. It noted that 30% of UXOs failed to detonate in the Indo-China war, leaving Lao PDR as one of the most heavily contaminated countries. Ireland and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) also recognised the impact landmines have on obstructing development, as they cause human and material damage.

The NAM, African Group, Cuba, and Pakistan recognised the need to reduce the amount spent on militarism, and encouraged states to instead devote resources to global development and fighting against poverty and disease. Pakistan criticised current levels of military spending, noting that the the UN budget is 3 percent of the global military budget, and arguing that these expenditure fuel rather than prevent conflict.

Two relevant resolutions include the NAM's L.30, "Relationship between disarmament and development," and L.24, "Objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures."

L.30 contains technical updates from last year—including referencing the SDGs instead of the Millennium Development Goals. Typically adopted without a vote but with reservations by France, United Kingdom, and the United States, this resolution requests the Secretary-General to take action on the programme adopted at the 1987 International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development and urges the international community to divert resources made available from disarmament and arms limitation to economic and social development.

L.24, last tabled in 2015, has been updated to endorse the report of the Group of Governmental Experts to Review the Operation and Further Development of the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures in operative paragraph (OP) 1. In addition:

- OP 8(c) has been updated to request the Secretary-General (SG) to circulate to member states the questionnaire contained in annex I of the above-mentioned report, to collect their responses, and to provide a summary ahead of next year's First Committee session;
- A new OP 8(d) has been added, requesting the SG to "continue consultations with relevant international bodies, with a view to ascertaining requirements for adjusting the present instrument in order to encourage wider participation, and to make recommendations, based on the outcome of these consultations and taking into account the views of Member States, on necessary changes to the content and structure of the standardized reporting system;"
- A new OP 9(c) has been added requesting that member states complete the questionnaires in annex I of the GGE report; and
- A new OP 10 recommends "that the matter of the establishment of a process of periodic reviews of the Report on Military Expenditures and the timing of the next review" be considered in two years time. •

GENDER

Madison Goodliffe | Reaching Critical Will of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

This past week brought increased discussion to the subject of gender and disarmament. Several delegations included gender considerations in a broader context, particularly in regards to conventional weapons. The four main topics were women's role in disarmament, armed violence and the effect on women, gender in relation to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), and gender-based violence.

The Nordic countries, Italy, Paraguay, Canada, Trinidad and Tobago, Spain, Jamaica, Ghana, and Zambia highlighted the need for women to play an augmented, more impactful role in the conversation of disarmament. The Nordic countries reiterated the importance of equal participation of men and women in order to achieve sustainable peace. This group emphasised that "improving gender aspects in disarmament is not a 'soft policy'—it is smart policy."

In its written statement on conventional weapons, the European Union said the "Promotion of gender equality, gender consciousness, empowerment of women and prevention of sexual and gender-based violence is an important horizontal priority for the European Union." However, it did not articulate this part of its statement when delivering it orally at First Committee. The written statement goes on to say that the "active and equal participation and leadership of women in decision making and action, including the area of disarmament and non-proliferation, is crucial in achieving peace, security and sustainable development."

Meanwhile, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Italy, Australia, Norway, Senegal, Haiti, Ireland, Canada, South Africa, Ghana, Zambia, and Myanmar underscored the imbalanced impact of armed violence on women. CARICOM stressed the link between Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16.4, which explicitly states the need to reduce the illicit flow of arms, and SDG 5.2 concerning violence against women and girls. Zambia echoed the need for women to be involved in combatting illicit trade as women can be disproportionately affected by conventional weapons

and therefore must be included in the discussion of related policy formulation. There was much discussion associating gender and sustainable development throughout the cluster on conventional weapons. Canada also made a statement, linking gender inclusion and sustainable peace.

Costa Rica and South Africa also considered gender perspectives in relation to the ATT. South Africa emphasised the need for states to sign and ratify the ATT as it plays a crucial role in combatting gender-based violence, explaining "the full and effective implementation and universality of the treaty will contribute to promoting international peace and security by reducing human suffering caused by armed violence, most often affecting women and children." The European Union, Norway, and Canada also highlighted the connection between conventional weapons and gender-based violence. •

SIDE EVENT: UNDER STRESS: SPACE SECURITY IN 2017

Jessica West | Project Ploughshares

Project Ploughshares and its partners on the Space Security Index (SSI) project—together with the Government of Canada—hosted a side event on 17 October to launch the 2017 edition of the annual report. The event was chaired by Canada's Ambassador Rosemary McCarney, who provided opening remarks emphasising the importance of diligent research and analysis in order to inform good policy outcomes. Noting the critical ability of being able to track developments affecting space security annually, she stressed the unique contribution that the SSI brings to the process.

Panelists highlighting civil society contributions to the security of outer space included Ms. Jessica West, the managing editor of the SSI at Project Ploughshares; Ms. Laura Grego of the Union of Concerned Scientists; and Ms. Victoria Samson of the Secure World Foundation. They emphasised a number of stressors that require urgent attention if the secure and sustainable use of space for peaceful purposes is to be maintained.

Drawing on trends and developments reported in the SSI, Ms. West pointed to environmental challenges and resource scarcity associated with projections for magnitudinal growth in satellites, regulatory and ethical questions raised by the prospect of greater private sector and human activity in outer space, and uncertainties tied to shifting awareness of outer space as a domain of warfare as key governance challenges. These suggest a risk that the outer space regime may become fragmented if global rules do not keep pace with rapidly changing capabilities and national regulations.

Ms. Samson noted the challenge posed by the rapid expansion of new actors in space, which inspired publication of the *Handbook for New Space Actors*. She also drew attention to new and shifting uses of space—including prospects for large commercial satellite constellations, evolving counter-space programs, and the potential for crisis escalation in space—as sources of stress to the stability of the space domain. These call for new norms of behaviour and improved space situational awareness.

Ms. Grego closed with a reminder of the logic and self-interest that drove the establishment of arms control measures in outer space during the Cold War, and their enduring rationale. Noting renewed interest in space weapons programmes and describing a number of ways in which satellites can be harmed, including through the use of anti-missile defense systems and dual-use capabilities of rendezvous and proximity operations, Ms. Grego noted that the viability of such programmes are nonetheless bounded by the laws of physics. Specifically, these are the potential to create self-defeating masses of debris, the expense of expansive satellite systems that would be required to maintain hypothetical systems such as space-based missile defense, and the ability of the international community to monitor activities from Earth. She argued that while space may be the military high ground, it is one that not only can be shared, but *must* be shared.

While the SSI points to a global responsibility to maintain the security and sustainability of outer space, the discussion captured frustrations with this process. Comments made note of reticence from some states to pursue additional arms control measures, while Ms. Samson acknowledged that efforts to develop new norms of behaviour require time to take hold. But as presentations by the panelists pointed out, time is being outpaced by events both on the ground and in outer space. •

SIDE EVENT: ADDRESSING ARMED UAVS: NEXT STEPS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Elizabeth Minor | Article 36

PAX and UNIDIR hosted this side event featuring opening remarks from Marcus Bleinroth of the German Federal Foreign Office, and speakers from the Mwatana Organization for Human Rights, Amnesty International, the Stimson Center, and UNIDIR. The event was moderated by Kertin Vignard of UNIDIR and Christina Hawley of PAX.

Radhya Almutawakel of the Mwatana Organization for Human Rights drew attention to the human costs of drone strikes in Yemen, highlighting that victims were still waiting for justice and redress. Ella Knight from Amnesty International presented a new publication on key principles on the use and transfer of armed drones, focusing on legality, transparency and accountability.

John Borrie presented some of the key findings of UNIDIR's forthcoming study on transparency, accountability, and oversight with respect to armed drones, which draws on a series of expert meetings with states and others during 2016 and 2017. The report will lay out a series of ways forward internationally. Borrie observed that any international process should be inclusive of states, civil society, and other experts.

Rachel Stohl of Stimson Center noted that any new international process on armed drones must also raise the bar in terms of international standards, rather than lower them or undermine existing international agreements—as is the danger with the current US-led process to develop political standards on the export and subsequent use of armed drones. •

SIDE EVENT: PATHWAYS TO BANNING FULLY AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS

Marta Kosmyna | Human Rights Watch

The Permanent Mission of Mexico and the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots convened a side event on 16 October. All the panelists voiced concerns over the development of autonomous weapons systems "with decreasing levels of human control over the critical functions of selecting and engaging targets." They emphasized that the agenda was too broad for the meeting of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) to be held in November, and called on states to focus their discussions at their annual meeting.

The Deputy Permanent Representative of Mexico, Juan-Sandoval Mendiolea, opened the discussion by reiterating the threat fully autonomous weapons pose. He said, "coupled with [these] weapons' lack of judgement and empathy, threat to dignity, absence of moral agency, among other solid and convincing moral concerns, has led my country to join other States in supporting the call to preemptively ban the development, production, and use of fully autonomous weapons."

Professor Noel Sharkey of the International Committee for Robot Arms Control discussed definitions around automatic weapons systems, the state of play of recent technological developments, and algorithmic bias as it pertains to these weapons. He stressed that we must retain meaningful human control in selecting and applying violent force, and not cede this responsibility to machines.

Bonnie Docherty of Human Rights Watch and Harvard's International Human Rights Clinic highlighted the legal challenges posed by these weapons and called for narrowing the scope of deliberations in November to engage substantively on these concerns during the first meeting of the Group of Governmental Experts. She stressed the inadequacy of existing international humanitarian law in regulating these weapons and reiterated the call for a preemptive ban.

Camilo Serna of Seguridad Humana en Latinoamerica y el Caribe (SEHLAC) reviewed the historical record of discussions within the CCW mandate on fully autonomous weapons. He highlighted the need for swift action for certain states would like nothing more than to stall or halt the progress made towards a ban.

Mary Wareham, global coordinator of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots and the moderator of the event, voiced concerns about the tough financial situation of the CCW this year and stressed the need to overcome these issues, get back on track, and ensure this instrument is successful so that vital action can be taken towards negotiating a new CCW protocol on lethal autonomous weapons systems.

Mexico reiterated the need to move faster on this process. "We've had incredible success with the nuclear ban, and now it's time to look to killer robots." •

SIDE EVENT: STRENGTHENING THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS FROM THE USE OF EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS IN POPULATED AREAS

Laura Boillot | International Network on Explosive Weapons

Austria and the International Network on Explosive Weapons (INEW) co-convened a briefing with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) on "strengthening the protection of civilians from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas". At this event, OCHA launched its *Compilation of Policy and Practice: Reducing the humanitarian impact from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas* (http://bit.ly/2yWw7KW).

As moderator, Ambassador Thomas Hajnoczi of Austria welcomed the opportunity to address this issue of humanitarian concern, and to look at examples of how it can be addressed in operational policies and practice.

INEW Coordinator Laura Boillot described the consequences for civilians when heavy explosive weapons are used in towns and cities. Civilians are disproportionately impacted, suffering 92% of casualties amounting to tens of thousands of casualties each year. Beyond the risk of death, injury, and trauma, explosive weapons also damage buildings extensively, including people's homes, and impact essential services needed to provide healthcare, sanitation, and education, further impacting civilians and driving displacement.

Simon Bagshaw of OCHA presented the *Compilation of Military Policy and Practice*, giving examples of how militaries have implemented policies and taken steps to restrict the use of explosive weapons with wide area effects to better protect civilians. With examples of policies implemented by AMISOM in Somalia to restrict artillery, and by ISAF in Afghanistan to restrict air strikes, this compilation highlights that measures have been taken at early stages of operations to address mounting casualties, and to ensure longer term strategic goals around the operations were not undermined.

Sahr Muhammedally talked about her work with the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC) engaging militaries to promote better civilian protection around specific operations. Part of their work, she said, is to raise awareness over the choice of specific weapons in particular contexts and knowing where weapons being used will land, as well as factoring civilian harm into battle damage estimates. Whilst international humanitarian law (IHL) sets out important principles that require adherence, clearer guidance is useful, she said, especially for commanders.

Steve Goose of Human Rights Watch, an INEW co-founder, presented INEW's views on elements of a declaration to prevent harm from explosive weapons. He highlighted the need for militaries to develop national operational policies to stop the use of explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas, as well as provide assistance to affected communities. He described how explosive weapons with wide area effects are particularly harmful for civilians, and designed for use in open warfare and not populated areas (see: http://bit.ly/2vhFbot).

In the subsequent discussion, the representatives from both Ireland and Norway said there are no doubts of the harm to civilians from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, which are causing death, destruction, and triggering displacement. They reminded delegates that they support the UN Secretary-General's call to develop an international political declaration to prevent harm from explosive weapons. Ireland encouraged other states to start work based on this call.

Whilst Sweden recognised the harm from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, the representatives of Sweden and Russia both expressed concerns over restricting the use of explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas. Sweden stated that it would use such weapons on Swedish territory in the case of a hostile attack by an enemy. The representative from Germany recognised the harm from this practice but suggested that different approaches are needed by different actors, and depending on the scenario. These states also suggested that IHL is adequate to prevent civilian harm from explosive weapons.

Panellists highlighted that explosive weapons with wide area effects are harmful to civilians, no matter the circumstances or actor involved, and a political declaration could provide clearer guidance to states to protect civilians. •

SIDE EVENT: EVERYWHERE THE BOMBING FOLLOWED US

Allison Pytlak | Reaching Critical Will of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

"When the bombs started falling near 31-year-old Ranim's home in Syria, she drove her four children to her parents' home, a few hours away. Her husband stayed behind to get their belongings in order. Ranim and her husband thought her parents' town would be safer. But the bombings followed them. And it continued to follow the family until they were forced to flee the country."

Handicap International (HI) launched a report on 17 October 2017 that features the perspectives of Syrian women refugees in Lebanon. Based on a survey of over 200 people, and in-depth interviews with women refugees, the report brings to life the very real effects that explosive weapons have had on individuals and communities, particularly women and persons with disabilities and injuries.

As HI researcher Luc Lampiere explained at the event, the study reflects the considerable harm caused by explosive weapons in populated areas in terms of socio-economic vulnerability, loss of livelihood, the disruption of civilian infrastructure, and a long-term impact on mental health.

The report confirms the correlation between multiple forced displacements and the use of explosive weapons. HI is part of the International Network on Explosive Weapons (INEW), which advocates for stronger international standards, including certain prohibitions and restrictions on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas.

Alma Taslidžan Al-Osta, also of HI, explained that her organisation decided to publish this report in order to contribute evidence concerning the relationship between explosive weapons use and enforced displacement and on women. Ambassador Michael Gaffey of Ireland highlighted his country's concern with this issue and support for the development of policy work to prevent these harms.

Ray Acheson of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), which is also an INEW member, spoke on the panel at the report launch to provide greater detail about the effects of explosive weapons on women. More women report feeling threatened by bombs than they do guns, she noted. As explained in the study, women are also more likely to find themselves without the means to defend their physical integrity and find themselves more vulnerable to crime in the "social chaos" that follows a bombing or explosive weapons attack.

Following the presentations there was good discussion from participants about the importance of implementing international humanitarian law (IHL), and the significance of providing guidance for this implementation through the adoption of new commitments and policy standards against the use of explosive weapons in populated areas.

The report is available online, along with short videos highlighting the experiences of the women interviewed, at http://www.handicap-international.us. •

SIDE EVENT: HIBAKUSHA'S TESTIMONY AND CALL

Madison Goodliffe | Reaching Critical Will of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

On 17 October, Peace Boat and the Permanent Missions of Austria and Costa Rica hosted a passionate event calling on the international community to continue fighting for a world free of nuclear weapons. The three speakers included atomic bomb survior Ms. Kimura Tokuko, actress and activist Ms. Azuma Chizuru, and Ms. Urata Shion, who is a youth communicator advocating for a nuclear free world. The three women spoke about the need to remember the tragic past to ensure that no more people experience the horrific atrocities that were unjustly experienced by the civilians of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

On 9 August 1945, Ms. Kimura Tokuko was exposed to the atomic bomb that shook the city of Nagasaki. She was ten years old at the time. Seventy-two years later, the horrific events that took place that day are etched in her memory. She explained that the air raid alarms began in the early hours of the morning and the noise was followed by a flashing orange fireball surrounded by white flames. Ms. Kimura Totuko initially ran to a bomb shelter with her siblings, but then was told that they would need to get to shelter further away. As they were running in and out of bomb shelters, she noticed a mass of people slowly walking in her direction—clothing melted to their skin, arms and faces burnt and swollen. They begged for water. Ms. Kimura Tokuko explained that the smell of burnt flesh encircled her as she desperately tried to find medicine for those horribly affected. She described the bright

red sky that hung over the devastated city that night and into the next morning. The effects of this shocking event would be felt for generations; in 2009 Ms. Tokuko lost her daughter to cancer, sixty years after the bombing had taken place. The fear and anxiety of these effects haunted Ms. Tokuko relentlessly. In 2010, she was diagnosed with stomach cancer herself. She explained her gratitude for the work of the international community on its efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons. She emphasised that no one should have to endure the terror that the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have had to endure for decades, and continue to endure.

Ms. Azuma Chizuru was born in Hiroshima. Growing up, she was informed about the effects of the atomic bombs on her hometown, which caused her a great amount of stress in her adolescent years. She explained that she was grateful for this education, however, as it motivates her to work towards nuclear abolition and to spread awareness through her acting. Ms. Chizuru emphasised her belief that although the atomic bomb destroyed lives, ruined nature, and demolished towns, it has not taken away the voices of those affected. With the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) winning the Nobel Peace Prize, she explained that it has empowered many others to share their story and not give up.

Ms. Urata Shion began by stating that she is a third generation hibakusha, as her grandfather was affected by the atomic bomb. She highlighted the fact that during the past 72 years a great number of individuals have exposed their most personal experiences. Last year, former US President Barack Obama visited the hibakushas and listened to their stories—even though at his side was a device capable of launching a nuclear bomb. Ms. Shion emphasised that the mentality still has not changed, and that we must continue to work towards a nuclear free world so that these horrific events, unfairly felt by innocent civilians, are never experienced again. •

SIDE EVENT: LAUNCH OF THE ATT MONITOR REPORT 2017

Raluca Muresan | Control Arms

Control Arms launched the third Annual Report of its ATT Monitor on 16 October. At a side event co-hosted with the governments of Australia, Ireland, and the Netherlands, the project's team outlined the main findings and analysis of the third Annual Report, which this year has a special focus on transparency.

Ambassador Gabrielse of the Netherlands stressed the importance of reporting for the effective implementation of and compliance with the Treaty's provisions. Noting that "reporting by states parties is not enough, reporting on reporting is also essential," he stressed that Control Arms' ATT Monitor is "a fact-based analysis on ATT reporting". This view was reinforced by Ambassador Gaffey of Ireland, who stressed that "the object and purpose of the ATT cannot be achieved without transparency."

Robert Perkins, ATT Monitor Researcher, provided an overview on the status of the ATT in 2017. He noted that while in 2016 there were 16 new states parties to the Treaty, this year only 7 countries—Benin, Cape Verde, Madagascar, Guatemala, Honduras, Republic of Korea, and Monaco—joined the ATT. While it is expected that the rate of ratification to any new Treaty will slow over time, this is a notable slowing in new membership. Ambassador Quinn of Australia highlighted the importance of partnerships with civil society in improving the Treaty's universalisation, particularly in regions which are lagging behind, such as Asia-Pacific. He noted that the ATT Monitor and its risk watch tool are "vital to the proper implementation of the Treaty".

A first glance at ATT reporting indicates that only 49 of the 61 states parties due to submit Annual Reports for 2015 had done so as of the end of May this year, meaning that 12 states parties still have not met their reporting obligation a year after the deadline passed. A more in-depth look reveals that there are a number of challenges and gaps and that many states have had very different approaches to submitting their reports, which makes it challenging to compare the data.

This year's ATT Monitor report, named by Ambassador Gaffey of Ireland as "a trusted source of information on ATT implementation," also offers an analysis of the ATT Initial Reports in order to help inform a collective understanding of implementation obstacles and progress. It identified a number of challenges that states parties are experiencing, such as a lack of a verification mechanism to assess the accuracy or comprehensiveness of information provided by states parties. The report also suggests potential opportunities for reporting synergies that states parties may find useful. •

2017 HUMANITARIAN DISARMAMENT FORUM

Mary Wareham | Human Rights Watch

Over the weekend of 13–15 October, Harvard Law School's International Human Rights Law Clinic, Human Rights Watch, and PAX convened the Humanitarian Disarmament Forum at the UN Church Centre. Various non-governmental organisations and global coalitions working to advance humanitarian disarmament have held the forum in New York City each October since 2012, when Human Rights Watch convened humanitarian disarmament campaigners on the 20th anniversary of the founding of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, the 1997 Nobel Peace Co-Laureate.

Approximately 80 campaigners and a dozen students attended the 2017 forum, which discussed multiple challenges facing the humanitarian disarmament movement, from the rise of populism to fake news. New participants this year included Bellingcat and Women's March Global.

Humanitarian disarmament aims to prevent and alleviate human suffering. By doing so this approach differs significantly from other arms control and non-proliferation efforts, which are primarily driven by national security interests. Humanitarian disarmament seeks to strengthen international humanitarian and human rights law to better protect civilians from suffering during and after armed conflict.

Humanitarian disarmament instruments are rarely the product of consensus decision-making, but rather created by the solid will of an overwhelming majority. These initiatives involve genuine co-operation and substantive partnerships between like-minded governments, international organisations including the International Committee of the Red Cross, and civil society groups organised into coordinated global coalitions.

The adoption this year of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the subsequent awarding of the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) affirms and validates the humanitarian disarmament approach as the best way for dealing with these and other weapons. The Nobel announcement acknowledged ICAN's central role in drawing attention to "the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons." •

FIRST COMMITTEE MONITOR

The *First Committee Monitor* is a collaborative NGO effort undertaken to make the work of the First Committee more transparent and accessible. The *Monitor* is compiled, edited, and coordinated by Reaching Critical Will, the disarmament programme of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF).

Contributing organisations and campaigns to this edition:

Article 36
Campaign to Stop Killer Robots
Cluster Munition Coalition
Control Arms
Human Rights Watch
International Action Network on Small Arms
International Campaign to Ban Landmines
International Network on Explosive Weapons
Pace University
Project Ploughshares
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

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