

Algeria  
Ambassador Idriss Jazaïry  
Conference on Disarmament  
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Unofficial Transcript

Mr President, allow me to begin by congratulating you on your selection of the presidency of the CD. Your presidency is beginning at a difficult time, at the beginning of the session where you would be offering us a way out to try to find a solution to the discussion, or the debate rather, on the program of work after the adoption, which, it was a good thing was rather swift of our agenda. Please be assured, Mr President, of our full support to accompany you in your efforts, we also support the P6.

I was able to take the measure of the efficiency of that group when I was president and I would like to wish a welcome to the new ambassadors in the CD: Brazil, China, Japan, Norway and the Russian Federation. We were very interested to listen to the statement by Ambassador Borodavkin of the Russian Federation.

The working document that you have provided us with moves me to anticipate little on some of the elements of the issues in the program of work of the conference, which I shall be going into more in detail at a later stage during my farewell speech. Let me say first and foremost that on behalf of the Algerian delegation, which is very grateful for all the efforts you have made and we are extremely grateful for the document CD/1929. Which demonstrates your good will and the interest that you have for the CD. The document CD/1929 stimulates our reflection on this CD at a critical time, which is marked by serious reasons for concern, in the face of the deadlock of the conference. My colleagues of Austria, Nepal and New Zealand have, I think this morning, expressed much more eloquently than I could have expressed their concerns on the subject of the deadlock of the conference. You mentioned an approach towards a solution to the problem of the program of work. How ambitious, it's quite a challenge to go down the path, which is different from the path involving consultation on the consensus to be able to try to raise reservation or lift reservations on points of disagreement. On this score I continue to believe that the decision CD1864, which was adopted by consensus in May 2009, which I would say in passing the document doesn't actually refer to, is a serious basis for compromise to be able to engage in negotiations and consultations. Which over long term could take on board the security concerns of all of us. It is difficult, I must say, to think of solutions that are radically different from this to the extent that the framework CD1864 is a framework that majored over a decade of negotiations. It's the logical framework that I think is necessary, essential for the common sense of any programme of work if we are to have one. The solution would require a political agreement as this was shown pretty clearly in the first plenary of the 2012 session, by my friend ambassador of Chile, Pedro Oyance. In order to work, this agreement must be based on common sense. If there is no agreement on this basis, Algeria as is the case for the countries of the non-alignment movement has pleaded in favour of a holding of the convenient of a special session on disarmament for SSOD4, as it is known of the English acronym. I am however, relatively realistic or pragmatic to acknowledge that the holding of this conference would be impossible during the course of 2012 for obvious political reasons. The condition, as you mentioned yourself Mr President, do not seem to lend themselves to the adoption of a programme of work, however, we do need to think

about the way in which we continue to work on questions of substance within the conference, while waiting for an agreement on a programme of work. Or perhaps, may I be so bold as to say, to do without such a programme of work as a Swahili proverb goes: "since we have no control over the wind we have to know how to use it". The options contained in your paper, recommending that the conference should be put in a standby situation or reduce the time allocated for meetings, doesn't actually touch the problem. The deadlock of the conference is an epiphenomenon, the situation applies in varying degrees to most of the multilateral disarmament mechanisms today, and if we follow this approach we should actually put on standby the entire UN disarmament machinery. I support your point of view that even if there is no agreement on the programme of work, we could actually still have substantive discussions on all of the issues on the agenda. This would include fissile materials as part of item one related to nuclear disarmament. In fact, §4 of your document, CD1929, deals with the immediate start up or not of negotiations and not about the time limits of reviewing a treaty. Which is relevant to this subject, within the CD and I think it's important to state clearly that based on the procedure-containing document CD/8/Rev 9 December of 2003. The programme of work is equivalent to the counter activities of the conference for the session. We could go back to the simplified format of the programme of work, which was applied and used in the 1980s. Which allowed us to negotiate the reports on the deliberations and discussions and to reflect them in the annual report. Such an exercise should not be prejudice or preclude the setting up of such agreed bodies or the launching on negotiations going back to 2004. Since 2004, each year we have organized thematic debates, sometimes in an official framework, sometimes in an informal framework and we have this discussions led by coordinators. These meetings were an opportunity to reiterate to the respective position of states, without at the same time being able to reflect their content in the annual report. We would wish to see the format of the programme of work, which I am suggesting. It would be simplified as much as possible. We would like to see it help us to move from the stage where we are making speeches to a drafting phase, where we would have to negotiate and approve by consensus reports on the discussions. This might make it possible for us to build a climate of confidence and to come back to the initial functions of the CD negotiations on questions of substance as was recalled for us by the ambassador of New Zealand, a little while ago. We would be in a position then to prepare technical elements for possible negotiations. The multilateral disarmament negotiation process is by nature an extremely complex thing, it requires patience, it requires time. Let us not forget that the first instrument negotiated by the CD, and here I'm talking about the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, was actually concluded in 1993. And 1993 was fifteen years after the setting up of the CD. So I think we have to be patient and not despair.

Thank you very much Mr President.