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


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### IN THIS ISSUE

Editorial: The meaning of implementation

Strengthening accountability for arms companies through business and human rights

News in brief



Reaching Critical Will

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# THE MEANING OF IMPLEMENTATION

Allison Pytlak | Reaching Critical Will, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

*“The ATT should be a serious tool to prevent human suffering but so far it is not living up to this task. We urge everyone participating here to reflect on your potential role in current and future conflicts—do you want to perpetuate the violence, or try to stop it by doing the work to improve this treaty’s implementation?”*

The above is drawn from WILPF’s statement to the Fifth Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty during its thematic session on treaty implementation. It is a question that speaks to the crux of an emerging implementation dichotomy, in which much discussion, funding, and practical work toward implementation are directed toward boosting the ability of some states parties to become Treaty-compliant and simultaneously obscuring the non-compliance of other states parties.

This dichotomy is reminiscent of dynamics we see in other areas of disarmament and arms control. While not as extreme, consider the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, where efforts to enforce the disarmament obligations of “responsible” nuclear-armed states have been brushed aside for a narrative of non-proliferation that emphasises the capacities and commitments of the alleged “irresponsible” non-nuclear-armed states. In ATT meetings we hear the word “responsible” all the time in relation to the behaviour of major exporters, yet as WILPF’s and other civil society statements pointed out today, these supposedly responsible transfers are somehow still causing the same pain and suffering that the ATT was designed to prevent.

Of course, as many delegations emphasised on Wednesday, implementation is an ongoing process with different starting points and priorities for all. Concern about uneven implementation priorities is not to undermine the importance or necessity of the work that has occurred, whether to assist states that are in the early stages of developing a national control system, fostering interagency cooperation, or harmonising legislation. As well,

it cannot be overlooked that the calls to focus discussion further on diversion are coming from states that are most impacted by the international arms trade, or that support for the Working Group of Effective Treaty Implementation to establish a new sub-working group on transit and transshipment has come from countries that are transit hubs and grappling with unique challenges, like Costa Rica and Singapore, or within the Pacific. These states are open about their needs and challenges and see benefit in ensuring work plans which correspond to that. What is absent is the same awareness or honesty from countries that take some dubious and possibly unlawful decisions in their export decisions, which is also an equal part of Treaty implementation.

Implementation and non-compliance also featured heavily during the afternoon’s session on transparency and reporting. The number of countries submitting annual reports is dropping, and concerns have also been raised over the growth in reports being kept private (viewable only to other states parties) and that only three countries have updated their initial reports despite having made changes significant enough that would warrant doing so. Most delegates expressed concern about all, or some, of these challenges, and the efforts made by the working group to understand and overcome these issues are appreciated by most states. The afternoon session heard many stern warnings that reinforced the message that reporting is not an option. Indeed, it is not an option, and the decrease in reporting rates and quality so early on in the life of a Treaty is hugely problematic, as is the uneven quality and detail in the information submitted. Reports must be “detailed, accurate, consistent, comparable and that correspond to all aspects of the Treaty,” reminded the International Committee of the Red Cross.

It’s this last aspect about “all aspects” of the ATT that bears repeating and stern reminders, in the context of implementation generally. There is otherwise the risk that as implementation of

ATT commitments across the board are being discussed and interpreted unevenly, it fosters a one-sided narrative that ultimately undermines the ATT's credibility, undermines universality, and gives fodder for its critics.

It is not too late to turn things around. The delegation of New Zealand noted that the ATT is at a "crossroads" and acknowledged that there are different opinions about whether certain transfers meet the Treaty's obligations or not—sometimes balanced with the objective of bringing new states, especially major exporters, on board. Its recommendation to stay alert to this challenge while not losing the good work done so far on implementation is a start; so too was the urging from the Netherlands for states to incorporate case studies of real practice so as to understand how the ATT and its assessment process is being implemented.

Many delegations expressed support for the two stakeholder sessions on diversion being held at CSP5, which are meant to be based on examples and real experiences. There has also been appreciation for presentations from states parties in working group sessions that demonstrate national experiences, either in setting up control systems or navigating ratification processes. This all indicates appetite for more precise discussions in general, although in the afternoon session on

Wednesday, a few states raised caution about confidentiality concerns in such conversations.

WILPF's statement to the treaty implementation debate included suggestions for ways to change the narrative and improve accountability. In addition, dialogue and interaction between the representatives at ATT diplomatic meetings, and those tasked with its implementation, particularly in the area of export control, must be encouraged. This gap became particularly evident at a training organised by Control Arms in May, which invited licensing officers from central and eastern European countries to a training on the ATT's gender-based violence provision. Control Arms did a report back on this training at CSP5 side event on Wednesday and this disconnect was among the lessons they highlighted as a barrier for implementation of article 7(4) but which probably has wider applicability.

At the end of the day, and no matter where you sit, compliance (aka implementation) ultimately rests on political will. To go back to our statement, "doing the work to improve implementation" will mean not only continuing the important capacity building and information sharing already underway, but will also require a far more stringent application of Articles 6 and 7, and that other states parties start to push the narrative in another direction by challenging these other forms of non-compliance.



Photo: Civil society appeals to governments to stop arming Saudi Arabia © Control Arms



# STRENGTHENING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ARMS COMPANIES THROUGH BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Tessa Cerisier | Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

An event organised on Tuesday by Amnesty International discussed the application of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to the arms industry. The event highlighted inputs from three expert panellists working on human rights and arms control: Tara L. Van Ho, Lecturer at the School of Law and Human Rights Centre at the University of Essex; Patrick Wilcken, Researcher on Arms Control, Security Trade and Human Rights at Amnesty International; and Aymeric Alluin, Researcher at Amnesty International France. All strongly conveyed the message that arms companies hold independent responsibility to respect human rights and thus they are required to exercise human rights due diligence to identify, prevent, mitigate, and account for how they address impacts on human rights and cannot simply rely on states' authorisations.

## Arms transfers and recent developments in the human rights field

While the effectiveness of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is being undermined by implementation failures of exporting and importing countries and

commercial interests of the arms industry, UN human rights bodies are increasingly reminding states of their human rights obligations in relation to arms transfers. The UN Human Rights Council's resolutions on the 'Impact of arms transfers on human rights' have recognised the linkages between arms transfers and armed conflicts, the gendered impacts of transfers, and the human rights impacts of diversion, amongst other areas.

Most importantly, the adoption by consensus of a Human Rights Council resolution this year is a strong signal from the international community that human rights obligations fully apply to arms transfers and that states can be held accountable for violations resulting from such transfers. The UN Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights' (OHCHR) reports requested by these resolutions also provide important guidance to states on their obligations under international human rights law as they relate to arms transfers.

UN human rights bodies in charge of monitoring the implementation by states of international human rights treaties (also called Treaty Bodies),




Photo: Ceiling of the Human Rights Council © Ray Acheson

such as the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, the Committee on the Rights of the Child, and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), are also increasingly scrutinising states' practices in this area and the impacts of arms transfers on various rights. International human rights law indeed imposes obligations on states to respect, protect, and fulfil human rights. The obligation to protect means that states parties must effectively prevent human rights violations, including abuses committed by private actors such as corporations, including extraterritorially. This requires that states parties adopt legislative, administrative, educational, and other appropriate measures to ensure effective protection against rights violations linked to business activities, and that they provide victims of such corporate abuses with access to effective remedies. For example, in 2018 WILPF, jointly with the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, submitted to the CESCR a report on Germany focussing on the linkages between arms and human rights including with regard to regulation of arms companies. In particular, it raised Germany's obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights with regard to the regulation of operations of German businesses in the arms industry, both in Germany and abroad. This led to questions being asked by a Committee expert on this matter.

### **Business and human rights and the arms industry**

In view of the growing human rights impacts of business activities and of the absence of accountability for abuses, a specific framework called the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) was developed and adopted unanimously by the Human Rights Council in 2011 after a long process of consultation with civil society, states, and the business sector. As reminded by Tara L. Van Ho, the UNGPs are a codification of customary and treaty-based law. They UNGPs have established a clear global consensus that companies in all sectors have a responsibility to respect all human rights wherever they operate. As stated by Patrick Wilcken from Amnesty International during the event, while high risk sectors, such as the extractive industry, are under the spotlight, hardly any discussions have

taken place on the arms industry in the business and human rights field.

Nonetheless, it is clear that under the UNGPs, companies operating in the arms industry have responsibilities to conduct robust human rights due diligence before, during, and after weapons transfers; and to take action to address human rights risks and abuses, including through mitigation and remediation. Patrick Wilcken from Amnesty International clarified that human rights due diligence covers the use of arms by third parties, including by security forces of the importing states. Companies hold responsibility over the way their arms are used by third parties, which cannot be simply absolved by the state licensing process. These responsibilities exist over and above compliance with national laws and regulations—such as State arms licensing processes—which aim to protect human rights. Research by Amnesty International on arms companies' policies, which will be published in September, indicates that arms companies consider human rights impacts in very limited and general ways, mainly in terms of internal compliance rather than by considering the external impacts of their products.

Tara Van Ho from the Essex School of Law and Human Rights Centre also recalled that under international law the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is just one instrument that interacts with international humanitarian and human rights law. These areas cannot be artificially siloed. As such, human rights risk assessments prescribed by the ATT are only one of the aspects that states should evaluate regarding arms transfers. Companies have an independent responsibility under the UNGPs to respect human rights and cannot simply rely on states' authorisations under the ATT.

The UNGPs also underline that states should exercise a higher standard of care to protect against human rights abuses by business enterprises that are owned or controlled by the state, or that receive substantial support and services from state agencies, as it is often the case with companies in the arms industry. Given the specific risks of gross human rights abuses posed by the arms industry, including by fuelling conflict, states have a specific obligation to ensure that

business enterprises operating in conflict-affected areas are not involved in such abuses. According to the UNGPs, states "should review whether their policies, legislation, regulations and enforcement measures effectively address this heightened risk, including through provisions for human rights due diligence by business. Where they identify gaps, States should take appropriate steps to address them."

Pressure from civil society groups and public opinion is increasing on states and arms companies notably, through litigation at national level against government authorities and arms companies. The adoption and consideration of laws on mandatory human rights due diligence for businesses including in France, Finland, and Switzerland are also critical avenues to increase pressure on arms companies to carry out human rights due diligence and to provide more transparency over their practices. Additional pressure can be put through country reviews by UN human rights mechanisms, such as the Treaty Bodies and the Universal Periodic Review, which is why WILPF does advocacy with them on these issues. We encourage other civil society organisations and recommending states in the UPR to use those opportunities, too.

1. *The Impact of Germany's Arms Transfers on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*, Joint submission by WILPF and the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, <https://www.wilpf.org/portfolio-items/the-impact-of-germanys-arms-transfers-on-economic-social-and-cultural-rights/>
2. *Egypt: How French Arms are used to crush dissent*. Amnesty International report available in English, French and Arabic, <https://www.amnesty.org/fr/documents/eur21/9038/2018/en/>
3. *WILPF New HRC Resolution Reminds States of Their Human Rights Obligations in the Arms Trade* (July 2019), <https://www.wilpf.org/new-hrc-resolution-reminds-states-of-their-human-rights-obligations-in-the-arms-trade/>
4. *Impact of arms transfers on the enjoyment of human rights - Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights*, UN Index: A/HRC/35/8, 3 May 2017, [https://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage\\_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/35/8](https://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/35/8)



WILPF has released a comprehensive report about the gendered impacts of military operations in Mosul, Iraq, where disregard for the human rights of the local civilian populations, including through the use of explosive weapons in populated areas and gender-based violence, has undermined local peacebuilding approaches and inflicted disproportionate impacts on Iraqi women and girls.

**Download the report at** <https://www.wilpf.org/new-report-we-are-still-here>



## NEWS IN BRIEF

Ray Acheson and Athena Kerins | Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

*The News in brief is not a comprehensive recording of all statements and positions but attempts to capture key points from discussions.*

### Treaty implementation

- The chair of the Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation (WGETI) and facilitators of its three sub-groups introduced the draft report to CSP5.

#### *Draft Basic Guide to establishing national control systems and reference list*

- The European Union (EU), New Zealand, and Switzerland, and Germany, among others, emphasised the important role of national control systems and supported the basic guide and list of possible references.
- The United Kingdom (UK) stated that the "implementation of the ATT looks different for each state party" and that guidance documents must be living documents able to accommodate these differences. Chile and Ireland made similar points.
- Mexico expressed its support for the guide and the reference list and described the WGETI as a "safe space" for living, dynamic information exchange. Australia, Argentina, and Norway reaffirmed the fundamentality of information and experience exchange between states.
- The Netherlands agreed that an exchange of information is valuable but recommended basing future discussion and work off of case studies, although acknowledged this may be sensitive.
- Palestine voiced support for the guide; however, requested that it be expanded to include more references to international humanitarian law (IHL).

#### *Article 5 on general implementation*

- The EU, Palestine, Switzerland, and the Republic of Korea (ROK) commended the work

of the article 5 sub-working group and support the suggestion of focusing next on article 9.

- Chile and South Africa cautioned against losing sight on work in article 5, stressing the importance of the guide and other resources as being living and open to updates.
- Latvia recommended directing article 5 resources to work on articles 6 and 7.
- Japan supported suspending article 5 discussions due to the success of the article 5 sub-working group and because of a growing need to work closely on export control.
- Belgium also expressed satisfaction with the progress of article 5 but recommended that, instead of suspending the sub-working group, a penholder be named to continue the work on updating the draft basic guide.

#### *Articles 6 and 7 on prohibition and export assessment*

- Ireland said it was pleased that the chair's draft report confirms the need to continue implementation of articles 6 and 7.
- Palestine, Ireland, and Switzerland offered support for a multi-year work plan for the sub-working group on articles 6 and 7 with collaboration of all states parties.
- Argentina recommended a dialogue between states about risk mitigating measures.
- France offered its national experience as an example of how to approach prohibition and export assessment.
- Norway noted that export licensing authorities have a special role to play in import control, risk diversion, and possibly data collection.

#### *Gender and gender-based violence (GBV)*

- Switzerland welcomed the work done on GBV to date.

- Costa Rica said that GBV requires a collective, multi-sectoral response recognising links to other relevant human rights instruments.
- Belgium backed the proposed voluntary training guide on GBV but reminded other states parties to consider existing work on the subject and with Ireland, recommended consulting civil society experts.
- Latvia voiced support for the proposed guide on GBV and cited the benefits of a training organised by Control Arms earlier this year.
- Japan expressed scepticism about the GBV guide but stated that it does see the merit in exploring it further.

#### *Article 9 on transit or transshipment*

- The EU, Palestine, Belgium, South Africa, and Mexico agreed that article 9 on transit and trans-shipment is a high priority.
- Chile said that it has updated its regulation on transshipment to address parts and components. It stressed the necessity for strong technical and human capacity in order to implement the ATT.

#### *Article 11 on diversion*

- Mexico, Chile, the EU, and Peru, among others, voiced their support for discussion on diversion, as was recommended by Costa Rica on the behalf of the Latin America and Caribbean Group (GRULAC).
- Costa Rica stressed the difficulties of controlling diversion and trafficking and stated that strengthened controls will require coordinating and communication from all parties.
- The ROK appreciated the advancements made on diversion over the past year but noted that there is still “a long way to go within the ATT to prevent diversion.” It recommended more pragmatic approaches with multiple perspectives.
- China said that strengthening all aspects of control is necessary to reduce diversion and offered Chinese national policies as an example.

#### *Other*

- Peru thanked Control Arms for its ATT Academy in Latin America.
- Mexico and Costa Rica requested their joint working paper on working methods be included in the final CSP5 report.
- Palestine recommended that more references to IHL be made in all ATT work, especially in states’ transparency reports. The ICRC voiced similar concerns.
- Chile said that democracies are based on public debate and analysis, recommending civil societies have a voice in ATT regulations.
- Argentina appreciates the contributions of civil society and the role of industry in ATT implementation.
- Ireland affirmed that universalisation and full implementation of the ATT will help achieve the 2030 Agenda, especially Sustainable Development Goals 5 and 16.
- Control Arms India recommended cooperating with civil society in the global south for monitoring compliance.

#### **Transparency and reporting**

- The ATT Secretariat gave an overview of reporting rates, noting that 25 per cent of states have not submitted their initial reports and only two have offered an update to their initial report. Thirteen states have requested that their reports remain restricted.
- Representatives of Mexico and Belgium, the co-chairs of the Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR) introduced the Group’s two reports and outlined their proposals for decisions that this conference should take.

#### *Importance of reporting*

- The EU, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Benin, Germany, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, France, Japan, Latvia, ROK, Switzerland, UK, ICRC, and Control Arms, among others, highlighted the importance of all states fulfilling their reporting obligations.



- The EU emphasised the importance of reporting for confidence building and implementation of the treaty.
- The Netherlands noted transparency is a requirement for building confidence of meaningful exchanges on arms transfers and full treaty implementation.
- Germany emphasised that reporting is mandatory, not voluntary, and noted that transparency is a core principle that is strongly correlated to the treaty's implementation.
- China said reporting can increase transparency of the arms trade and lead to greater trust among countries and the prevention of excessive accumulation, illicit transfer, and abuse of weapons.
- ICRC said sharing of information on implementation facilitates cooperation and assistance, and helps develop a culture of responsibility and accountability in the arms trade. It noted with appreciation the practice of states that have used information in the reports to better implement the Treaty.
- Control Arms said transparency can help shed light on global arms transfers, mitigate risks of the arms trade conducted in secret, and serve as a confidence building measure leading to cooperation and assistance.
- Italy, Mexico, New Zealand, and Nigeria suggested that lack of capacity and administrative obstacles could be responsible for low reporting rates in many cases.
- ICRC said it is clear there is way to go in achieving transparent and timely reporting that provides useful insights into implementation of the ATT. It suggested that exploring means to improve compliance with reporting should be a priority.

#### *How to improve reporting rates and reports*

- South Africa urged using other ATT structures such as the VTF and sponsorship programmes to develop reporting capacities.
- EU, China, Japan, Netherlands, and New Zealand encouraged developing synergies with other conventional arms reporting mechanisms such as the UNPoA and UN Register of Conventional Arms. China said it has been reporting to UNROCA for years and therefore is in de facto compliance with ATT reporting requirements.
- The EU urged developing practical tools to strengthen national capabilities and make reports more efficient in line with provisions of Treaty.
- The EU, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Switzerland, UK, and Control Arms welcomed the online reporting mechanism.
- Belgium noted that quality of reporting is equally important as quantity, expressing hope that the WGTR in the next cycle can have discussions on comparability of data and reporting templates.
- Italy said that while it recognises the need for comparability, reporting templates are voluntary and states can use other formats if that makes reporting easier.
- Latvia suggested that harmonisation of customs codes in reporting could significantly help.
- Latvia, Netherlands, ICRC, and Control Arms amongst others, emphasised the importance of public reporting to increase transparency and confidence and reduce corruption.

#### *Concerns with reporting rate*

- The ATT Secretariat, the co-chairs of the WGTR, the EU, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Japan, Latvia, New Zealand, ROK, South Africa, Switzerland, and the UK expressed concern with the lack of compliance with the ATT's reporting obligations.
- The co-chairs of the WGTR said poor reporting risks delegitimising the treaty, saying the transparency barometer is "not looking good."
- Latvia noted that there are high rates of discrepancy between imports and exports reported, possibly due to differing methodologies and timeframes.
- ROK warned that the low submission rate of reports could be a serious threat to the Treaty.

- Latvia noted that all states parties must report on all arms trade measures they have undertaken whether or not they are ATT obligations.
- UK urged the retention of flexibility, arguing that reporting should be simple and intuitive.
- Italy welcomed the guidance documents from the working groups; South Africa took note of them.
- Control Arms suggested the WGTR should include discussions about the reasons for the worrying trend towards secrecy.

#### *International cooperation and assistance*

- The EU encouraged states parties with good reporting records to offer in-kind support for other countries.
- Argentina, New Zealand, and ROK committed to share best practices with any interested states parties.
- Australia urged a proactive role in practical bilateral assistance to states parties to meet reporting requirements. It highlighted its support for the Centre on Armed Violence Reduction in developing the arms tracker database to maintain accurate records of conventional weapons.
- Japan said the FAQ on reporting could be useful reference for states.
- Japan noted that reporting is useful for the international community to analyse needs for international assistance,
- Nigeria urged ATT states parties to focus resources in regions where capacity seems to be the main problem with reporting compliance.

#### *Examples of reporting*

- The EU said its exports reports display the number and value of authorised exports, type of military technology, number and type of denials, their destinations, and reasons for denial.
- Latvia noted it makes all its reports public.

- France explained it handed in its 2018 report two weeks after the 31 May deadline, due to the time it took to analyse, compile, and check the data. It also decided to append a copy of the report it sent to parliament, which includes information related to export licences that may be granted.
- Benin highlighted its experience with ECOWAS reporting, where all information is shared and states can raise objections and discuss. It suggested the same should go for the ATT.

#### *CSP5 recommendations*

- Belgium, France, Germany, Nigeria, Switzerland, and Control Arms, among others, supported the recommendations from the WGTR.
- Australia, France, and Germany endorsed the mandate for next year's WGTR.

#### *Cautions*

- UK said it is the responsibility of states to establish their own way to review arms exports.
- Italy said it is open to a periodic review of reporting templates but continuing to change them may be problematic for those that already abide by reporting obligations.
- France said it is not convinced of the need and relevance of re-examining reporting templates.
- China said that transparency under reporting might bear on legitimate concerns, such as security interests and commercial secrets of some countries.

#### *Diversion*

- Argentina, Germany, Switzerland, and others welcomed the first informal meetings on diversion occurring at CSP5.
- Argentina said these and future meetings need to be confidential and urged against publicising information on particular cases discussed. It also said that states parties need to decide which states can convene relevant meetings and what happens if these cases

involve states that aren't parties or signatories to ATT.

- Germany said it can see the point of closed sessions of highly sensitive cases on diversion.

## Universalisation

### *Progress and efforts on universalisation*

- The ATT Secretariat noted there are 104 states parties, 32 signatories, one state that has signed and said it doesn't intend to become a party, and 57 states have not joined.
- The co-chair of the working group (WG) on universalisation, Amb. Takamizawa of Japan, reported on the WG's efforts as contained in document ATT/CSP5.WGTU/2019/CHAIR/532/Conf.Rep.
- The EU, Argentina, Australia, Benin, Germany, Japan, Ireland, Latvia, Mexico, Mozambique, New Zealand, Nigeria, ROK, South Africa, UK, Control Arms, and others welcomed progress and efforts made toward universalisation so far.
- Argentina, France, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa, UK, ICRC, and Control Arms endorsed the Welcome Pack and the Universalisation Toolkit developed by the WG. The UK specified that its understanding is these are nonbinding and voluntary.
- The EU said it is impressed by increased support for the ATT UN General Assembly resolution in 2018, with 151 voting in favour, 30 abstaining.
- The EU welcomed that Namibia could soon be the 105th state party.
- Mexico and the UK welcomed the continued participation of non-states parties and non-signatories as observers at CSPs.

### *Importance of universalisation*

- Ireland noted that universal adherence to the ATT would positively contribute to peace and security and sustainable development. As long as states remain outside the treaty, said Ireland, stemming the flows of illicit arms and

reducing irresponsible arms transfers will remain a significant challenge.

- New Zealand said the ATT has the ability to contribute to peace and security.
- Mozambique said universalisation is important because of the ATT's focus on the mitigation of human suffering from use of conventional arms and its upholding of international humanitarian law and human rights law.
- Australia said if universalised the ATT could be a global normative success.
- Argentina and Control Arms noted that universalisation is strongly linked to implementation.

### *Civil society*

- Latvia welcomed the partnership with civil society on universalisation and highlighted the Sprint to 100 campaign. It encouraged states to continue to engage with civil society on universalisation activities.
- The EU, France, Ireland, ROK, and South Africa said they appreciate efforts of civil society and others.
- Control Arms highlighted work of activists in promoting universalisation, including with parliamentarians and through the ATT Academy.

### *How to make more progress*

- Argentina, Australia, France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, and the UK encouraged all states parties to highlight the significance of the ATT at every opportunity.
- The UK said states parties should maximise efforts to engage non-states parties. It said they need to be clear about the scope and purpose of the treaty and clarify misinformation that may prevent some from joining. Australia and Mexico agreed.
- Japan, ROK, and the ICRC encouraged translation of the ATT into local languages.
- Argentina suggested states should explore synergies with other international



mechanisms on illicit trade in weapons to promote universalisation.

- New Zealand said states parties should ensure that sufficient resources and support exist to allow countries to join and noted the critical importance of the VTF in universalising this treaty.

#### *Top arms exporters and importers*

- The EU and South Africa, among others, highlighted the need to engage with top exporters and importers to bring them on board the Treaty.
- Ireland expressed regret that many states with large numbers of arms exports remain outside of this Treaty, and in this context deeply regrets the US decision to withdraw as a signatory.
- Argentina said lack of top exporters and importers is a main challenge.

#### *Regional focus*

- The EU, Japan, Lebanon, New Zealand, Nigeria, ROK, and South Africa supported regional discussions on universalisation.
- Australia, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, and the ICRC reported on regional efforts to promote universalisation.
- Japan, Philippines, and ROK noted concern with underrepresentation of states parties and signatories in Asia. Philippines hoped for outreach efforts with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to help advance acceptance of ATT in the region.
- The ICRC reiterated its support for the identification and creation of opportunities to discuss the ATT at regional and subregional levels, and for states parties to share information about their ATT experiences with their neighbours.
- The ICRC commended the ROK on its working paper for Asian ratification outreach, including suggestion of translation.

## ATT AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

Still not sure how to implement the ATT's provision on gender-based violence?



Download WILPF's resources on [reachingcriticalwill.org](http://reachingcriticalwill.org)

# ATT MONITOR

Reaching Critical Will is the disarmament programme of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), the oldest women's peace organisation in the world. Reaching Critical Will works for disarmament and the prohibition of many different weapon systems; confronting militarism and military spending; and exposing gendered aspects of the impact of weapons and disarmament processes with a feminist lens. Reaching Critical Will also monitors and analyses international disarmament processes, providing primary resources, reporting, and civil society coordination at various UN-related forums.



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## **ATT MONITOR**

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The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of WILPF or Reaching Critical Will.