

# Arms Trade Treaty Monitor

Independent views and reports from the Arms Trade Treaty negotiations

**14 July 2011**

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The *Arms Trade Treaty Monitor* features civil society reporting and analysis on meetings of the UN conference on an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).

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All views expressed in this publication and corresponding blog, [attmonitor.posterous.com](http://attmonitor.posterous.com), are solely those of the contributing authors and do not necessarily reflect the positions of the supporting organizations.

## Early reservations

Robert Zuber | Global Action to Prevent War

In today's discussion at the ATT Prep Com, the focus was on 'final provisions,' including the means by which a final, negotiated treaty shall enter into force. Delegates debated the minimum number of ratifying states that should be required, the challenges of provisional entry, the alleged need for major arms producing states to be early ratifiers, the prospects for development of an Assembly of States Parties, and more.

One of the most interesting debates focused on issues of 'reservations'— the capacity of states to highlight their concerns in the context of formal ratification. In principle, a system that allows for reservations is both consistent with standard UN practice and, in its own way, helpful in outlining areas for further review once a treaty enters into force. A well-placed reservation 'holds the table' for future clarifications of a treaty's scope, reporting mechanisms or other frameworks of interpretation. The best reservations allow for a robust review of the menu without threats of

outright rejection or, at least, the withholding of support. A meal will be served even if it is not initially the one that many had anticipated.

Some delegations, including Trinidad and Tobago and Lichtenstein, were wary of reservations or, more appropriately, reservations that have little or nothing to do with the ATT itself. In essence, this can be likened to not wanting states to fuss needlessly over reservations for movie tickets when dinner is actually on the agenda. With that important caveat noted, states understand that complete enthusiasm for every aspect of a treaty as a precondition for ratification is setting a bar too high to reach. Regardless of the care in treaty formulation facilitated by the Chair, there will always be elements of any treaty that will make states nervous. Ratification is in part a reflection of national interest, but it is also partly a matter of faith. A system that affirms legitimate reservations and eschews superfluous ones is part of the business of getting treaties ratified, entered into force, and

properly assessed and revised in a timely manner. Most delegations have accepted (and in some cases affirmed) the notion that an ATT will come into force with important provisions and processes subject to periodic assessment and review. As we move from preparation to negotiation, we cannot lose sight of our collective learning curve. There are still legislative and licensing interoperabilities to be

explored, reporting obligations to be made clearer and less burdensome, scope revisions to undertake to incorporate new technological developments, and so much more.

Reservations are indeed necessary. With all that needs to be discussed, negotiated and assessed, we will need to hold this table for a considerable amount of time.

## Final provisions

Ray Acheson| Reaching Critical Will of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

During day three of the third arms trade treaty (ATT) preparatory committee, member states considered the final provisions for the potential treaty, which cover issues such as entry into force, withdrawal, reservations, amendments, meetings of states parties, and more. This article provides a brief overview of states' positions on these items as indicated at this PrepCom so far.

### Entry into force

- The majority of delegations speaking on this subject supported the treaty's entry force after the thirtieth ratification. These included Colombia, Liechtenstein, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Zambia.
- However, Algeria, Australia, and the United Arab Emirates suggested 60 ratifications would be more reasonable.
- Cuba, Nicaragua, the United States, and Venezuela urged for "more than 30" while Indonesia said the number of required ratifications should be "as high as possible".
- The Russian delegation said it should be "at least" 60.
- The Iranian delegation suggested that 100 ratifications would be necessary.
- Iran, Nicaragua, Syria, and Venezuela argued that all of the major arms exporting states would need to be party to the treaty in order for it to have any effect.
- Brazil's delegation suggested this would depend on the elements for implementation, arguing that if the treaty includes provisions on transfer denials, compulsory reporting, and other complexities, the treaty will require the accession of the major arms exporting countries to avoid discrimination.

- However, most countries disagree with this position. Colombia, Jamaica, Japan, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, United States, Uruguay, and Zambia argued against requiring specific countries to ratify the treaty before it can enter into force, though the United States also said that "in best of all worlds," the treaty would have "some portion of states that have some particular qualification," perhaps measured by value of exports.

- The Dutch delegation noted that the ATT addresses quality of arms transfers, not quantity, and therefore the major weapon exporters are not more important than any other states for the treaty's effective functioning.

- The Norwegian delegation pointed out that the only treaties with truly universal adherence, the Geneva Conventions, require only two ratifications to enter into force. Arguing that there is no link between a high threshold for the entry into force of a treaty and universal adherence to it, the Norwegian delegate also noted that if entry into force is dependent on specific countries, this gives those states a veto over the treaty's very existence.

### Withdrawal

- Algeria and Iran's delegations argued there is no need for provisions on withdrawal because it's a sovereign right to withdraw from a treaty.
- Indonesia's delegate questioned the clause in the chair's paper that suggests that the withdrawal "shall take effect 180 days after the date of receipt of the notification," arguing that states should not have to endure this waiting period.

- Agreeing that withdrawal is a sovereign right, the Uruguayan delegation argued that it's important to be clear about provisions for withdrawal, otherwise a variety of interpretations can arise.

- Switzerland and Uruguay suggested that states should be able to withdraw with written notification that includes an explanation of the reasons for withdrawal.

- Uruguay's delegation also suggested that the treaty should specify that the provisions of the treaty apply to state for as long as they are parties to it. Indonesia's delegation also suggested that the treaty should make provisions for states to conclude their obligations to any transfers underway before they withdraw from the treaty.

#### **Duration**

- Uruguay supported unlimited duration for the treaty.

- Venezuela's delegation suggested that during the initial implementation phase the treaty could be of limited duration and that its extension could be considered at RevCons.

#### **Reservations**

The chair's text currently states, "No reservations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of the present Treaty shall be permitted."

- Most delegations, including those of Australia, Liechtenstein, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, and United Arab Emirates agreed with this provision, though several called for further elaboration regarding how and who would determine when a reservation is not admissible.

- Mexico and Liechtenstein preferred prohibiting reservations altogether.

- Mexico, New Zealand, and Peru urged a prohibition on reservations on the scope of the treaty.

- Cuba and Iran's delegations said the treaty should explicitly state the right to reservation without any qualifiers.

- The US delegation argued that the question of reservations "gets simpler if you don't have great detail in the treaty," urging once more for the treaty to be as "short, simple, and easy to implement" as possible so as to not interrupt or burden the arms industry.

The rest of the article is available at <http://bit.ly/qgpz3l>

## The so-called big, bad wolf

Jessica Erdman, @DisarmDialogues | Global Action to Prevent War

While the ATT PrepCom is entitled, "Recommendations on the elements that would be needed to attain an effective and balanced legally binding instrument on the *highest possible common international standards* for the transfer of conventional arms," there remains a significant rift between states who see the Arms Trade Treaty as a decentralized treaty governing the arms trade and those who see the future treaty as a humanitarian solution to long-ignored problems. While delegations have debated a number of issues—ranging from international assistance to final provisions, there has not been an articulation of what these "common standards" will be. There are a great deal of unresolved issues from the number of states required to ratify a future treaty to the more serious, fundamental problem of an inadequate definition of the actors targeted by an ATT. Effective

implementation of an ATT seems impossible without a clear definition of the actors involved. The "common" standards in our conversation have not been made clear, arguably so because our dialogue has danced around the "big, bad wolf" of a global industry: the private arms dealers themselves.

Although we would like to see as many states as possible accede to the treaty, we must keep in mind the paradox in international treaty-making: as state parties increase, the treaty's goal of being in "the *highest possible common international standards*" diminishes. While the delegations of Liechtenstein, Nigeria, and Uruguay have suggested entering the treaty into force after 30 ratifications, delegations such as Australia and Brazil have suggested numbers as high as 60. In a change of tone, Norway reminded the Preparatory Committee that the most famous of all international law,

the Geneva Conventions, required a mere 2 signatures, because it was a norm-setting document. The “numbers” debate illustrates an important question that has not been adequately satisfied—through which lens should we view a future ATT? It is important as civil society, UN secretariat, and member states to recognize the role of the private arms industry. Even with 193 ratifications, will a future arms treaty without consideration of other actors be worthwhile? An arms treaty that fails to define the actors as wide-ranging will likely be ineffective.

Nonetheless, definition implies responsibility. Should we define the range of players in the process to include non-state parties and actors, we must hold them to an appropriate level of accountability. Although unprecedented, delegations have addressed the inevitability of the conversation that must follow: one that is not about numbers, but about “common standards” with the major players in the arms industry. While some may argue that the inclusion of private arms dealers impedes sovereignty, the creation and subsequent export/import of arms is a global phenomenon. Much like drug trafficking, the arms export/import process (whether legitimate or illegitimate) involves a series of production

actors. From bullet to export, we must define who should be held accountable and at which levels. Of course, definition does not guarantee responsibility. We must also engage in dialogue with the arms industry, identifying major players and coming up with the “highest possible international common standards” with the private arms industry. The arms trade has never been exclusively state-to-state. If this were the case, the outlook of a future treaty would be much clearer.

Whether states choose to interpret the ATT as a treaty of trade or humanitarian imperative, the treaty itself is vital. However, without a comprehensive approach when developing the “highest possible international common standards,” we will be unable to resolve *either* issue. Although dialogue with the arms industry is the first step, the process does not end with a conversation. States and civil society must develop and coordinate future initiatives with the private industry. The arms industry will neither see its responsibility, nor the benefits of an arms treaty, without a long, difficult dialogue. The answers may not be clear, nor satisfy everyone, but it is a necessary exercise in humility for all parties involved in the arms treaty process.

## Comment assurer la force contraignante d'un Traité sur le Commerce des Armes?

Missak Kasongo | Caritas DRC, IANSA

La conclusion d'un traité sur le commerce des armes (TCA) est aujourd'hui presque une unanimité mondiale. Cependant, des réserves persistent entre les États sur la contrainte d'un tel instrument. Plusieurs États déclarent être d'accords pour un traité avec un caractère contraignant (efficace, robuste, fort), mais ne proposent pas expressément quels mécanismes mettre en place pour assurer la force contraignante d'un tel traité. Parmi les mécanismes utilisés jusqu'à ce jour dans ce domaine, les Nations Unies et les organisations régionales ont souvent fait recours aux mesures d'embargos encadrées par des mesures de surveillance telles que le Groupe d'Experts et le contrôle par les missions de paix déployées.

Il sied cependant de constater que les embargos d'armes dans le contexte africain

n'ont souvent pas produit les résultats escomptés. C'est le cas de la République Démocratique du Congo où des violations multiples ont été signalées par les Groupes d'Experts, sans que des sanctions soient prises à l'encontre des États concernés.

En conséquence, des voix s'élèvent de plus en plus pour qu'un mécanisme contraignant essaie de corriger ces insuffisances. Quelles voies existent pour renforcer la mise en œuvre du TCA au-delà des mécanismes de transparence (reporting, unité d'appui international - ISU) ?

Les embargos sur les armes à destination des États africains sont confrontés à plusieurs défis, notamment :

- la porosité des frontières (terrestres, maritimes, aériennes...);

- la mobilité des groupes armés ;
- l'exploitation des ressources naturelles et trafics d'armes,
- les faibles capacités de contrôle des stocks étatiques et des armes détenues par les civils ;
- les conflits interétatiques sous-régionaux ;
- la corruption...

Le cas de la RDC est un exemple patent où de nombreux cas de violations ont été constatés et rapportés par le Groupe d'Experts. Sans un mécanisme juridique contraignant, le TCA risque de ne pas s'éloigner d'un caractère politique. En vertu du principe de légalité des peines et délits, il faudra que le TCA définisse, en des termes clairs, et érige certaines pratiques qui violent les dispositions du traité comme des incriminations. Nous citerons comme exemple le trafic illicite, le courtage illicite, l'importation et l'exportation illicites, le transit illicite, le transbordement et le courtage des armes

conventionnelles et des munitions non autorisées suivant les termes du traité.

Ces incriminations peuvent engager la responsabilité des États comme des personnes physiques ou morales. Au niveau des individus/personnes morales, les juridictions nationales devraient appliquer les législations nationales appelées à se conformer au TCA.

Concernant la responsabilité des États, on devrait penser à une cour d'arbitrage ou un mécanisme de revue par les pairs. Au-delà d'un mécanisme juridictionnel pour la mise en application du TCA, la réforme du secteur de sécurité (police, armée, douanes, services de renseignement) constitue un des moyens susceptible de soutenir l'application du TCA dans les États. Des renforcements de capacités dans le domaine de gestion des stocks sont aussi indispensables comme mesures d'application appelant la coopération entre États.

## Arms transfers: States love secrets, but we want facts

Alaphia Zoyab, @alaphia| Amnesty International

All governments say they want to stop the flow of illicit arms, but listening to many of them at the UN this week, it became clear that not many are willing to do anything about it. This is because it will **involve much greater transparency** on how they report on arms transfers and this immediately makes governments uncomfortable. Amnesty International's findings show that the biggest source of illegal arms is **through diversions from legal stockpiles and authorized trade**. However, because current reporting by governments on imports, exports and arms transfers is so poor, it is near impossible to establish where and how deadly weapons are getting diverted.

So if States want to be able to find out how this is happening and put a stop to it, then they have to commit to greater overall transparency by reporting publicly. States can't claim "confidentiality" due to security needs on the one hand and miraculously expect illegal arms transfers to stop on the other. **It's not a one way street.**

But another reason Amnesty International wants to see public reporting on arms transfers in

the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is so that people like us can actually see what our governments are doing – who are they giving arms to and are they taking enough care to ensure these arms don't end up in the hands of human rights violators?

Some people think such extensive public reporting will lead to excessive bureaucracy but the fact is all the largest arms producers and exporters – China, Russia, France, Germany, the UK and the US – are already gathering this information and reporting it under different UN mechanisms. All States should now do it uniformly under the ATT.

Dozens of governments also agree that the arms trade **cannot continue to operate in the dark**. Norway rightly said today, "Reporting cannot be a matter of convenience." Norway and other countries should do their best to influence the others not to dilute the transparency mechanisms in the ATT which will allow public and legislative scrutiny of arms transfers.

Since 1989 nearly 250,000 people have died every year as a result of armed conflict. Another 300,000 die outside of conflict annually. Despite this, the arms trade continues to operate in the shadows.

Transparency will be a key pillar of a Treaty that will hopefully stop these irresponsible arms transfers and therefore bring down these deadly numbers.

Read more about Amnesty's

recommendations on the transparency mechanisms for the Arms Trade Treaty at <http://bit.ly/oHVWqx>. Follow the negotiations at the UN this week on the Arms Trade Treaty by following [@amnestyonline](#).

## A verification deficit

Nathan Sears | Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University  
Reaching Critical Will, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

A significant number of state delegations have now taken the opportunity to speak before the third ATT PrepCom on their views in respect to the Chairman's draft paper on implementation. Their statements have made it increasingly clear that an ATT is likely to have a substantial verification deficit.

### What is verification?

"Verification" is the determination of whether or not states parties to a treaty are acting in ways consistent with their treaty obligations. Verification depends on transparency (openness) and sound monitoring techniques (the collection of information on treaty implementation by states parties). At the third ATT PrepCom, delegations have held the near-unanimous position that treaty implementation should occur at the national level. However, a few delegations have questioned whether this is intended to mean that states maintain the right to subjective interpretation of treaty obligations in their design of national implementation systems, or whether it means that national implementation systems shall be organized to reflect objective standards agreed under a treaty. The delegations' statements have shown a general preference for the former interpretation, but this presents a substantial verification problem for an ATT: if states maintain the right to determine how to implement their treaty obligations, are their actions really verifiable?

### Why verify?

Verification is said to have three broad functions: detection of noncompliance; deterrence of noncompliance; and confidence-building in the effective functioning of a treaty. In negotiation, states balance these expected benefits with expected costs in terms of finance and political and commercial intrusiveness. Verification favours more intrusiveness, while

politics may favour less.

In the third PrepCom, there have been a substantial number of states that have spoken generally about the need for verification in respect to an ATT, particularly states aligned with the African Group, CARICOM, and the Group of Like-Minded States as presented by Mexico. Some delegations have articulated more specific components for verification, including verification of final destination. In general, however, states have been reluctant to speak to what verification should actually look like.

### How to verify?

Verification processes ultimately depend on the specific goals, scope, and parameters of a treaty, but experience shows that there are a number of verification methods that have been consistent across different treaties. At a minimum level, verification requires transparency, which has generally translated into state parties' reporting of relevant information. The third PrepCom has demonstrated resistance by some delegations to even the relatively minimalist provision of obligatory reporting.

Nevertheless, obligatory reporting by states parties would provide obvious verification benefits because of the opportunity to cross-check reports, particularly through annual reporting under a standardized framework (including, *inter alia*, information on the exporter, importer, category, units, and descriptions of arms and materials under the scope of a treaty for all transactions, as well as information on export control systems, steps taken towards implementation and enforcement of treaty obligations, and any implementation challenges). Civil society organizations and industry can also play a complimentary reporting role for an ATT—and including provisions for civil society and

industry in the text of a treaty could assure their beneficial reporting role.

At a higher level, verification benefits from proactive and continuous monitoring, which has led to varying methods of on-site inspections (“regular,” “*ad hoc*,” or “challenge”) and fact-finding missions by experts. The word “inspections” has been taboo throughout the third PrepCom, the sole mention being made by the delegation of the United Arab Emirates, despite the obvious utility that on-site inspections could provide in respect to verification of any provisions on marking and records-keeping, and transfer denials. Inspections could also help redress the so-called “reporting fatigue” problem, as inspections could reduce the verification burden on reporting procedures. Verification can also benefit significantly from monitoring technologies. Advanced tracing technologies (including, *inter alia*, GPS and nanotechnology) could possibly yield verification benefits for an ATT. Additionally, human right treaties have demonstrated a potentially useful monitoring technique for an ATT, where states parties send delegations to present their reports and respond to questions of a competent committee (e.g. an ISU or Secretariat). Finally, verification requires analysis of the information gathered.

#### **Who verifies?**

In the most effective treaties verification is entrusted to an independent organization—although this is generally not taken to impede states parties’ abilities to verify other states parties’ compliance through their own National Technical Means. The institutional framework of an ATT has been one of the more contentious issues of the third ATT PrepCom; and as we approach the end of the week, there is by no means consensus among delegations on this point. Some delegations call for the creation of an independent organization to be funded by states parties; others call for an organization created under the auspices of the UN and funded under its regular budget. A number of delegations support the creation of an Implementation Support Unit (ISU), as long as it is “small” or “lean;” a few delegations have called for a more robust Secretariat; while still other delegations have remained silent on the institutional framework of a treaty, or disagree that one should be established at all.

Assuming that states parties can come to an agreement that some form of institutional arrangement should be created under an ATT, what is to be its mandate? Of course, this necessarily depends on the objectives, scope, and parameters of a treaty. Nevertheless, many delegations have commented on various functions of a possible organization. The most commonly cited functions have been the clearinghouse activities of receiving and analyzing reports and the coordination activities of facilitating information exchange, international cooperation and assistance. These principles certainly help form the foundation of an effective treaty: reporting and information exchange are crucial to transparency, which is in turn a necessary condition for verification. International cooperation and assistance are important means—albeit likely insufficient—for boosting developing states’ capacities to implement treaty obligations. However, state delegations have been reserved in respect to creating a robust verification system under an ATT, where an ISU or Secretariat could possess, *inter alia*, inspection, clarification, and peer review capabilities.

#### **How much verification is enough?**

Theoretically, 100% verification is not possible. Fortunately even moderate capacities for detection of noncompliance can provide useful deterrence of noncompliance and confidence-building in the effectiveness of a treaty. Ultimately, a treaty’s verification system is determined by states political balancing of its financial costs, political intrusiveness, and expected effectiveness. The statements by state delegations during the third ATT PrepCom are making it increasingly clear that an ATT is going to have to make do with a relatively weak verification system, as delegations have frequently called for a system that is low in financial costs and not overly burdensome or intrusive for governments and industry. Nevertheless, the statement made by the delegation of Egypt is undoubtedly correct: an ATT will need to be verifiable in order to be truly effective.

#### **Verdict on ATT verification**

There are a number of problems facing an ATT verification system. First, any system will need to be able to appropriately address the likely high number of cases of technical

noncompliance by states that lack the capacity to implement their treaty obligations—particularly by those states that are incapable of preventing arms from illicitly entering their territorial borders, or corrupt officials from falsifying relevant documentation. However, experience has shown that technical noncompliance is not overly problematic for treaties with robust verification systems. Second, by definition we cannot verify the compliance of non-state actors, such as brokers involved in illicit arms trading. However, this is more a theoretical problem than a real one, as we can verify compliance of states parties' tasked with implementing treaty obligations in respect to individuals operating within their territories.

Thus, effective ATT verification is not so much a technical problem as a political one. The real challenges come from the states that see verification as too financially costly, or as

potentially interfering with their security and commercial interests, including, among others, Canada, China, India, Iran, and the United States. In this view, many delegations have voiced the need to be “pragmatic” and “realistic” in formulating an ATT, but these concepts should not be synonymous with doing less in terms of verification. In fact, pragmatism and realism support verification efforts, unless these words mask intentions of weakening a treaty. Moreover, the complexity of the arms trade does not make its regulation incompatible with the verification lessons learned from existing treaties. Reporting, peer review, monitoring technologies, and on-site inspections could constitute part of an effective ATT verification system—all of which can be done under an institutional arrangement that maintains the confidentiality of sensitive information in the interests of governments and industry.

## Women's participation at the ATT PrepCom

Jasmin Nario-Galace | IANSA Women's Network

The PrepCom on the ATT listed 116 women participants out of a total of 523 participants. That is 22%.

One of the major commitments of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 is to ensure greater participation of women in decision-making processes concerning peace and security.

Estonia, Monaco, Saint Kitts and Nevis have an all-women delegation to the meeting. Jamaica and Luxembourg have 75% women participation. Guyana, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Trinidad and Tobago have 67% women participation while half of the participants from Barbados, Finland, Grenada, Guatemala, Mali, Mongolia, New Zealand, Serbia, Uruguay and Vanuatu are women as reflected on the list of participants.

The following States do not have women delegates on the list: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Egypt, Fiji, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Lesotho, Malaysia, Montenegro,

Mauritania, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Togo, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

Though Fiji does not have a woman in its delegation, Fiji spoke in the meeting about the need to incorporate the UN Women Security Council resolutions in the treaty's principles, as well as the need to include in the criteria that arms not be transferred if there is a substantial risk that they will be used to commit gender-based violence. Kenya, Trinidad and Tobago and St. Lucia spoke about such need as well, in this third PrepCom. During the 2<sup>nd</sup> PrepCom, the issue of gender has been brought up by many States in the discussions, among them Mali, UK, Spain, Nigeria, Norway and Australia, among others.

We are eagerly waiting for more delegates to champion this cause as arms such as SALW and ammunition facilitate widespread domestic violence, rape and other forms of sexual violence both during and outside of conflicts. It is about time that women count.



## Summary of Day 3 in 140 characters or less

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@ [controlarms](#) How many states must ratify the #armstreaty before entry into force? Mexico: 20, Algeria: 60, Norway: 2.  
@ [LeMoJuste](#) Papua New Guinea strongly supports calls for SALW inclusion in [#armstreaty](#)  
@ [KristnaFreds](#) Number of small Pacific Island nations speak up @UN to show that [#Armstreaty](#) is not just for exporters  
@ [PriyaShoshana](#): Pacific Islands speak as one: "We are all neighbours...transfer arms responsibly" [#armstreaty](#)  
@ [OllySprague](#) New Zealand favour 30 ratifications in [#armstreaty](#). Says small states need some flexibility on reporting to make it not unduly onerous  
@ [sultanpintos](#) [#Indonesia](#) wants ratification by as many countries as possible. You mean 195? [#armstreaty](#)  
@ [controlarms](#) New Chairman's papers out tomorrow 10am @UN [#armstreaty](#) talks. Followed by a visit from [#NRA](#) president. Follow the action on [#armstreaty](#)  
@ [DisarmDialogues](#) Prevention and fighting illicit trafficking of arms should be main objective of [#armstreaty](#) [#Nicaragua](#)  
@ [DisarmDialogues](#) [#Japan](#): we should examine relationship b/w state parties and non-state parties who trade arms [#armstreaty](#) [#un](#)  
@ [DisarmDialogues](#) [#TrinidadandTobago](#) - encourage non-state parties and civil society to participate in review conferences [#armstreaty](#) [#goodidea](#)  
@ [DisarmDialogues](#) [#Uruguay](#) - possibility of adding a new section to ATT about relations w/ non-state parties to treaty [#UN](#) [#armstreaty](#)  
@ [sultanpintos](#) [#China](#) believes transit control would be a very big technical and political challenge for small countries. [#armstreaty](#)  
@ [OllySprague](#) UAE want 60 [#armstreaty](#) ratifications & wants reporting in brackets. Never put reporting in brackets, it's more than just a grammatical error  
@ [DisarmDialogues](#) [#Brazil](#): we need major arms exporting countries to accede to the treaty as well in order to avoid adverse effects [#armstreaty](#) [#UN](#)  
@ [LeMoJuste](#) Sweden: industry should be involved in review of [#ArmsTreaty](#).  
@ [Tldefenceteam](#): Day 3 of [#armstreaty](#) PrepCom. [#Lichtenstein](#) suggests that an ATT should address [#corruption](#) AND [#moneylaundering](#)  
@ [OllySprague](#) Colombia can support 30 [#armstreaty](#) ratifications.  
@ [LeMoJuste](#) Colombia: Should be fundamental [#ArmsTreaty](#) principle that parties should respect ATT even if making transactions with non-state parties.  
@ [OllySprague](#): Colombia says [#armstreaty](#) review conferences should review scope of items covered in treaty.  
@ [DisarmDialogues](#) [#Corruption](#) will play into transfer denials and arms transfers [#Nigeria](#) [#armstreaty](#)  
@ [sultanpintos](#) [#Nigeria](#) prefers a ratification by 30-40 countries irrespective of role as importer or exporter of arms [#armstreaty](#)  
@ [sultanpintos](#) [#Fiji](#) wants annual meeting of the assembly of parties [#armstreaty](#)  
@ [sultanpintos](#): [#Iran](#) wants ratification by almost 100 countries and all 15 major importers and exporters [#armstreaty](#)  
@ [DisarmDialogues](#) [#USA](#) does not believe inclusion of major arms exporters is a necessity for [#armstreaty](#) Agree/Disagree?  
@ [natashaleite](#) Place your bets! RT @ [OllySprague](#) USA basically agreeing with Iran on the numbers issue [#armstreaty](#) How often does that happen?  
@ [sultanpintos](#) [#USA](#) recommends to defer final provisions because of legal and technical issues [#armstreaty](#)  
@ [LeMoJuste](#) Cuba: 30 [#ArmsTreaty](#) ratifications not enough for entry into force; need major exporters/producers.  
@ [OllySprague](#) Cuba thinks that [#armstreaty](#) ratifications must stipulate a number of key exporting states. Not many supporting this  
@ [DisarmDialogues](#): [#Norway](#): [#Geneva](#) Conventions only require 2 signatures! More signatures does not mean universality [#armstreaty](#)  
@ [LeMoJuste](#) Burkina Faso: Extend [#ArmsTreaty](#) record-keeping duration to 20 years.  
@ [LeMoJuste](#) Israel: need reasonable no. of [#ArmsTreaty](#) ratifications for entry into force but shouldn't create hurdle so high it won't enter into force  
@ [DisarmDialogues](#): [#Zambia](#) calls for strong [#armstreaty](#): [#victimassistance](#), brokering, review conf. [#UN](#) [#treaty](#)  
@ [sultanpintos](#) [#Nigeria](#): Too many cooks said to spoil broth, but [#ArmsTreaty](#) delegates are making it possible to cook a good meal"  
@ [DisarmDialogues](#) [#Syria](#) skeptical about definition of the purpose of an [#armstreaty](#) - doesn't think it has been effectively defined yet  
@ [LeMoJuste](#) Syria: Reporting should be voluntary; need ratifications of producers/exporters; major exporters should fund victim assistance. [#armstreaty](#)  
@ [sultanpintos](#) Syria: How will the treaty handle existing military alliances? [#armstreaty](#)

@LeMoluste Netherlands: [#ArmsTreaty](#) is about arms transfer quality, not quantity -- not about stopping legal trades, but the few irresponsible ones.

@LeMoluste Intl Conf of Great Lakes Region: Must include small & light weapons in [#ArmsTreaty](#)—they perpetuate armed violence & destruction in GL area.

@sultanpintos Interpol: Small arms of major concern. Intl cooperation among security operatives needs to be much improved [#armstreaty](#)

@sultanpintos Interpol: need for secure global network of police info xchng, database 4 arms tracing, policing & judicial cooperation [#armstreaty](#)

@oxfamnz "Mapping the Arms Trade Treaty": country positions on the UN [#armstreaty](#) negotiations tracked & mapped [www.armstreaty.org](http://www.armstreaty.org)

@controlarms New Chairman's papers out tomorrow 10am @UN [#armstreaty](#) talks. Followed by a visit from [#NRA](#) president. Follow the action on [#armstreaty](#)

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