

Arms Trade Treaty Monitor

Independent views and reports from the Arms Trade Treaty negotiations

15 July 2011

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The *Arms Trade Treaty Monitor* features civil society reporting and analysis on meetings of the UN conference on an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).

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A “short and easy” arms trade treaty, or a focused and effective treaty to protect people at risk?

Jonathan Frerichs and Daniel Pieper | World Council of Churches

As planned, this third PrepCom for an Arms Trade Treaty is more about means than about ends. Of necessity, much time is going into papers and discussions of technical issues about implementation and “Final Provisions” of the future treaty and into states’ concerns regarding political, economic and logistical implications of an ATT.

Yet when the world’s five biggest arms exporters tell the PrepCom the treaty will need to be ‘simple, short and easy to implement’, one wonders how well the ‘means’ are stacking up against the ‘ends.’

Let’s take a look back at why civil society pushed so hard for an Arms Trade Treaty in the first place. A global ATT was and is seen as a mechanism that would curb the use of illicit weapons to commit human rights abuses, kill, injure or intimidate innocent civilians. It would protect civilians at risk and enhance risk-management in the arms industry. As an international trade agreement, it would make

the illicit trade in arms more difficult for the sake of the common good.

With that said, the ATT in design will not stop all illicit transfers of weapons or violations of national laws or build-ups of illicit arms, nor will it dole out punishments for those found to have illegally obtained arms. Rather, a robust Arms Trade Treaty will monitor and regulate the licit movement of arms, and in so doing will make it significantly more difficult for illegitimate and dangerous transfers to take place. This is not a panacea to end the illegal trade in arms. The ATT along with other UN registries and treaties, regional agreements and the Programme of Action Small Arms and Light Weapons can all work together and be a more effective framework than the piecemeal measures in place now.

One way to assess the balance between means and ends is to ask three questions about the public good and the arms trade: (a) What are the legitimate goals of the world’s trade in

arms? (b) What is the actual impact of the world's current unregulated trade in arms? (c) How much of the gap between 'a' and 'b' will be closed by the ATT?

A fair and adequate assessment here requires that national security concerns are treated as a subset of human security broadly defined. An ATT today has to live with the fact that few of the 21st Century's security challenges will yield to the force of arms while many will be solved cooperatively—and without weapons—or not at all. The issues surrounding - national sovereignty and the national right of self-defence recognized in the UN Charter become more manageable—not less—with an ATT that covers all conventional weapons including small arms and light weapons, parts and ammunition.

In fact, the more inclusive the trade treaty is, the more it will defend the pursuit of broad and resilient forms of security. This year's World Development Report notes that 1.5 billion people live in areas affected by “fragility, conflict, or large-scale organized criminal violence” and that no low-income fragile or conflict-affected country has yet to achieve a single Millennium Development Goal. The World Bank report identifies the remedy in terms as “security, justice and jobs”, a trio that can inform the ATT debate.

Another way to assess the balance between means and ends is to remember the issues that will determine whether the ATT has a role in protecting communities and saving lives: human rights, international humanitarian law, and sustainable development; including all

types of arms transfers as well as the full scope of weapons; gender-sensitivity and survivor assistance provisions; and enforceability, monitoring and accountability in a legally binding instrument. Each of these issues is mutually reinforcing of the public good. A treaty that addresses gender cannot credibly exclude the small arms used in gender-based violence. A treaty that includes human rights cannot exclude the projectiles that maim, terrify, and kill innocent human beings.

At this ATT PrepCom the main task is to bring to the surface elements of a treaty that will have little to no problem making consensus, and what elements of the treaty will be more challenging during the drafting and consensus-building negotiations.

But a simple treaty that sets modest standards for a lethal trade is hardly a consensus goal. It would be better understood as yet another sign of current dysfunction in the international community and in its ability to deal convincingly or comprehensively with arms controls. While discussions over the technical issues are critical at this stage of the game, debate about the means cannot be used, or allowed, to obscure why the ATT is needed. The ends it will serve are the issue of greatest concern to the peoples of the United Nations—those who are represented this week in New York by most civil society organizations and by governments that are demonstrably public-minded when it comes to an ATT. What exactly is happening here that could make a difference for them?

#armstreaty: un tratado de seguridad humana

Javier Alcalde Villacampa | International Catalan Institute for Peace, @ICIPeace

En el transcurso de estos días estamos viendo que algunas de las declaraciones de los estados están yendo en la dirección de cambiar el marco conceptual del tratado. Así, no se trataría tanto de un tratado de control de armamentos, sino de un tratado de comercio. Esto no es necesariamente negativo, pero sí tiene un peligro: puede alejar a la sociedad civil de los debates y facilitar el papel de la industria armamentística, que de momento se ha mantenido a la sombra, aunque con estrechos

contactos con algunos países.

Por este motivo, las intervenciones de las ONG en el plenario de ayer fueron cruciales, ya que permitieron recuperar el sentido original de su presencia aquí: en un ámbito que se encuentra en la intersección entre el control de armamentos y las consecuencias humanitarias del comercio y uso de las armas, los activistas y los cooperantes tienen un rol fundamental en la aplicación práctica de conceptos como desarrollo humano y seguridad

humana. Recordemos, por ejemplo, la influencia de las campañas contra las minas antipersona o las bombas de racimo en la consecución de ambos tratados.

En en los dos casos, los activistas siempre trataron de enmarcar las cuestiones de desarme en términos de crisis humanitarias. Y es difícil argumentar que no hayan tenido éxito y que este discurso no haya servido para acercar posiciones distantes, como las basadas en las preocupaciones de la seguridad dura y las basadas en otro tipo de seguridad, que tenga en cuenta las necesidades de las personas.

Ello explicaría los continuos esfuerzos desplegados por las campañas citadas para replantear los problemas de seguridad en términos humanitarios, incluyendo, a su vez, la relación entre las consecuencias de las transferencias irresponsables de armas y los problemas derivados de las violaciones de

derechos humanos, la corrupción o las dificultades para el desarrollo socio-económico. Sin duda, la mejor ilustración de este hecho es el concepto de seguridad humana, que pretende reducir la brecha entre las demandas de los activistas y las legítimas aspiraciones de la seguridad internacional.

La idea de seguridad humana proporciona, pues, un marco intelectual coherente para la formulación de problemas y la negociación sobre el fondo de estas cuestiones, lo que debería permitir un análisis compartido entre los países productores de armamentos y aquellos que más sufren sus consecuencias.

En conclusión, quizás no se trata tanto de la dualidad *control de armamentos vs. comercio*, sino de empezar a hablar de que el tratado sobre comercio de armas es, en realidad, un tratado de **seguridad humana**.

This article is also available in English at <http://bit.ly/qxdVPk>

Debate over an implementation support unit

Katherine Prizeman | Global Action to Prevent War

The question of the type of oversight body for an arms treaty is a critical issue that has received much attention among delegations this week. As explained by the Egyptian delegate, the type of structure decided upon—whether it is an Implementation Support Unit (ISU) or an independent secretariat—will be vital to the level of success of an ATT's implementation. The questions remain: what type of structure will be created? What will be its mandate? How will such a structure be funded? Will the structure be embedded within an existing international organization or be a stand-alone entity?

Daniel Prins, Chief of the Conventional Arms Branch of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), offered a helpful and beneficial presentation of structural possibilities that are available from the perspective of the UN secretariat. The options include an independent secretariat, an ISU embedded in an existing organization, or support services offered from the UN secretariat itself within an office of UNODA, such as is the case with the UN Programme of Action on small arms. Mr. Prins

also addressed financial resources, the need for which would depend on the structure chosen, as well as the means of financing—by states parties to the treaty alone or by all member states through the UN regular budget.

Chair Ambassador Moritán presented in his non-paper an outline for an ISU structure with the following responsibilities: to serve as a repository for annual reports and disputes over transfer denials; to assist states parties in implementing the treaty's provisions; to provide services for the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) and its subsidiary organs as deemed necessary; to assist states parties in providing information to the ASP and one another, upon request; to serve as a clearinghouse for offers and requests for assistance for treaty implementation and thereby promote international cooperation; to ensure coordination between the ISU and relevant international and regional organizations; to promote awareness of the treaty and to promote its universality; and, finally, to perform the technical and administrative tasks assigned by the ASP.

These tasks are formidable and require adequate human and financial resources to be effectively carried out. Delegations commented on this proposal and offered opinions as to how an ISU, or other entity, should be structured. Many delegations expressed the desire for greater clarity on the mandate of a potential ISU including Argentina, Italy, Indonesia, and Venezuela. The issue of financial constraints was also highlighted in the statements of smaller countries concerned over incurring more financial burdens. As an alternative, the delegations of Peru and Ecuador encouraged the Chair to consider placing the ISU within UNODA, which would tap already existing UN funding. Italy's representative made clear that there should be 'careful concern over financial implications.' The Peruvian delegation encouraged a flexibly developed ISU under UNODA with the potential for expansion later on.

Zimbabwe and Iran represented perhaps the most contrary views on an ISU. Zimbabwe explained that national authorities already possess mechanisms of control so that an ISU is not necessary. The Iranian delegation affirmed that control and implementation is a national responsibility not to be referred to the international community. The Indian delegation was not keen on supporting an ISU that they believed would be funded by a small group of states who would, in turn, control it. Egypt took the opposite view, affirming support for a fully funded independent structure for a treaty of this importance and sensitivity. The Egyptian delegate explained that setting up a weaker ISU would inappropriately prejudice the role of this structure. CARICOM also reiterated support for an independent secretariat. Likewise, the Republic of Korea agreed that a secretariat with a strong verification mechanism would facilitate successful implementation of an ATT.

In terms of ISU mandate, delegations expressed varying views. The EU affirmed support for its function as a report repository that would receive and process reports to be shared with other states parties. Australia explained that an ISU should be independent with a mandate balancing information sharing, evaluation, cooperation assistance, and budgetary matters. Uruguay also supported the ISU proposal, indicating that it should be

independent from the UNODA, but be financed with already allocated funding so as not to burden developing countries. Such a body, according to the Uruguayans, should receive all annual reports as well as coordinate information sharing between review conferences. Brazil also supported an ISU within the UN framework to support cooperation and assistance that can allow states to better control arms transfers. New Zealand also supported the ISU proposal specifically underlining the benefit of having a clearinghouse for requests for capacity building. South Africa also supported an ISU, but expressed concern over reporting burdens on smaller states. France and Switzerland stated that an ISU is needed, but the Swiss provided the caveat that it should not explicitly assess ATT implementation but, rather, report back to states parties. There was also a general view that the ISU should remain 'light-weight' and avoid bureaucratic excesses. Guatemala supported a "small and efficient" support unit.

National points of contact received general support from delegations. Sweden pointed out that national points of contact would facilitate greater bilateral cooperation and pose fewer problems than other types of coordination. Sweden also expressed concern that granting too long a list of duties to the proposed ISU was worrisome. The delegate called for a shorter, more precise list of duties for an ISU that is fully funded by states parties. Furthermore, some delegations, including India, wanted to be sure to limit interaction among points of contact to issues of ATT implementation only. Similarly, Germany stated that an ISU should be in charge only of strictly administrative duties and basic ATT implementation functions.

Frank discussions on a structure to enable proper ATT implementation are indispensable to the treaty process. Concerns over financial burdens and national sovereignty are valid. However, it seems that most delegations, with few exceptions, are in agreement that some structure of oversight would be helpful. From our standpoint, it is important to endorse and support a coordinating body that can assist member states in providing capacities and resources needed to uphold the treaty's provisions that they otherwise would not possess. Given that the form that this structure

takes is still up for debate, we encourage delegates to work towards a structure that will provide the best possible support for universal

implementation of the treaty so that the hard work that has been put into its formation is not for naught.

Implementation support and international assistance: keys to combating illicit flows of small arms and light weapons

Nathan Sears | Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University

Reaching Critical Will of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

A great number of state delegations to the third ATT PrepCom have spoken to the important role of exporter states in preventing illicit conventional arms transactions, particularly small arms and light weapons (SALW). The point is relatively clear: the adoption of more stringent export controls and law enforcement practices can shore up the cascading effect of illicit arms flows from developed to developing states. This is not only a feasible objective of an ATT, but also one that has received considerable support in the PrepCom. The arguably more important variable in sustaining illicit SALW diffusion, and certainly a more serious vulnerability for an ATT, is developing states' capacity problems. State delegations have maintained the near-unanimous position that treaty implementation should occur at the national level. However, many developing states lack the capacity to effectively control their borders, coastlines, and airspace, as well as regulate customs offices and the officials in them. For this reason, many delegations aligned with the African Group, CARICOM, and the Group of Like-Minded States have also called for treaty provisions on international cooperation and assistance to improve developing states' capacities to implement their treaty obligations.

Both the importance and the difficulty of this part of an ATT cannot be underestimated. There are already millions of SALW in illicit circulation worldwide, and so simply preventing the future diffusion of weapons from developed supplier states to developing importer states will not solve the world's illicit SALW problems. Developing states need to play the key role in dealing with illicit SALW within their borders. International cooperation and assistance can help, but the challenges facing developing states are as much development problems as disarmament and arms control problems, because of what is

required in terms of border control and law enforcement. It therefore becomes important to ask how appropriate are these sorts of capacity support commitments by developed states to developing states under the prerogatives of an ATT.

As a simple response: they are still very relevant. While it would be unrealistic to think that we can "solve all the world's problems" through an ATT—echoing the sentiment of the delegation of the United States—there are legitimate and feasible objectives in this regard that are appropriate under an ATT.

Many of the areas in which developing states require assistance to implement their treaty obligations are those for which developed states are perfectly capable of providing assistance. The first is in providing technical assistance to meet state reporting requirements. Many developing states are under-staffed and under-resourced to meet their existing reporting requirements under international instruments from human rights to disarmament. As a result, the professionals tasked with reporting may not possess the technical knowhow and experience to do so. Developed states, civil society organizations, or an independent organization created under an ATT (an Implementation Support Unit) could make available specialists to help train and provide technical assistance to developing states on areas ranging from reporting, to designing export and import control systems, or border and customs systems.

Another major area with great potential for international cooperation and assistance to facilitate treaty implementation by developing states is in respect to law enforcement. A delegate of Interpol spoke on the afternoon session of the third ATT PrepComm on 13 July. He spoke of the utility of information exchange and cooperative operations for detecting and

combating illicit brokering and shipments of conventional arms. There is no reason that his words should not become part of the basis for the international cooperation and assistance provisions of an ATT. Developing states can benefit greatly from developed states' capacities in the areas of intelligence collection and law enforcement, particularly in terms of technical assistance, training, information exchange, and actual operations.

The delegations of many developing states have spoken before the third ATT PrepCom of the capacity challenges facing them in respect to a potential ATT, and the need to include substantive provisions on international assistance and cooperation within a treaty text. Three further points could be spoken to in this respect. The first is the provision of

international financial assistance for capacity building. Careful not to exacerbate the so-called "aid dependency" of certain developing states, this is an area that could be considered under an ATT. The second is the provision of victim assistance, which has been addressed by a number of state delegations during the third ATT PrepCom. The final provision is on the roles that non-state actors can play in providing assistance, including civil society organizations (particularly NGOs) and private contractors that specialize in this sort of training. While it would be unrealistic to think that an ATT can redress all of the world's problems created by illicit SALW diffusion under the international cooperation and assistance articles of an ATT, there are a number of feasible objectives that can and should be addressed by such a treaty.

Brokering and implementation of the ATT

Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

The question of arms brokering was primarily dealt with during discussions of scope at the second arms trade treaty (ATT) preparatory committee. However, it has come up this week, as states have different visions of how brokering might be dealt with in terms of implementation provisions.

Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, CARICOM, Costa Rica, European Union, Fiji, Ghana, Ireland, Jamaica, Liechtenstein, Nigeria, Pacific Island States, Saint Lucia, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, and Zambia are in favour of including brokering in the implementation section of the treaty. For the most part, these states argue that brokering should be subject to the same standards and controls as export, import, and transit.

There are some nuances in position among these delegations. For example, Zambia suggested the treaty should include a requirement by states to establish a clear legal framework for, *inter alia*, extraterritorial jurisdiction over brokers; licencing of brokering activities; disclosure of brokers and licence applications; and steps to ensure brokers don't breach UN arms embargoes.

Meanwhile, the EU suggested that state parties should "put in place adequate measures

that would allow them, where necessary, to monitor and control brokering of arms covered by the scope of the treaty.... [including] the obligation to obtain an authorization prior to brokering activity. States Parties should apply the same parameters as for exports when assessing a brokering application."

The Belgian, Germany, and Swedish delegations, however, noted that brokering *per se* is not an illegal activity. They suggested that only unauthorized brokering, or brokering activities that, as Sweden said, "lead to irresponsible or illegal" transfers of arms, need to be controlled. The German delegation explained that it does not issue licences to brokers but to manufacturing companies, for which "brokering is one of the natural operations during their transaction." Belgium's delegation emphasized that brokers would need a permit granted by the relevant authority and that illicit brokering should be considered a separate issue, and considered under the enforcement section of the treaty.

Other states are hesitant about including brokering in the treaty at all. The US delegation said it is too complicated and that the treaty should simply say that states have to establish for themselves a means to regulate brokering. Japan's delegation said states need to

be “realistic” on the brokering issue, while the Egyptian delegation said that brokering is not relevant to the treaty and states should have national regulations to deal with it already.

However, because arms brokers play such a pivotal role in the arms trade, leaving them unregulated by the ATT would be as irresponsible as leaving out ammunition. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) highlighted the importance of including brokering in the implementation provisions of the treaty. “Some arms brokers contribute to the exacerbation of armed conflicts and facilitate continued violations. They are able to continue their illicit arms transfer activities with impunity by exploiting loopholes and inconsistencies in national and regional mechanisms,” explained ICRC representative Peter Herby. “If the activities of brokers are not controlled, then the Arms Trade Treaty will be easily undermined by the activities of unscrupulous brokers operating outside of any regulatory framework or from the territory of States with little or no controls in place.” In this context, the ICRC recommended that the treaty ensure that brokering is covered by a uniform, global, and legally-binding regulatory framework and that brokering activities and arms transfers are subject to the same criteria under the ATT, “including an assessment of whether the recipient is likely to commit serious violations of IHL with the weapons.”

In its 2005 report on arms brokering, Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité (GRIP) outlined the necessity, benefits, and potential formulations for global regulations on brokering. The ATT could seek to include the following provisions for national control systems on brokering:

- a clear legal definition on persons, entities, and activities subject to national controls;
- a system of registration able to screen those wishing to engage in the trade of military equipment, including brokering activities;
- a system of licensing of brokering transactions, where decisions should be taken according to explicit and comprehensive criteria;

- adequate systems of state monitoring, including, inter alia, mandatory record-keeping and reporting on the part of the broker and post-delivery verification mechanisms; and
- the establishment of penalties, such as fines or imprisonment, for violations of national brokering regulations.

The chair's draft also brought up the issue of criminalizing illicit brokering under the treaty. Australia, Grenada, and Trinidad and Tobago supported this idea, though others, including Canada, Colombia, Lichtenstein, and Zimbabwe expressed concern with the implication in the chair's text that state parties would have an obligation to control the activities of brokers that are citizens of their country regardless of those brokers' physical location. They cautioned that this raises issues about the application of laws extraterritorially. Cuba's delegation argued that it is too difficult to criminalize any activities under the ATT and that this should be dealt with elsewhere.

However, states without national controls on brokering are attractive bases of operation for brokers seeking to circumvent government oversight on their activities. GRIP outlines the benefits of instituting regulations over such brokers, suggesting that “comprehensive extraterritorial controls would be based on a license requirement for ‘third-country’ brokering activities conducted abroad by a country's nationals and permanent residents.”

National legislation and regional cooperation would be greatly supplemented by a legally-binding ATT that includes brokering. Such a treaty would help close the gaps and loopholes in national and regional measures, which vary greatly in scope and effectiveness between countries. Global standards on the regulation of arms brokering and related activities would go a long way to ensuring that the ATT is truly effective in preventing irresponsible and illicit trade in conventional weapons. As the representative of INTERPOL said on day three, international mechanisms should not be the missing link that prevents effective regulation of the arms trade.

Caribbean civil society calls for safer societies

Roxanne Meyers | Caribbean Coalition for the Reduction in Armed Violence (CDRAV)

The easy access of small arms and light weapons and high crimes rates has severely crippled the economic and social development of Caribbean states. Our quality of life has been negatively impacted by armed criminality and violence, particularly for women and youths, who are both direct and indirect victims. The proliferation of arms that has accompanied the drug trade in the region contributes to the stealthily rising numbers of homicides and incidents of gender based violence. Women have been forced to maintain the fabric of the family that has been tethering at the seams when husbands, fathers and sons are victims or perpetrators of gun crimes. This week, 8 lobbyists, from the Caribbean are attending the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty Negotiations (ATT PrepCom) in New York. The team of lobbyists comprised of 5 women and 3 men are dialoging with diplomats and participating in various committees related to ATT negotiations. We are working for a better future with safer communities and the ATT will help to stem flow of illegal weapons to the Caribbean and minimize the risk of diversion.

This has been a welcomed opportunity by the Caribbean Coalition for the Reduction in Armed Violence (CDRAV), since this is the first UN meeting that a group larger than 3 persons has been able to participate and contribute to the discussions at the international level. We have been able to take the opportunities presented at this forum to work with other civil

society groups from the Caribbean, the Pacific, Africa and around the world. Our participation in this ATT PrepCom allows us to build on the ongoing dialogue previously started at the regional level with – CARICOM and its Member States to endorse a comprehensive legally binding ATT. We are keen to see an ATT that also includes small arms and light weapons and ammunitions, in addition to a monitoring framework for the implementation of the treaty. We would welcome the establishment of National and International Implementation mechanisms that would assist state parties to meet their obligations under the Treaty.

We believe that such an international instrument will help our countries in the fight against the proliferation of illicit arms and to focus our limited resources on the development of people subsequently reducing current investments in security and armed violence prevention. The views expressed by manufacturing states who are principal exporters also helps us to understand better their positions and learn a great deal about the process of negotiations within the UN. As such, we are working with our permanent missions here in New York to highlight the importance of an ATT. The instrument is important for CARICOM states, while not being manufacturers or major importers of arms; have to suffer the impact of illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons and ammunitions in their societies. Citizen security and safety has been one of the greatest challenges to sustainable human development.

Arms trade, small arms, and conflict prevention: integrating state and community responsibilities

Dr. Robert Zuber | Global Action to Prevent War

There are many organizations and governments represented here at this ATT with experience in conflict prevention, in ending impunity for conflict-related violations (especially against women) and in the control and elimination of illicit weapons. Their efforts are impressive, and they're mostly not shy about sharing their skills and materials.

However, in our view, the best efforts in conflict prevention are often and especially undermined in situations where there is a widespread lack of confidence in the security sector as well as a lack of complementarity between government policies on armaments and the aspirations of mostly civilian, community practitioners.

There are many venues in which illicit small arms proliferation could fuel conflict and security challenges:

We all know about organized crime and the drug trade, but there are also serious impacts on community and domestic violence. Uncontrolled weapons keep children from going to school and women from seeking a place at the policy table. These weapons keep elders from exercising leadership and everyday people from sharing their legitimate needs and concerns.

There is an implied contract with the state that must be raised in this context—we renounce our right to armed retribution on the assumption that the state can provide basic security, eliminate impunity, etc. In situations where the state is unable to exercise that control, or sometimes worse, where it exercises that control selectively in accordance with economic or ethnic prejudices, the incentive only grows for ordinary citizens, even those not involved with criminality, to acquire arms by any means.

Once arms possession in a community becomes widespread, opportunities for both use and misuse magnify. Our family used guns for sport and to supplement our food supply; guns were respected in my household, but not feared. At the same time, for some other families in our community, guns were used in a variety of contexts – allegedly to protect and defend, but clearly also to intimidate and even retaliate. In looking back, I'm sure our guns intimidated others as well. I'm also convinced that the role that small arms were alleged to have in preventing conflict was completely out of proportion to their actual value. The guns meant to prevent conflict exacerbated the potential for conflict more often than not.

I've had many occasions in my life, especially in Oklahoma in the 70s, Mindanao in the 80s, and Harlem in the 90s, to attempt to communicate with someone holding a gun in some sort of menacing position or other. It takes a great deal of discipline to concentrate on the person you are trying to communicate with and not their weapon. It takes a great deal of skill to take firm positions in situations where

you can't trust the discipline or patience of the gun holder, especially when self-control has been impaired by narcotics or alcohol.

Where life-threatening weapons abound beyond legitimate state control, the risks of mis-communication are considerable; the stakes of misjudging your neighbor are simply too high.

The reality is that viable conflict prevention that adequately accounts for illicit small arms proliferation must combine skill building at community levels with security sector reform at policy levels. If the latter is neither competent nor unbiased, guns in communities are likely to fill security gaps and complicate efforts to build local skills, empower local constituents, and challenge those who threaten local stability.

This is one of the places where the conflict prevention, small arms and ATT communities converge. Governments can do more to promote a more stable, predictable and non-abusive security environment, including the elimination of rogue weapons and unregulated stockpiles. And, of particular relevance to the this week's ATT Prep Com, we can also promote confidence in the security sector through more robust attention to questions of diversion in transfers – weapons traded legally that find their way to non-state actors, or are used to abuse human rights, or are re-gifted to reap profits for government officials. Each of these instances creates problems that have been well highlighted this week. As a general rule, unaddressed diversion creates insecurity and reduces public confidence – measures that are corrosive to efforts to build safer, more stable, less violent communities.

With armed conflict, there is often deep community weariness, but also diverse threats – not only to physical integrity but to prospects for full participation in society and even to the motivation of citizens to prevent conflict and build better communities.

From a conflict prevention standpoint, we are paying a very high price for diverted transfers and unregulated stockpiles. It is time to bring those costs down.

Summary of Day 4 in 140 characters or less

Morning Session

@dbasuray77 Investors w/ \$1.2 trillion assets issue statement calling for strong & comprehensive #armstreaty incl strong anti-#corruption

@disarmdialogue Should re-export be included in an #armstreaty? #Canada asks this morning

@olysprague Canada says hunting & sporting guns should not be in #armstreaty, Mexico strongly challenges saying all guns shld be regulated & controlled

@KristnaFred: Mexico to Canada's suggestions to exclude civilian arms from an ATT: "victims don't make that difference and neither should we" #Armstreaty @sultanpintos Republic of Korea rejects inclusion of victims assistance#armstreaty

@LeMoJuste Senegal:#ArmsTreaty only viable if it includes all conv arms & SALW, as well as ammunition, & includes brokering & broad range of transfers

@disarmdialogues #Sweden welcomes #brokering addition under National Authority & Systems section of Chair's draftpaper #armstreaty

@sultanpintos Sweden so meticulous. Good point on inclusion in text of munitions instead of ammunition. Not too keen on victims assistance. #armstreaty

@disarmdialogues In contrast to #Canada, #Uruguay points out that recreational weapons are as lethal as conventional arms #armstreaty

@sultanpintos Uruguay wants strengthening of victims assistance. Inclusion of all kinds of small arms. Improvements on rights to withdraw #armstreaty

@disarmdialogues #Tanzania reiterates its support for an Implementation Support Unit in an #armstreaty

@LeMoJuste Tanzania requests victims assistance be retained in #ArmsTreaty because it affects both the supply and demand sides.

@disarmdialogues #India wants reference to non-state actors who use weapons #armstreaty

@sultanpintos #India doesn't want inclusion of tech transfer, manufacturing, ammunition. Wants less burden on transit countries. Against ISU #armstreaty

@annamac33 South Africa says must have brokering, ammo, all arms covered in #armstreaty good challenge back on Canada

@disarmdialogues If an arms transfer is said to harm socio-economic development, who determines this? #Ecuador #armstreaty

@disarmdialogues Hunting and sporting rifles are also lethal weapons #Nigeria #Mexico #Uruguay #armstreaty

@sultanpintos Nigeria: include ammo. agrees with Mexico on regulating sporting arms.Wants inclusion of term 'armed violence'.#armstreaty

@sultanpintos #Mexico asks for records upward of 20yrs. Says guns have have a long lifespan. requests inclusion of transports regulation. #armstreaty

@sultanpintos #USA: this treaty is not about making this world a better place to live. #armstreaty

@sultanpintos #USA just broke my heart #armstreaty: #USA surmised that the ATT draft paper has been a waste of time #armstreaty

@LeMoJuste US: very little advance in new #armstreaty paper; doesn't reflect commercial reality; mentions subjectivity, idealistic principles.

@VinoThorsen: What happened to "Change We Can Believe in" @BarackObama? US says #armstreaty is not about making the world a better place

@annamac33 Ghana reminds the room of the humanitarian imperative of #armstreaty

@annamac33 UK's @JillMorrisFCO commends the Chair for his paper, is good basis to move forward with #armstreaty

@olysprague Ghana say a gun without ammo poses little threat! Ammunition is vital component in the #armstreaty

@TIdefenceteam Great statement by #Ghana: #corruption needs to be specifically addressed in an #armstreaty, existing anti-corr. instruments not sufficient

@ICIPeace: Costa Rica: brokering controls must form part of national #armstrade licensing. #armstreaty reinforces rights and responsibilities