


# ARMS TRADE TREATY MONITOR

*Civil society perspectives on the Arms Trade Treaty negotiation process*

**20 July 2012**  
**Vol. 5, No. 13**

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## Editorial: Rule of law or rule of “interests”?

Ray Acheson | *Reaching Critical Will* of WILPF

On Thursday morning, a battle broke out during negotiations of the arms trade treaty (ATT) over whether or not the criteria for assessing the risk of arms transfers should be buried in the national implementation section of the treaty, and, whether or not identification of a substantial risk should result in an automatic denial of the transfer. These debates are central to determining whether the ATT will be a document that strengthens or undermines the rule of law. If it is the latter, the whole point of developing an ATT will be lost.

The committee working on the criteria and parameters went through two draft texts on Thursday. The first, introduced at 10:00, reduced the parameters section to two paragraphs stipulating that states parties “shall make risk assessments” to ensure the export “is consistent with the provisions of the Treaty, based on the criteria”; and that the state party shall not authorize the export if it would “violate the provisions of the treaty” or the state party’s “relevant obligations under international law”. The list of criteria that are to be taken into account in risk assessments was moved to the national implementation section of the treaty, along with vague language on mitigation measures.

There were several issues of concern with this draft. One was that the parameters section only stipulated that states shall make risk assessments to ensure a transfer would be consistent with the treaty—it did not suggest what the appropriate action is if a risk is identified.

Many countries noted the failure of the draft to make a connection between the risk assessment and criteria on the one hand and the decisions states should make on the other. Delegations including those of Austria, Australia, Costa Rica, Denmark, European Union, Germany, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Ireland, Japan, Mexico, Portugal, and Switzerland said the treaty must stipulate that state parties “shall

not authorize” the transfer if substantial risk based on criteria is identified through the mandatory risk assessment process. The ICRC pointed out that if transfers are allowed to take place despite knowledge of substantial risk of violations of IHL, this would undermine states’ existing obligations under the Geneva Conventions to “ensure respect” for IHL.

Despite this, the US delegation emphasized that it will not accept a “shall not” clause, nor even a “presumption” against transfers upon identification of risk. The US representative said her country operates under a policy of exercising “particular restraint” in the case of a risky transfer and would not accept any stricter language in the ATT.

A second issue of concern was that the draft only required state parties to deny an export if it would “violate the provisions of the treaty” or “relevant obligations under international law”. Several delegations argued this was too vague and called for clarification as to which “provisions” and “relevant obligations” are being referred to in this context. Costa Rica, France, and Germany said this paragraph would have to include explicit references to items such as IHL, IHRL, and international crimes. But then the question remained, why not link the requirement of transfer denial to the list of criteria?

A fourth issue concerned the implications of moving the criteria to the section on implementation. This move was originally proposed by the P5 on 12 July and was supported by Brazil, India, and Syria. However, with the introduction of this change on Thursday, delegation after delegation argued this would detract from the ability of the ATT to set international legally-binding standards for arms transfers, which is the overall objective of the treaty. If criteria are a matter of simply implementation, they are implicitly a matter for national discretion rather than international scrutiny. The implemen-

*continued on page 3*

## Criteria creep

Dr. Robert Zuber | *Global Action to Prevent War*

My original intention today was to prepare an essay on ‘curbing our enthusiasm’ regarding the introduction of proposals that create new structures or introduce language that is not consistent with these negotiations or with established practice in other treaty bodies or international legal obligations. There are several ways to undermine a treaty, only one of which involves a direct assault on the treaty itself. The others involve an assault on consensus through the introduction of concepts, structural recommendations, or placement of treaty elements that jeopardize consensus and timely progress.

But we had a change of focus early on Thursday.

The first paper from the Chair of Main Committee I represented a major challenge to treaty coherence. GAPW has previously highlighted the folly of moving criteria into the implementation section – a position suggested primarily (though not exclusively) by the P5. In the absence of criteria that stand as a corrective to narrow or self-interested state interpretations, we are left

with states possessing many fluid options but few binding obligations. Criteria as a function of implementation represents nothing more than guidelines – like replacing the Ten Commandments with the Ten Suggestions. We need neither commandments nor suggestions but legally actionable risk criteria that directly impact the decision making of major producing and importing states alike.

Criteria placed in proposed treaty text as a subset of implementation is not properly criteria at all and is not in keeping with the customary understanding pertinent to other treaty obligations. As we have mentioned often, an ATT must do its part to end diversion of transfers but must not set a dangerous precedent in the UN system for creating treaties that have, in practice, little more force than ‘non-papers’. Fortunately, the paper presented by the Chair later in the day represents, in our view, a much more competent understanding of the role of criteria in a treaty. We strongly urge that this formulation carry the day. •

## ATT MONITOR

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The *Arms Trade Treaty Monitor* features civil society reporting and analysis on meetings of the UN conference on an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). It is coordinated, edited, and published by the Reaching Critical Will project of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom in partnership with Global Action to Prevent War, World Council of Churches, and the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA). PDF versions of all *ATT Monitors*, along with statements and other documents from the conference, are available at [www.reachingcriticalwill.org](http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org).

**All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the contributing authors and do not necessarily reflect the positions of the supporting organizations.**

### Editorial, cont'd

tation section of the treaty deals with *how* the treaty will be implemented, not *what* it will implement. Therefore, the criteria must be a separate section.

A great deal of states declared this draft as undermining the very purpose of an ATT. In a joint statement, Estonia, CARICOM, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, Fiji, Ghana, Ireland, Liberia, Mexico, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Switzerland, and Vanuatu argued that the criteria section “is an essential part of the over-arching, global framework for the treaty,” emphasizing, “It is part of its universal framing in much the same way as its principles, or objectives, are.” Several other states, including Chile, Germany, Japan, Malawi, and Peru, agreed with this assessment.

The outcry against changes to the structure and content of the text on criteria led the Chair to release a second draft text at 17:00. This text put the criteria list back in the parameters section. It also finally added gender-based violence to the criteria. As Iceland’s delegation noted in the morning, at least 15 member states had demanded its inclusion, yet it had not appeared in the text. The new text now includes use “to perpetrate or facilitate acts of gender-based violence, and violence against children” in the risk assessment criteria. The new text also specifies that mitigation measures must be taken prior to a final decision on the authorization of an export.

However, problems remain. The draft now does make a link between the risk assessment criteria and decisions on transfers, but it merely says “Where substantial risks exist, there shall be a presumption against authorization.” This is not strong enough. Even with a “presumption against authorization,” a state can override the presumption if decides that other political or economic interests are more important. This is a huge loophole in the treaty, an “escape clause” that will allow transfers to occur regardless of the consequences if a state decides other interests trump human security concerns.

The new draft also retains the language stipulating that state parties shall not authorize an export if it would “violate the provisions of the treaty” or the state party’s “relevant obligations under international law”. Despite calls for these “provisions” and “relevant obligations” to be explicitly described, both elements remain vague and unspecified. And, despite many calls for the parameters to refer to transfers rather than exports, in order to capture the broad range of activities covered by the treaty, the text still only discusses exports.

As the ICRC noted, a treaty based on these parameters would undermine existing international law. The text does not prohibit states from transferring weapons even where there is a significant risk of serious violations of international human rights law or international humanitarian law, or where weapons can be used to facilitate commission of international crimes. Thus the text gives states a list of suggested items to consider when deciding whether or not to export weapons. It does not establish the highest common international standards for governments to apply to their international arms transfer decisions, but rather encourages them to deny an export when it would have negative consequences while still allowing other interests to take precedence.

Venezuela’s delegation argued on Thursday afternoon that we do not live in a world with a just system of collective security, which is why an ATT should not inhibit the ability of states to acquire arms. On the contrary, this is exactly why we need a strong ATT. The lack of justice and security is what motivated the development of an ATT in the first place. Unregulated arms transfers have done nothing but undermine justice and security around the world. And in fact, the development of an ATT, with robust criteria and scope, strong implementation mechanisms, and effective transparency measures, would actually *aid in the development of* collective security. This is the reason we have spent six years trying to develop this treaty. We must not let those governments that put their ability to buy and sell weapons above the protection of civilians to undermine the achievement of our objective.



Art by Lin Evola



## Preamble, principles, objectives, and goals?

Katherine Prizeman | *Global Action to Prevent War*


As the negotiations for an arms trade treaty (ATT) continue for a third straight week, the urgency for compiling and agreeing on treaty text intensifies. Delegations have been busy discussing the various proposed sections of the treaty (including an intense discussion around criteria throughout Thursday's open meetings) and attempting to solidify each section so that a full text will be possible by the conclusion of next week. The discussion over the preamble and principles as well as the goals and objectives has been particularly difficult given the complexity of this treaty process. As has often been noted by delegations and civil society alike, the ATT is of a unique nature in that it is not merely a trade treaty nor is it purely a humanitarian instrument. Unlike the Cluster Munitions Convention of 2008 and the Anti-Personnel Landmines Treaty of 1997, the ATT will not ban one individual category of weapons nor will it disallow the trade in conventional weapons. Therefore, the ATT represents a fusion of dual goals: arms control through regulation as well as humanitarianism related to human suffering caused by the unregulated trade in conventional arms. This duality presents a particular challenge in drafting the beginning sections of the treaty, which will ultimately present the lens through which to interpret the remaining articles, most importantly the criteria and implementation sections.

The Chair of Main Committee I has proposed treaty text related to both preamble and principles and goals and objectives. The discussion around these texts has focused, in part, on the nature of these sections and what exact purpose they will serve in the text. This is a conversation as important as the substance of the text insofar as these sections will determine how states parties will interpret and ultimately implement the actionable elements of the treaty, particularly how seriously state parties will treat assessment criteria. Some delegations have expressed support for merging the preamble and principles section. Both the Cluster Munitions Convention and Landmines Treaty provide for only a preamble that notes the incentive for pursuing the treaties as well as recalls the principles of international humanitarian law and related conventions and resolutions. Likewise, the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) includes a preamble that lays forth the reasoning for pursuing non-proliferation as well as affirms the principles of "peaceful uses of nuclear energy" and non-threat of force. Nevertheless, as a result of the complexity of the ATT's intentions, a separate section on principles could be useful to ensure proper and consistent implementation of the Treaty by states parties.

In the ATT context, the preamble and principles, as in other instruments of international law, provide the rationale for why member states are pursuing an ATT—to prevent, eradicate, and combat the irresponsible and illicit trade in conventional arms. It is essential to clearly outline this motivation so that this purpose is made manifest in the subsequent treaty text. There is also still unease among delegations on how to reference the UN Charter, i.e. whether to reference particular articles or mention it in more general terms. Some delegations, such as Mexico, have warned against selectivity in referring to the Charter's principles, noting that the Charter takes precedence over all other treaties and conventions crafted under UN auspices. Nonetheless, given the nature of the ATT and the sensitivity it provokes around national sovereignty related to self-defense and arms acquisition, the most relevant principles of the Charter (such as self-defense, right to regulate arms internally, and the right to territorial integrity) could be referenced in the principles as a means to ensure that states parties do not feel that their sovereign right to trade in arms is threatened (prompting states to 'walk away' from the Treaty or resist ratification) and instead focus on preventing diversion and irresponsible transfers, which should be the Treaty's true purpose.

The question then becomes: how do we differentiate between the preamble and principles and the goals and objectives? While the preamble and principles 'set the stage,' the goals and objectives will play a crucial role in implementation of the treaty. As previously noted, the ATT is a unique instrument that seeks to regulate a trade, but with a view towards combating the dire humanitarian consequences associated with irresponsible and illicit arms transfer. Bearing this in mind, the goals and objectives will drive implementation and risk assessment. Therefore, these goals must be ironclad and comprehensive so that states "shall deny a transfer" if it is inconsistent with the goals and objectives of the treaty. It cannot be only those in violation of the goals and objectives as this indicates only that which goes directly against it and, therefore, is too limiting.

Strong goals and principles will be the linchpin to ensuring robust application of the parameters. The challenge of agreeing on precise treaty language is formidable, especially in light of the distinctive nature of the ATT. Treatment of these sections of the treaty will impact greatly the effectiveness of its future implementation. •



## Across

1. What type of group examined the feasibility of the ATT in 2008 (4 words)?
5. To pave the way for negotiations, the broad objective of the OEWG was to narrow differences on four areas of an ATT, including ...
7. In 2003, the International Action Network Against Small Arms, Amnesty International, and Oxfam launched what campaign (2 words)?
6. List the six countries that export 74% of the world's conventional weapons (there are multiple "6 across" field, one per country).
8. Attempts to regulate the arms trade at a global level are not new. The ratification of a proposed convention to control the arms trade appeared as a subject on the first agenda of which organization (3 words)?
9. The second session of the preparatory committee for the UN Conference on an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) met in which city (2 words)?

## Down

2. Member states that presented a draft resolution, entitled "Towards an arms trade treaty: establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms" (there are multiple "2 down" fields, one per country).
3. Who said, "Armed violence undermines development and impedes the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals" (3 words)?
4. Which one country voted against developing an Arms Trade Treaty in 2009?

**News in Brief***Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF and Katherine Prizeman | Global Action to Prevent War***Main Committee 1: Parameters**Chair's rev1 text on parameters and criteria (paragraph 5)

- Austria, Australia, Denmark, Malawi, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK noted the missing linkage between the new paragraph 5 on parameters and the specific list of criteria.
- ICRC said the bottom line of the text is that despite substantial risk, a transfer can go forward.
- Sweden and Uganda said it is unclear what would constitute a violation of the provisions of treaty.
- Colombia proposed replacing “violate the provisions of this treaty” in paragraph 5.2 with direct reference to violations of obligations under international law.
- Costa Rica, France, and Germany said it was necessary to spell out the obligations under international law, including arms embargoes, IHL, and IHRL in paragraph 5.2.
- Austria, Australia, Costa Rica, Denmark, EU, Germany, ICRC, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, and Portugal, and Switzerland said the treaty should stipulate that state parties “shall not authorize” the transfer if substantial risk based on criteria exists.
- ICRC said allow transfer to take place despite knowledge of risk undermines states existing obligations under the Geneva Conventions to “ensure respect” for IHL.
- Holy See said “presumption” should be define as “shall not authorize”.
- Djibouti, DRC, Liberia, Somalia, South Sudan, and Uganda said states shall prohibit transfer if it contradicts the treaty’s goals, objectives, and principles or relevant regional or international obligations.
- Norway argued 5.2 is unnecessary because it is redundant to specify that states shall not violate their obligations under international law.
- India proposed replacing in 5.2 “would violate the provisions of the Treaty” with “if the export could be used to support, encourage, or perpetrate terrorist acts...”
- ECOWAS, EU, Nigeria, and USA supported a section on “prohibitions” referring to UN arms embargoes.
- Iran said adding embargoes will complicate progress.
- USA supported including specific obligations under international agreements to which states are a party.
- USA said it could not support a prohibition of transfer where there is “substantial risk” nor an “overriding presumption” against transfer, as other considerations (i.e. national security) could take precedence over the criteria.
- Costa Rica, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, DRC, France, and Uruguay said transfer should be used instead of export to capture broad range of activities.
- Iran said export is exactly the right term to use.
- Mexico and Peru said “originate in its territory” should be deleted from 5.1.
- DPRK and Syria said 5.2 should reflect right to self-defence and principle of non-interference.

*List of individual criterion*

- Iceland said that as at least 15 delegations have called for gender-based violence in the criteria, the ATT should include criteria assessing whether transfers will “perpetrate or facilitate gender-based violence, including rape and other forms of sexual violence.”
- CARICOM, Ireland, Italy, Malawi, and Portugal agreed the criteria should include gender-based violence.
- Ireland called for reference to violence against children.
- Costa Rica, EU, Finland, France, and Togo called for inclusion of corruption, while Uruguay called for a separate paragraph referring to “corrupt practices”.
- CARICOM called for a provision on stability, in particular regional stability.
- Venezuela and Brazil disagreed with the inclusion of development as a criterion.
- Austria said sustainable development should carry an overriding presumption against authorization.
- Ecuador, Syria, and Venezuela said development should not be included.
- China said references to IHL, IHRL, and development should be moved to the preamble.
- DPRK said criteria on IHL, IHRL, war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity are subjective and should be deleted.
- DPRK said criterion on undermining stability should add “due to excessive production and exports”.
- ECOWAS & China suggested adding non-state actors.
- Indonesia questioned the meaning of ‘rigorous assessment’ under paragraph 1 of the list of criteria and called for an advisory body to check consistency of the application of criteria.
- Peru said the criteria should be a general framework against which states evaluate transfers and that criteria are international in nature.
- Syria said it will never agree to a treaty without inclusion of criterion on foreign occupation.

*National assessment (paragraphs 2–4)*

- Pakistan noted any parameter must also take into account that any transfer must not introduce destabilizing military capabilities in any region or sub-region.

- Colombia said paragraph 2 was confusing in its wording and should be deleted.
- Egypt said it appreciated the language in paragraph 2 on applying the criteria “consistently and in an objective and non-discriminatory manner.”
- India said that paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 are subjective and would be open to interpretation.
- DRC called for provisions for importer states.
- Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay said “credible” should be deleted in para 2 because all information submitted in good faith should be credible.
- Djibouti, DRC, Liberia, Somalia, South Sudan, and Uganda said in making assessments states parties shall be guided by multilaterally agreed mechanisms.

#### *Placement of criteria under implementation section*

- Estonia, CARICOM, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, Fiji, Ghana, Ireland, Liberia, Mexico, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Switzerland, and Vanuatu and said they could not agree that moving the criteria to implementation would be practical or advance global implementation of the ATT’s criteria.
- Chile, Germany, Japan, Malawi, and Peru agreed.
- Brazil, India, Syria, and USA supported the proposal to move criteria to implementation and said that risk assessment is national and not international in nature.
- Iran said it was flexible on move.
- Sweden said moving the criteria to implementation had implications for the nature of the criteria themselves and would require more detailed language to address these implications.
- The ICRC said criteria must be a core obligation and not simply an implementation issue.
- Brazil expressed doubts over the movement of the criteria noting that it is already clear that implementation of the treaty rests with states parties.
- Russia proposed a separate section on “practical measures” placed before the criteria section with a parameters section that includes just two main provisions regarding decisions on export.

#### *Mitigation measures*

- Austria, ICRC, and Mexico said mitigation measures must take place before transfer.
- The ICRC and the Holy See noted that mitigation measures should not be used as a substitute for non-transfers and are not to be used as justification for a transfer that otherwise would be unjustifiable.
- Mexico said mitigations measures could serve as incentives and generate dialogue between states.

- ROK said mitigation measures have no place in the parameters.
- ICRC and Uruguay noted that it is unclear what mitigation measures should be.
- ICRC suggested they could include bilateral assurances and clarifications, training of forces, disciplinary actions for previous violations, and securing of stocks to prevent diversion.
- Djibouti, DRC, Liberia, Somalia, South Sudan, and Uganda said treaty should say states parties shall take mitigation measures to ensure the transfer is consistent with the goals, objectives, and principles.
- Ireland said it cannot accept any obligation to undertake mitigation measures.

#### Chair’s rev2 text on parameters and criteria

- All delegations welcomed the new text as an improvement except the Cuban delegation, which said it was unacceptable.
- Switzerland called for the word “applicable” to be deleted in reference to IHL and IHRL in 2a.
- Belgium asked what word “applicable” in 2a means.
- Switzerland said transfer denial should be automatic, not presumed, in case of substantial risk.
- France regretted absence of reference to corruption and national stability.
- Belgium, Finland, and Italy called for reference to corruption.
- Finland said reference to international law in para 1 is too general.
- CARICOM, Colombia, Ghana, and Mexico called for “transfer” rather than “export”.
- Belgium, Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Italy, and ROK called for reference to UN arms embargoes.
- Colombia, Ghana, and Mexico called for armed violence to be added to 2c and 2f.
- Colombia and Mexico called for paragraph on consultations between importers and exporters.
- Holy See complained about use of word “gender” and said it should be replaced with “violence against women”.
- Ghana and Italy welcomed the inclusion of gender-based violence.
- Ghana said the criteria should include intentional transfer of weapons to non-state actors, not just diversion to them.
- Australia called for socioeconomic development to be reinserted.
- Australia said for clarity paras 4 and 6 should say, “Where substantial risk of any of the consequences defined in a-i...” •

## Negotiation by exhaustion: the mad dash to the finish

Dan Lee | Control Arms

From yesterday onwards the Conference has started to extend its hours into the night, with negotiations also taking up the delegates' upcoming weekend before the final allocated week of negotiation time. The commitment by governments to use this extra time to ensure they reach an agreed arms trade treaty (ATT) is admirable, but it comes with certain risks. The most obvious of these is that delegates will begin to tire, burn out, and exhaust themselves from long and increasingly tense days of negotiating. These days will almost certainly get increasingly longer as the week goes on.

As with many conferences, the risk is that the Treaty could ultimately be decided by "negotiation by exhaustion". This phrase was coined by the Tanzanian delegate on the final night of the negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, when negotiations continued through the final night of the Conference right through to the final plenary (Oberthür & Ott, 1999). The Kyoto Protocol negotiations were also decided by consensus, but Chairman Raul Estrada-Oyuela played a central role in the way the final negotiations proceeded.

This sort of experience can be a good thing in some ways. It may reduce the amount of time delegations spend trying to filibuster or get in the way of certain issues they are less in favour of. It may spur governments on to find agreement quickly and efficiently in order to cover a lot of ground very fast. It may even lead them to find agreement where there previously was none, with quick last minute compromises to get things done.

But it can also risk damaging the quality of the discussions taking place. At Kyoto, most delegates became highly fatigued and had little willingness to engage in long and extensive discussions. As such, vital pieces of information may be lost in the eagerness to get things done as soon as possible. Extensive discussions can be inefficient and self-serving, but at other times they may reveal arguments and information that would not otherwise see the light of day. The same can be said of the compromises that delegations may be forced into, towards the end of negotiations. Already we are seeing governments making compromises, which is positive. But compromises should only be there to ensure that in the end, as strong a Treaty as possible results. The willingness to get the Treaty completed should not come at a cost to its quality. The same goes for the decisions made by the Chairs, and the work of the Secretariat, who will also suffer from the exhaustive process.

Another drawback of this kind of negotiation is the issue of capacity. Larger states are much more adept at dealing with long, drawn-out negotiations. These are the states that are already equipped with wide pools of resources, many advisors, and large delegations. At Kyoto, the United States was able to benefit by having a different negotiator head their team every few hours, to ensure they were fresh, aware, and awake. It was argued that "[o]n a few issues, the advantage of being awake and willing to invest some energy made a decisive difference". Smaller delegations will be at a huge disadvantage as negotiations wear on, and will need all the assistance and understanding they can get to participate effectively and to have their voices heard. To some extent, regional and cross-regional groupings will one way of ensuring the burden is shared between groups of like-minded governments.

The Conference on the ATT has already lost nearly a week of negotiating time at the start, and nothing is yet agreed on any final text to send to capitals for approval. If delegations are going to reach any agreement on a worthwhile Treaty by the middle, or at the latest the end of the next week, they will need to show much perseverance, but also a great deal of understanding for their fellow delegates, who will be under increasing strain from the negotiations. •







## INVITATION

# Women's Human Rights The Arms Trade Treaty and CEDAW

Friday, 20 July 2012

UN-Women headquarters, 19th Floor Conference Room  
(220 East 42nd Street, New York)

From 1:15 to 2:45 pm

*Light Lunch will be served*

**Please RSVP** (for access reasons) to: [ameer.el.nager@unwomen.org](mailto:ameer.el.nager@unwomen.org)

The panel will discuss important ways in which two treaties-- the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of discrimination against Women (CEDAW) along with the UN Security Council resolution 1325 et al. can work to prevent discrimination and violence against women, particularly in conflict and post-conflict situations.

Speakers include:

- Anne Marie Goetz, Chief Advisor, Peace and Security, UN Women.
- Pramila Patten, CEDAW expert and Chair, Working Group on Women in Conflict and Post-conflict Situations.
- Vanessa Farr, International expert and consultant, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF).
- Michèle Olga Pépé, IANSa Women's Network and the West African Action Network on Small Arms (WAANSa)-Cote d'Ivoire / Réseau d'Action sur les Armes Légères d'Afrique de l'Ouest (RASALAO)-Cote d'Ivoire.
- Nicole Ameline, Vice-Chair, CEDAW committee and expert

**Co-sponsors** International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSa), The International Alliance of Women (IAW), Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) and UN Women.

## ATT MONITOR 5.13

### Calendar of events for Friday, 20 July 2012


When	What	Where	Who
10:00–13:00	Main Committee 1 (open): Preamble/principles	Conference Room 1 North Lawn Building	
10:00–13:00	Main Committee 2 (closed): Implementation	Conference Room 4 North Lawn Building	
13:15–14:45	Women's Human Rights: The ATT and CEDAW	UN Women 220 East 42nd Street 19th floor conf room	WILPF, IANSA, IAW, UN Women <i>RSVP for security reasons</i> ameer.el.nager@unwomen.org
13:15–14:45	From the Front Line: Four Perspectives on the ATT	Conference Room 4 North Lawn Building	Permanent Mission of Belgium to the UN, Oxfam Contact: Øistein Moskvil Thorsen, oistein.thorsen@oxfaminternational.org
15:00–18:00	Main Committee 1 (closed): Goals and objectives	Conference Room 4 North Lawn Building	
15:00–18:00	Main Committee 2 (open): Scope	Conference Room 1 North Lawn Building	

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**Reaching Critical Will**

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Global Action  
to Prevent War

**WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR  
PEACE & FREEDOM**



international action network on small arms



**World Council  
of Churches**

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