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CAMPAIGN TO **STOP**
KILLER ROBOTS

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EDITORIAL: DRAWING BOLD MORAL LINES AGAINST AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS

Richard Moyes | Campaign to Stop Killer Robots

The UN Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) returns to formal work in August on the issue of autonomous weapons. With the Sixth Review Conference (RevCon) of the CCW scheduled for the end of this year, and some significant developments in the international policy conversation already in 2021, states in August will be looking to position themselves in relation to the content of the issue and the political questions around “outcomes” from the RevCon. For civil society in the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, policy content continues to be key as we build recognition of the need for both prohibitions and regulations in response to the challenges of autonomy in weapon systems. These will provide the basis for a future legal instrument that protects human dignity and preserves meaningful human control in the use of force.

The Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) will meet from 3–13 August, with Ambassador Pecsteen of Belgium chairing discussions. Previous sessions of this GGE have been disrupted by COVID and by disagreements over meeting arrangements in the context of COVID. This has resulted in the status of certain sessions being disputed, and in the undertaking of informal online discussions to keep the conversation moving. The August session will see a return to formal, in-person, work—without the capacity for remote interventions and with constraints on room numbers that threaten to constrict civil society access. The meeting agenda is split broadly into two parts: first, discussions on content, and then consideration of how the GGE reports on its work. The latter is an open space for political arguments reflecting the ambitions of different constituencies for the RevCon.

Informal, online discussions held during the last week of June present an important backdrop to the first part of this session. Conducted without a formal agenda, the June discussions allowed states to express positions on how to approach the content of the issue as a whole. The most striking

feature evident in June was the emergence of a structural coherence across the policy positions of many states and reflected in a number of joint papers. Although differing on the status of response needed (i.e. legal instrument vs. best practices) and on the choice and description of certain boundaries, there is clear movement towards a two-tier structure of prohibitions and regulations, which recognises that some things are unacceptable and other things need to be subject to positive obligations for control.

The centrality of this structure now, which reflects also the structure of the International Committee of the Red Cross’s recently announced position, has profound implications for the conversation ahead. It allows people to talk productively in a way that has been difficult to this point and is forcing states to position themselves more distinctly. The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots calls for:

- Prohibitions on autonomous weapon systems that cannot be used with meaningful human control;
 - Prohibitions on autonomous weapon systems that would target human beings;
- and*
- Positive obligations to ensure that meaningful human control is maintained over all other autonomous weapon systems.

We will be working to grow further the partnership of states and other actors that are working within this structure. We have strong arguments for why these components are necessary in response to the threat of dehumanisation, the erosion on legal protections, and risks unpredictable harms. Those arguments will provide the basis for a partnership of states, international organisations, and civil society to put in place the legal response that is necessary on this issue.

In opposition to that partnership, we are likely to see increasingly frantic efforts to secure something that can be claimed as an “outcome” on this issue at the RevCon, in order to bolster assertions that the CCW can be expected to provide an effective long-term solution. But asserting that “the CCW is the appropriate forum” and actually securing a meaningful outcome are very different things.

The implications of autonomy in weapon systems for society are profound and they will be generally recognised, sooner rather than later, as requiring a substantive legal response. We need multilateral

processes that are adequate to solving pressing issues of technology in society, and we need to build greater confidence in norms and standards that protect our shared humanity. Amongst the structure of rules that the Campaign promotes, the rejection of allowing machines to kill people draws the clearest moral line. It is an invitation for states to be bold in setting the norms of our relationship to technology in the future. It is at that level of societal vision that states should approach the content of this discussion, with confidence that such content will find appropriate legal expression.

WILPF AGAINST AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS

Ray Acheson | Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) has opposed war and the development of technologies of violence since its founding in 1915. We have condemned high levels of global spending on militarism and conflict rather than on the benefit of humankind and the promotion of human security. While WILPF opposes all war and violence, there is something especially cynically abhorrent in the idea of human beings assigning killing to a technological creation. The taking of life requires human accountability, determined by morality and law. Without that we shirk our responsibilities and betray our common humanity.

WILPF has delivered several statements to many previous CCW meetings on autonomous weapons, including in May 2014, April 2015, April 2016, August 2018, and March 2019. We have used these opportunities to express WILPF's position against the development of killer robots, including our belief that the laws of war and protection of human rights and dignity require meaningful human control over all weapon systems and the use of force.

Human beings are fallible. We can be violent, we can break laws. But we have traits that machines do not have, and cannot be programmed to have: moral reasoning, empathy, compassion, mercy. Giving machines power to target and kill human

beings crosses a moral line. It points to an increasing remoteness and abstraction of violence. It suggests the further erosion of the value of human life and dignity.

Weapons symbolise power. Whether it is small arms or atomic bombs, weapons have been developed and used to dominate others. The production and proliferation of weapons also means profits for corporations and their leaders. The potential development of autonomous weapon systems must be seen in the context of power and profit. Corporations will be seeking to make money off the development of these weapons, and high-tech countries will use autonomous weapons to oppress and occupy others.

Countries of the global south may not be the ones to develop and use autonomous weapons, but they will likely become the battlegrounds for the testing and deployment of these weapons. It will be the so-called rich countries using these weapons against the poor—and the rich within countries using it against their own poor, through policing and internal oppression.

Autonomous weapons will also exacerbate discriminatory gender norms and be used to commit acts of gender-based violence. They could also be programmed with gender, racial, socioeconomic, (dis)ability, and other forms for bias

that cause disproportionate harm to marginalised communities.

The bottom line is that if autonomous weapon systems are developed and used, human beings around the world will suffer. Human rights will be undermined. They will be used to repress, to harm, to kill. It is the protection of human rights and dignity that has motivated WILPF's previous work for humanitarian disarmament. It is this that motivates our work for stronger laws and norms to prevent the increasing abstraction and mechanisation of violence.

At the end of the day, the answer is simple: Weapons must be under human control. We already experience far too much violence among human beings. How can we risk further automating this violence? Fighting to retain human control over violence is not just about preventing mechanised death and destruction; it is also about calling ourselves to account for the violence we already perpetuate.

WILPF National Sections are taking the threats of autonomous weapons seriously and are mobilising actively to prevent their development.

WILPF Burundi is focusing on the inclusion of youth as future actors to support a ban on killer robots. It recently organised workshops with young people and has set up discussion groups for possible actions and exchanges related to stopping killer robots. It is also working to engage high-level decision-makers at the executive and legislative levels through advocacy meetings with members of parliament and government authorities, to elicit action and clarify Burundi's position.

WILPF Cameroon has mobilised the public and government officials to urge support for a ban on autonomous weapons, hosting workshops and education events. Recently, WILPF Cameroon and **WILPF Togo** co-hosted a launch of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots in Togo, so that WILPF Togo can spread the message for an urgent ban in its country.

WILPF DRC is organising an awareness and information workshop to educate opinion leaders in academia, the media, human rights activists,

and youth, and conduct advocacy outreach with Congolese authorities.

WILPF Germany published a report in May 2021 on Germany's disarmament policies, which included a chapter on intersectional feminist perspectives on autonomous weapons and Germany's position.

WILPF Ghana launched the new initiative "Arts for Peace," facilitating activities such as art exhibitions, art shows, social media campaigns, storytelling with images, poems, photo essays, photography books, and cartoons, drawings, amongst others, to increase awareness and gather more public support for a ban. WILPF Ghana believes that art is a catalyst for positive change that can alter public perceptions and move people to action and therefore makes it a valuable peace building tool. WILPF Ghana has also been building public awareness by educating community members, organising rallies in town halls, holding press conferences, briefing the national parliament, and hosting educational conferences and trainings.

WILPF Kenya is working to create awareness and spark dialogue amongst youth to reinforce the role of young people in peace building, autonomous weapons, and their futures. The Section will hold three educational workshops featuring guest experts from key areas (youth, tech workers, feminist peace organizations, and academia) in sessions designed for Kenyan youth to unpack the issue of fully autonomous weapons and the untold realities of killer robots.

WILPF Sierra Leone, in partnership with the Christian Outreach Justice Mission-Sierra Leone, is engaging in a series of communications and media activities to increase awareness and grow public support for a ban on autonomous weapons. They will conduct virtual meetings with key stakeholders, including the National Youth Commission and the Ministry of Youth Affairs, the Parliamentary Committee on Arms, and the Small Arms Commission. They will also conduct outreach to youth and other civil society organisations.

WILPF Sweden is working to get the Swedish public and government on board for a ban. In 2021, they held a workshop for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on killer robots and gender, produced


accessible information material for WILPF members and the public on the topic, featured in a Channel 4 news piece, and mobilised other civil society organisations to work actively on the issue of autonomous weapons.

WILPF United Kingdom, as part of the UK Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, recently made a submission to the Foreign Affairs Committee for the government's call for evidence for their Inquiry into Tech and the Future of UK Foreign Policy. In its submission, the UK Campaign calls for a legally binding instrument to pre-emptively ban autonomous weapons.

WILPF Zimbabwe recently organised a youth online conference which addressed, amongst others, the role that young people can take in speaking out against killer robots and mobilising their governments for a ban. The Section also hosted workshops for civil society colleagues as well as

government representatives, addressing different aspects of killer robots, including what they are and why they need to be banned, and about gender dimensions of the issue. They also brought together youth organisations led by young girls, women-led civil society groups, as well as students and others. This led to an alliance of women and youth led civil society organisations, who are now working jointly for a ban on killer robots.

These are but a few examples of WILPF's ongoing work to prevent the development of autonomous weapon systems. We urge all WILPF Sections and members to join these efforts—to get started, check out our [WILPF Guide to Killer Robots](#) and our [papers](#) on feminist perspectives on autonomous weapons. We also urge other activists and civil society groups to get involved with the [Campaign to Stop Killer Robots](#) to help us prevent digital dehumanisation and autonomous violence.



Find our latest publications providing feminist perspectives on autonomous weapons at www.reachingcriticalwill.org



Collaborative paper by Maria Pia Devoto, Eunice Janssen and Wanda Muñoz

Analysis of the proposals and statements of countries from the Global South on the normative and operational framework in the area of Autonomous Weapons Systems

*“This is the voice from the Global South” – JJ Dominguez, Philippines,
Group of Government Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems at the
Informal Exchange of Views, 29 June 2021*

This paper examines the written contributionsⁱ submitted by some of the countries from the Global South on recommendations in relation to the clarification, consideration and development of aspects of the normative and operational framework on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). It also examines statementsⁱⁱ from the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Group of Government Experts (GGE) on LAWS ‘Informal Exchange of Views’ meeting which took place from 28 June to 2 July 2021.

The objective is to find common elements in the written submissions and statements of these countries, include those from the Latin America region, to make evident the common ground built over the years as States chart a way forward.

At the 2019 meeting of High Contracting Parties to the CCW, discussions largely focussed on challenges posed by LAWS, the importance of human element, aspects of human-machine interaction, military applications of related emerging technologies, challenges posed to the International Humanitarian Law (IHL), and possible options on how to address humanitarian and international security concerns such as: a legally binding instrument, a political declaration, guidelines, principles, a code of conduct, and the improvement of existing legal requirements.

The successful outcome of this meeting was the adoption by consensus of the eleven Guiding Principles which as expressed by the Chair *“the GGE on LAWS is to utilise (...) for its recommendations in terms of clarification, and development of the normative and operational framework”ⁱⁱⁱ*.

Despite the challenges posed by the pandemic, Ambassador Janis Karklins of Latvia, who chaired the 2020 GGE on LAWS until August, organised virtual informal consultations called *“fireside chats”* throughout the year in an effort to achieve progress. Ambassador Karklins also invited High Contracting Parties to submit commentaries on the operationalising of the Guiding Principles at the national level.

Current GGE Chair, Ambassador Marc Pecsteen de Buytsverve of Belgium, requested that States submit written contributions on recommendations in relation to the clarification, consideration and development of aspects of the normative and operational framework on emerging technologies in the area of LAWS. These written contributions were discussed at an ‘Informal Exchange of Views’ organised for 28 June – 5 July when the GGE session initially planned for May 2021 was cancelled.

The next formal GGE meeting is scheduled for August 2021 as an in-person event provided the pandemic restrictions are eased to allow for such a gathering.

Historically the Latin American region has played an essential role in humanitarian disarmament by supporting, in some cases, leading negotiation processes on legally binding instruments to ban or control weapons that cause unacceptable harm. As a matter of fact, the international community witnessed their most recent effort in the entry into force of the 2017 Nuclear Ban Treaty in January 2021 when Honduras became the 50th state to ratify it in October 2020. Likewise other countries from Africa, Asia and the Pacific have also been instrumental in strengthening International Humanitarian Law in the past decade.

This common humanitarian disarmament perspective among the Latin American countries and more broadly countries from the Global South, could potentially foster a stronger collaboration towards a legally binding instrument on autonomous weapons systems (AWS).

The 'Informal Exchange of Views' meeting triggered an enriched discussion allowing for States to come forward with a more 'open-minded' position in regards to the need for a prohibitions and regulations framework that could serve to adopt a mandate for the negotiation of a legally binding instrument sooner rather than later.

It was noted that a growing number of states share very similar positions and concerns, and while recognising there are different approaches to some of the elements being discussed on LAWS, the following commonalities in key areas have been identified:

1. **Description of the weapons of concern:** Weapons that cannot ensure meaningful human control in the critical functions of selecting and attacking targets/applying force
2. **Normative framework:** Legally binding instrument
3. **Elements of the structure of a normative framework:** Prohibitions and regulations (positive obligations) should be included to ensure meaningful human control over the use of force
4. **Prohibitions:** Prohibitions are necessary for AWS that cannot ensure human control over its critical functions of selection and engagement of targets in the application of force
5. **Regulations:** Regulations are necessary for other AWS and should include limits such as those related to types of targets, duration, geographical scope, scale of use, among others
6. **Accountability and responsibility:** International rules should apply to the use of AWS. Both States and individuals should be held responsible for violations of International Law
7. **Meaningful human control:** It should be ensured so that the use of AWS is compliant with International Law. Meaningful human control applies to the life cycle of weapons systems and all its critical functions
8. **Transparency and legal reviews:** These are fundamentals and should cover all aspects of the development of AWS.

Five key recommendations for all States on the way forward

- 1) States are encouraged to further analyse and address the need for a prohibition of **antipersonnel AWS** to ensure the protection of human dignity.
- 2) There should be no further delay in the process of agreeing on an **actual normative framework** of all AWS and divergencies in topics such as meanings and definitions should be addressed in the negotiation process instead, as has been the case in other humanitarian disarmament processes.

- 3) States with similar positions on the **key aspects of the debate** should make a targeted effort towards inviting other countries from Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Pacific to urgently join the ongoing process and encourage them to manifest their positions and commonalities as well.
- 4) States should aim at presenting a **joint statement to the GGE meeting in August 2021**, outlining the shared elements in an effort to consolidate a stronger position.
- 5) Joint statements presented by States from various regions in other multilateral fora such as the **United Nations General Assembly First Committee**, are a viable approach to achieve wider support towards the negotiation of a legally binding instrument.

Conclusions

It has been established that these States share important similarities in key aspects of the debate on LAWS, including on the need of prohibitions and regulations of weapons that cannot ensure meaningful human control in the critical functions of selecting and attacking targets/applying force. The Informal Exchange meeting carried out at the end of June included positive discussions whereby various States delivered a progressive message that could lead to an achievable and desired outcome: **a legally binding instrument**.

While the continued commitment from some of the countries of the Latin America region to present concrete proposals throughout the discussions is commendable, this is an ongoing process and more States from the Global South are expected to join the efforts that the countries from Latin America and other regions are carrying out at the CCW fora. This approach should continue to seek a stronger advancement in the process of negotiating a legally binding instrument that: a) prohibits AWS that select targets/apply force without meaningful human control, and those that target people; and b) includes positive regulations to ensure meaningful human control. States should move past definition boundaries, which could be part of the negotiation stage, as has been the case in other humanitarian disarmament processes. It is clear that the autonomy in taking lives poses legal, moral, ethical, human rights and humanitarian concerns, and must be prohibited under International Law.

Technological innovation and development are evolving faster than the current pace of diplomatic dialogue on LAWS. Regardless of the pandemic challenges, progress must be made during the GGE that is scheduled to meet from 27 September to 1 October 2021, and during the Preparatory Committee to the Sixth Review Conference which is scheduled from 6 to 8 of September, in hopes of the targeted outcome in December at the Sixth Review Conference: **a mandate for a legally binding instrument on autonomous weapons systems (AWS)**.

ⁱ Joint Working Papers:

- Costa Rica, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Sierra Leone and Uruguay
- Austria, Brazil, Chile, Ireland, Luxembourg, Mexico, and New Zealand
- Venezuela on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)

ⁱⁱ Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Uruguay, Venezuela (on behalf of the NAM)

ⁱⁱⁱ Chairperson's Summary, 19 April 2021. Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons System, Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. CCW/GGE.1/2020/WP.7

https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/CCW_GGE1_2020_WP_7-ADVANCE.pdf



En colaboración por María Pía Devoto, Eunice Janssen y Wanda Muñoz

Análisis de las propuestas y declaraciones de países del Sur Global sobre el marco normativo y operativo en el área de Sistemas de Armas Autónomos

*“Esta es la voz del Sur Global” - JJ Domínguez, Filipinas,
Grupo de Expertos Gubernamentales sobre Sistemas de Armas Letales Autónomas
en el Intercambio Informal de Opiniones, 29 de junio del 2021*

Este artículo examina las contribuciones escritasⁱ presentadas por algunos de los países del Sur Global sobre recomendaciones en relación a la clarificación, consideración y desarrollo de aspectos del marco normativo y operativo sobre tecnologías emergentes en el área de sistemas de armas letales autónomas (SALAs o LAWS, por sus siglas en inglés). Se examina también las declaracionesⁱⁱ hechas durante el “Intercambio Informal de Opiniones” del Grupo de Expertos Gubernamentales (GEG o GGE, por sus siglas en inglés) sobre SALAs de la Convención sobre Ciertas Armas Convencionales (CCAC o CCW, por sus siglas en inglés) que se llevó a cabo del 28 de junio al 2 de julio de 2021.

El objetivo del artículo es encontrar elementos en común en las contribuciones escritas y declaraciones de esos Estados, que incluyen de la región de Latinoamérica, para evidenciar el interés común cimentado en los últimos años en la medida que los Estados se trazan un camino a seguir.

En la reunión del 2019 de la Altas Partes Contratantes de la CCAC, las discusiones se enfocaron ampliamente en los desafíos planteados por SALAs, la importancia del elemento humano, aspectos de la interacción máquina-humano, aplicaciones militares relacionados a tecnologías emergentes, los retos desde la perspectiva de Derecho Internacional Humanitario (DIH), y las posibles opciones para garantizar la seguridad humana y la seguridad internacional tales como: un instrumento jurídicamente vinculante, una declaración política, directrices, principios, un código de conducta, y actualizar los requisitos legales existentes.

El resultado exitoso de la reunión del 2019 fue la adopción por consenso de los once Principios Rectores que, como expresó el Presidente, *“el GEG sobre SALAs debe utilizar (...) para sus recomendaciones en términos de aclaración y desarrollo del marco normativo y operativo”*ⁱⁱⁱ.

Ante los desafíos planteados por la pandemia, el Embajador Janis Karklins de Letonia, quien presidió el GEG sobre SALAs hasta agosto del 2020, organizó consultas virtuales informales denominadas *“charlas privadas”* durante todo ese año, en un esfuerzo por seguir avanzando en la temática. El Embajador Karklins también invitó a las Altas Partes Contratantes a presentar comentarios sobre la puesta en práctica de los Principios Rectores a nivel nacional.

El Presidente actual del GEG, Embajador Marc Pecsteen de Buytsverve de Bélgica, solicitó a los Estados presentar contribuciones escritas sobre recomendaciones en relación con la clarificación, consideración y desarrollo de aspectos del marco normativo y operativo sobre tecnologías emergentes en el área de SALAs. Estas contribuciones escritas se discutieron en un ‘Intercambio Informal de Opiniones’, que se llevó a cabo del 28 de junio al 5 de julio, luego de que la sesión formal del GEG inicialmente prevista para mayo de 2021 fuera cancelada.

La próxima reunión formal del GEG está programada en formato presencial para agosto 2021, en el caso tal de que las restricciones de la pandemia mejoren para permitir una reunión en persona.

Históricamente, la región latinoamericana ha desempeñado un papel esencial en el desarme humanitario mediante su apoyo, y en algunos casos, liderando los procesos de negociación de instrumentos jurídicamente vinculantes para prohibir o regular armas que causan daños inaceptables. De hecho, la comunidad internacional fue testigo del esfuerzo más reciente con la entrada en vigor del Tratado de Prohibición de Armas Nucleares (2017) en enero de 2021, después de que Honduras se convirtió en el quincuagésimo Estado en ratificarlo en octubre de 2020. Asimismo, otros países de África, Asia y el Pacífico también han sido fundamentales para fortalecer el DIH en la última década.

Una perspectiva común de desarme humanitario entre los países de América Latina y, en general, los países del Sur Global, podría fomentar una colaboración más sólida hacia un instrumento jurídicamente vinculante sobre sistemas de armas autónomas (SAA o AWS, por sus siglas en inglés).

El ‘Intercambio Informal de Opiniones’ incitó una discusión fructífera que permitió a los Estados presentar posiciones más abiertas en lo que respecta a la necesidad de un marco sobre prohibiciones y regulaciones que facilite la adopción de un mandato para la negociación de un instrumento jurídicamente vinculante sobre SALAs en un futuro cercano.

Se observó que un número creciente de Estados comparten posiciones e inquietudes muy similares, y si bien existen diferencias en algunos elementos, se han identificado puntos en común en temas fundamentales, entre ellos:

1. **Descripción de las armas en cuestión:** armas que no pueden garantizar un control humano significativo en las funciones críticas de seleccionar y atacar objetivos/aplicar la fuerza.
2. **Marco normativo:** instrumento jurídicamente vinculante.
3. **Elementos de la estructura de un marco normativo:** prohibiciones y regulaciones (obligaciones positivas) deben ser incluidas para asegurar el control humano significativo sobre el uso de la fuerza
4. **Prohibiciones:** prohibiciones son necesarias para los SAA que no pueden garantizar el control humano sobre sus funciones críticas de selección y compromiso de los objetivos en la aplicación de la fuerza.
5. **Regulaciones:** Las regulaciones son necesarias para otros SAA y deben incluir límites como los relacionados con los tipos de objetivos, duración, alcance geográfico, escala de uso, entre otros.
6. **Rendición de cuentas y responsabilidad:** las reglas internacionales deben aplicarse al uso de SAA. Tanto los Estados como individuos deberán ser considerados responsables sobre violaciones del Derecho Internacional (DI).
7. **Control humano significativo:** Se debe asegurar para que el uso de SAA sea compatible con el DI. El control humano significativo se aplica al ciclo de vida de los sistemas de armas y todas sus funciones críticas.
8. **Transparencia y revisiones legales:** Estos son fundamentales y deben cubrir todos los aspectos del desarrollo de SAA.

Cinco recomendaciones principales para todos los Estados sobre el camino a seguir

1. Se alienta a los Estados a analizar y abordar más a fondo la necesidad de prohibición de **SAA antipersonales** para garantizar la protección de la dignidad humana.
2. No debe haber más demoras en el proceso para acordar un **marco normativo** de todos los SAA, y las divergencias en temas como significados y definiciones deberían abordarse en el proceso de negociación, como ha sido el caso en otros procesos de desarme humanitario.
3. Los Estados con posiciones similares sobre los **aspectos fundamentales del debate** deben hacer un esfuerzo dirigido a invitar a otros países, en particular a aquellos de África, Asia, América Latina y el Pacífico a unirse urgentemente al proceso en curso y alentarlos a manifestar también sus posiciones y puntos en común.
4. Los Estados deben tener como objetivo presentar una **declaración conjunta en la reunión del GEG en agosto de 2021**, con los elementos compartidos, en un esfuerzo por consolidar una posición más sólida.
5. Realizar declaraciones conjuntas presentadas por Estados de diversas regiones en otros foros multilaterales, como la **Primera Comisión de la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas**, contribuye a lograr un apoyo más amplio hacia la negociación de un instrumento jurídicamente vinculante.

Conclusiones

Se ha establecido que existen similitudes importantes en los aspectos fundamentales del debate sobre SALAs en particular sobre la necesidad de prohibir y regular armas que no pueden asegurar el control humano significativo en las funciones críticas de seleccionar y atacar objetivos/aplicación de fuerza. En la reunión de 'Intercambio Informal de Opiniones' que se realizó a finales de junio se dieron discusiones positivas en las cuales diversos Estados ofrecieron mensajes progresivos que podrían conducir a un resultado alcanzable y deseado: **un instrumento jurídicamente vinculante**.

Si bien el compromiso continuo de algunos de los países de la región de América Latina para presentar propuestas concretas en las discusiones es digno de elogio, este es un proceso en curso, y se espera que más Estados del Sur Global se unan a los esfuerzos que los países de América Latina y otras regiones han llevado a cabo en los foros de la CCW. Esta perspectiva debe continuar para fortalecer el proceso y llevar a la negociación de un instrumento legalmente vinculante que: a) prohíba los sistemas de armas autónomas que seleccionan objetivos/aplican la fuerza sin un control humano significativo, y aquellos que tienen como objetivo a las personas; y b) incluya regulaciones positivas para asegurar un control humano significativo.

Es evidente que la autonomía en quitar vidas implica problemas legales morales, éticos, de derechos humanos y humanitarios, y por tanto debe ser prohibida por el Derecho Internacional Humanitario.

La innovación y desarrollo tecnológico están evolucionando más rápido que el ritmo actual del diálogo diplomático sobre SALAs. Independientemente de los retos de la pandemia, se debe avanzar con pasos más claros en el GEG sobre SALAs, el cual está programado reunirse del 27 de septiembre al 1 de octubre de 2021, y durante el Comité Preparatorio de la Sexta Conferencia de Revisión, que está programado del 6 al 8 de septiembre. Esto, con la esperanza de conseguir el anhelado resultado en diciembre en la Sexta Conferencia de Revisión: **un mandato para negociar un instrumento jurídicamente vinculante sobre sistemas de armas autónomas**.

ⁱ Contribuciones escritas en conjunto:

- Costa Rica, Panamá, Perú, Filipinas, Sierra Leona and Uruguay
- Austria, Brasil, Chile, Irlanda, Luxemburgo, México, and Nueva Zelanda
- Venezuela en nombre del Movimiento de Países No Alineados (MPNA)

ⁱⁱ Brasil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, México, Perú, Filipinas, Uruguay, Venezuela (en nombre del MPNA)

ⁱⁱⁱ Reporte del Presidente, 19 de abril de 2021. Grupo Gubernamental de Expertos sobre Tecnologías Emergentes en el Área de Sistemas de Armas Autónomos Letales, Convenio sobre Prohibiciones o Restricciones en el Empleo de Ciertas Armas Convencionales que Pueden Considerarse Excesivamente Nocivas o de Efectos Indiscriminados. CCW/GGE.1/2020/WP.7

https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/CCW_GGE1_2020_WP_7-ADVANCE.pdf




**“THERE ARE... FUNDAMENTAL
MORAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES
IN ALLOWING TECHNOLOGY
TO DECIDE TO TAKE HUMAN
LIFE.”**

ANTONIO GUTERRES
UN SECRETARY-GENERAL MAY 2020

CCW REPORT

Reaching Critical Will (RCW) is the disarmament programme of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), the oldest feminist peace organisation in the world. RCW works for disarmament and the prohibition of many different weapon systems; confronting militarism and military spending; and exposing gendered aspects of the impact of weapons and disarmament processes with a feminist lens. RCW also monitors and analyses international disarmament processes, providing primary resources, reporting, and civil society coordination at various UN-related forums.



Reaching Critical Will

www.reachingcriticalwill.org



www.wilpf.org

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Editor: Ray Acheson

Contact: disarm@wilpf.org