


THE FIRST COMMITTEE MONITOR

Third Edition: October 17-21, 2005



*NGO Reporting on the
General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security*



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Contributing groups to THE FIRST COMMITTEE MONITOR include:

**Global Action to Prevent War;
Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy;
NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security;
The Undiplomatic Times
United Methodist United Nations Office;
Unitarian Universalist UN Office;
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom;
World Council of Churches;
and others.**



The Monitor is a weekly report produced by the NGO Working Group on the First Committee, a collaborative effort undertaken by 9 non-governmental organizations to make the work of the UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security more transparent and useful for those not based in New York. *The Monitor* is compiled, edited and coordinated by Reaching Critical Will, a disarmament project of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. RCW, supported by the NGO Working Group on the First Committee, provides several services to activists, diplomats, UN staffers, academicians and others, including:

- * Posting statements, draft resolutions, and First Committee information online at **www.reachingcriticalwill.org**;
- * Coordinating an array of briefings, workshops and panels designed to educate diplomats and activists on issues of disarmament, peace and security;
- * Serving as an information resource by email or phone;
- * Providing a link between the First Committee and NGOs who are not in New York.

The First Committee Monitor is made possible through the generous support of the Canadian Government and other Reaching Critical Will donors.

Introduction

The First Committee, as the only currently functioning multilateral disarmament forum, has an obligation to take the lead and give direction to the other deadlocked fora. If the world is going to move forward with disarmament it is absolutely necessary for governments to engage in dialogue and for like-minded states to work together with civil society to increase the pressure on the handful of holdouts that have the world hostage to their narrow security interests. Creating progressive resolutions and voting in the First Committee is an important tool to continue and increase this pressure, and there a variety of new and revamped resolutions this year that may force some governments to either ante up or show their hand.

This week, the First Committee took ad hoc civil society collaborations and institutionalized them by inviting two representatives from civil society to formally address the Committee for the first time. Dr. Kathleen Sullivan and Dr. Peter Lucas made First Committee history by giving presentations about their work in Disarmament Education, and engaging in interactive debate with the delegates, who called the presentations "fascinating". Similar NGO presentations have long histories of utility and effectiveness in other disarmament fora, and the NGOs look forward to now continuing that tradition in the First Committee. (See Disarmament Education and Disarmament Machinery Reports)

In her presentation, Dr. Sullivan used an interactive exercise from the classroom encourage the delegates to use their imaginations and hearts to understand what Japan has called "the true nature of nuclear weapons." Several Member States responded that they had "learned a lot" from the presentations, which encouraged the diplomats to feel as well as think, something they need to continue as they cast their votes next week.

As Member States gear up for voting, the issue of consensus has come up again and again. Almost all the resolutions strive for consensus and most achieve it. However, some have been questioning the utility of sacrificing progress to the lowest common denominator, particularly in the one functioning multilateral disarmament fora that allows for voting. From small arms and light weapons to the CD, consensus is being used as a veto tool to enact the tyranny of the minority, which some have called the abuse of consensus. Indonesia mainly attributed the "failure of the CD to act on pertinent issues such as disarmament and non-proliferation" on the "misinterpretation its rule of consensus."

In much of the activist world, where people working for peace and justice have struggled to make decisions via consensus, it is understood that one only blocks consensus if one

believes that not doing so will bring serious harm. This should not be a common situation, and if an individual blocks consensus more than once a year, either the rule is being abused or the group does not share a common security analysis. In international disarmament fora, we have a situation where consensus is being abused and where the group lacks a common security analysis. Both of these situations will have to be changed in order for the international community to move forward operating on consensus.

Many delegations this week have called the new initiative of the 6 nations to get people talking about the issues again "courageous" because it was creative and challenged the minority of consensus blockers to expose themselves and really engage in debate on the issues, assuming that dialogue is the only way to bridge disagreements. While civil society agrees, and supports and stands behind the initiative and other progressive efforts at the First Committee civil society's understanding of courage comes from a world very different from the diplomatic UN. "NGOs use the word courage informed by the work of indigenous peoples who struggle against the nuclear industry's practices of mining and dumping dangerous materials on their lands. We use the word courage informed by the lives of individuals such as Phil Berrigan who spent 11 years of his life in prison on charges from protesting nuclear weapons, as well as Karen Silkwood and other whistleblowers who have been killed and silenced," explained Felicity Hill of Greenpeace International, at a panel on First Committee Revitalization organized by The Netherlands.

As civil society and governments meet in the middle and collaborate, we learn from each other. Through understanding courage and the urgency of the situation with mind and heart, we urge: Do not be afraid of voting. Do not be afraid to isolate the minority and let it be public who is blocking movement, and why. Follow our lead. Let civil society continue its efforts to create political will in the states who are stopping progress, and support those efforts by demonstrating that you too support forward-looking, creative solutions to build a world founded on the rule of law that will "abolish the scourge of war" and the instruments used to wage those wars.

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Nuclear Disarmament

Three draft texts tabled this week rounded out the gamut of resolutions on nuclear disarmament.

Japan introduced resolution A/C.1/60/L.28, "Renewed Determination toward the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons." The draft text has been completely rewritten and streamlined from the last year's resolution, "A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons" (A/RES/59/76), which has been submitted annually since 1994. Last year's resolution was widely supported in the General Assembly with 165 votes in favor, opposition from India, Palau and the United States, and abstention from the New Agenda Coalition.

Against the backdrop of "the sixtieth anniversary of the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki," invoked in the first preambular paragraph, the current resolution recalls "the Decisions and the Resolutions of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference," but does not reaffirm them. Also notably absent is any reference to the "unequivocal undertaking" agreed to by the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.

In its operative sections, the current resolution no longer cites the "central importance" of specific practical steps from the 2000 NPT Final Document, nor the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted by the 1995 Conference. Operative Paragraph (OP)3 of the current draft instead "encourages further steps leading to nuclear disarmament... including deeper reductions in all types of nuclear weapons," emphasizing the importance of irreversibility, verifiability, and transparency in the process of nuclear disarmament. The resolution, in OP 6 and 10 respectively, calls for "the nuclear-weapon States to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems," and for "all States to redouble their efforts to prevent and curb proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and the delivery means." OP9 emphasizes "the importance of immediate commencement of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty," dropping language mandating that the treaty be "effectively verifiable."

This Resolution and the New Agenda Coalition's (NAC) Resolution (A/C.1/60/L.4) have their strengths for progressing on disarmament. The New Agenda Resolution broadly reaffirms the consensual agreement to take practical steps for disarmament made at the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, which the Japanese Resolution recalls but does not reaffirm. The NAC Resolution also recalls the "unequivocal undertaking" agreed to by the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, which the Japanese Resolution does not

mention. The Japanese Resolution, on the other hand, identifies specific priorities for moving forward. Thus far, there are indications that certain members of the NAC will break ranks and support this text, with other members continuing to abstain. The United States is likely to continue its opposition, primarily over the language on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Last year, Japan supported the New Agenda Resolution.

Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.52, "Reducing Nuclear Danger," is unchanged from last year's text (A/RES/59/79) introduced by India. Implicitly directed at Russia and the United States but also applicable to nuclear rivals India and Pakistan, OP1 of this narrowly focused resolution "calls for a review of nuclear doctrines and, in this context, immediate and urgent steps to reduce the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons."

Civil society organizations and other distinguished individuals made a similar appeal for the reduction of the operational status of nuclear forces (<http://www.lcnp.org/disarmament/policypractice/statement.htm>), noting that thousands of warheads in Russia and the United States remain on high alert, launch-on-warning status. A model resolution for the United Nations General Assembly on the operational status of nuclear weapons is available at <http://www.lcnp.org/disarmament/policypractice/modelresolution.htm>.

Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.54, "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons," is also unchanged from the text introduced by India last year (A/RES/59/102). The preambular paragraphs bear in mind the July 8, 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. While the opinion held that "the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict," this finding stopped short of definitively adopting the position, articulated by several members of the Court, that any use of nuclear weapons would be categorically unlawful, even in "an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake." OP1 of L.54 addresses this loophole by requesting that the Conference on Disarmament commence negotiations "on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances."

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Verification and Compliance

Verification and Compliance have been key to nearly all of the topics before the First Committee. In the area of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), compliance with the proposed international instrument on marking and tracing will not be strictly enforced because the instrument is not legally binding, a lack bemoaned by many delegations. Provisions for enhanced monitoring and reporting in the 2001 Program of Action on SALW are contentious. The Biological Weapons Convention is largely seen to be deficient compared to the Chemical Weapons Convention because it lacks a verification regime (the Bush administration scuttled negotiations to create one in the summer of 2001).

Perhaps most central to these discussions, however, is compliance and verification with regards to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the potential Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). The United States has claimed that the commitments made at the 2000 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty were political, and not legally binding, while others have called US compliance, and that of other Nuclear Weapon States, with Article IV obligations into question. The United States has accused the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Iran of intentional non-compliance, and the board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, with many abstentions, recently found Iran to have violated its Safeguards Agreement agreement in the past. Disagreement over whether an FMCT is effectively verifiable is one of two things stalling its negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament.

This week in the First Committee, Paula DeSutter, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance and Implementation for the United States formally introduced the draft resolution "Compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements" (A/C.1/60/L.1). The text of L.1 has changed substantively since its last introduction in 2003, A/Res/57/86. The earlier version is more multilateral, while the new one downplays international law and adopts a tougher tone regarding compliance enforcement (See Nuclear Disarmament Week 2 Report). The current text calls on "all Member States to take concerted action to ensure that all States comply with their existing arms limitation, non-proliferation and disarmament agreements and hold those not in compliance with such agreements accountable for their non-compliance."

The 2002 resolution (A/Res/57/86) called upon States to "support efforts aimed at the resolution of compliance questions by means consistent with such agreements and international law," and welcomed "the role that the United Nations has played and continues to play" on the issue. The current

text does not necessitate that compliance questions be resolved by means consistent with international law, and the United Nations is listed as one of a range of international actors the resolution endorses to "take action to prevent serious damage to international security and stability arising from non-compliance by States with their existing arms limitation, non-proliferation and disarmament obligations."

The ability to effectively verify the compliance of all States Parties with any given treaty is essential to its viability. The US does not believe international cooperative measures, including technical measures and on-site inspection regimes, are sufficient for detecting noncompliance. Verifiability assessments are much broader for the US, and include "the proven reliability of our negotiating partners in adhering to agreements, the incentives given parties may have to cheat on a given agreement, and the relative significance of cheating pursuant to obligations." This obviously leaves room for subjective judgments that may have motives going beyond assessment of compliance. Particularly relevant to negotiations for an FMCT, the US stated at the beginning of its speech that it "generally does not join regimes or sign international agreements that constrain the freedom to exercise our national right to pursue our security when U.S. compliance is not going to be reciprocated."

Other states believe that multilateral approaches, such as international cooperative measures, technical data, and on-site inspections are the best verification tools. A panel of governmental experts will examine the issue of verification in 2006 and report their analysis and recommendations to the First Committee. Canada insists that verification requires and benefits from research and development programs such as the Security Research and Outreach Program (ISROP) and the Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance. Canada also believes that the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) plays a vital role in compliance assessment, and Member States and NGOs have called for this to become a standing body to investigate compliance issues. Rebecca Johnson of The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy underscored that "multilateral verification is by definition cooperative and consensual in principle," during a panel discussion on Gender, Militarism and War hosted by the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom and Global Action to Prevent War.

Draft resolution L.1 is intended "to exhort governments to seek common cause in pursuit of diplomatic means to bring international violators back into compliance." The resolution and its introduction call for not only compliance assessment but also compliance enforcement. Neither the US introduction nor L.1 outlined strategies for compliance enforcement,

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Disarmament Machinery

Political will, which China called "the precondition for diplomatic efforts", continued to be an important element in discussions of the workings, and failings, of disarmament machinery during the thematic debate this week on the subject. However, political will is not mysterious; it is decisions made in capitals. Achieving the "political will" necessary to unblock disarmament machinery and get back to work on disarmament and non-proliferation means that every Member State must make the decision to develop a cooperative security analysis and accept the security concerns of all other Member States.

Some noted that pieces of disarmament machinery with a permanent structure were performing better than those without such a structure, recalling Canada's repeated suggestions to create an NPT Secretariat. Others recommended increased cooperation among pieces of the machinery: "The handling of the weaponization of outer space would, for example, benefit from a better understanding of the work of COPUOS and UNISPACE III," Sweden noted.

Discussions on the Conference on Disarmament (CD) continued to consider procedural efforts to make substantive progress, while acknowledging the crucial role of political will. During Tuesday's and Wednesday's sessions, several member states indicated their support of the new initiative by Brazil, Canada, Kenya, Mexico, New Zealand and Sweden. The six nations again indicated their willingness to bring the initiative back to the First Committee if the CD does not adopt a program of work this year, as well as to work with the previous and incoming CD Presidents to find a consensual program of work. Indonesia, the Chair of the disarmament working group of the Non-Aligned Movement, called it a "good initiative" that will "give opportunity to move forward with discussion and deliberations that can set the legal, technical and political framework for substantive action on the four issues by the CD once it agrees to do so."

After praising the "courageous initiative" by the 6 nations, The Netherlands bemoaned that "next year would be a most unwelcome jubilee of sorts, if we did not succeed at having at least a meaningful and structured debate on the core issues at hand." The next three CD Presidents, Poland, the Republic of Korea and Romania have indicated their intention to work together to sustain a structured discussion of the core issues in the CD. However, as Pakistan reminded the First Committee, the CD "is a negotiating, not a deliberative, forum."

Several speakers also supported creating continuity in the CD presidency through dialogue and consultations. At the CD, some delegations have even suggested extending the CD presidency. Poland, the incoming CD President, "believe[s] that the establishment of a common platform of cooperation between the session's Presidents can advance us closer

towards a long awaited progress on substantive issues." Poland is conducting consultations during the First Committee on the program of work, along with current CD President Peru.

France was the only Member State besides the US who expressed support for a CD program of work other than the near-consensus Five Ambassadors' proposal, or its very similar cousin the Food for Thought Paper, when it advocated for working on what it calls 'new issues' or 'out of the box issues' in the CD.

After the Disarmament Commission's Chairman's report, Member States indicated their support for the Chairman's work to achieve consensus, and wondered if the First Committee Resolution on the Disarmament Commission (DC) would include an agenda this year. Some indicated they may not be able to vote for a Resolution with brackets, as the current resolution contains a bracketed agenda. In the negotiations to achieve an agenda for the DC, almost all delegations were in agreement, with one exception. The near-consensus agenda from the DC's discussions this summer is the agenda currently in brackets in A/C.1/60/L.59. Canada suggested the DC, while awaiting an agenda, "do a stocktaking of what has been achieved and what remains to be done in realizing the goals set out by UN SSODI, and where goals might be revised" in order to facilitate agreement on convening an SSODIV.

Several Member States indicated that reviewing the mandates and the procedures of the disarmament machinery would require going back to the institution that created them. Convening a Fourth Special Session on Disarmament (SSODIV) could be used to take stock of the goals set out for the DC and CD in SSOD I. Indonesia, which calls an SSOD IV "the only viable alternative to our collective efforts", has submitted a draft decision, A/C.1/60/L.17, to include "Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament" (SSOD IV) in the agenda for its 61st Session. Many members of the Non-Aligned Movement have increasingly advocated for an SSOD IV, particularly since the CD and DC, created by the First SSOD in 1978, have been deadlocked for several years. Last year, Malaysia introduced a consensus-adopted resolution on convening SSOD IV (A/RES/59/71), after having withdrawn a similar resolution in 2003. Resolution A/RES/59/71 reconvened an Open-Ended Working Group to develop objectives and an agenda for SSOD IV that will meet in the Spring of 2006 and report back by August, 2006.

According to China, "Only SSOD and its preparation process can provide UN Member States with the opportunities to...reach new consensus on adjustment to multilateral mechanisms," and although Italy approaches calls for sus-

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Disarmament Education

On Friday, October 21, the First Committee heard presentations from and engaged in interactive discussion with NGOs on Disarmament Education. Dr. Kathleen Sullivan and Dr. Peter Lucas, both disarmament educators, gave presentations about education work on nuclear weapons and small arms and light weapons, respectively. During her presentation, Dr. Sullivan demonstrated one of the interactive exercises or 'thought experiments' she uses in the classroom; one of the most engaging and heart-opening demonstrations the First Committee has experienced in a long time. Dr. Sullivan first requested the delegates to use their imaginations "by listening to two sounds, which will help us understand the fire-power of the world's nuclear arsenal," quoting Albert Einstein that "Imagination is more important than knowledge."

She dropped a single BB into a tin to represent the total fire-power of all the weapons used in World War II. "That is all bullets, bombs, grenades and landmines; all the torpedoes and conventional bombs; and the two new, nuclear weapons used on Japan." Dr. Sullivan then asked for quiet so the First Committee could listen to the sound that represents all the nuclear weapons that exist in the world today, 60 years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and poured 2,667 BBs into the tin, creating a crackling explosive sound that went on for several minutes. Some of the diplomats even closed their eyes. After a moment of silence, Dr. Sullivan reminded the Committee, "That sound represents the reality we all live with. 2,667 World War II's is equivalent to today's nuclear arsenal - approximately 31,000 nuclear weapons. And it is important to know the facts, to 'combat ignorance, complacency and a culture of violence' as the Secretary General stated in the forward to the UN Study."

The UN Expert Group on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education, convened by Ambassador Miguel Marín-Bosch of Mexico, was authorised by UN Resolution A/RES/55/33E of the General Assembly in November 2000. It was the passion and commitment of Ambassador Marín-Bosch and support of Mexico that initiated the two-year study. During that time there was a great deal of interaction between the Expert Group, NGOs, educators, as well as members of the UN family of organizations, including the IAEA, CTBTO, UNIDIR, UNESCO, and others, and not least the pivotal role played by the DDA as the Secretariat of the study.

In October 2002, after two years of work by the Expert Group, the report from the Study was launched, and the General Assembly adopted its 34 recommendations without a vote. When the study was launched, Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated that "Disarmament education seeks to

inform and empower citizens to work with their Governments for positive change. I hope that Governments, the United Nations family, ... non-governmental organisations and others ... will do their part to sustain the process of consultation and co-operation started by the Group of Experts, so that disarmament and non-proliferation education becomes an integral - and natural - part of the education of the next generation." (<http://disarmament2.un.org>).

Member States play an essential role in implementing this hope. There are many recommendations that are specific to Member States and require their support in the training of not only the next generation but of current diplomats, parliamentarians, peacekeepers and military personnel. As the Study indicates, there is a need to "expand and improve disarmament and non proliferation education and training in order to promote disarmament and non proliferation" (VIII OP43). That means to incorporate not only education about disarmament, but education for disarmament. Also, the study notes that "in order for the Department for Disarmament Affairs to facilitate the implementation of the recommendations of this study, the General Assembly is encouraged to allocate adequate human and financial resources to the task."

There are specific recommendations that Member States work with NGOs and civil society, and provide financial support for disarmament education initiatives. This year's Draft Resolution A/C.1/60/L.28, encourages Member States to "undertake concrete activities to implement" the recommendations of the Study. Several states have contributed reports on disarmament education activities, and others have collaborated with NGOs to develop new curricula, particularly regarding small arms disarmament. Canada, for instance, "supports [the] efforts of Reaching Critical Will to ensure wide public access to national statements and other documents emanating from meetings of UN disarmament bodies." The DDA is developing disarmament curricula which will be posted on the UN's Cyberschoolbus website.

While it is heartening to see that this item is again on the agenda of the First Committee, it is tragic to see that the words that have been put forth year after year are not being followed with action- specifically with a full-fledged commitment to provide disarmament education with all the material and human resources that this noble, indeed, necessary cause requires. For with every dollar transferred from military expenditures to the cause of disarmament education future generations may indeed be saved from the "scourge of war".

There are many ways to make the process of disarmament education "integral" to the education of not only young peo-

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First Committee Revitalization

Although no resolution has been tabled on First Committee reform, discussions on its continued revitalization and the implementation of resolution A/RES/59/95 have continued. On Friday, October 21, Chairman Choi held an "informal informal" on the possible revitalization of the First Committee for the next session, discussing efforts made under his Chairmanship this year as well as De Alba's last year. Norway noted improvements in the First Committee's working methods already, calling the General Debate "more focused" and the thematic debate "more interactive and interesting." Canada praised the First Committee for "continu[ing] to give democratic expression to the hopes and expectations of the UN membership" on disarmament and international security matters, and New Zealand called the First Committee the "ideal forum" for discussing ideas and alternatives to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) deadlock.

Several delegations have suggested that First Committee Reform include at least, in the words of The Netherlands, a "modest further opening up" of the Committee to Civil Society, and this First Committee witnessed the first NGO presentation ever, on Friday, October 21. Two well-known Disarmament Educators and Civil Society representatives made presentations and engaged in interactive discussion with the Committee in a dialogue Member States called "fascinating" "very interesting" and "educational." (See Disarmament Education Report) A practice that has been in place for years in various other disarmament fora, including conferences on the Non-Proliferation Treaty and Small Arms and Light Weapons, this interaction was precedent-setting in the General Assembly, and created an important avenue for NGOs and governments to critically engage each other within the institution of the United Nations.

Other discussions of First Committee Reform included improved implementation and follow-up of resolutions (OP 6 of A/RES/59/95), as well as the merging of duplicitous resolutions and the bi- and tri-annualization of repetitive resolutions. The general feeling was that this should all be the responsibility of the co-sponsors. Some Member States argued that there were important reasons for maintaining the independence and the frequency of certain resolutions. "The question of the merger of resolutions or changing freestanding resolutions into omnibus resolutions should be left to the sponsors," said Pakistan.

Admittedly, follow-up mechanisms for the General Assembly and the First Committee are lacking. However, some thought the reports requested from DDA, particularly those requiring Member States' input, were of questionable utility, an issue also discussed last year. There is room for using the reports as verification and compliance instruments,

and utility in increasing their analytic nature, but it was suggested that Member States exercise restraint in calling for them. Sweden noted that "year after year the UNGA produces Resolutions that are not implemented" and asked "What can be done to hold States accountable?"

In the discussion on First Committee Revitalization organized by The Netherlands on October 6, Felicity Hill of Greenpeace International offered an explanation for this seemingly redundant repetition, and a suggestion for getting out of it. "If the Security Council had produced this plan [Article 26 of the UN Charter]," she said, "to save money and human life from being diverted and bucketed into creating more sophisticated and gruesome ways of slaughtering each other, the First Committee wouldn't have become the plea making, resolution-reaffirming chamber of repetitious refrains, which it can sometimes be reduced to."

-Jennifer Nordstrom, Reaching Critical Will
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Landmines

Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.56, "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction" was presented again this year with minor textual updates. This resolution aims at eliminating landmines from existing fields, prohibiting their production and distribution and providing assistance to victims.

The text of the resolution is essentially the same as A/RES/59/84 with the following new points: (1) 147 countries have now formally accepted the obligations of the Convention; (2) It recognizes the contribution of regional seminars to its implementation; and (3) It welcomes the potential for partnership between the mine action community and the World Bank.

Last year, the votes in the General Assembly were 157 in favor, none opposed, with 22 abstentions.

-Jean-Marie Goldstein, NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security, disarmtimes@igc.org



Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

The CTBT did not receive much attention this week in the First Committee, though the "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty" draft resolution was submitted by Andorra, Australia, Czech Republic, Finland, Mexico, New Zealand, and South Africa. The draft resolution, A/C.1/60/L.26, both reaffirms the CTBT's importance and underlines the necessity of its universal ratification. Echoing the comments made throughout the first two weeks of the 60th session of the First Committee, draft resolution L.26 "underlines the need to maintain momentum towards completion of the verification regime"; "urges all States to maintain their moratoriums on nuclear-weapons test explosions . . . and to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty"; and "urges all States that have not yet signed [and/or ratified] the Treaty to sign and ratify it as soon as possible." The draft resolution also requests the Secretary-General and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) Preparatory Commission to "prepare a report on the efforts of States that have ratified the Treaty towards its universalization and possibilities for providing assistance on ratification procedures to States that so request it, and to submit such a report to the General Assembly at its sixty-first session."

Last year's CTBT resolution, A/RES/59/109, did not include two statements made in this year's preamble. While 59/109 "reiterates that the cessation of nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions constitutes an effective nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measure," it is not "convinced that [banning nuclear-weapon test explosions] is a meaningful step in the systematic process to achieve nuclear disarmament." 59/109 also does not "Reaffirm the importance of the Treaty for the continued systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control," as this year's does.

This year's additional comments indicate that the submitting states were concerned the importance of the CTBT is not being recognized to its fullest extent. By including text emphasizing that the CTBT is a necessary and effective step towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, L.26 is concretely framed as a disarmament measure.

In addition to the submission of L.26, a few States made mention of the CTBT or nuclear testing in their statements during Thematic Debate this week. While introducing draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.3 on a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in the Middle East, Egypt called on all draft states to refrain from conducting nuclear weapon tests. On October 18th, Norway reiterated its call for the entry into force of the CTBT, in context of the discussion on disarmament machinery.

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Negative Security Assurances

This week, a draft resolution on the "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" (A/C.1/60/L.45) was introduced in the First Committee. The resolution, identical in both text and sponsorship to the one adopted last year (A/RES/59/64), appeals to all states, particularly Nuclear Weapon States (NWSs) to be proactive in working toward a "common formula that could be included in an international instrument of legally binding character." (OP 3)

In his statement to the First Committee on October 4, Ambassador Nana Effeh-Apenteng of Ghana reaffirmed his delegation's belief in the critical nature of legally binding Negative Security Assurances (NSAs): "A grave concern to my delegation is the perennial issue of negative security assurances. The fear among the majority of states regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons could be assuaged, if Security Council Resolution 984 is affirmed by a legally binding document, as rightly stipulated in paragraph 8 of the decision of the 1995 [NPT] Review and Extension Conference. Legally binding security assurances by nuclear-weapons states to non-nuclear-weapon states would impact positively on the NPT, with its attendant effect on disarmament and non-proliferation." Although Ghana is not a co-sponsor of the resolution, Ambassador Effeh-Apenteng's call for legally binding NSAs echoes the major concerns addressed in the resolution.

In addition to reaffirming that until universal nuclear disarmament is achieved the only way to prevent further proliferation is to develop measures to ensure the security of Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWSs), the resolution also calls upon the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to adopt a program of work that would include discussion of a legally binding international convention to assure NNWSs against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Although the resolution takes note of the existing widespread support for a legally binding NSA convention and urges the CD to "actively continue intensive negotiations," the CD has been idling without a program of work since 1995. The most broadly supported proposal for a CD program of work, the Five Ambassadors' (A5) Proposal, includes an Ad Hoc Committee with a mandate to "negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements" on NSAs, which "could take the form of a legally binding agreement."

Last year, the resolution passed in the General Assembly with 118 votes in favor, 63 against and no abstentions. In the only explanation of vote on this resolution, the Republic of Korea maintained that "we do not believe that such negative security assurances would be of a nature to be provided to all

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Proliferation

In reporting how First Committee resolutions reflect international concerns with weapons proliferation, it is necessary, in this 60th anniversary year of the United Nations, to note that the General Assembly has never dealt with a central and critically important element of the issue: the role of arms corporations. Not only do they manufacture most of the world's weapons, they drive research and development and play a significant role in shaping military doctrines and the international security policies of governments. International insecurity and conflict are extremely profitable for arms manufacturers and traders, and they have shown no compunction in actively promoting arms sales to areas of conflict and tension, often to regimes with heinous human rights records. In addition to the large established multinational corporations that produce everything from small arms to aircraft and missiles, small corporate entities also play a dangerous role in weapons proliferation. For example, the infamous nuclear proliferation activities of the A.Q.Khan network were conducted largely through a variety of shell corporations. The trafficking of small arms and light weapons into areas of conflict also usually involves companies fronting for organized crime or terrorist groups. Despite this broad involvement, governments have ignored the need to address corporate governance and responsibility in dealing with proliferation issues.

Many resolutions currently before the First Committee deal directly and indirectly with proliferation issues. For other reports dealing with proliferation, see the Nuclear Weapon Free Zones Report and Verification Report.

India has slightly reworked its annual draft resolution (since 2002) on "Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction" (A/C.1/60/L.51), to reflect the adoption of Security Council resolution 1540, which mandates such action by governments. Its other annual submission, on the "Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament" (A/C.1/60/L.53) remains unchanged from 2004 (A/RES/59/62). It deals with the international transfers of dual use goods and technologies and high technologies with military use. States are urged to undertake multilateral negotiations to reach "universally acceptable, nondiscriminatory guidelines" on such international transfers.

Egypt on behalf of Arab States introduced its annual resolution on "Risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East" (A/C.1/60/L.6). It calls on Israel to renounce nuclear weapons and join the NPT. (See NWFZ Report)

A Russian Federation initiative calls, as in the past, for the "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new

Disarmament and Development

With over \$US 1 trillion spent annually on the military, it is more important than ever that the First Committee address Disarmament and Development in its Resolutions. At the side event on "Revitalizing the General Assembly First Committee", organized by The Netherlands, Felicity Hill of Greenpeace International suggested the First Committee do this in the context of Article 26 of the UN Charter, and called for the International Community to develop a means of compliance with this early goal of the UN. This Article calls on the Security Council to develop a plan for "peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources" (Article 26). However, "the Security Council permanent members have participated in arms races and weapons profiteering," instead, according to Hill.

The Draft Resolution A/C.1/60/L.16 introduced on October 12 by Indonesia titled "Relationship between disarmament and development" continued to stress "the importance of the symbiotic relationship between disarmament and development and the important role of security in this connection". While this resolution does not differ from last year's Resolution (A/RES/59/78) it continues to call for the "international community to devote part of the resources made available by the implementation of disarmament and arms limitation agreements economic and social development".

The Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean is also addressing the nexus between disarmament and development. On October 12, Argentina introduced the Draft Resolution, "UN Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean" (A/60/L.21), highlighting the "important role that the [Regional Centre] can play in promoting confidence-building measures, arms control and limitations, disarmament and development at a regional level". This resolution differs from last year's Resolution A/RES/59/99 in its review of the endeavors the Regional Centre has undertaken in the past year. Noting that "assistance was provided in the form of inter alia, weapons destruction and stockpile management, training courses for the law enforcement community, members of organizations, guidance on reporting in connection with weapons related instruments and the development of methodologies for future confidence building among States".

It is becoming increasingly clear that in order to increase security interests across the globe we must further the progress of social and economic development. It is through a commitment to Article 26 of the UN Charter as well as the Millennium Development Goals that we will see an increase in development and security. We must recommit ourselves to freeing the world's human and economic resources from the production of arms.

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Verification and Compliance, Continued

but its introduction did underscore the purpose of verification: "If detection has no consequences for the violator, then verification has no meaning, and deterrence is unachievable." Given the recent invasion of Iraq based supposedly on US assessment of Iraqi compliance with Security Council resolutions, such language to put it mildly is cause for concern. In contrast, Sweden believes that states must be held accountable for noncompliance based on the rule of law, and that representatives of civil society have a role to play in this regard.

Other states emphasized confidence-building measures as an important aspect of treaty compliance by addressing what China has called the root causes of non-compliance and proliferation. For instance, Pakistan's draft resolution "Confidence-building measures in the regional and sub-regional context" (A/C.1/60/L.24) recognizes that confidence-building measures "have improved peace and security" and calls for meaningful dialogue and sustained consultations "while at the same time avoiding actions which may hinder or impair such a dialogue." Confidence-building comes from a cooperative security framework instead of a deterrence-based force-projection framework.

The DPRK's right of reply to the US on October 18th demonstrated the dangers of the deterrence-based force-projection framework. The DPRK denounced the US statement as the fabricated product of the hostile policy of the US against the DPRK, and remarked that it was the US that had systematically pushed the DPRK to turn to nuclear deterrence, which is clearly the opposite of what a verification regime within a deterrence-based security strategy intends.

Speakers at a panel discussion hosted by the Department of Disarmament Affairs (DDA) and the Government of Canada on Verifying Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Agreements indicated that new strategies for strengthening treaty verification are necessary to deal with what Angela Woodward of the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) calls a "different political environment of verification." Brian Wood of Amnesty International suggested that the international community create a "supportive architecture" of verification by "urging states to implement legislation nationally" in order to prosecute violators. It was also suggested that perhaps one reason some states were reluctant to support stringent verification resolutions was that verification technologies are now "too good" in that they can expose a history of production from decades past. Thus, states involved in prior activities may be nervous about being identified as a violator of UN resolutions and treaties.

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Disarmament Machinery, Continued

pension of the multilateral disarmament fora "with caution," it does "not exclude the option of reviewing the functioning of the existing machinery...follow[ing] the appropriate institutional processes."

The Islamic Republic of Iran, "convinced that there is need for the United Nations to pursue the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations," has submitted the draft resolution "Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed in the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" (A/C.1/60/L.38/Rev.1). The resolution calls for establishing an ad hoc committee of the General Assembly in 2006 "to hold three one-week sessions to review the implementation of the nuclear disarmament obligations" of the agreements from the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences and to submit a report on "possible practical mechanisms and strategies for complete nuclear disarmament".

The resolution is causing a stir in the First Committee for several reasons. First, Iran submitted it without consultation or co-sponsorship, largely as a surprise. Second, it contains relatively strong language on disarmament. Third, it creates an ad hoc committee under the General Assembly, which includes three non-States Parties to the NPT, to review the implementation of the NPT. Finally, the ad hoc committee in the resolution, which, according to Iran's introduction is the one suggested by the President of Iran in his speech during the General Debate, where he "suggest[ed] that the General Assembly, as the most inclusive UN organ, mandate an ad-hoc committee to compile and submit a comprehensive report on possible practical mechanisms and strategies for complete disarmament," is also designed "to investigate as to how-contrary to the NPT-material, technology and equipment for nuclear weapons were transferred to the Zionist regime," according to the same speech.

On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), France introduced a resolution that recognized UNIDIR's importance and requested Member States to continue to make voluntary contributions to the Institute.

Mexico tabled its draft decision (A/C.1/60/L.11) on a "United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of disarmament" again this year, which again agrees to include that item in next year's agenda. This conference was originally called for in the Secretary-General's Millennium Report and elaborated in the 2001 report of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters (A/56/418), and is also supported in India's draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.52.

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Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS)

Two draft resolutions relating to weapons in outer space have been introduced to the First Committee this year. Russia's new resolution entitled 'Measures to ensure transparency and confidence building in the uses of outer space' (A/C.1/60/L.30) builds upon GA resolution 45/55 B of 4 December 1990, which reaffirmed the importance of confidence building measures as a means to ensure the prevention of an arms race in outer space. During its introductory statement, Russia voiced its hope that the resolution would be adopted by consensus due to its simplicity and its applicability to all States.

Sri Lanka's draft resolution 'Prevention of an arms race in outer space' (A/C.1/60/L.27) is identical to resolution A/RES/59/65 adopted by the First Committee in 2004. The resolution highlights the importance of complying with existing multilateral and bilateral agreements, and points out that as the current legal regime on outer space does not itself guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space, "there is a need to consolidate and reinforce that regime and enhance its effectiveness." It reiterates that the Conference on Disarmament (CD) plays a pivotal role in the negotiation of any multilateral agreement regarding the prevention of an arms race into outer space, and reaffirms the contribution made by the Ad Hoc Committee on PAROS during its 9 years of operation. The draft urges states to keep the Conference on Disarmament informed of all progress in the area of bilateral and multilateral agreements.

The Sri Lankan resolution was discussed this week at a Department of Public Information (DPI) panel discussion entitled 'Preserving Outer Space for Peaceful Uses'. Egypt's Ambassador Abdelaziz and Sri Lanka's Ambassador Fernando both commented on the importance of the PAROS resolution in preserving space for peaceful uses, and agreed that preventing an arms race is a much easier task than decelerating a race once it has begun. Sri Lanka noted that the resolution calls for the reinstatement of the Ad Hoc Committee on PAROS as soon as possible in order to work towards a legally binding instrument banning the weaponization of space, and Egypt lamented that the CD's stalemate was severely impeding progress on PAROS (See Disarmament Machinery Report). Egypt also highlighted the need for a legally binding document specifically preventing the weaponization of outer space, "Many countries still argue that there is no need for a further legally binding instrument on the uses of outer space," he said, "however nothing could be further from the truth."

Egypt may be concerned that some states are on the verge of weaponizing space. Laura Grego, a Staff Scientist with the Union of Concerned Scientists, discussed defending and

attacking satellites at length, noting that the character of military space has changed significantly, and conventional warfare, as well as telecommunications and meteorology, now rely heavily on satellite systems. Grego noted US STRATCOM's policy in this area: 'One may deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy adversary space capability' (1996 National Space Policy). Destruction of satellites continues to be a major concern, particularly as their destruction creates space debris which can render entire orbits useless for space activities. Grego concluded that Ballistic Missile Defense Systems are not viable as missile defense, as they are onerously expensive, technically unfeasible and so vulnerable that they are absolutely useless as missile defense systems. However, such defense systems are effective at attacking other satellites.

Ambassador Fernando focused on the particular impact that space activities have on developing countries, asking "can we really afford to have an arms race in outer space when the world is still faced with the problem of extreme poverty and hunger?" (See Disarmament and Development Report) She reiterated the inherently universal nature of outer space, stating that "all States are custodians of the global commons, for the benefit of unborn generations." Egypt recognized and commended the role NGO's have played in the UN's work on PAROS.

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Proliferation, Continued

types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons" (A/C.1/60/L.10). It calls on the Conference on Disarmament to keep the matter under review and communicate its recommendations to governments and to the General Assembly.

An Australian-led initiative (A/C.1/60/L.49) on man portable air defense systems (MANPADS) that was adopted for the first time last year (A/RES/59/90) reappears. It calls on States to exercise effective control on MANPADS, combat their illicit trade, and prevent their transfer to non-State groups.

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Regional Centres

On Thursday, October 20, the First Committee heard presentations from and about the three UN Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament.

Governmental statements over the past three weeks have emphasized the usefulness of the Regional Centres. In the first week of the First Committee, the ASEAN group stated: "We wish to take this opportunity to express, once again, our appreciation to the United Nations Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean and Africa for their effective contributions towards international peace and security. Regional Seminars and Forums, which were organized by those Centres, effectively contribute to the progress of ongoing security and disarmament process in respective regions."

At Thursday's session, Under Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs Nobuyasu Abe stressed the need for cooperation between the U.N. and regional organizations. "In September, at the 2005 World Summit, world leaders expressed their support for a stronger relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations, as envisaged in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter," he reminded the Committee. Agnes Marcaillou, Chief of the Regional Disarmament Branch of DDA, also emphasized integrating the work of the UN and regional organizations. The Centres should facilitate this by sharing experiences and ideas and transferring knowledge.

However, the three Regional Centres face significant financial and logistical challenges. "Past experience has led the Department of Disarmament Affairs to understand that donors are ready to make financial contributions in support of projects and activities, but many are unable to provide the same support for the operating costs of the Centres. The lack of core funding for the operating costs of the Centres has thus become a persistent challenge for the Centres to ensure their financial viability and to fulfill their mandates in the regions," explained USG Abe.

The main logistical concerns regard possibly moving the site from Nepal to Bangkok (where the Asian ECOSOC branch lies) and from Togo to Nairobi (UN facility in Africa) or Addis Ababa (African ECOSOC branch). No decision has been made, but consultations continue. Nepal and Togo both made their desire to keep the Regional Centres clear during the general debate and the thematic debate. The Centre in Peru is more well-funded and without such logistical questions.

Patricia Lewis, Director of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), also participated in the panel on Regional Centres. She proposed a Regional Centre be created in the region "that perhaps needs it most": the Middle East. Some Member States indicated interest in the suggestion, which they will follow up with UNIDIR.

Biological and Chemical Weapons

This week, draft resolutions on the strengthening and implementation of both the Chemical and Biological Weapon Conventions were introduced by Poland and Hungary respectively. Although Poland's draft resolution on the implementation of the CWC (A/C.1/60/L.33) is almost identical to the one it proposed to the First Committee last year (A/RES/59/72), significant changes include greater emphasis on the importance of the Action Plan for implementation of national legislation (Article 7). In his statement to the First Committee on October 12, Ambassador Paturej also highlighted a new section of the resolution that will "for the first time reaffirm the importance of Article 11 provisions relating to the economic and technological development of States Parties and recall that the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of these provisions will contribute to universality." While there were few other changes in the text of the resolution, it continues to reflect the progress made in the implementation of the CWC and urges States Parties, the UN, and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to continue to push for substantive progress in this critical area of disarmament and non-proliferation.

Hungary's resolution on the implementation of the BWC (A/C.1/60/L.33) includes several new paragraphs, primarily welcoming increased participation in meetings of States Parties and reaffirming the importance of the Convention's implementation. The resolution also requests support from the Secretary General for assistance in services required for the implementation of decisions and recommendations of the BWC Review Conferences. Throughout the previous two weeks of First Committee sessions, numerous delegations called for development of verification mechanisms for the BWC, hoping to achieve them with the assistance of the Secretary-General at the 6th BWC Review Conference, to be held in Geneva in 2006.

Both Poland and Hungary hope for and expect adoption of the resolutions without a vote.

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Regional Centres, Continued

Four draft resolutions on Regional Centres have been tabled; one general resolution, A/C.1/60/L.18, "United Nations Regional Centres for peace and disarmament", and then three resolutions specific to each of the three Centres. They all recognize the Centres' contributions to disarmament (the Latin American Resolution (A/C.1/60/L.21) includes development as well) and ask Member States and the Secretary General for financial support. All of them are recurring resolutions that are traditionally adopted without a vote.

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Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

Draft resolutions and decisions tabled this year pertaining to Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs) were often identical to their 2004 predecessors. Seven of this year's resolutions focused on NWFZs; five of these resolutions are specifically about NWFZs, while the other two referred to NWFZs in the language of the resolution as an integral part of regional peace and security. Support for regional disarmament action continued this week, particularly in the light of the disappointment with international disarmament machinery. On Thursday, October 20, the Committee invited an expert panel to discuss U.N. regional peace centers (see U.N. Regional Peace Center Report).

The Central Asian NWFZ (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan) tabled the same draft decision this year (A/C.1/60/L.7) as last year (A/C.1/59/L.7), when it was adopted without a vote. As this is a by year, Mongolia did not table its biannual "Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status", which was adopted without a vote last year (A/RES/59/73). In its statement to the First Committee this year, Mongolia did note that the first Conference of States Parties to NWFZs "has also been helpful in strengthening further Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status" by proclaiming recognition and full support for it.

Nigeria tabled the biennial resolution in relation to the African NWFZ, A/C.1/60/L.8, which was adopted without a vote when Nigeria presented it in 2003 (A/RES/58/30). Parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Latin American and Caribbean NWFZ, tabled its triannual resolution on consolidating the NWFZ (A/C.1/60/L.12), traditionally adopted without a vote.

Indonesia presented the biannual resolution "Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace" (A/C.1/60/L.19), tabled by Malaysia two years ago (A/RES/58/29). At that time it received three no votes (France, UK, and US), 42 abstentions, and 110 yes votes in the First Committee. The same three states also voted no on last year's "Nuclear-weapon-free Southern Hemisphere and Adjacent Areas" (A/RES/59/85). This year the resolution (A/C.1/60/L.12) is sponsored by Brazil, New Zealand, Ecuador, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

In regards to the Middle East, several nations co-sponsored the resolution entitled "The Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East" (A/C.1/60/L.6), which received 157 yes votes, 4 no votes, and 8 abstentions last year (A/RES/59/106); with Israel, Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and the US voting no. Egypt presented the draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.3 this week, which refers to the creation

of a Middle Eastern NWFZ, and was adopted without a vote last year (A/RES/59/63).

During this week's thematic debate on Regional Disarmament and Security on Monday October 17, several Middle Eastern nations spoke, including Algeria, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Jordan, Morocco, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. Establishing a NWFZ in the Middle East was a key topic. For instance, Jordan "continues to view efforts to establish a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons in the Middle East as vital...Jordan would like to remind that since 1974, the General Assembly has adopted more than thirty-two resolutions on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone...and has called upon all parties directly concerned to consider taking practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of this proposal...to date, however, this remains yet to be realized."

Middle Eastern States also discussed nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, often using language similar to the Draft Resolution "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East" (A/C.1/60/L.6), which includes a call for a NWFZ in the ME, and directly focuses its concerns on Israel's nuclear facilities. This resolution is obviously more contentious than the traditionally consensus-adopted NWFZ resolution. Last year, Israeli Director for Arms Control, Mr. Alon Bar, explained its no vote to the "The Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East" resolution, stating, "The first committee is called upon to vote on A/C.1/59/L.37...a resolution which is blatantly one-sided, contentious and divisive and undermines, rather than enhances confidence between the states of the region. The bias of this resolution stems from the fact that the real risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East emanates from countries that, despite being parties to international treaties do not comply with their relevant international obligations."

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NSAs, Continued

non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT regardless of their behavior in fulfilling obligations under the Treaty [NPT]." Although this year's voting patterns will be confirmed next week, as the NSA resolution remains unchanged, many delegations' objections and support will probably still stand.

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Small Arms and Light Weapons

Because thematic debate this week focused on disarmament machinery and disarmament and security, Draft Resolutions on Small Arms and Light Weapons were only being discussed outside of the plenary, save for comments made by Monday's opening speaker, UN Secretary General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters Chairman Vincente Berasategui.

Berasategui discussed regional security and global standards for SALW, which are moving forward with the help of regional and subregional organizations as well as civil society. To further progress on the issue of SALW, Berasategui, on behalf of the Board, recommended the Second Biannual Meeting of States look at the implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms, and discuss the creation of global norms in greater detail. He also urged the General Assembly and the Security Council to begin working more closely with each other in order to treat SALW more comprehensively.

The Netherlands has held 5 discussions regarding draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.34 "Addressing the Humanitarian and Development Impact of the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons." An experiment in the ability of states to mold resolutions into a consensus document together at the First Committee, most recent drafts reflect Member States' urging for increased emphasis on the link between SALW and development, while removing some references to human rights. For example, a line that read "Calls upon States to take full account of the interconnections between development, peace, security and human rights, which are markedly relevant to the issue of small arms and light weapons" now reads "Calls upon States, when dealing with the issue of the illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects, to explore ways to more effectively address the humanitarian and development impact of the illicit manufacture, transfer and circulation of SALW and their excessive accumulation." The suggestion of requiring "adequate care and assistance of victims of small arms violence, including support to ensure their social and economic reintegration" was removed entirely, as was a call to "implement strategies to report on, prevent and punish gender-based violence." Some southern countries wanted more explicit language on the commitment of donor states to contributing funds to countries for preventing the illicit trade in SALW.

Following the discussions last week (See SALW Report, Week 2) on possible amendments to the omnibus resolution (A/C.1/60/L.57) on the "Illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects", lead sponsors South Africa, Japan and Colombia held a consultation this week. The three amendments proposed by the EU last week, as in years past,

were: (1) emphasizing work on SALW transfer controls, (2) including suggested topics to be submitted to the preparatory committee "without prejudice to the eventual agenda for the Review Conference in 2006," and (3) using stronger language on the establishment of the Group of Governmental Experts on developing an instrument on brokering. Once again, these proposals were rejected in favor of keeping consensus on the resolution. This choice was made after certain states (China, Egypt, India, US, and some of the NAM states) threatened to vote against the resolution if needed.

Other changes from last year's resolution include the recognition of NGOs "in the provisions of assistance to states for implementation of the Programme of Action," noting the outcomes of the 2005 World Summit, the Second Biannual Meeting of States, and the Open Ended Working Group. The most substantive change is the call for the establishment of a Governmental Group of Experts to convene after the Review Conference to "consider further steps to enhance international cooperation in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit brokering."

In subsequent workshops, including one sponsored by Mexico, the Netherlands, Sierra Leone, and the Biting the Bullet Project on "Issues and Priorities for the 2006 Programme of Action Review Conference," Member State representatives focused on the struggle between receiving broad-based support of resolutions through consensus or being caught by the tyranny of the minority when consensus is used as a veto tool (See Disarmament Machinery Report).

There is also much contention regarding the purpose of the 2006 review Conference on the Programme of Action, and whether moving forward constitutes "re-opening the original PoA," or whether simply "reviewing" the PoA stagnates the process and allows only "backward looking" discussions.

The new draft resolution "Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus" (A/C.1/60/L.40) was introduced in the context of a proposed international marking and tracing instrument that does not include ammunition. This followed the inclusion of this item in the provisional agenda of the 60th session (A/C.1/59/L.48). It "calls upon all interested states to determine the size of their surplus stockpiles of ammunition, explosive materials, and detonating devices if they represent a security risk and if external assistance is required to eliminate this risk," encourages States to assist other States, and asks States to develop measures to combat illicit trafficking of ammunition. When France introduced the resolution on Friday, October 14, it insisted that it is intended as a non-intrusive voluntary exercise in which States determined if

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Terrorism

Four draft resolutions were presented that relate to terrorism, a multi-faceted threat that involves weapons ranging from WMD to small arms. Singapore emphasized that new global security threats had appeared through non-state actors against whom deterrence is inoperative, and that global terrorist networks now have the means to acquire WMD. Morocco pointed out that cooperation between countries is critical to counter this threat by stressing that the states surrounding the Mediterranean had to coordinate their efforts. United Arab Emirates expressed concerns about nuclear weapons falling in the hands of terrorists.

The new draft resolution "Preventing the risk of radiological terrorism" (A/C.1/60/L.39) aims at better control over radiological materials and their means of production to prevent their use by terrorists to make a "dirty bomb". When introducing the resolution, France called radiological terrorism and dirty bombs instruments of mass disruption.

Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.51, "Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction", urges states to cooperate to avoid terrorists acquiring WMD. This resolution has 14 new sponsors this year, bringing the total to 24. Its text is similar to last year's consensus adopted text (A/RES/59/80), with an updated urge for states to sign and ratify the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism that was adopted on April 28, 2005.

Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.49, "Prevention of the illicit transfer and unauthorized access to and use of man-portable air defense systems", focuses on control over man-portable devices. In the second week of the First Committee meetings, the European Union stated: "The use of Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) by terrorists and non-state actors as a tool for threatening civil aviation (and also aviation involved in peacekeeping operations) warrants worldwide attention and immediate action." Some 51 sponsors were added this year bringing the total to 57. Last year this resolution (A/RES/59/90) was adopted without a vote.

Draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.29, "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security", sponsored by the Russian Federation, is designed to improve information security. It aims to keep terrorists, among others, from using information systems to their benefit and to keep them from disrupting society by attacking information systems. The group of experts on information technology, chaired by Russia, was unable to achieve consensus this year on their study due to the complexity of the issue and disagreements over language. In discussing the findings with the First Committee, the Chair affirmed that common definitions would facilitate future work.

Small Arms & Light Weapons, Cont.

they had excess ammunition. France was encouraged by the support and useful proposals for the resolution that came from the open-ended meeting it held before introducing it. Co-sponsors include Bulgaria, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Slovenia, Switzerland and Turkey.

The draft resolution "Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them" (A/C.1/60.L.37) was submitted again this year (last year A/RES/59/74 was adopted in the GA without a vote), and decides again to include the aforementioned topic in the provisional agenda of the 61st session and acknowledges the most recent accomplishments in the area. It also calls on the international community to "provide technical and financial support to strengthen the capacity of civil society organizations to take action to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons."

In a meeting of the Group of Interested States in Practical Disarmament Measures, the Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) and Interpol presented on "International Cooperation and Assistance in the Implementation of the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons," to promote and explore draft decision A/C.1/60/L.55. Interpol has developed a Weapons Electronic Tracing System (IWeTS) to "enhance both national and international criminal investigations in relation to the tracing of firearms" and may be launching a project for "collecting and analyzing information regarding key figures involved in [the illicit brokering of SALW] and their modus operandi."

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Disarmament Education, Continued

ple, but to the whole community of humanity. Teaching people about disarmament and non-proliferation, and letting them know that there is a choice other than violence to resolve conflict, is one step along the path called Permanent Peace.

See <http://disarmament.un.org/education/study.html> for full list of recommendations.

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