


THE FIRST COMMITTEE MONITOR

NGO Reporting on the
General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security



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The First Committee Monitor

CONTENTS

PAGE 1		INTRODUCTION
PAGE 2		NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
PAGE 3		NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONVENTION
PAGE 4		NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONES
PAGE 5		DISARMAMENT MACHINERY
PAGE 6		MISSILES
PAGE 7		OUTER SPACE
PAGE 8		VERIFICATION AND TRANSPARENCY
PAGE 9		NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES
PAGE 10		BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS
PAGE 11		DEPLETED URANIUM
PAGE 12		CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
PAGE 13		SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS
PAGE 14		ARMS TRADE TREATY
PAGE 15		LANDMINES
PAGE 16		DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
PAGE 17		REGIONAL DISARMAMENT
PAGE 18		TERRORISM

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International Action Network on
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International Association of Lawyers
Against Nuclear Arms;
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Middle Powers Initiative;
NGO Committee on Disarmament,
Peace and Security;
Quaker United Nations Office; and
Women's International League
for Peace and Freedom**



The Monitor is a weekly report produced by the NGO Working Group on the First Committee, a collaborative effort undertaken by non-governmental organizations to make the work of the UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security more transparent. *The Monitor* is compiled, edited, and coordinated by Reaching Critical Will, the disarmament project of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.

RCW provides services to activists, diplomats, UN staffers, academics, and others, including:

- Posting statements, draft resolutions, and First Committee information online at www.reachingcriticalwill.org;
- Coordinating an array of briefings, workshops and panels designed to educate diplomats and activists on issues of disarmament, peace, and security;
- Serving as an information resource by email or phone; and
- Providing a link between the First Committee and NGOs who are not in New York.



Introduction

Over the last three weeks, we have heard repeated calls for a new security environment, within which nuclear disarmament would be “possible.” We have also heard many largely rhetorical, often conflicting proposals for achieving this. Pakistan’s non-paper on a new consensus for disarmament argues it should be based on “universally recognized principles of equity and non-discrimination,” and the “legitimate national security and economic interests of all States.” No longer interested in “what would have to be done to control and eliminate nuclear weapons,” the United States delegation has dismissed “laundry lists of traditional arms control steps” in favour of emphasizing “the practical challenges of making nuclear disarmament the most stabilizing, deliberate policy choice.” In statements and working papers submitted to various disarmament fora, the US argues “stricter compliance with the [NPT’s] non-proliferation rules is essential” to this end. The US also cites, apparently without irony, “lessening international tension and strengthening trust between nations” as necessary precursors for disarmament. Meanwhile, nearly every state has called for increased “political will” to overcome the deadlock in disarmament machinery and to reach consensus on an agenda for disarmament.

Will is constituted by a fixed and persistent intent or purpose. It also involves choice. In her presentation on disarmament machinery, Dr. Patricia Lewis of UNIDIR quoted Arthur C. Clarke, saying, “The only way to discover the limits of the possible is to go beyond them into the impossible.” Subsequently, a delegate from Benin suggested that delegations should strive to set aside their national priorities when they enter deliberative or negotiating fora, that they should come as agents of change whose job it is to find solutions to the problems of humankind—something they are unable to do strictly as representatives of their governments.

On 26 October, civil society for the second year in a row delivered presentations to First Committee. Five non-government organization (NGO) representatives spoke about nuclear weapons, outer space security, small arms, and the Arms Trade Treaty. (See the Outer Space,

Small Arms, and ATT reports.)

Jacqueline Cabasso, Executive Director of Western States Legal Foundation, explored the concept of good faith obligation to disarm, which is embedded in Article VI of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and was unanimously affirmed by the International Court of Justice in 1996. Good faith (or lack thereof) provides a useful perspective for assessing the current impasse in disarmament and non-proliferation. She explained, “some of the legal elements of good faith [include] correspondence between word and deed; no secret reservations; openness and transparency, with a complete disclosure of material facts; and a readiness to submit one’s actions to external scrutiny. In addition, good faith requires that meaningful steps be taken towards the desired goal, with no backtracking, and within a reasonable time span [emphasis added].”

After the NGO presentations in First Committee, Chairperson Paul Badji reminded the Committee of the importance of the relationship between member states and NGOs, emphasizing the value of our presence and contributions, and pointing out that delegates themselves are members of civil society—that we are, in short, all on the same team. It does not always feel this way, however. Badji’s reference to the responsibility of NGOs to present their facts accurately and fairly reminds us of the delicate balance between our integrity of belief and the pressure on us to conform ourselves to the medium in which we act. This view tends to overlook other responsibilities, such as the need for member states to, as Benin said, balance national priorities with the need for efficient progress, and for the United Nations to balance its need to maintain a fraternal atmosphere among member states while guarding against the curtain of censorship and fulfilling its obligation to its true constituents—“we the peoples.”

-Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will
(www.reachingcriticalwill.org)

Nuclear Disarmament

The third week of First Committee focused on issues other than nuclear disarmament, so attention on this field centered on the new draft resolutions. The three key omnibus drafts—the New Agenda Coalition (NAC)’s, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)’s, and Japan’s “total elimination”—were released, as were the traditional drafts covering specific aspects of nuclear disarmament.

The only new nuclear disarmament draft is “Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems” (A/C.1/62/L.29). Co-sponsored by Chile, New Zealand, Nigeria, Sweden, and Switzerland, the draft calls for de-alerting nuclear without using the phrase. While the United States will likely oppose the text, the use of the most neutral phrase—“operational readiness”—is a bid to draw the support of non-nuclear NATO states. In contrast, India’s annual draft on “Reducing Nuclear Danger” (A/C.1/62/L.21) retains the language that the United States finds objectionable, in particular, “hair-trigger alert,” in its call for de-alerting and de-targeting. (See section on “Operational Status of Nuclear Weapons” from last week). India’s other annual draft, calling on the CD to negotiate a “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons” (A/C.1/62/L.23), is unchanged from last year.

The NAC’s resolution (A/C.1/62/L.9), “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments,” essentially follows the pattern of the 2006 draft, meaning that it calls for support for the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the decisions from 1995 and 2000, as well for universal adherence to the Treaty. The draft is a broad brush appeal to implement all practical steps agreed to at the previous review conferences, specifying only the “vital importance” of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). It updates the NPT paragraph, welcoming the first session of the Preparatory Committee, and “looks forward to a constructive and successful preparatory process.” The paragraph on North Korea is also updated: last year, the NAC condemned North Korea’s nuclear test; this year’s draft urges Pyongyang to “rescind its announced withdrawal” from the NPT.

In contrast, the Japanese-led annual draft, “Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons” (A/C.1/62/L.30) focuses on a number of specific steps. The emphasis is on the need for the nuclear weapon states to fulfill their disarmament obligations under Article VI of the NPT, calling for “deeper reductions in all types of nuclear weapons” with an emphasis on “irreversibility and verifiability, as well as increased transparency.” It says the US/Russian reductions “should serve as a step for further nuclear disarmament.” The text calls for the reduction in operational status of weapons systems and a “diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies.” It endorses the CTBT, the Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), and calls for the “universalization” of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) comprehensive safeguards agreements. Like the NAC draft, this text is basically the same as its 2006 version, except for updating the paragraphs on North Korea and the NPT Preparatory Committee.

The NAM’s annual draft “Nuclear Disarmament” (A/C.1/62/L.40) adheres to the Movement’s past declarations and resolutions on the subject. It contains every nuclear disarmament initiative endorsed by the Movement including no first use, de-alerting, a Conference on Disarmament (CD) ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, the CTBT, a “non-discriminatory, multilateral ... and verifiable” FMCT, and a halt to qualitative improvements in nuclear weapons. The operative paragraphs of the 2007 draft are identical to 2006’s resolution.

“Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” (A/C.1/62/L.8) is Iran’s draft resolution on the NPT nuclear disarmament obligations. The draft focuses on reaffirming the 13 practical steps, the “unequivocal undertaking” by the nuclear weapon states to eliminate those arms, and the Middle East resolution.

Neither the US nor Russia tabled drafts either individually or jointly on their bilateral relations. The last year the two powers submitted a joint

continued on page 10



Nuclear Weapons Convention

For the eleventh year running, Malaysia has submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/62/L.36) to First Committee on “Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.”

The resolution calls for implementation of the universal and unequivocal nuclear disarmament obligation affirmed in the ICJ opinion through the commencement of negotiations culminating in a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC), an international treaty prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination.

If the UN Secretary-General’s report on implementation of this resolution (A/62/165) is anything to go by, the resolution has had very little impact. Only four countries—Chile, Cuba, Lebanon and Mexico—submitted reports to the UN on their implementation efforts. However, lacklustre reporting to the UN does not necessarily reflect recent political developments in favour of a NWC—and general support for nuclear abolition—within and beyond the UN corridors.

The 2006 Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Havana, reaffirmed the importance of the unanimous conclusion of the ICJ and expressed strong support for the Malaysian resolution.

An increase in support for a NWC from across the political spectrum is indicated by the launches of the book *Securing our Survival: The Case for a Nuclear Weapons in Australia, Austria, Canada, Malaysia, and New Zealand*. Conservative leaders such as the Rt. Hon. Malcolm Fraser (former Prime Minister of Australia) and the Rt Hon. Jim Bolger (former Prime Minister of New Zealand) have joined military leaders such as Romeo Dallaire (former Commander of UN Forces in Rwanda), parliamentary leaders, international law experts such as Christopher Weeramantry (former Vice-President of the ICJ) Nobel laureates, mayors, UN officials such as Sergio Duarte (UN High Representative for Disarmament) and others in supporting an NWC.

General support for nuclear abolition has also gained increased support from across the political

spectrum. In late 2006 the Hoover Institute hosted a twentieth anniversary conference of the historic Reykjavik Summit of Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, out of which emerged a statement from Republicans Henry Kissinger and George Schultz, along with Democrats Sam Nunn and William Perry, calling for a nuclear weapons free world.

Last week the Hoover Institute hosted a follow-up conference, which considered ideas for a nuclear weapons convention. Nancy Reagan, President Reagan’s wife, told the conference that “Ronnie had many hopes for the future and none were more important to America and to mankind [sic] than the effort to create a world free of nuclear weapons. As Ronnie said, these are ‘totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing but killing and possibly destructive of life on earth.’”

Back in the UN, the NWC received a strong push in the non-governmental statement to the First Committee delivered by Jacqueline Cabasso on 26 October. Ms. Cabasso noted the NWC has been revised and was submitted to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee in May 2007 (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.17).

Also on 26 October, the Costa Rican delegation hosted a meeting of governments interested in joining it and Malaysia in submitting the revised Model NWC to the United Nations General Assembly at the current session. Costa Rica noted that the Model NWC, an update from the 1997 version (A/C.1/52/7), sets the legal, political and technical elements for the establishment and maintenance of a nuclear weapons free world. As such, it can assist the deliberative and negotiating processes for nuclear disarmament. The revised version takes into consideration developments since 1997 relevant to the establishment of a nuclear weapons free regime.

-Alyn Ware, International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (www.ialana.net)

Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

As of the end of the third week of the First Committee, six resolutions have been introduced relating to nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs).

Two draft resolutions call for the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East. Egypt introduced the annual resolution on the “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East” (A/C.1/62/L.1), calling on countries in the region to adhere to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and place all of their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Members of the League of Arab States introduced the annual resolution, “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East” (A/C.1/62/L.2), reaffirming “the importance of Israel’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive [IAEA] safeguards.” In past years, the draft resolution on the establishment of a Middle East NWFZ has been adopted without a vote, while the resolution on proliferation in the Middle East has been repeatedly rejected by Israel and the United States on the basis of being one-sided and divisive.

Three other resolutions pertain to existing zones in Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa and Southeast Asia.

Nigeria introduced the draft resolution “African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty” (A/C.1/62/L.26) calling upon all African states that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty of Pelindaba so that it may enter into force, as well as to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA. The resolution further expresses support for the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East as a measure that “would enhance the security of Africa and the viability of the African nuclear-weapon-free zone”.

On the tenth anniversary of the Treaty of Bangkok entering into force, States Parties to the Treaty introduced a draft resolution titled “Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone” (A/C.1/62/L.19). The resolution calls on the five NWS to accede to the protocols of the Treaty and to “provide individual or collective

declarations that they would not contribute to any activity that would violate the Treaty.”

A group of members of the Treaty of Tlatelolco introduced a draft resolution on the “Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)” (A/C.1/62/L.10). In the fortieth anniversary year of the historic treaty establishing the world’s first NWFZ in a densely populated region, this resolution encourages further cooperation between all existing NWFZs and the implementation of agreements reached at the 2005 Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones.

In this spirit of enhanced cooperation between existing NWFZs, Brazil and New Zealand introduced the draft resolution “Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas” (A/C.1/62/L.27). The resolution reaffirms the significant contribution of existing NWFZ Treaties to regional and international peace and security, while sending a strong political message that a large part of the world is already nuclear weapon free. Support for the resolution in the past has been strong among the regional NWFZs. Last year, the resolution was co-sponsored by 25 countries, and was approved by a large majority.

At a panel discussion sponsored by the Atomic Mirror, a dialogue between civil society and country delegates from NWFZs of Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, Africa and Central Asia pointed to the need of increased cooperation and communication among the NWFZs and the involvement of civil society in these efforts. The 2010 meeting of all NWFZ countries planned to take place in the Pacific offers new opportunities for advancing the NWFZ-led path to achieving global nuclear disarmament.

-Monika Szymurska, Atomic Mirror
(www.atomicmirror.org)



Disarmament Machinery

During a panel discussion last week, Dr. Patricia Lewis, Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, presented her examinations of disarmament machinery as complex systems—that is, systems that have many interrelated parts, and in which there are multiple interactions between many components.

Dr. Lewis explained disarmament machinery is composed of a multiplicity of fora—multilateral, bilateral, etc.—and each of these fora is composed of multiple elements—treaties, negotiating and deliberative bodies, international organizations, and so forth. Each of these in turn are composed of issues, methods, and actors. All these components of the system interact with each other, often resulting in non-intuitive, non-deterministic behaviour. In complex systems, history matters—interactions between components in a complex system are not singular events. Exchanges between diplomats in First Committee are not simply a product of their experiences in Conference Room 4, and do not simply effect future exchanges in this setting.

After developing this framework, Dr. Lewis explained that small changes in environment, such as the introduction of new or unexpected methods of work or external events, can effect the entire system. In this vein, Ambassador Labbé of Chile, Chairperson of the Open-ended Working Group on SSOD IV (the fourth special session on disarmament), introduced new methods to the working group in order to foster a “critical mass of political support for SSOD IV”. He encouraged delegates to seek ways to understand each other, to live with their differences, and to create conditions to keep the idea of SSOD IV alive. To this end, he held a retreat for delegates to talk about the issues, insisted everyone refer to each other by their first names, and invited eleven non-governmental organizations to speak at one of their sessions.

Ambassador Labbé’s approach to the working group is an example of how small key changes to the environment or methods of work can effect a complex system: the group had more energy and a spirit of congeniality that is missing from the rest of the machinery. While the group was

unable to reach consensus on the establishment of SSOD IV, channels of dialogue remain open and more flexible than in other parts of the system.

We need this spirit to infect other aspects of the machinery. We need, in short, a complex *adaptive* system—a system that learns or evolves by utilizing acquired information (such as a child learning her native language). Complex adaptive disarmament machinery would require the machinery to not simply respond to the multiplicity of interactions and events, but to *grow* from it—to become more effective, or even to change.

Often falling short of this mark, a few delegations made proposals for reforming First Committee’s methods of work. The United States argued many draft resolutions are no longer “relevant to today’s international security situation,” and suggested they not be tabled more than five times, while Norway’s delegate suggested “limiting the possibility of co-sponsorship to resolutions which are introduced for the first time in this committee.” The Canadian recommendation of increased reporting on the implementation of resolutions offers a more substantial change that could improve the machinery’s effectiveness.

Ambassador Duncan of the United Kingdom spoke of improving the capacity to address the challenges of the twenty-first century and to “reflect the world as it is, not as it was.” He believes that to do this, disarmament machinery might need new instruments or approaches. In her presentation, Dr. Lewis pointed out that many delegations seem to believe the idea of a new piece of disarmament machinery is “indistinguishable from magic.” She argued that new machinery is not magic, and in fact, might be the only solution. Illustrating this point, the Canadian delegation pointed to the Oslo Process and Ottawa Convention as indications that “if states are serious about accomplishing something, they will find the appropriate diplomatic vehicle for so doing; and second, that innovative, external processes most often bring us back—sooner rather than later—to work within our treaty-based multilateral agreements and multilateral bodies, and make them more relevant and robust.”

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Missiles

On 25 October, the United States and Russia presented a joint statement to the First Committee, noting the twentieth anniversary of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and calling for interested countries to discuss the possibility of internationalizing the Treaty, “though the renunciation of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, leading to the destruction of any such missiles, and the cessation of associated programs.” The statement, delivered by Russia, also describes the Treaty as an important and practical step toward fulfillment of Article VI of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), cites the role the Treaty played in easing tensions in Europe, and expresses concern about the proliferation of missiles in this range to an ever-greater number of countries. Speaking after the presentation of the statement, US Ambassador Rocca, called for greater attention to be paid to the issue in order to ensure regional stability.

The statement is deliberately vague. Notably, it does not call on all states to join the Treaty, but rather calls for discussion on the possibility of “interested” parties to consider renouncing their intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. Nor does it specifically reference whether this commitment would take the form of a new treaty or, most importantly, how this objective would be verified. This minimalist, non-committal approach to international arms control and disarmament perhaps reflects disagreement between the two former superpowers on the utility of legally-binding treaties as a means to combat proliferation. However, while this statement tends to come across as a half-full political gesture, the substantive aspects of the issues are worth (re)exploring.

As Ambassador Rocca notes, “Today’s world is far different.” Yet, this is not the first time we have heard calls for internationalizing the INF treaty. This position initially gained popularity in the period immediately following the end of the Cold War, at a time when the former superpower rivals were engaged in verifiable reduction of their overall strategic inventories, not just those of intermediate-ranges. It was also a time when very few countries other than the US and Russia fielded missiles with ranges between 500 and

5500 km.

But in the past decade and a half, the strategic sands have begun to shift. Eight countries now deploy missiles that would be affected by extending the missile ban covered by the Treaty, including China, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. As a complication to possible verification of an expanded INF regime, most of these countries have developed an indigenous capacity to manufacture ballistic missiles and a number of them, along with several states not included in this list, are developing independent space launch capabilities.

This proposal also faces a number of other issues. Although Rocca cites proliferation of missiles as a concern to regional stability, in many cases it is insecurity that has been a key driver of both missile proliferation and arms races in several regions, particularly in the Middle East and South and Northeast Asia. As the evolving situation with North Korea demonstrates, it is often necessary to address the underlying political causes of insecurity before considering steps affecting regional stability.

More important to the credibility of this proposal are the policies and proposals of its proponents and other NPT nuclear weapon states. Likely incompatible to the goal of internationalizing any regime governing missiles, these states continue to modernize and develop more advanced intercontinental ballistic missile systems (ICBMs), and indeed even are even considering placing conventional warheads on certain ICBMs previously used only for nuclear missions. Beyond this, there are US programs for next generation strategic weapons, such as Prompt Global Strike, which, according to US Air Force planning documents, involves the possibility of a “range of system concepts to deliver precision weapons with global reach, in minutes to hours.” It is also likely that the INF expansion proposal will be incompatible with approaches to missile non-proliferation taken over the past two decades: namely establishment of export control regimes (the efficacy of which is called into question by the continuing proliferation of longer-ranged missile systems) and ballistic missile defenses.

continued on page 15



Outer Space

Last week in the First Committee, the co-sponsors of the two anticipated draft resolutions on outer space tabled their texts, A/C.1/62/L.34, “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space,” and A/C.1/62/L.41, “Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space”. Neither contained any significant change from previous years’ texts.

While the Russia-sponsored L.41 garnered 10 new co-sponsors—Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Italy, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Romania, Spain, Switzerland, and Venezuela—curiously, it lost 6 of the sponsors from last year’s draft, including Portugal, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Belgium. None of these countries commented publicly on why they would drop their sponsorship of a text that remained, essentially, unchanged.

First Committee heard presentations from the Chairperson of the UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and Magnus Hellgren of the Swedish Mission, who talked about the role of COPUOS and the CD, respectively, in dealing with space security issues, and specifics of the debate surrounding the possibility of a new treaty. Despite these efforts, a new treaty in space at this time does not seem possible, in particular due to the US’ stated objection to such a treaty, as articulated in its 2006 National Space Policy and as reiterated this week by Mr. George Pataki during the Thematic Debate.

Therefore, as a way to stimulate new ideas and deepen the debate on the subject, some members of the international community organized several events over the past two weeks. The Global Security Institute, the Secure World Foundation, the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and the Governments of Russia and China organized a panel discussion on 15 October entitled “Exploring Cooperative Approaches to Outer Space Security.” Russian Counselor Valery Semin discussed elements of the not-yet-released Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space Treaty, and Counselor Li Yang of China voiced his country’s general support of a new legal instrument, without any specifics attached to such support. US Ambassador (ret.) Thomas Graham, Chairman of the Bipartisan Security Group,

discussed several initiatives and possibilities for strengthening our outer space regime, including the Space Security Index and the possibility of a protocol to the Outer Space Treaty. He urged that more be done to protect outer space as a global common, similar to the approach to Antarctica, before weapons programs “become entrenched.” Dr. Patricia Lewis of UNIDIR offered a very comprehensive overview of several paths forward, including a code of conduct, a new treaty, and other new “rules of the road” options. She appealed to the international community to build trust, confidence and cooperation, so as to enable the emerging “space generation” to realize their goal of exploring outer space in ways unimaginable to us so far.

In the personification of Dr. Lewis’s appeal, two young filmmakers screened their film in Conference Room 4 on Tuesday, *Final Frontier: Explorers or Warriors?* This inspiring project looked insightfully and humorously into the issues of space security, highlighting the danger of space junk and the folly of the weaponization of space.

For the first time ever, civil society delivered a presentation to the First Committee on outer space security, whereby they voiced support for the suggestion of the Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters to convene a high-level panel to assess our security situation in outer space and recommend ways forward. While it may be too late for inclusion of this recommendation in this year’s resolutions, individual member states or regional groupings are strongly encouraged to write letters of support for this idea to the Secretariat. Some have already voiced their willingness to do so.

For more information or to discuss this initiative further, or to obtain a copy of the film *Final Frontier*, contact the Global Security Institute.

-Rhianna Tyson, Global Security Institute
(www.gsainstitute.org) and Secure World Foundation (www.secureworldfoundation.org)

Verification and Transparency

On 17 October, Gustavo Zlauvinen, Representative of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), explained, “effective verification has four elements: adequate legal authority, state-of-the-art technology, access to all relevant information and locations, and sufficient human and financial resources.” Zlauvinen noted IAEA comprehensive safeguards and the Additional Protocol constitute the verification standard, but argued that “the Agency’s crucial verification role needs more sophisticated approaches for information analysis, as well as for continuous updates to verification equipment and expertise. As new facilities and countries come under safeguards, the Agency will need the corresponding increases in financial funding and personnel.” Many delegates have noted the value of IAEA verification measures, and have called upon states outside of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime to submit their nuclear facilities to IAEA inspections.

On 23 October, Dr. John Barrett of Canada provided an update on the progress of the UN Group of Government Experts (GGE) on Verification. As Chair of the GGE, Dr. Barrett emphasized the need for reports to demonstrate how verification has addressed international security needs. He argued that the success of verification mechanisms can best be measured by the extent to which member states are in compliance with verification methods. The United States delegation subsequently argued that “verification is designed to strengthen national and international security by providing the means and methods for the detection and deterrence of noncompliance.” The US statement focused on “the importance of responding to noncompliance resolutely and in a timely fashion,” arguing, “if detection has no consequences for the violator, then verification has no meaning, and deterrence is unachievable.” According the US, verification is only the first step, not an end in itself.

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NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION


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VERTIC
Building trust through verification



Verification and Transparency (cont.)

Meanwhile, the Canadian delegation emphasized, “[e]ffective verification, compliance and monitoring is a core ingredient in the development of trust among States.” It pointed out that the most significant multilateral disarmament and arms control agreements from the 1990s “made verification an integral tool to reinforce disarmament agreements.” Canada subsequently introduced draft resolution A/C.1/62/L.47, “Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification,” which notes the GGE on Verification’s report, requests the Secretary-General circulate it widely, and encourages member states to read it and offer additional views to the Secretary-General. Last year, Canada submitted a draft decision by the same name, encouraging the GGE on Verification “to bring its work to an agreed conclusion as soon as possible.”

Transparency was also frequently cited in many statements as necessary and beneficial to increasing international peace and security. The European Union argued that transparency in armaments “is an essential component in fighting the uncontrolled proliferation” of weapons and “in providing an atmosphere of confidence and security.” The EU further contended that transparency in military spending “constitutes a key element of confidence between States and can thus contribute to conflict prevention.” Draft resolution A/C.1/62/L.33, “Objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures,” notes the importance of the standardized reporting system while recognizing it needs to be improved. It calls upon states to contribute to the reporting system, and “[e]ncourages relevant international bodies and regional organizations to promote transparency of military expenditures and to enhance complementarity among reporting systems.” This is a bi-annual resolution, last introduced in 2005. The texts are virtually the same.

-Ray Acheson and Sarmadi Almecci, Reaching Critical Will (www.reachingcriticalwill.org)

Negative Security Assurances

On Wednesday, the delegation of Peru introduced draft resolution A/C.1/62/L.44 entitled, “Conclusion of effective international agreements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.” The resolution was co-sponsored by 27 additional states, although the only nuclear weapon possessing state to co-sponsor was Pakistan. Peru’s draft resolution closely resembles the resolutions that have been introduced by Pakistan in previous years. It stresses the “urgent need to reach an early agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons” and appeals to all member states to work towards that end.

The resolution also stresses the role the Conference on Disarmament (CD) has to play in bringing about negative security assurances. It notes there seem to be no objections in the CD to the principle of negative security assurances, and “recommends that the CD actively continue intensive negotiations with a view to early agreement and concluding effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.”

Several other draft resolutions introduced this week also brought up the subject of negative security assurances. A/C.1/62/L.8, “Follow up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 review conference of the parties to the [nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty],” introduced by Iran without co-sponsors noted, among other things, that “the 2000 review conference of the parties to the treaty agreed that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the treaty strengthen the non-proliferation regime.”

Draft resolution A/C.1/62/L.40, introduced by Myanmar with 32 co-sponsors, is titled “General and complete disarmament: nuclear disarmament.” Among the resolution’s operative paragraphs is one that “[c]alls for the conclusion of an international legal instrument or instruments on adequate security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.”

continued on page 11

Biological and Chemical Weapons

On 17 October, Hungary submitted a draft resolution entitled “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction” (A/C.1/62/L.37). The document notes with satisfaction the growing number—from 55 last year to 59 this year—of parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). The new parties are Gabon, Kazakhstan, Montenegro, and Trinidad and Tobago.

Discussion on biological weapons during Thematic Debate focused on the outcome of the Sixth Review Conference of the BTWC, which took place in December 2006, vis-à-vis the strengthening of the Convention. The draft resolution submitted by Hungary praised the successful outcome of this Conference. Ambassador Masood Khan of Pakistan, the president of the Sixth Review Conference and Chairperson of the BTWC at the First Committee, said the outcome of the Conference established a “common vision for the Convention and its implementation.” Russia emphasized the adoption of practical measures at the Conference for the strengthening of the BTWC, and the contribution of the former to the establishment of a verification system for the latter.

On 23 October, Poland introduced a draft resolution entitled “Implementation of the Convention of the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction” (A/C.1/62/L.7). A similar draft resolution was introduced last year, and there are no substantial differences between the two. This year’s draft resolution notes there is an ongoing effort to achieve the objective and the purpose of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

The draft reaffirms how essential the outcome of the First Special Session of the Conference of the State Parties to Review the Operation of the CWC was to achieving the objective and the purpose of the Convention. Also, the universality of the CWC is vital to achieving these goals, so the draft resolution calls on the states that have not become parties to the Convention to do so without delay.

The implementation of the CWC was a reoccurring theme in the Thematic Debate on other weapons of mass destruction. According to Indonesia, the destruction of chemical weapons has been more successful than the destruction of other weapons of mass destruction; however, Indonesia expressed some pessimism by stating that 5 out of 6 possessors of chemical weapons have asked for extensions to destroy their stockpiles, until 2012. There is an overall sentiment that possessors of chemical weapons will not be able to meet this deadline; the delegation also regretted that only one-third of the world’s chemical weapons stockpiles have been destroyed.

Another reoccurring theme in L.7 is the importance of the “effective application of the verification system”, which contributes to the compliance with the CWC by establishing confidence building measures. The draft mentions the vital work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in this respect, in addition to the organization’s contribution to the implementation of the Convention.

-Edgar Socarras, NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security
(www.disarmtimes.org)

Nuclear Disarmament (cont.)

resolution on strategic arms control was 2004. With START set to expire in 2009, and SORT in 2012, many member states and arms control experts have been calling for renewals or new agreements to be negotiated. The US and Russia did release a joint statement on the Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF Treaty), which they announced on 25 October in First Committee (see Missiles).

-Jim Wurst, Middle Powers Initiative
(www.middlepowers.org)



Depleted Uranium

For the second time in First Committee, a draft resolution related to depleted uranium (DU) has been tabled. In 2002, Iraq tabled draft resolution A/C.1/57/L.14 in First Committee, entitled “Effects of the use of depleted uranium in armaments.” Only 35 states voted in favour of the resolution and it was not adopted. The European Union, Pakistan, and United States objected to DU being characterized as a weapon of mass destruction, and the EU and US argued that scientific studies by the World Health Organization (WHO) and UN Environmental Programme had found no evidence that DU in armaments has a notable impact on human health or the environment.

This year, the Cuban delegation drafted the text and secured sponsorship from the rest of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). In a letter circulated to fellow delegations, the Chairman of the Coordinating Bureau of the NAM explains the text “is fully consistent with the international concern on this issue and the factual information available in this regard.”

The draft resolution, “Effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium” (A/C.1/62/L.18), considers the potential harm caused by DU armaments and ammunitions on human health and the environment, and subsequently requests the Secretary-General “seek the view of Member States and relevant international organizations” on these harmful effects and submit a report to the General Assembly next year. It also requests member states “refrain from using armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium until studies to determine the effects of such armaments and ammunitions on human health and the environment are completed.”

DU is a by-product left over when natural uranium ore is enriched for use in nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons. It is a toxic, dense, hard metal. If it is ingested, inhaled, or enters the body through other means, it creates risks as both as a toxic heavy metal and as a radioactive material. DU munitions explode upon impact and release uranium oxide dust. It has been used by the US and other militaries in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and both recent conflicts in Iraq.

The WHO’s depleted uranium fact sheet notes

that uranium released from embedded fragments (shrapnel wounds) may accumulate in the central nervous system tissue, though it is difficult to draw firm conclusions from the few studies reported. The one area of potentially demonstrable health hazard is liver and kidney damage due to long-term exposure, because both the kidneys and liver help to filter ingested uranium out of the human body.

There have been striking coincidences of increased cancer rates, childhood cancers, still-births, and birth defects in southern Iraq (Basra), and among military personnel involved in areas in which DU has been used extensively in both the 1991 Gulf War and the ongoing conflict in Iraq. Whether these cancers are causally linked to DU has not been irrefutably established.

At the Fourth International Conference on DU Weapons, Professor Manfred Mohr of the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms argued the use of DU armaments raises questions under the principles of international humanitarian law, including those of distinction, indiscriminate effect, proportionality, and precaution. For more information about Professor Mohr’s remarks and the rest of the Conference, please see RCW’s Conference Report. For more information about DU, please see RCW’s backgrounder and the International Coalition to Ban Uranium Weapons website.

-Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will
(www.reachingcriticalwill.org)

Negative Security Assurances (cont.)

During last year’s First Committee, the “Conclusion of effective international agreements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons” draft resolution passed 108-1 with 57 abstentions, and the resolution passed 119-1 with 59 abstentions in the General Assembly. The United States was the only state to vote against the resolution.

-Nathan Band, Global Security Institute
(www.gsinsitute.org)

Conventional Weapons

On behalf of the European Union (EU), Ambassador Gomes of Portugal stated, “Uncontrolled stocks of ammunition contribute to the risks of trafficking and proliferation and to the prolongation and intensification of armed conflicts.” In this regard, the EU looks forward to the work of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on “Conventional Ammunition Stockpiles in Surplus” in 2008. The EU also noted that the recommendations of the GGE on the “continuing operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and its further development” were incorporated into resolution 61/77 on Transparency in Armaments. Ambassador Tarui of Japan noted he “values China’s efforts as a first step towards confidence building in the international community through the improvement of transparency in armaments” by returning to the Register (see Conventional Weapons Week 1).

France’s Ambassador Dobelle noted that conventional weapons have the greatest immediate impact on the security, well-being, and survival of the inhabitants of the planet. The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), while an example of an effective instrument for addressing conventional weapons issues, is in crisis. France is organizing an informal conference on the CFE to be held in early November, to which all States Parties and candidates for adhesion to the treaty are invited.

The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) was highlighted this week by Ambassador Rivasseau (France), President of the CCW Third Review Conference. Ambassador Rivasseau spoke in particular of the Plan of Action (PoA) to Promote Universality of the Convention, pursuant to the decision on universality as contained in the Final Declaration of the Third CCW Review Conference. This PoA contains a number of successive steps: urging all States Parties to the CCW to join all Protocols and the amendment to Article 1; fostering interest in and prevent violations of the Convention; and encouraging involvement in universalization efforts.

Regarding cluster munitions, the EU again urged the High Contracting Parties to the CCW to support its proposal for a negotiating mandate

on cluster munitions (CCW/GGE/2007/WP.3) (see Conventional Weapons Week 1), so that the CCW can show its relevance to matters of International Humanitarian Law, considering both military requirements and humanitarian concerns. The delegations of Japan, France, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland also support the negotiation of an international agreement on cluster munitions within the CCW, with Switzerland calling for support of the Oslo Declaration on cluster munitions as well. Guatemala’s delegation, on behalf of the Centre for Central American Integration System (SICA) and Mexico, stated that participants of the Latin American Conference support efforts to create a cluster munitions-free zone, and asked countries that produced cluster munitions to cease doing so immediately. Ambassador Mtshali of South Africa noted the humanitarian crisis caused by unexploded munitions in the aftermath of the conflict in Lebanon demands the international community take action to prevent such a situation from reoccurring, and that South Africa remains flexible as to whether negotiations on an international instrument to prohibit cluster munitions takes place within the framework of the CCW or as part of a separate process.

On man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), the EU “firmly supports broader efforts in various multilateral fora, focusing particularly on export controls,” and supports initiatives targeting MANPADS-related issues separately, including through implementation of General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus.

In closing, Ambassador Rivasseau aptly reminded states that “multilateral diplomacy is not to score goals against some of us but to dig tirelessly the furrow where to seed the hopes of a world which would be more just and fair, therefore more peaceful and more secure.” This sentiment should carry through the remaining deliberations on resolutions and voting in this year’s First Committee.

-Waverly de Bruijn, Global Action to Prevent War (www.globalactionpw.org)



Small Arms and Light Weapons

The Thematic Debate on conventional weapons included a range of issues on small arms and light weapons (SALW), such as UN and regional measures to combat the illicit trade in SALW. Most are echoed in the draft resolution, co-sponsored by 25 states, “The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects” (A/C.1/62/L.49). The preamble of L.49 is slightly different from last year’s SALW resolution, in that it bears in mind “the importance of regular national reporting, which could greatly facilitate the rendering of international cooperation and assistance to affected States.” The new text also “takes note of the report submitted to the General Assembly by the Group of Governmental Experts ... and encourages States to implement its recommendations.”

Unlike its predecessor, L.49 notes the relationship between the uncontrolled spread of SALW and sustainable development, remarking on the “wide range of humanitarian and socio-economic consequences” of illicit trade. Furthermore, it “[r]ecognizes the necessity for interested States to develop effective coordination mechanisms ... to make international cooperation and assistance more effective,” and “encourages civil society and relevant organizations to strengthen their co-operation and work with States at the respective national and regional levels to achieve the implementation of the Programme of Action.”

Daniël Prins, Chair of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Illicit Brokering in Small Arms and Light Weapons, offered a presentation on the work of that body. The presentation stressed that not only should states work against illicit brokering, they should also work to support international cooperation. These efforts to combat illicit brokering should be linked to the UN’s 2001 Programme of Action (PoA) to Combat, Prevent, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons. Prins’ presentation also touched on the Biennial Meeting of States Parties (BMS), set to take place in July 2008 in New York, as a way to move forward. South Africa and other delegations lauded the report of the GGE and hope the General Assembly will endorse the recommendations of the group.

In light of the failure of the 2006 Review

Conference of the PoA to produce any substantive outcome, many states have focused on the upcoming BMS as a focal point of the work on SALW. Finland suggested that the BMS could develop new instruments, like peer review on PoA implementation. Japan also hoped the upcoming BMS would include discussion on implementing the International Instrument on Marking, Record-keeping and Tracing, which could help keep track of the movement of SALW. The European Union (EU) and Nigeria also expressed support for this instrument.

The Thematic Debate gave many states a chance to speak on regional and local initiatives in the area of SALW. Japan’s statement highlighted its “Tokyo Workshop on Small Arms and Light Weapons,” called “SALW Issues from the Perspective of the Protection and Empowerment of the Peaceful Community.” This workshop aimed to develop best practice on SALW control. Statements by Nigeria, the EU, and MERCOSUR emphasized their existing regional initiatives. The Centre for Central American Integration System (SICA) and Mexico referenced the May 2006 Antigua Declaration.

Section III of the PoA, assistance to states on projects related to SALW control, was also an important topic. Japan spoke about its initiatives to assist the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. South Africa identified “capacity, financial, and other concrete needs” for reduction of illicit trade in SALW. The EU said it provided 105 million Euro for such assistance between 2003 and 2005. Mali, on behalf of the members of the Economic Community of West African States, tabled its annual resolution on “Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them” (A/C.1/62/L.5). The text is virtually the same as its predecessor.

Throughout the debate on SALW, states noted the work of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well. MERCOSUR’s statement supported the efforts of civil society in the area of SALW, as did that of Switzerland. The EU statement supported the “Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development,” a project driven in part by NGOs.

Arms Trade Treaty

Delegations from the European Union (EU), Nigeria, Finland, Japan, Lesotho, the United Kingdom, and France spoke in favor of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) process. The EU regards it as a “pressing need,” as irresponsible arms transfers negatively impact peace, security, human rights and sustainable development, and expressed that “the United Nations is the only appropriate forum to deliver a truly universal instrument.” The delegation of Finland assessed that the ATT is “one of the core issues at the nexus of development, human rights and security,” and looks forward to the report of the upcoming Group of Governmental Experts to the 63rd session of the UN General Assembly. Ambassador Duncan stated that the United Kingdom’s vision of the Responsibility to Protect is to “improve our capacity to prevent the emergence of conflict.... A critical dimension is controlling the spread of weapons whose easy availability makes it so simple to set up militias, and provoke violence and mayhem.”

Uruguay’s Ambassador Perazza, on behalf of MERCOSUR, stated that while “respecting the premise that no regulation shall undermine the sovereign right of States to acquire arms for their security and for the exercise of their legitimate defence,” MERCOSUR takes note of the upcoming GGE to examine the feasibility, scope, and parameters for an ATT. MERCOSUR encouraged states to discuss the standards in a “non-discriminatory, objective, balanced and transparent” way, and reiterates its appeal for states to “reinforce regulations on the acquisition and possession of arms to prevent the diversion of legally acquired arms towards the illicit market.”

Mr. Bob Barr, on behalf of the World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities (WFSA), and Mr. Joseph Dube, on behalf of the International Action Network on Small Arms, addressed First Committee on the ATT during the NGO statements on 26 October. Mr. Barr noted that the majority of the estimated 875 million small arms in the world are owned by civilians, many of whom are “law-abiding hunters, sport shooters, collectors and other firearms owners.” He reported that the WFSA feels these owners are “at risk” to be impacted by the results of the ATT. He accused the Treaty of being “no more than an

exercise in ‘gesture politics.’” Mr. Dube’s presentation followed, in which he told the story of a 13-year-old boy in West Africa who lost his parents and sister and was forced at gunpoint to become a child soldier, because of the uncontrolled arms trade. Mr. Dube further noted that the process that Cambodia, Mali, and Costa Rica is now supported by 153 (80% of) member states, who voted to start the ATT process. Mr. Dube reiterated that the ATT will not prevent states from acquiring arms for legitimate defense purposes, but should have at its heart respect for human rights, international humanitarian law, and sustainable development.

A number of side events held by Control Arms, Parliamentarians for Global Action, the Parliamentary Forum on Small Arms and Light Weapons, and others also highlighted the need for an ATT. They included testimony by parliamentarians and gun violence survivors, and showcased analyses of member states and “people’s consultations” on the feasibility, scope, and parameters of such a treaty.

Forward motion on the establishment of an ATT is continuing. Of this process, Mr. Dube aptly quoted President Nelson Mandela who once said “it always seems impossible UNTIL IT’S DONE.”

-Waverly de Bruijn, Global Action to Prevent War (www.globalactionpw.org)

Small Arms and Light Weapons (cont.)

Friday’s NGO presentations to the First Committee allowed for civil society input on SALW. Bob Barr of the World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities raised concerns that efforts to limit SALW would ultimately limit legitimate civilian possession. Rebecca Peters of the International Action Network on Small Arms said her organization was disappointed this year’s SALW did not commit to regular review processes of the PoA. She also recommended that the BMS be less formal, more dynamic, and allow more structured NGO participation, and urged more funding for PoA implementation.

-Gabriel Morden-Snipper, Quaker United Nations Office



Landmines

To mark the tenth anniversary of the Mine Ban Treaty, Australia convened a panel discussion to outline the achievements and challenges concerning the Treaty. Australia's Ambassador Miller highlighted the Treaty's unique role in banning an entire class of weapons, noting also that the Treaty has the highest membership of any conventional arms treaty. However, challenges still remain, with key anti-personnel mine-producing nations yet to ratify the Convention.

Dr. Reza of the Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan outlined the humanitarian impact of landmines, stating that Afghanistan needs to "banish the legacy of mines ... with people unable to reclaim their lives until this remnant of war is removed." Dr. Reza noted that since Afghanistan signed the Treaty in 2003, it has cleared sixty percent of contaminated land, but it requires more financial assistance to meet its obligations. Ian Mansfield from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining highlighted that other than the "cheap" factor there was little historical evidence of the useful military purpose of anti-personnel mines, with the long term humanitarian impact outweighing any military benefits.

On 17 October, draft resolution A/C.1/62/L.39, "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction" was introduced. The omnibus resolution, sponsored by Australia, Croatia, and Jordan, is similar to last year's resolution, with minimal text changes. This resolution aims at eliminating landmines from existing fields, prohibiting their production and distribution, and providing assistance to victims.

Ambassador Mtshali of South Africa supported the resolution and called on member states to provide further financial assistance in rehabilitation and mine victim support. Canada also voiced its support, noting that 40 states are yet to ratify the Treaty and that 160-180 million landmines are still stockpiled in China, Russia, the United States, Pakistan, and India.

The Republic of Korea and China (both non-signatories to the Treaty) responded informally to the panel discussion. The Republic of Korea stated that while innocent civilians must be

protected from irresponsible use of landmines, there is a distinction between military use and targeting civilians. China explained it supports the principles of the Treaty, and while it is not a party to the Treaty, it has voted in favour of the resolution since 1995. The United States issued a written statement reiterating its position of destroying "non-self destructing anti-personnel landmines" but maintaining stockpiles for defence of South Korea, training, and research. While non-signatories do support demining and victim assistance, universal membership would make the Mine Ban Treaty a more effective tool in the quest to ban anti-personnel landmines.

-Kavitha Suthanthiraraj, Global Action to Prevent War (www.globalactionpw.org)

Missiles (cont.)

While we must certainly acknowledge the achievement by Russia and the US in eliminating a whole class of weaponry, thereby ensuring more stable security especially for the peoples of Europe and the former Soviet Union, the present reality points to the need for a comprehensive approach to missiles. That said, there are aspects of the present proposal worth considering, especially if it could add an international character to a verification regime on missiles, which would put in place the procedures, institutions, and knowledge necessary to verify further reductions in ballistic missile inventories.

Regardless of the merits of the proposal, it is good to see some attention being paid to a subject that has slowly become the elephant in the room of arms control. However, in light of the complicating factors highlighted above, and in particular the current atmosphere of superpowers that seem allergic to verifiable and irreversible reductions in their strategic forces, any proposal that tends to accentuate existing imbalances in the international strategic framework without ameliorating the root causes of insecurity seems a bit cynical.

-Michael Spies, Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy (www.lcnp.org)

Disarmament and Development

Methods and tools for increasing awareness of the link between disarmament and development were discussed last week in both governmental statements and the introduction of resolutions. The United Nations CyberSchoolBus was hailed by the Japanese delegation as an important program in explaining the link between development and disarmament, emphasizing, “[as] long as there are landmines in the ground, people will be deprived of their basic right to a decent life; communities will be denied the opportunity to prosper.” In presentations marking the tenth anniversary of the Mine Ban Treaty, several panelists also highlighted mine contaminated areas as a hindrance to development, and the need for continued efforts in disarming for development.

Delegates reiterated the necessity to follow through on agreements and treaties that would enable countries to designate funds to development programs. Finland reiterated the importance of the Arms Trade Treaty “as one of the core issues at the nexus of development, human rights and security.” The European Union similarly argued that irresponsible arms transfers negatively impact “peace, reconstruction, security, stability, human rights and sustainable development,” which is “especially damaging to developing countries,” and further emphasized, “it diverts scarce resources from vital poverty alleviation and other development work.”

The delegation from Switzerland reported that at a ministerial summit in Geneva in June 2006, a decision was reached with provisions to reduce consequences of armed violence on socio-economic development. The summit adopted a text called *The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development*, in which ministers and representatives from 42 countries pledged to strengthen their “efforts to integrate armed violence reduction and conflict prevention programmes into national, regional and multilateral development frameworks, institutions and strategies, as well as into humanitarian assistance, emergency, and crisis management initiatives.”

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) emphasized the importance of achieving the Millennium Development Goals through the draft

resolution “Relationship between disarmament and development” (A/C.1/62/L.50). Speaking for the NAM, Indonesia’s Ambassador Wibowo introduced L.50, emphasizing “that the symbiotic relationship between disarmament and development and the important role of security in this connection.” NAM also expressed concern “at the increasing global military expenditures, which could otherwise go into development, poverty eradication and the elimination of diseases, particularly in the developing countries. NAM reiterates the importance of exercising restraint in military expenditure, so that human and financial resources thus saved can be used for the on-going efforts to eradicate poverty and achieve the Millennium Development Goals.”

The draft is similar to last year’s resolution. It adds paragraphs noting the fact that 2007 marks the twentieth anniversary of the adoption in 1987 of the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development,” and remarks on the importance of following up on the implementation of the action programme adopted there. There is also a new operative paragraph (6), which “[i]nvites Member States to provide the Secretary-General with information regarding measures and efforts to devote part of the resources made available by the implementation of disarmament and arms limitation agreements to economic and social development, with a view to reducing the ever-widening gap between developed and developing countries.”

A decrease in arms and redistribution of military expenditures to development programmes would help improve the quality of life and decrease the number of unnecessary deaths associated with both war and poverty.

-Gabrielle Walther and Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will (www.reachingcriticalwill.org)



Regional Disarmament

In 1986, the UN General Assembly created Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and Africa, and for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin American and the Caribbean. The Centres operate under the auspices of the Office of Disarmament Affairs (ODA). Their contributions to the implementation of peace and disarmament initiatives in Africa, Asia, and Latin America are highly valued by the states of their regions, but their efficacy continues to be hampered by the at-will funding mechanisms that provide their operating budgets. Lack of funds has inhibited a more robust role for the Centres in implementing norms and principles of disarmament.

Last week, the Director of the ODA Regional Disarmament Branch, Ms. Anges Marcaillou, reported on the Centres. Both she and the delegation of Nepal mentioned that arrangements for the relocation of the Asia/Pacific Centre to Kathmandu have been finalized. Ms. Marcaillou also noted that eleven Central African states have commended the work of the Regional Centre in Africa, and that the Lima Centre in Latin America and the Caribbean has assisted in regulating small arms and light weapons in the region. Overall, her presentation emphasized the vital role of the Centres in implementing global norms and efforts in specific regional contexts. She expressed hope for collaboration of the Regional Centres in the implementation of worldwide projects, but emphasized the importance of tailoring projects to the specific needs of each Centre's region.


Unlike the other two Centres, the Lima Centre's mandate includes economic and social development—a distinction noted by the Peruvian delegation in its statement introducing draft resolution A/C.1/62/L.4 on the Centre. As in previous years, this resolution emphasizes the importance of the Regional Centre to peace and security in Latin America, especially in its support of the implementation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which establishes a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in Latin America. The resolution also highlights the Centre's efforts in the field of development.

Nepal introduced draft resolution A/C.1/62/L.35, on the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, which

commends the efforts and successes of the Centre. Nigeria, on behalf of the African Group, introduced a similar draft resolution, A/C.1/62/L.24, which commends the work of the Centre in Africa, but expresses deep concern about the chronic inability to sufficiently fund its work, encourages close cooperation with the African Union to help stabilize the funding situation, and urges all states and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to make voluntary contributions to strengthen the Centre.

In addition to the attention given the Regional Centres, draft resolution A/C.1/62/L.31, "Regional Disarmament," states, "global and regional approaches to disarmament complement each other and should therefore be pursued simultaneously" in areas of disarmament, nuclear proliferation, security, and confidence-building measures. The complementarity of global and regional approaches corresponds with Dr. Patricia Lewis of UNIDIR's presentation, in which she spoke of the need for a multiplicity of approaches and fora to pursue global peace and security. Additionally, a resolution on "Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional contexts," A/C.1/62/L.43, is intended to address the need for a regional approach to confidence-building and transparency, while draft resolution A/C.1/62/L.42 addresses conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels, calling for closer cooperation to prevent proliferation of conventional weapons and illicit trafficking. Lastly, draft resolution A/C.1/62/L.48 calls for the strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region.

-Anna Walther, Reaching Critical Will
(www.reachingcriticalwill.org)





The First Committee Monitor



Terrorism

During Thematic Debate, a few states referenced specific issues of concern regarding terrorism. Sudan's Counsellor Hassan stated the successful implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) depends on international, regional, and sub-regional institutions assisting developing countries in their implementation efforts. He added that "[n]on-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [must] move towards a global disarmament process to discourage the new arms race."

Ambassador Langeland of Norway focused on the threat of bioterrorism, which "makes it even more important to renew our preventive efforts in the field of biosafety and biosecurity." Meanwhile, Kazakhstan's Ambassador Aitimova argued that information available online poses a potential threat if used by terrorists.

India tabled the draft resolution A/C.1/62/L.22, "Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction," which was adopted without a vote last year. Besides purely cosmetic updates, there has been a substantial swap among the sponsors. The draft resolution was brought forward by 18 previous sponsors and two new ones (Bangladesh and Malaysia), but without the support of Albania, Armenia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, France, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Malta, Monaco, Myanmar, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, or Zambia.

France reintroduced a draft resolution on "Preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive materials and sources" (A/C.1/62/L.46), which had been previously adopted with consensus by the General Assembly in 2005 (A/60/73). The former title, "Preventing the risk of radiological terrorism," has been slightly changed "to encompass a diverse range of instruments by the member states to circumvent terrorists of acquiring radioactive materials or sources," according to Ambassador Dobelle of France.

L.46 has a three fold goal: to maintain support for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as a central player in securing sources of radiological materials, to sustain the universaliza-

tion of existing international instruments, and to promote the expansion of bilateral and multilateral cooperation aimed at enforcing the security of radioactive sources.

The preambular paragraph related to the IAEA introduces the establishment of technical guidance as a particularity of the IAEA's activities in promoting and reinforcing the safety and security of radioactive materials and sources. A new paragraph (3) encourages member states to extend their control measures to detect trafficking of radioactive materials inside their territory, in addition to maintaining border controls, which they are already obliged to. Ambassador Dobelle emphasized this amendment "did not evoke any difficulties due to prior informal consultations ... even though we all comprehend that ... everybody is lead in their actions by the resources to his disposition." A second new paragraph (7) welcomes the efforts undertaken by member states "to search for, locate and secure unsecured and/or uncontrolled sources."

Barbados tabled amendments (A/C.1/62/L.53) to draft resolution L.46, which extend the focus on the cessation of the transport of radioactive materials through the regions of small island developing states. By the time of writing this article, the negotiations on the revision of the draft resolution L.46 were still taking place.

-Philip Urech, NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security
(www.disarmtimes.org)

Disarmament Machinery (cont.)

Draft resolutions on the Conference on Disarmament (A/C.1/62/L.11), UN Disarmament Commission (A/C.1/62/L.3), and SSOD IV (A/C.1/62/L.17)—each of which contain only technical updates from last year—have been tabled and will be voted on next week. Further information about these resolutions will be provided in next week's edition.

-Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will
(www.reachingcriticalwill.org)