



# NPT NEWS IN REVIEW

Civil society perspectives on the 2019 Preparatory Committee of the  
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 29 April–10 May 2019



Reaching Critical Will

7 May 2019  
Vol. 16, No. 4

## IN THIS ISSUE

1 | Editorial

5 | News in brief

The *NPT News in Review* is produced by the Reaching Critical Will programme of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom during meetings of NPT states parties.

The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of RCW or WILPF.

Editors: Ray Acheson and  
Allison Pytlak

[www.reachingcriticalwill.org](http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org)  
[disarm@wilpf.org](mailto:disarm@wilpf.org)

## COMMITMENT CATCH-22, OR WHY THEY SAY WE MIGHT HAVE DISARMAMENT ONE DAY IF WE REALLY WANT IT, AS LONG AS WE DON'T ASK FOR IT OR TRY TO MAKE IT HAPPEN

Ray Acheson | *Women's International League for Peace and Freedom*

The issue of commitment was on the table front and centre again Monday morning, as NPT states parties discussed regional issues including the establishment of a weapons of mass destruction free zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran, and ongoing diplomatic process with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In each of these circumstances, commitments have been made and broken, putting at risk significant achievements of multilateral diplomacy and the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Peril awaits.

This Wednesday is the one-year anniversary of the US government's withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). After a "year of patience," indications are that Iran now plans to "reduce compliance" with the JCPOA in the coming days and to "enforce specific decisions to reciprocate". On 29 April 2019, Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs told the PrepCom that Iran's "supreme national interests" were now at stake. This is code for the conditions for NPT withdrawal under article X.

Ali Akbar Salehi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says this could start by no longer abiding by the limits on uranium enrichment established by the JCPOA. Seyed Hossein Mousavian, a former spokesperson for Iran's nuclear negotiators, and other analysts have suggested this would put Iran at odds with the rest of the international community and open Iran to further sanctions.

The JCPOA was endorsed unanimously by the UN Security Council on 20 July 2015 in resolution 2231, which means that the unilateral sanctions the United States has imposed on Iran are in violation of this resolution. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

has since January 2016 confirmed that Iran is in compliance with its nuclear commitments under the JCPOA. Last week, the IAEA told the PrepCom that "the implementation in Iran of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, Additional Protocol, and additional transparency measures under the JCPOA amounts to the most robust verification system in existence anywhere in the world."

For virtually every government on earth, except for the United States and Israel, this is great news. But as US senators Richard Durbin and Tom Udall have warned, it seems that the rejection of the JCPOA by the US and Israel is not about preventing nuclear proliferation but building a case for military action against Iran, a policy that is "built on the ashes of the failed Iraq strategy." The two senators are not the only ones to see the obvious connections with Iraq. Mousavian sees the efforts to bring Iran's oil exports to zero and declare the Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organisation are about "laying siege to Iran in ways similar to the way the Bush administration did as it prepared to wage an illegal war against Iraq." Joseph Cirincione and Mary Kaszynski of Ploughshares Fund have also argued the US government is "taking pages from the Iraq War playbook."

Despite all of the forewarning, and our repeated experience with this scenario, the rest of the international community is not engaging sufficiently. In particular, the other parties to the JCPOA—China, France, Germany, Russia, and the UK—have not gone beyond indicating political support for continuation of the JCPOA. At the NPT PrepCom, all have indicated support for the continuation of the JCPOA; they and almost every other state party has expressed concern about the US withdrawal. But they have not sought to "offset the negative impacts" of the US sanctions, and instead have just urged Iran to continue

*Editorial, continued*

complying with the agreement. Meanwhile, the US is moving an aircraft carrier to the region accompanied with bellicose rhetoric from John Bolton about “countering the Iranian threat”.

The US withdrawal from the JCPOA and aggression towards Iran is part of a larger enduring US-driven failure over the Middle East WMDFZ. For a brief history of this issue, see Sharon Dolev’s piece in *Reaching Critical Will’s* 2019 NPT briefing book (pp. 12–14). In short, this zone was first proposed by Egypt with backing from Iran in 1990. In 1995, as part of the decision on an indefinite extension of the NPT states parties endorsed the idea of creating this zone. In 2010, they agreed to a specific plan of action to finally actualise its negotiation. But that plan was never implemented, despite serious efforts by many individuals across several countries. The United States called off the conference set to take place in 2012, and at the behest of Israel blocked attempts to restart this process at the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

As Dolev writes, “The main stumbling block to meaningful progress on the zone involves sharp disagreement amongst regional countries on the terms and the sequence of steps leading to its establishment.” In particular, “The security concerns in the region are viewed through two prisms—Israel, as the sole nuclear-armed state, insists on a comprehensive peace agreement with its Arab neighbours before committing to any talks on the zone, while other regional states emphasise the need for the creation of the zone first as a contribution to peace and stability.”

This division was at work during Monday’s debate on the issue, with the United States and United Kingdom expressing concern that the Arab states had gone through the UN General Assembly to establish a conference convened by the UN Secretary-General in 2019. While the US and Israel have voiced their opposition to this initiative, it is currently scheduled to take place in November 2019. According to the League of Arab States, the UNSG has suggested the dates of 18–22 November 2019. The League also said the candidature of Jordan has been informally accepted to chair the meeting.

Despite actively blocking progress on this issue in the NPT context, the US and UK both expressed concern that this conference will undermine work on a Middle East WMDFZ in the NPT context. It’s one of those catch-22 dilemmas the nuclear-armed states consistently raise—we can only make progress on their terms, but we are not allowed to make progress because their terms stipulated the environment is not right for pro-

gress. And yes, the United States has the position, as it does on nuclear disarmament, that the security environment is not appropriate for the negotiation of a WMDFZ in the Middle East. It even has a working paper on this.

But from the perspective of the Arab states as well as the third co-sponsor of the 1995 resolution, Russia, the 2019 conference should have a positive impact on the security environment, as well as on the NPT and non-proliferation regime. While the US and UK argued that the 2019 conference is not inclusive, Russia and the League of Arab States pointed out that no one has been excluded nor pressured to join. Russia also said it is expected that all decisions in any negotiation process would be taken by consensus to ensure the interests of all states in the region would be taken into account.

Iran voted in favour of establishment of the 2019 conference at the UNGA but did not mention it in its statement on Monday, focusing instead on recommendations for the 2020 NPT Review Conference. The European Union, which has helped facilitate past consultations on the zone, also did not comment specifically on the 2019 UNGA conference. It just said that the 2010 NPT action plan “remains the most promising basis on which to proceed” and that zones “can only be established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at between all states of the region concerned.” It also argued, “The process must be inclusive for it to be effective and a proposal that forces the issue risks failure.”

Given the decades of difficult discussions on this issue, “it is an understatement that the process to establish a zone free of WMD in the Middle East desperately needs an injection of energy and commitment, for its own sake and for the health of the NPT that is tied so closely to its progress,” writes Dolev. This is what has driven a group of civil society individuals from the region, with international experts and diplomats, to start work on a draft treaty for a Middle East WMDFZ and a Middle East Treaty Organisation.

This spirit has also driven civil society to engage with renewed vigour with demands for peace on the Korea peninsula. Korea Peace Now, a campaign organised by several women’s civil society groups including WILPF to ensure gender diversity and perspectives in a Korean peace process, have argued that a peace process is crucial and complementary to denuclearisation.

Most countries speaking at this PrepCom have welcomed recent diplomatic efforts between the US and DPRK, and between DPRK and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Most have called for concrete progress on denuclearisation of the DPRK and for the pursuit of peace.



*Editorial, continued*

But what's important here, as with Iran, is that the issues of disarmament and non-proliferation cannot be separated from peaceful relations. In the case of the DPRK, this means ending the Korean War. It also means pursuing a peace agreement as a mutually reinforcing process with denuclearisation. Furthermore, denuclearisation is not just about ending the DPRK's nuclear and missile programmes, but also US threats, US-ROK military exercises, and the US-ROK "extended nuclear deterrence" arrangement. It means using instruments like the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive nuclear Test Ban Treaty to bring all relevant states onto the same page. Achieving peace and denuclearisation also means lifting sanctions with humanitarian impacts and those that are creating obstacles to implementation of the inter-Korean agreements.

Based on its statement to the NPT PrepCom on Monday, the US government seems to be sticking to its principles from the Singapore Summit and is obviously keen to continue a diplomatic process with the DPRK. This is welcome news and the rest of the NPT has expressed support for the ongoing dialogue. But they have also expressed wariness about the "trustworthiness" of the DPRK and also of the US—especially given ongoing events about the JCPOA. Even if the US government manages to reach agreements with DPRK for peace and denuclearisation, many are wondering, how long will those agreements last?

Multilateral negotiation is never easy. And where relations have soured over many years, distrust builds up. But this is the entire point of diplomacy, to build relations and to try to create something better, together. This process is difficult when all parties are committed. When we have a situation that we have with right now, with the United States trashing pretty much of all of its past arms control agreements (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the JCPOA, etc.) it becomes extremely challenging to understand how to advance peace and security. We are not on solid ground; we are in the rabbit hole. And thus again the catch-22 created by the United States: it wants to create the environment for nuclear disarmament, which it posits as a world safe for it to give up nuclear weapons; yet it is actively creating a world that is less safe.

NPT states parties have to stand up against this. The vast majority of governments at this meeting know well the danger that lies ahead. The international community did not prevent the excesses of this danger before—they must act now to prevent it. This includes countering US sanctions against Iran to ensure that it continues to fully comply with the JCPOA, supporting the inter-Korean and other multilateral actions for sustainable peace and disarmament on the Korean peninsula along with the US-DPRK talks, and supporting efforts from governments and civil society for the establishment of a WMD free zone in the Middle East. •

## Gender and the NPT: Building Momentum to 2020 and Beyond

Side event at the 2019 Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

**Thursday, 9 May 2019 from 13h15 to 14h30 in Conference Room B at the United Nations**

During the 2020 NPT review cycle, delegations have demonstrated increased awareness on the importance of full, meaningful and **diverse participation** in the NPT review cycle; the differential **gendered impacts** of nuclear weapons; and the **gendered discourse** that perpetuates stereotypes about power and security.

This side event seeks to examine how efforts toward gender equality have developed during the 2020 NPT review cycle and how the complementary strands of these efforts can be harnessed to strengthen the NPT going forward.

### Featuring

**Dr Patricia Lewis**, *Research Director for International Security at Chatham House*

**Ray Acheson**, *Director of Reaching Critical Will at the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom*

**Rebecca Hallin**, *Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs*

Moderated by **Ambassador Brian Flynn**,

*Permanent Mission of Ireland to the United Nations in New York*





**IPFM**  
INTERNATIONAL PANEL  
ON FISSILE MATERIALS

## ***Fifty Years of the NPT***

### ***Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Materials, Nuclear Energy***

*Opening Remarks: Ambassador Dell Higgie*  
*Ambassador for Disarmament, New Zealand*

*Speakers: Zia Mian, Moritz Kütt, Alex Glaser,*  
*Pavel Podvig, Mycle Schneider*

*Closing Remarks: Rebecca Johnson*  
*Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND)*  
*International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN)*

**Tuesday, May 7, 1:15–2:45 p.m.**  
**Conference Room C, United Nations, New York**



## NEWS IN BRIEF

Allison Pytlak and Katrin Geyer, *Women's International League for Peace and Freedom*

The following is not meant to capture every country's position on every issue.

### Cluster two, specific issue: regional issues

#### *Nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs)*

- Almost every state that spoke in this cluster affirmed the important role that NWFZs can play in efforts for non-proliferation.
- Mexico reiterated its support for Mongolia to preside over the Fourth Conference on NWFZs and expressed hope for its success.
- Some states referenced their support to the treaties establishing NWFZs, including the Treaty of Rarotonga, Pelindaba, Central Asia, as well as Mongolia.
- Switzerland welcomed any steps to establish new NWFZs or implement existing ones including by the ratification of protocols to existing zones.
- Malaysia said that all nuclear-armed states should accede to NWFZ treaties and should remove all reservations to such Treaties. China called on nuclear-armed states to respect the legal status of NWFZs and to take concrete measures to implement security assurances in respective protocols.
- South Africa encouraged the remaining relevant states to sign and ratify the protocols to the Treaty of Pelindaba.
- Switzerland encouraged further ratifications to the Protocol of the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (SEANWFZ).

#### *Middle East*

- The vast majority of states expressed their support for the establishment of a Middle East Zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction (WMDfZ) in the Middle East.
- Venezuela, Italy, Malaysia, Algeria, Cuba, Switzerland, the African Group, and Mexico, amongst others, expressed regret at the lack of progress towards the establishment of a WMDfZ in the Middle East. Some delegations, including the Non-Aligned-Movement (NAM), the Arab Group, and Switzerland, expressed disappointment at the lack of an agreement at the 2015 NPT Review Conference (RevCon).
- The African Group, Cuba, the Arab Group, NAM, Syria, Brazil, Switzerland, and the European Union (EU) stressed that the 1995 resolution remains an integral part of the process towards establishing a WMDfZ in the Middle East. Switzerland, Iraq, the League of Arab States, and the Arab Group affirmed

the special responsibility of the three co-sponsors under this resolution. Some states, including Cuba and the African Group, reminded that the NPT's indefinite extension is based on the basis of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. Cuba noted lack of progress on the resolution risks the NPT's credibility.

- NAM, Iran, Malaysia, and others expressed concern at the lack of Israel's accession to the NPT. Iran, NAM, South Africa, Qatar, Cuba, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the Arab Group, and China called on Israel to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-armed state and to bring its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.
- China reaffirmed the need to encourage states in the region to sign and ratify Additional Protocols. The EU considered that all states of the region should become party to the NPT. The EU and Italy called all states of the region to become states parties to the CTBT, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons Convention.
- Malaysia, Russia, China, Algeria, Cuba, NAM, Iraq, South Africa, the Arab Group, and the African Group welcomed the UN General Assembly 73/546 resolution adopted in 2018 to convene a conference to establish a WMDfZ in the Middle East. Switzerland, Japan, and Brazil took note of the adoption. Russia said that the adoption of the resolution is an important step towards the objective of establishing a WMDfZ in the Middle East. The UK and the US expressed concern about the resolution as it did not enjoy the consensus of all states in the region.
- The League of Arab States informed that the UN Secretary-General suggested holding the conference from 18-22 November. It noted that it is open to this or another date. It was pleased about the informal confirmation of Jordan's presidency over the Conference. It noted that it was important to convene the Conference through the United Nations.
- The United Kingdom (UK) informed that it hasn't decided if it will participate in the Conference. Russia confirmed its participation and urged others to do the same. The US stated that it will not participate in the Conference in the absence of participation by all regional states.
- Russia reminded that during this NPT review cycle, it has proposed ideas on organisational modalities of the Conference, including the draft agenda and final document.
- Malaysia hoped that the Conference will be convened later in 2019, and that it will advance the





*News in brief, continued*

long-overdue goal in establishing such a zone in the region.

- Qatar and the League of Arab States suggested that UN Secretary-General submit a report on the Conference to the 2020 RevCon. The League of Arab States added that the RevCon should express strong support for the Conference and that more Conferences will take place after the RevCon 2020.
- Russia, Brazil, Japan, the US, Iraq, the League of Arab States, and the EU stressed that the work on the WMDFZ Treaty has to be carried out on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the states of the Middle East. Russia, the EU, Japan, Switzerland, and the UK emphasised the need for inclusiveness for the Conference to be effective.
- The UK rejected “any attempt to single out one state” under this initiative. The African Group called on all states of the region to actively participate in good faith in negotiations to establish a Treaty on the Middle East.
- The UK argued that a Treaty on the Middle East should also consider other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), such as chemical weapons and proliferation of ballistic missiles and called for clarification how the inclusion of these considerations would be considered in the NPT RevCon process.
- Iran and NAM suggested providing the 2020 NPT RevCon with a recommendation to establish a subsidiary body under Main Committee II on this topic. NAM further proposed to establish a standing committee with members of the bureau to follow up on 2020 RevCon commitments.
- Brazil recalled its proposal of a flexible mechanism which could provide a model, based on the Treaty of Tlatelolco, for the Middle East allowing different time-frames and progressive adherence of states parties to the Treaty.
- EU expressed its readiness to assist in the process to establish a WMDFZ in the Middle East. France supported for the EU to take on the role as mediator on this process. Japan also offered its support based upon the agreement of all states in the Middle East and the three co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution.

*Nuclear sharing*

- Iran said that states should refrain from nuclear sharing.
- Iran and Syria noted that nuclear sharing is a violation of the NPT.

- Iran and Syria argued that the United States (US) has been in non-compliance with the Treaty by stationing nuclear weapons in non-nuclear armed states, and called on the US to terminate its nuclear sharing arrangements.
- Iran called on the non-nuclear armed states to renounce their participation in NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements.

*Negative security assurances (NSAs)*

- China called on nuclear-armed states to conclude an international legal instrument on NSAs.
- Malaysia argued that all nuclear-armed states should provide NSAs to non-nuclear armed states.
- Switzerland noted that NWFZs provide security benefits to NWFZ’s states parties via legally binding NSAs, “but also to the global community by gradually limiting the geographical area where nuclear weapons can be deployed.”

*Humanitarian concerns*

- The Arab Group expressed concern at the devastating humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons.
- Mexico said that humanitarian concerns underpin all of its work across the NPT’s three pillars.

*IAEA safeguards*

- Iran said that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the only competent authority to verify compliance with safeguards obligations.
- Iran said it was essential that IAEA conducts its activities in an impartial and independent manner. Cuba expressed concern at the pretensions of “some states” to politicise the IAEA’s work.
- Norway urged all states to ratify the Additional Protocol.

*Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)/nuclear testing*

- Mexico called on Annex II states to ratify the CTBT.
- Mexico condemned any nuclear testing by anybody under any circumstances.

*Relationship to disarmament*

- Mexico and Iran noted that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing processes. Mexico argued that as long as nuclear weapons exists, somebody will want them and justify their existence and use.

*Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)*

- Japan observed there has been “no essential change in North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities.”



*News in brief, continued*

- Japan affirmed its strong commitment to achieving complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of DPRK's nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles of all ranges as well as related programs and facilities in accordance with relevant UN Security Council resolutions.
- Japan and Italy called on the DPRK to come into full compliance with the NPT and IAEA safeguards and to sign and ratify the CTBT.
- Japan expressed appreciation for the IAEA's readiness to verify the DPRK's nuclear programme.
- The US informed it was committed to making progress on "transforming relationship" between itself and the DPRK, and in establishing a lasting and stable peace and to ensure full denuclearisation on the Korean peninsula.
- The US called on states to recognise the important role of sanctions and pressure. Italy reiterated the need to maintain sanctions against the DPRK. The US called on states to fully implement their obligations under UNSCRs. Japan said it supported the US' approach to urge the DPRK to take concrete actions while not making any concession easily.
- China called for a roadmap for denuclearisation and peace mechanism for the Korean peninsula. It suggested NPT states parties should play a constructive role in the Korean peace process and support diplomatic efforts.

*Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)*

- Japan, Venezuela, Italy, China, Russia, and Cuba expressed support for the JCPOA.
- Japan and the US asserted the importance of the IAEA's continued verification and monitoring of Iran's implementation of its nuclear related commitments.
- Japan called on Iran to ratify the Additional Protocol and it called on Iran not to undertake any activities inconsistent with UN Security Council resolution 2231.
- The US said that it was working with "its partners to bring maximum pressure on Iran" to achieve a new deal that addressed Iran's "destabilising activities, its development and proliferation of ballistic missiles, and its nuclear programme."
- Cuba said it shared the deep rejection of the international community towards US' withdrawal from JCPOA and the re-imposition of sanctions.

- China said the JCPOA is the only effective way to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue and urged all parties to comply with its provisions. It appreciated and expects that Iran will continue to implement the agreement and called on the US to stop its unilateral pressure and sanctions.
- Russia is concerned that the US is refusing to fulfil its obligations and is violating UN Security Council resolution 2231.

*Syria*

- Japan and the US regretted the lack of progress in Syria's NPT safeguards non-compliance.
- Japan called on Syria to sign, ratify, and implement the Additional Protocol. The US and Italy called on Syria to cooperate with the IAEA.

*Fissile material*

- Mexico called for the commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. Mexico said the instrument should include the regulation of fissile material and of other nuclear explosive weapons devices, a verification mechanism, and confidence building measures.

*Nuclear terrorism*

- Norway and Mexico called for states to ratify the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

*Nuclear security*

- Norway expressed concern at the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian applications. It supports efforts to develop international law on the regulation of highly-enriched uranium. Norway encouraged states to sign INFCIRC912, the joint statement on Minimising and Eliminating the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Applications.
- Mexico expressed support for the strengthening international nuclear security, and noted that this was a challenge. Mexico said that promotes the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

**Cluster III**

- Virtually every delegation that spoke in this cluster re-affirmed the inalienable right of all NPT states parties to develop, research, produce, and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of the NPT.
- The technical credibility of the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) was widely affirmed by delegations. Many, including the EU, called on states



*News in brief, continued*

parties to ensure that IAEA has sufficient technical, financial, and human resources to undertake nuclear security activities.

- NAM and Cuba warned against politicising the IAEA's work. Cuba also highlighted the danger of imposing restrictions on some developing states that would impede access to materials, equipment, technology.
- Switzerland suggested that the 2020 Review Conference should recommend that states parties continue efforts to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme.
- The African Group expressed concern over the cooperation between NPT states parties that have nuclear material and technology, and states not party, as this undermines decision two of the 1995 Review Conference.
- In this cluster, many delegations provided details on specific medical or scientific programmes and activities.

*Accidents*

- Ukraine explained that minimising the consequences of the Chernobyl accident are a priority and it stands ready to cooperate with the Agency on Chernobyl-related issues. It is willing to share with other states its national experience in this regard, including how it converted the damaged unit into an environmentally safe system and enabled the destruction of unstable structures.
- Argentina said that in spite of the "undeniable impact" of the Fukushima-Daiichi accident, national nuclear programmes are improving "their level of ambition, in every region, including newcomer countries to nuclear energy production." Argentina also highlighted several of the "operative and normative" improvements that followed in the wake of the Fukushima-Daiichi accident such as comprehensive stress tests and the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety.

*Nuclear security*

- Brazil highlighted its active participation in IAEA conferences and the Nuclear Security Summits, and that it develops and implements robust, effective and adequate legislation in these areas. Brazil said it is of the view that it is impossible to dissociate nuclear non-proliferation, including the quest for nuclear security, from the effective implementation of disarmament commitments.

- Qatar called to confirm the need of a multilateral instrument that would prohibit the attack or threat of attack on nuke facilities used for peaceful purposes.
- Canada highlighted that a single act of "nuclear or radiological terrorism could have catastrophic consequences, locally and globally, as such an incident would negatively impact the use of nuclear energy and technology worldwide." As a result, strong nuclear security measures are "essential in addressing the constantly evolving threat of nuclear terrorism, and underpin the long-term, sustainable, peaceful use of nuclear energy." It described several of the activities it engages in or supports in the area of nuclear security.

*Nuclear safety*

- The European Union (EU) referenced the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) as a key instrument and provides legally binding framework for overview and mutual assessment of safety work. Switzerland noted that the Eighth Review Meeting of the CNS will take place a few weeks prior to the NPT 2020 Review Conference and will be an important occasion to again assess how Contracting Parties are implementing their obligations.
- Qatar reaffirmed the need to heighten safety and security standards to guarantee safety & security of neighbouring states
- Finland, among others, urged all states to show their commitment to non-proliferation by signing and ratifying the Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements.
- Russia said that while recognising the role of nuclear safety and security, as well as the "importance of civil liability issues in the context of international cooperation on peaceful atom," it believes it is necessary to recall that these issues are not directly related to the NPT and are not regulated by the Treaty.
- Switzerland and the EU highlighted the value of peer review missions.
- Some delegations, including Norway and Ukraine, among others, reiterated that the responsibility for nuclear security rests with individual state that the IAEA plays a coordination role. Switzerland encouraged that the Review Conference recommend strengthening national nuclear safety and security measures as well as the IAEA's central role at the global level and encourage enhanced sharing of best practices.





## News in brief, continued

### Fissile materials

- The NAM stressed that the supply of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to states not party to the NPT significantly undermines the Treaty's credibility and contradicts its agreed obligations.

### Highly-enriched uranium (HEU)

- The EU called for minimising the use of HEU where feasible.
- Australia shared that it had purposely chosen to eliminate HEU from nuclear medicine production in order to eliminate an unnecessary nuclear proliferation and security risk. It, along with other major producers, have eliminated HEU from around 75 per cent of the world's molybdenum-99 supply chain and encouraged other states parties that in the process on conversion to "stay the course".
- Poland said that the successful conversion of the research reactor and removal of a spent HEU fuel directly contributed to improving the nuclear security in the country and the region. It will continue to support efforts in order to minimise the use of HEU in civilian applications.

### Phase-out of nuclear power/energy

- Germany informed that given the risks of nuclear energy, it decided to phase out nuclear power plants by 2022. Italy also reminded that following a referendum, Italy has phased out nuclear power for electricity entirely.

### Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)


- Italy asserted the crucial role that the JCPOA has played in ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. It observed that the comprehensive verification and monitoring activities by the IAEA provided confidence of Iran's compliance. Italy invited Iran to ratify the Additional Protocol that it is already implementing provisionally

### Other

- Multiple delegations spoke of how peaceful uses of nuclear energy can facilitate achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including NAM, the EU, France on behalf of Egypt, Brazil, and the Netherlands, Brazil, Qatar, Republic of Korea, South Africa, Australia, Canada, Ukraine, Niger, Argentina, Norway, Philippines.
- The Netherlands referenced specific SDGs, such as securing food, clean water, health, sanitation, clean

energy, and the reservation of cultural heritage. France, in a joint statement with Brazil, Egypt and the Netherlands, demonstrated in detail how nuclear technology can help to reveal new information about and protect cultural heritage. Argentina noted other of the SDGs that are relevant, such as Goal 16.

- The Netherlands also warned that without adequate safety and security measures, nuclear energy could harm progress toward the SDGs.
- Some delegations, such as South Africa, Finland, and Canada also drew linkages between nuclear energy and climate change prevention.
- Argentina welcomed the multiplication of "efforts and initiatives for the transversalisation of the gender perspectives in this forum".
- Argentina indicated that if confirmed for the presidency of the 2020 Review Conference, it would call for a series of meetings with operators, the nuclear industry, regulators, agencies, and promotion, and research institutions as they are the ones "bringing to life" the nuclear industry. •



© Dimity Hawkins





2019 NPT Preparatory Committee Side Event

## Achieving the possible **WMD Free Zone in the Middle East**

Where: **Conference Room 12**

When: **Wednesday, May 8<sup>th</sup>, 1:15pm to 2:30pm**

Previous processes to begin negotiations on a WMD Free Zone Treaty for the Middle East have come to little, despite the future of the WMD non-proliferation regimes depending upon its progress.

The METO Project is comprised of a network of civil society organizations that have produced a living and adaptive text of a draft Treaty for establishing the Zone. This evolving text, shaped through ongoing engagement with a broad spectrum of stakeholders, demonstrates what may be possible. It also aims to create a constructive, inclusive and principled discussion of the features of any future arrangements.

### Speakers

*Introduction from the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade*

**Wael Al-Assad**, Former Ambassador of League of Arab States

**Patricia Lewis**, Head of International Security at Chatham House

**Tariq Rauf**, Former Head of Verification and Security Policy at IAEA

**Emad Kiyaei**, Principal at IGD Group & METO Project

**Sharon Dolev**, Israeli Disarmament Movement & METO Project

*Chair:* **Paul Ingram**, Executive Director at BASIC & METO Project

For further details, please contact us at:

**meto@wmd-free.me**

