



NEWS IN REVIEW



*Civil society perspectives on the second session of the Preparatory Committee
for the 2010 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference
28 April–9 May 2008*

Discussion of a Middle East NWFZ: Dialogue of the deaf

Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will

On Monday, delegations finished delivering statements on cluster 2 and began discussing regional issues, including implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution. This always contentious and divisive issue has become even more of a political powder keg in the NPT context due to the recent accusations made by the US government about Syria's alleged cooperation with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to construct a clandestine nuclear reactor that the US believes "was indeed not intended for peaceful purposes."

During the PrepCom, other states have expressed concern about these allegations, including Australia, Canada, the European Union, France, the Republic of Korea, and the United Kingdom. On Monday, the UK delegation said their government's officials "found the evidence presented to be convincing," and Canada's Amb. Grinius called on both the DPRK and Syria "to cooperate fully with the IAEA to clarify the situation."

These expressions of concern have prompted the Syrian delegation to exercise its right of reply several times throughout the PrepCom, including twice on Monday. He argued that these governments, which maintain silence about or even assist Israel's nuclear programme, have no right to accuse Syria of violating its safeguards agreements or the NPT. He complained that Amb. Grinius didn't even mention Israel or request that Israel accede to the NPT, concluding that Canada lacks credibility not just in the NPT but in all international fora. Iranian Amb. Soltanieh also complained that Canada "made a dangerous prescription" in its report on the Middle East nuclear weapon free zone to the PrepCom (see NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/3), arguing that Canada's proposal for states not party to the NPT in the Middle East to "separate civilian and military fuel cycles and to place all civilian nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards" as an interim confidence-building measure until they accede to the NPT is an "irresponsible suggestion". He insisted, "The countries in the region cannot accept anything less than the total and unconditional elimination of Israeli nuclear weapons and its facilities and its acceding to the NPT."

Most delegations recognize the connection between the peace process in the Middle East and the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) in the region. However, almost all states take the position that one has to happen before the other, which Greenpeace International Political Advisor Merav Datan described as a "chicken or the egg" dilemma, in a event organized by Greenpeace on the experience of campaigning for disarmament in Israel (see page 6). On Monday, many Arab delegations argued that the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East would, as the Egyptian delegate said, "advance the prospects of overall

peace in the region." He also argued it would "represent a practical attestation that destructive arms and weapons would no longer remain the guarantor of security." China's delegate agreed it would advance the peace process in the Middle East, by helping create a political atmosphere of trust and conciliation.

As a fundamental step toward creating a Middle East NWFZ, many states repeated calls for Israel to join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state and place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. Yet others, particularly those from the West, refrained from mentioning Israel by name, simply calling on "all states in the region to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state," without mentioning that Israel is the only state who has not yet done so. These are often the same states that tend to emphasize the need for progress in the peace process as a precursor to the establishment of a NWFZ.

Meanwhile, Western delegations have increasingly called on Iran to cease uranium enrichment and other "proliferation sensitive" activities and to comply with relevant UN Security Council resolutions. During the PrepCom, the United States has even gone as far as to proclaim that non-nuclear armed Iran is single largest barrier to a MENWFZ, without any reference at all to nuclear-armed Israel. On Monday, the US delegation recommended that Iran follow Libya's example and give up its nuclear programme, noting that it has been offered a "remarkably generous package of incentives that present the regime in Tehran with two choices"—"defiance and noncompliance ... isolation ... continuing and additional sanctions ... further stunted economic opportunities," or "international reconciliation [and] the eventual restoration of international trust in its peaceful intentions."

This "choice" offered by the US further undermines what Norway's delegate described as the already "fragile consensus" on the Middle East. For example, a statement made by the UK delegation prompted right of replies from both the Russian and Chinese delegations, who criticized the UK representative for making political comments about the Iran situation on their behalf without their consent. In addition, the perception of double standards—or what Amb. Soltanieh referred to as "nuclear apartheid" in the Middle East—is a major source of tension during the NPT review cycles. These double standards contradict the fundamental bargain of the NPT itself and undermine the basis upon which the decision to indefinitely extend the Treaty was agreed to the Arab states and many other non-nuclear weapon states.

**6 May 2008
No. 6**

In this issue:

Solving global warming without nuclear power .. 2

Rendering the abolition of nuclear weapons credible 3

News in Brief ... 4

Verification of multilateral nuclear disarmament ... 6

The Middle East: Nuclear Future or Nuclear Free? 6

Military Research 7

What's On: Calendar of Events 8

Nuclear Wordsearch 8

The *News in Review* is a daily publication produced by the Reaching Critical Will project of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.

See www.reachingcriticalwill.org for information, statements, papers, reports, archived *News in Reviews*, and more from the NPT.

continued on page 5

Solving global warming without nuclear power

Jennifer Nordstrom, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research

Nuclear power is not the answer to global warming. Despite the oft-repeated myth that it is, a new study by renowned scientist Dr. Arjun Makhijani and the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research shows that the major global emissions polluter, the United States,¹ can achieve a zero-emissions economy by 2050 without relying on nuclear energy. In the recently published book *Carbon-Free and Nuclear-Free: A Roadmap for U.S. Energy Policy*, Dr. Makhijani not only proves that this feat is technically and economically feasible, but he outlines a roadmap of how to do it.

The NPT community is well aware of the proliferation and terrorism risks associated with nuclear energy. The entire PrepCom was nearly undermined last year over whether and how to address questions about nuclear energy programs. These questions are not going anywhere, and will only grow if nuclear energy expands. The NPT clearly states in Article IV that parties to the treaty have an "inalienable right" to commercial nuclear energy. However, that does not mean that nuclear energy is the wisest, most economical, or safest choice.

The problems with cost are perhaps more important for many of the Member States. Nuclear energy is incredibly expensive. Recent nuclear industry and Wall Street estimates of cost range from \$5,000 to \$8,000 per kilowatt, putting the per kilowatt-hour cost of nuclear energy at at least 12 cents and up to 17 cents (without taking into account any further real cost escalation), compared to 8 to 12 cents for wind and 14 cents for solar thermal power. Moreover, solar energy costs have been declining rapidly. Each twin nuclear reactor project in the United States now has a tab of \$12 billion to over \$20 billion attached to it depending on the size of the reactor and other factors. In this context, nuclear power investments are likely to foreclose investments in efficiency, distributed generation, and safer renewable energy sources.

There is also no solution to the problem of nuclear waste. No country has so far been able to address the significant long-term health, proliferation, environmental and safety problems associated with spent fuel or high level waste management and disposal. Official assessments of the risk of harm from exposure to radiation continue to increase.² History has shown us that the poorest and most vulnerable communities within countries and among them are far more likely to face exposure to this waste.

The renewable energy technologies that will enable the world to reduce and eliminate its carbon emissions already exist, although some need to be commercialized. In the reference scenario proposed by Dr. Makhijani, large scale wind and solar photovoltaic energy play a major role in a new electricity grid, as do combined heat and power, biomass from non-food sources (notable aquatic plants like microalgae and water hyacinths), geothermal, wave energy, hydropower, and solar thermal central stations. Improvements in technology would allow us to eliminate our carbon emissions even sooner than 2050. For instance, development of direct conversion of solar energy into hydrogen is highly desirable to reduce land requirements for biofuels, and could speed the path to zero.


The threat we face globally from climate change requires urgent action. It is important that we consider our choices careful and make them based on science and the best interest of humanity, not on propaganda or profit. An increased reliance on nuclear energy will increase proliferation and other risks we face globally. There is no scarcity in renew-

able energy options, but there is a scarcity in resources to fund those options. Turning to nuclear energy to solve climate change will not only exacerbate proliferation, safety, and some health and environmental risks, it will preclude investments in better, safer, cheaper options.

A more detailed picture of the climate change problem and a map of how to solve it without nuclear energy is available online at www.ieer.org. You can order a hard copy of the book from IEER here: <http://www.ieer.org/pubs/puborder.html#books>, or you can download the entire book or a summary of it, from the IEER website. For more information about the global Carbon-Free, Nuclear-Free Campaign, contact Jennifer Nordstrom at jennifer@ieer.org. •

¹ Although China may have surpassed the U.S. in overall carbon emissions, the U.S. is still number one in per-capita carbon emissions.

² See for instance the report of the National Academy of Sciences, published in 2006, at <http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?isbn=030909156X>.



Rendering the abolition of nuclear weapons credible

Pierre Villard, le Mouvement de la Paix

Our aim to remove nuclear weapons is not a new one. But our methods to achieve it, our arguments to convince others, and our strategy must be applied to the actual world. Nothing will change without public opinion and citizens' action.

During the Cold War, some thought that nuclear weapons were justified by the argument of deterrence, which implied the weapons were not for common use. Many people continue to argue that the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings were necessary to end the Second World War. But Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not the end of the Second World War, they were the foundations of the Cold War. In other words, these bombings confirm that nuclear weapons are weapons of domination.

Weapons for deterrence do not exist. Weapons are always used, sooner or later. To speak about weapons for deterrence is to forget thousands victims in Japan, it is to forget the Hibakusha, the civilian and military victims of nuclear tests in Algeria, Nevada, Polynesia, and so on. For a "deterrent weapon," that represents a good many victims since 1945.

The danger of using atomic weapons seems to have diminished in public opinion. French citizens think that our country has made many efforts to disarm since the end of French tests in Mururoa. It was true in 1996-97, but not now. France has modernised its equipment with new missiles, new submarines, new warheads, simulated test programs, for ten years. All of that without any public debate or transparency.

The danger of use is not remote. **On the contrary, the danger has increased.** The risk of nuclear war is a reality. We have to help people to be aware of that.

To be successful, we believe that education is most important.

Education is the aim of the French coalition, "Campagne pour le désarmement nucléaire," which brings together over fifty volunteer organisations. As François explained at the side event about NGO work on ICAN held last Wednesday, last autumn we organised twenty meetings all around the country. We found ignorance about the new risks of nuclear weapons and ignorance about the policies of the nuclear weapon states. We also found ignorance about progress on the way to abolish nuclear weapons.

For example, how many people know that since the signature of the NPT, more states removed nuclear weapons or nuclear programs than states which have acquired them? How many people know about nuclear free zones? How many people know the hard work done by NGOs during the NPT review conferences and preparatory committees? How many people know about cooperations between NGOs, states, and institutions?

It confirms that we have much to do to educate the general public. At the same time, providing this information will enable people to be more confident.

In the current globalised world, nobody can conceive their own security without worrying about the security of others. Kofi Annan said, "Either we'll all have security, or we'll all have insecurity." Neither walls nor weapons guarantee security. In our view, security should be based on the security of each individual. **This security should not be based on fear or distrust or mistrust. It must be built on rights and du-**

ties, on justice and education, on the ability to live with dignity alongside neighbours. The question of alternatives to nuclear security is essential. We have to develop alternative values to war and domination. We have to develop human values.

The answer to the problems that plague the world is the culture of peace: if we want peace, we have to prepare peace. If we prepare war, we will have war. That is why, in terms of social strategy, we think that **the abolition movement has to build close links with all social movement as well as the anti-globalisation movement.** We have to approach nuclear issues in a new way. **We can't build another world with nuclear weapons.** We must build peace through the satisfaction of needs. The billions of dollars devoted to military expenditures could be used for that. How many people die every day because money is swallowed up by nuclear weapons? They have to be added to the victims of deterrence policies during the last sixty years.

In order to not feel alone in each country, we need to promote cooperation and joint campaigns. **We need to launch a new race, the disarmament race.** And we have to run quickly!

Consequently, le Mouvement de la Paix supports the ICAN campaign. We think that an international campaign with a clear common goal is a good way to increase people's confidence of their capacity to be successful. We want this campaign to take off all around the world to achieve the abolition of nuclear weapons. **Nuclear weapon states have to understand that their arrogance is no longer acceptable.**

Last but not least, I would like to speak about the role of European Union. Will Europe be under the power of United States or will we have an Europe active for peace and disarmament? As you know, France will take the presidency of the European Union on 1 July. To prepare for this, le Mouvement de la Paix will organise a seminar of European organisations in the senate on 10 May. The priority of President Sarkozy is European defence with nuclear weapons. This is not our point of view. At the seminar, we propose to produce a road map for Mr. Sarkozy, showing the way to peace and disarmament in Europe.

In conclusion, abolish nuclear weapons could be considered as utopian. **We have the duty to make this utopia credible to ensure next generations have the right to live.** •



News in Brief

Michael Spies, Arms Control Reporter

Highlights from the Cluster 2 Discussion:

Iran's nuclear program

- The United Kingdom described the outcome of the 5 May EU3+3 meeting, explaining an updated "package of incentives" had been offered to the Iranian government. It also stated, "it remains our judgment that Iran's nuclear programme only makes sense as part of a plan to develop, at the least, a nuclear weapons capability."
- In a right of reply to the UK statement, Russia criticized the United Kingdom for going beyond what the EU3+3 foreign ministers had agreed to. Russia accused the UK of making a political statement on behalf of the group, when only a technical statement had been agreed upon. Russia also accused the UK of distorting the essence of the EU3+3 agreement. Russia stated its position on Iran's enrichment program was that as had been set out in the UN Security Council resolutions on Iran, no more, no less.
- Also in a right of reply to the UK statement, China echoed Russia's concerns. It also welcomed the results of the EU3+3 meeting and expressed hope the parties would step up their efforts to achieve a diplomatic solution.
- Switzerland said that in order to break the present impasse, Iran must adopt a different approach, including confidence-building measures.
- In its cluster 2 statement, Iran strongly criticized the United States, United Kingdom, and France for instituting nuclear apartheid. It accused these states, plus Australia, Canada, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, of numerous treaty violations. These accusations prompted right of replies from Australia, Japan, and the ROK.

Syria's alleged secret reactor program

- The Republic of Korea shared the international community's concerns regarding reports that the DPRK had supplied Syria with nuclear technology.
- The United States accused Syria of violating safeguards by not providing design information on its alleged reactor to the IAEA. It also added Syria to its list of proliferation challenges facing the NPT, along with Iran and the DPRK. In reference to Syria, the United States said Iran was not the only state in the regional to have a clandestine nuclear program.
- The United Kingdom said it found the US evidence of the alleged Syrian reactor to be "convincing" and welcomed

the IAEA agreement to investigate.

- In the only comment during the interactive discussion on cluster 2, Indonesia asked why the video evidence of the alleged facility was only disclosed seven months after the Israeli attack. It also asked whether the information had been shared with the IAEA before then. In this context, Indonesia expressed support for a mechanism for mandatory provision of information to the IAEA. Indonesia said the Israeli attack was unacceptable and that it undermined the NPT safeguards regime.
- Syria affirmed that it implements all provisions of the NPT. Later in a right of reply, Syria denounced US accusations as "false" and "undocumented". It criticized US expressions of concern regarding non-proliferation and establishing a Middle East nuclear weapon free zone, contrasting this concern to US positions on Israel.

Article III: Strengthening Safeguards

- Indonesia, Iran, and Syria opposed making the Additional Protocol a condition of supply, absent the universalization of comprehensive safeguards agreements.
- New Zealand stated the Additional Protocol should be a condition of new supply arrangements. The Republic of Korea expressed support for Nuclear Suppliers Group discussion of the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply.
- Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States said the Additional Protocol now constitutes the new compliance standard.
- The IAEA said that states with information (such as national intelligence) pertinent to the implementation of safeguards should report that information to the Agency.

Article VII: Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

- Mexico, on behalf of the parties to the Tlateloclo Treaty, reiterated its call for the nuclear weapon states to withdraw their interpretive statements to the Treaty's protocol.
- Mongolia announced that in September 2007, after receiving feedback from Russia and China, it had submitted a draft treaty to the two states toward institutionalizing its nuclear weapon free status.
- Uzbekistan, on behalf of the five Central Asian states, announced it would be submitting a working paper containing an update on implementation of the Semipalatinsk Treaty since September 2006. The United Kingdom had

*continued on next page***Youth delegation**

News in Brief (cont.)

noted earlier that the five states had still not agreed to resume consultations with the nuclear weapon states over their concerns regarding the Treaty's text.

Other Issues

- The United States made its strongest declaration yet, stating that "nonproliferation is unquestionably the core interest served by the NPT—not merely one 'pillar' among others, but in fact the Treaty's very foundation."
- The United Kingdom stated it considers DPRK's withdrawal from the Treaty invalid, and that the event underlined a weakness in the NPT.
- Switzerland said it cannot accept nuclear fuel cycle proposals that are contrary to Article IV and that "would create a new form of discrimination".
- Ukraine proposed to convene a UN conference on security assurances in order to discuss the issue and find a solution acceptable to nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states.

Highlights from the Discussion on Regional Issues and the Middle East:*Middle East*

- By the numbers: nine delegations called for a nuclear weapon free zone; six delegations called for a WMD free zone; nine delegations called on Israel to accede to the NPT and to conclude comprehensive safeguards.
- Australia and China took note of Egypt's working paper on measures toward implementing the 1995 NPT resolution.
- The Non-Aligned Movement reiterated its standing calls for: specific time during PrepCom and RevCon to be set aside to discuss the issue; establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee 2 of the RevCon; and establishment of a standing committee of the NPT bureau to meet intersessionally to follow up on implementation on the resolution.
- Russia advocated for the multilateral development of nuclear energy in the region, bringing attention to its existing fuel cycle initiatives.
- Canada expressed support for an IAEA forum on the experience of nuclear weapon free zones in various regions that may be relevant toward establishing such a zone in the Middle East.
- Algeria called for a regional monitoring mechanism to report on implementation of the 1995 NPT resolution, with a focus on Israel's accession to the NPT and comprehensive safeguards.

South Asia

- Canada and Norway expressed concern over the US-India nuclear cooperation deal, although both expressed appreciation of India's commitment to non-proliferation norms.
- Canada, Japan, and Norway called on India and Pakistan to observe a moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapons.
- Norway called on India and Pakistan to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states.

Northeast Asia

- Canada called on the DPRK to provide a full declaration of its nuclear programme, urging the PrepCom to make a strong statement.
- Japan said more dialogue was needed in the context of the Six-Party Talks.
- Australia and Norway called on the DPRK to fulfill its obligations under the six-party process. •

Dialogue of the deaf (cont.)

In response to these tensions, a few states appealed to reason and sincerity. Malaysia's delegation called for "genuine dialogue," while New Zealand's representative argued that promises of the past need to be effectively implemented in good faith. Botswana's delegation, noting that the situation requires leadership, flexibility, and compromise from the nuclear weapon states in particular, warned that the disarmament debate is in danger of turning out "to be a dialogue of the deaf with no end in sight."

NGO observers often find the circuitous, repetitive nature of "discussions" of the NPT review cycle extremely frustrating, and are sometimes made to feel incapable of doing anything about it. Yet it is here where we and all of civil society should feel the most empowered to act creatively, to reject and resist our governments' policies and actions that reinforce double standards, undermine consensus, or do not foster peace through genuine dialogue. In our own countries, we can stimulate and maintain a dialogue among citizens and between the people and their representatives. At the event mentioned above, representatives of Greenpeace spoke about their work in Israel, where a culture of fear can limit or even "prohibit" discussion about security and nuclear issues. They try to foster communication and understanding about their government's official policies and encourage citizens to question its actions. For example, Sharon Dolev of Greenpeace explained that Israel's occupation of Palestine and human rights issues were once taboo, through a grass-roots movement to use all available political tools and employing creative ways to reach out and stimulate dialogue, those issues have now entered the realm of mainstream political discourse. Through sustained efforts to question and resist the status quo, we can influence government priorities and policies and help bring about the nuclear free world of peace, justice, and equality that we desire. •

**Nothing could be worse than the fear
that one had given up too soon,
and left one unexpended effort that
might have saved the world.**

Jane Addams



Verification of multilateral nuclear disarmament

Sandra Fong, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom and Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will

Attila Burjan (AWE), Marius Bjorningstad (NRPA), and Andreas Persbo (VERTIC) gave a joint presentation on the technical intervention between Norway, UK and VERTIC on the verification of multilateral nuclear disarmament. They explained their motivations and goals for the project, discussed why non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) should get involved, and outlined some questions that continue to challenge their work.

Mr. Persbo explained that the initiative is not trying to create a perfect model, but is rather taking an interdisciplinary approach to explore how nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states can cooperate to develop the practices, structures, and equipment necessary to undertake the verifiable dismantlement of nuclear warheads in an effective, sustainable, transparent manner. He emphasized that the group aims to maintain a "laboratory spirit," saying they welcome technical contributions and suggestions as long as they are not politically motivated.

Mr. Bjorningstad of Norway spoke to the need for balance between national security and transparency. He recognized that involving representatives of NNWS in inspections of nuclear facilities is often seen as a proliferation risk, but argued that those representatives might have technical and research capacity instrumental to the project. He also argued that involving NNWS enhances the credibility of the verification regime—if NNWS are involved in developing the mechanisms and equipment for verification, they are more likely to trust the system once it is operating. He also pointed out that NNWS involvement is warranted by Article VI of the NPT, which calls for the participation of NNWS in nuclear disarmament.

On the other hand, the panelists also emphasized that NWS must take the lead, and when questioned by the Russian delegation on how NWS should do that, Mr. Persbo suggested that Russia and the United States look over their fissile material accounting procedures in reference to the uncertainty about the amount of fissile material they have produced, in order to prepare for verification once the technical means are in place.

Mr. Burjan of the UK Atomic Weapon Establishment outlined some of the technical questions the project has begun to address, explaining that the group has identified managed access and measurements as two key areas where NNWS and NWS cooperation is viable. He also mentioned some of the difficulties they have encountered, such as protecting classified information while measuring attributes of a given system.

Through the questions and answers at the end of the presentation it became clear that the project is still in the "beginning stages" and that the current participants wish to keep the working group small for the time being. While welcoming suggestions from outside sources on technical issues, they emphasized this would have to be on an informal basis. In response to a question about possible applications for negotiation of an fissile materials treaty, the panelists indicated that was outside the scope of their project, both politically and technically. •

The Middle East: Nuclear Future or Nuclear Free?

Jacqueline Leahey, Reaching Critical Will and Michael Spies, Arms Control Reporter

On Monday, 5 May, members of Greenpeace Mediterranean and Greenpeace International organized a panel discussion, sharing their experiences and initiatives related to campaign on nuclear power and nuclear weapons issues in Israel. At the outset of the discussion, moderator Rhianna Tyson of the Global Security Institute remarked on the unprecedented nature of the event, the first time in memory in which an Israeli civil society delegation held an event at a nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Conference. The timely panel discussion took place immediately before the afternoon session of the Preparatory Committee took up the issue of regional issues, with a focus on implementing the 1995 NPT resolution on the Middle East.

Merav Datan, political advisor to Greenpeace International, presented an overview of the geopolitical situation in the Middle East and Greenpeace's political priorities. She emphasized the centrality of the 1995 Middle East resolution to the realization of the NPT goals, and its connection to the indefinite extension of the Treaty. Datan recounted repeated calls by the international community for establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East, as reflected in numerous UN Security Council, UN General Assembly, and IAEA resolutions. Datan compared the current Middle East deadlock with a chicken and egg scenario and suggested that the impasse is not so much a consequence of the nuclear issues at hand as they are about who takes the first risk. In this context, Datan described Greenpeace's priorities for dealing with nuclear disarmament in Israel and the region, which included: introducing the issue into the Middle East discourse; securing ratification of the CTBT by Egypt, Iran, and Israel; concluding an FMCT; considering a nuclear fuel cycle free zone; and pursuing confidence- and trust-building measures.

Greenpeace Mediterranean program director Paul Horseman discussed the geopolitical dimension of energy security in the region. He reflected on the importance of energy to poverty alleviation and economic development, as well as the negative consequences of environmental degradation. He presented conclusions from the Middle East portion of a feasibly study on global renewable energy, advocating for an "energy revolution scenario." Horseman described key advantages of renewable energy, which included the use of indigenous energy sources, a sustainable, limitless and reliable supply, shared community ownership, limited pollution effects, and the ability of renewable energy to cushion economies. He concluded that the primary barriers to renewable energy in the regional were political rather than technical.

Theodora Karchovsky, Greenpeace Mediterranean communications director, explained the limited public discourse on nuclear policies within Israel. Not only was Greenpeace the only organization working against nuclear energy in Israel, Karchovsky noted the inadequate media coverage and the general reluctance to critically examine government policies on nuclear and security issues. She explained that while the media in Israel was "free," self-censorship was the largest barrier to public discourse. Karchovsky reflected on the pervading sentiment within Israel, which holds nuclear matters as so central to Israel's survival and security that any criticism of nuclear policies is considered tantamount to denigration of state security.

continued on next page



The Middle East (cont.)

Sharon Dolev, Greenpeace Mediterranean disarmament campaigner, discussed the blanket of ambiguity and security the Israeli government maintains around its nuclear policies and the related lack of public understanding of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons issues. Dolev explained that to the general populous, the word 'nuclear' almost exclusively conjures the specter of 'Iran', negating the possibility of discussing the many environmental, health, and social implications of nuclear issues.

The question and answer session focused on strategies for engaging Israeli civil society from within and outside the region. Dolev suggested that the key was appealing with sympathy toward Israelis' perceptions of insecurity rather than invalidating them, a strategy which only closes dialogue. Dolev and Datan argued that while demands, such as implementing the 1995 NPT resolution, were unlikely to be implemented as conceived, they helped open space for dialogue within Israel. Dolev reflected on the success of past movements in allowing the Israeli occupation and human rights issues to slowly enter into mainstream political discourse. In another response, Datan speculated that Israel could benefit from a civil society truth and reconciliation process, similar to the process in South Africa, where participants could meet to discuss differences without pressure to reach consensus, but nonetheless achieving progress. The event concluded with a powerful vision of reconstructed rail lines running from Cairo to Damascus, through Israel, reconnecting a normalized region. •

Military Research

*Linnéa Lagergren, Women's International League
for Peace and Freedom*

On Monday morning, Dr. Stuart Parkinson, Executive Director, Scientists for Global Responsibility (SGR) gave a presentation on Military Involvement in Research and Development.

Showing how the world's military spending has increased by 37 percent over the last ten years, reaching over US\$ 1.2 trillion in 2006, Mr. Parkinson opened his presentation by pointing out the fact that the US military budget stands for 46 percent of the world's total military spending. According to Mr. Parkinson, the US is also the main spender on military research and development (R&D), an area in which the world's spending has increased by 57 percent since 2001. Mr. Parkinson underlined that the high US spending on R&D affects other country's spending, since it encourages them, including US allies, to follow the same line.

Emphasizing that military R&D is a key aspect of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), Mr. Parkinson stressed that non-technological approaches, e.g. political solutions, have been marginalized in favour of a focus on complex military technology, in the belief that this will bring about rapid and "clean" victory when dealing with security threats. According to the speaker, major limitations of the latter approach are clearly apparent in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Mr. Parkinson highlighted that military R&D has been a key factor in the exponential growth in lethality of weapons during the 20th century. He stressed there is an increased risk of civilian casualties when using technologies that are highly destructive even if they are targeted and of making going to war more appealing than seeking political or diplomatic solutions, since governments assume "our" soldiers will not get killed. He highlighted further concerns of the risk of a re-ignition of an arms race, the increased potential for use of nuclear weapons, and the weaponization of outer space.

The presentation closed with a brief description of a case study of the UK. Mr. Parkinson stressed the role of military corporations, arguing that the majority of military R&D—including government funded R&D—takes place within the military industry. According to Mr. Parkinson, this represents a large subsidy, since the government first funds the research, and then buys it back from the industry, thus spending twice for the work.

Regarding military corporations' involvement in education, Mr. Parkinson explained that military corporations are involved in science and technological education, providing curriculum materials and apprenticeships, especially within engineering. Mr. Parkinson highlighted the difficulties for scientists of making an issue of military funded research even if they want to speak up, since there is often a lack of funds. Therefore, he argued that some explicit discussions are needed within universities and research centers regarding what sort of funding they should accept.

In conclusion, the presenter argued that it is important to first of all try to make people aware of the current global funding of military R&D, which is driven by rationales that raises serious ethical problems and can undermine security. Other areas, e.g. environment and health, are under-supported and urgently need more R&D resources, requiring the funds to be reallocated. Mr. Parkinson believes that when people start to see this imbalance, it will be easy to change their minds and thus the public opinion. •

*"No Time To Kill is a
fascinating and informative
work. It will be a valuable addition to my research library."
—Walter Cronkite*


*"Your book contains
a mine of useful information..."
—FW de Klerk*

*"Warmest congratulations on your capacity to go
straight to the heart of these complex issues..."
—Robert J. O'Neill, A.O.*

*"I appreciate your efforts to promote
a world...without weapons of mass destruction."
—Desmond Tutu*

*"Your book is
attractive, impressive, effective,
and powerful—a noble effort."
—Sydney Drell*

*No Time To Kill is a holistic guide to
WMDs, terrorism, and genocide. It
focuses on these complex problems
through the lenses of anthropology,
foreign policy, psychology, the
history of war, religious violence,
and the rule of law.*



Daisy Alliance
To order, go to:
www.daisyalliance.org

Make the World free from WMD





What's On Today's Calendar of Events

NGO Strategy Session

Where: NGO Room (Room VIII)

When: 8:30 - 9:00am

Contact: Anthony Salloum, Abolition 2000

Website: www.abolition2000.org

Operational Status of Nuclear Weapon Systems

Where: NGO Room (Room VIII)

When: 10:00am - 1:00pm

Contact: John Hallam, Nuclear Flashpoints

NPT: Pathfinder to a Nuclear Weapon Free World

Report from the Middle Power's Initiative's Dublin Article VI Forum

Where: NGO Room (Room VIII)

When: 1:15-2:45pm

Contact: Jim Wurst, Middle Powers Initiative

Website: www.middlepowers.org

UK Atomic Weapons Establishment: Verification of nuclear disassembly

Where: Room IX

When: 1:15 - 2:45pm

US Presentation: Article VI

Where: Room XI

When: 1:15 - 2:45pm

Contact: US Delegation

Environmental Aspects of Nuclear Energy

Where: NGO Room (Room VIII)

When: 3:30 - 5:30pm

Contact: Regina Hagen, INESAP

Website: www.inesap.org

Nuclear Wordsearch

n p w i v o s r s o b e p e a
n s a f e g u a r d s b p n r
n r l r a w s o l e a i m o p
t i l b t t a o p e i c e i e
e e a y m d o f r r e o i t p
m i n u t e m a n a e s d i l
l n o i t n e v e r p p e l u
y t i l i b a t n u o c c a e
e e t n e m y o l p e d n o i
s r a s u i e g s e i t e c m
s c n p c s b i l a t e r a l
t e r e r s a t e c s t r b n
n p e c u i s n c e t e e m e
a t t e l l p m i l a e t a g
s o n o r e l r a e s r e g e
r r i t c s t p e b n e d w e

PAROS
Coalition
Peace
SLBM
Deployment
Interceptor
International Law
Prevention
Safeguards
Prepcom
Bilateral
Missiles
Accountability
Deterrence
Minuteman