



# NPT NEWS IN REVIEW

*Civil society perspectives on the 2015 Review Conference of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 27 April–22 May 2015*



Reaching Critical Will

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The *NPT News in Review* is a daily publication produced by the Reaching Critical Will programme of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom during meetings of NPT states parties.

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## EDITORIAL: BAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS, REJECT MASSIVE NUCLEAR VIOLENCE

*Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF*

The new draft text released from Main Committee I (MC I) on Thursday morning merges the most recent MC I and subsidiary body 1 (SB 1) drafts and contains further edits. Overall, this document does not contain any new action-oriented commitments, time-bound or otherwise. There is nothing here to suggest that states parties will be any more compelled to implement these suggested actions than they were the 2010 action plan. It largely encourages, urges, emphasises the need to, etc. Where it does call on states to undertake specific activities, such as ceasing modernisation or reviewing security doctrines, it does not provide time-frames or benchmarks for doing so.

For this to be a credible, successful outcome document, it must include concrete measures that advance nuclear disarmament and truly initiate a meaningful process to fill the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. Most delegations speaking in MC I on Thursday afternoon were clear about this.

Thailand expressed concern that the legal gap is not clearly articulated in the draft text, arguing that this is a factual assessment and must be included in any outcome. Beginning a process on a legally-binding instrument to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons, the Thai delegate argued, will help salvage the credibility of the NPT and signal that states parties have moved beyond a Cold War mentality. She emphasised that this request is not illogical, unreasonable, or farfetched, but rather, is a long overdue step.

Yet the nuclear-armed states continued to push back on the idea that anything more than the reductions they have already undertaken or have said they might take in the future is necessary. They clearly do not view their continued possession of nuclear weapons as inconsistent with the Treaty. This became starkly evident with the insertion of new language in the draft text noting

that the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995 did not imply the "indefinite extension of the possession" of nuclear weapons. "Extension of" suggests that nuclear weapon possession by the five states was legitimate during the first 25 years of the Treaty's existence, which is a dangerous revision and interpretation of the Treaty's history.

The US delegation again forcefully argued that there can be no timelines for disarmament. But beyond timelines, there also does not appear to be any kind of plan. South Africa and Austria argued that reductions do not constitute disarmament unless they are undertaken as part of a framework for total elimination. While the nuclear-armed and nuclear-dependent countries continue to insist upon the so-called building blocks or a step-by-step approach as the only "practical" path to disarmament, this "process" has not achieved any disarmament at all. Further, the New Agenda Coalition expressed concern "about the precedent set, in the NPT context, by giving recognition to policies that have been determined unilaterally and subjected only to self-assessment."

During an SB 1 meeting on Wednesday, Ambassador Minty of South Africa demanded that the nuclear-armed states illuminate the roadmap they are working on. "How fast are they going on this road? At what rate are they travelling and how long will it take to reach the destination? Do they need some fuel from us to make them go faster or are they taking rest-stops along the way, or are they simply lost?" He sharply pointed out that the "misuse of the 2010 outcome as a roadmap seems to give licence to an approach, which suggests that they have an indefinite right to possess nuclear weapons. It further suggests that if they get tired of talking to each other, then they take a rest stop, whilst they are armed with the most dangerous weapons."

This attitude from the nuclear-armed states is mirrored by their reaction to the

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*Editorial, continued*

inclusion of language on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons (HINW) in the draft text. France once again argued that there is no new information in relation to the HINW and that the three conferences should not be referenced because France did not attend them. The fact that approximately 93% of UN member states did attend did not stop Ambassador Simon-Michel from arguing that these conferences were “divisive” and that it is better for the outcome text to not refer to “divisive” things at all. He called for the deletion of the two key paragraphs on the HINW.

In contrast, the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) pointed out that the text “does not accurately reflect either the depth of concern or the urgency of action—nor does it give due recognition to the facts and evidence presented at the three Conferences held over the past five years.” Also, argued NAC and Ireland, the substance of the 159-state joint statement must be reflected, that “it is in the interests of the very survival of humanity that nuclear weapons never be used again under any circumstances.”

The nuclear-armed states argue, as France did again yesterday afternoon, that elimination of nuclear weapons is not possible because of the current strategic context. Ambassador Simon-Michel complained again that the strategic context is not adequately reflected in the draft text. But as Ambassador Minty asked, “How can we all put our own fate at risk, because of potentially incorrect or subjective perceptions of some ‘security concerns’? What are the criteria for working out this security standard?” Are there “other ways to provide them with the security that they seek, rather than their over-dependence on nuclear weapons?” Ultimately, he noted, “the security considerations of the five are unilateral and imposed on all of us.” And of course, as many states parties have pointed out over the decades, if the nuclear-armed states and their nuclear-dependent allies continue to promote the perceived “security benefits” of nuclear weapons, they are essentially promoting proliferation.

The approach of the nuclear-armed states to this outcome document, much like their approach to nuclear disarmament in general, is based on their apparent belief that they have the right to possess nuclear weapons for as long as they like, regardless of the risks, consequences, or injustice of this situation. They are very clearly in a minority at this Review Conference. They are isolated. Yet they do not appear willing to compromise or accept any new commitments that would help them fulfill their legal obligations.

NPT states parties should not give into this petulant position of the nuclear-armed states. On Thursday

afternoon, it did appear that many delegations were getting fed up. “Consensus must be built around the overwhelming majority, not the other way around,” warned Austria, while Ecuador asserted that if the outcome document is blocked, it will be by only a minority for whom nuclear disarmament is not a priority.

“While we work towards consensus, some continue to divide us by using the notion of consensus to make us surrender to their wishes or risk putting the whole outcome in jeopardy,” explained Ambassador Minty. But over the years, there has been so little flexibility by the nuclear-armed states that it increasingly appears that the NPT is “their” treaty. There is a very big gap between the nuclear-armed and non-nuclear-armed states. Yet the non-nuclear armed “represent the vast majority of humanity—our lives, our future and our destiny is wrapped up” with the arsenals of the nuclear-armed.

States have a chance to change this. The urgency and opportunity to negotiate a legally-binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons is before us. Now is the time to ban nuclear weapons and crawl out from under the thumb of those who seek to rule through the threat of massive nuclear violence. •

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*The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom or the Reaching Critical Will programme.*



## DRAFTS REVIEW

Ray Acheson, Gabriella Irsten, Susi Snyder, Tim Wright

This brief only highlights changes from the last texts.

### *Main Committee I*

- The MCI and SB1 texts have been merged.
- PP1 removes “without prejudice”.
- PP8 deletes “slow” from the “slow pace” of the implementation of disarmament commitments.
- PP8 adds “as perceived by some States parties” in relation to concerns over breaches of the Treaty’s obligations.
- PP8 changes “undermines confidence in the Treaty” to “undermines confidence in nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy”.
- PP9 moves the reference to “transparency, verifiability, and irreversibility of all measures relating to nuclear disarmament undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States” to PP23. The new PP9 is now about the “full and non-discriminatory implementation of articles I and II of the Treaty by all States parties ... to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.”
- PP10 on accession of Palestine adds “without prejudice to the positions of State parties”.
- PP12 changes “ensuring” to “promoting” the equal participation of women and men in the process of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and removes the words “at all levels”.
- PP13 adds “eight to twelfth preambular paragraphs”.
- PP15 is new; it urges NWS to comply with their nuclear disarmament obligations under NPT, 13 practical steps, 2000 and 2010 outcomes.
- PP16 is new; it recalls the ultimate objective is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.
- PP17, is the old 15; instead of noting the updated reports from NWS making use of standard categories, it notes the agreement by the NWS on a common reporting framework and the submission of their reports in 2014 and 2015. Instead of noting the “increased transparency” of some NWS with respect to the number of weapons in their national inventories, it now welcomes “further information” to this end.
- PP20 is a new para noting future undertakings or actions previous to this review cycle by China, France, and the UK.
- PP21, instead of noting that despite “significant achievements” in bilateral and unilateral reductions,

now welcomes “achievements,” while noting with concern that the “total estimated number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpiles ... amounts of several thousands” rather than “many thousands”.

- PP21 also deletes the reference to the “many hundreds” of nuclear weapons remaining on high alert.
- PP21 deletes the comment that this does not ameliorate the environment of international peace and security and overwhelms the demand of the majority for disarmament. Instead, it expresses “deep concern at the humanitarian consequences that would result from any use of such weapons under any circumstances.”
- PP22, which reaffirms the importance of lowering operational readiness, now also stresses that reductions in deployments and operational status cannot substitute for irreversible elimination.
- PP23 is the old PP 9.
- PP24, continues to recognise that the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 did not imply the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons, but it changes the phrase to “indefinite extension of the possession of nuclear weapons”.
- PP24 also deletes the reference to increasing international tensions and concern regarding the continuing role of the nuclear in military concepts, doctrines, and policies of states and regional alliances.
- PP25 is the old PP22, though it adds “and maintaining” to achieving a NWWF and deletes all reference to “negotiations of a mechanism with clearly defined benchmarks, timelines and a strong system of verification”.
- It also changes “affirms” to “supports” treaty-based nuclear disarmament.
- PP26 changes UN conference to international conference.
- PP27 is a new para based on old OP12 reaffirming that total elimination is only guarantee against use, including risk of unauthorized or accidental use. The old OP12 linked this with humanitarian risk and negative security assurances, which this no longer does. The previous para on risk in the MC I document, para 25, expressed concern over the growing risk and affirmed that these risks concern all humanity, but this is removed here.
- PP28 is new and reflects the preamble of the NPT on the devastation of nuclear war and safeguarding the security of peoples.
- PP29 previously said the Conference welcomes the extensive international discourse on the unaccepta-

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### Drafts review, continued.

ble humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons (HINW), especially the three HINW conferences, whereas now it just notes the conferences and welcomes the “growing interest of a large number of States parties in the international discourse”. It also changes the assertion that this discourse has “deepened collective understanding” to “added to understanding”.

- It notes that the CELAC endorsement was made at head of state level.
- It deletes the sentence on the fact-based discussions at the three HINW conferences and the reference to the uncontrollable destructive capability and indiscriminate nature of nuclear weapons and the deep implications for human survival and the health of future generation. In its place, it notes the joint statement by Austria on behalf of 159 states parties on the HINW and the joint statement by Australia on behalf of 26 states parties.
- PP30 deletes the recalling of its deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and acknowledging the new information presented at the discussions on HINW.
- It includes the sentence that all states at all times must comply with applicable international law, including IHL, originally from para 26.
- PP31 retains the reference to ICJ opinion but cuts out the fact that new information on HINW has significant implications for the assessments of nuclear weapons under international law.
- PP32 is a new para on the FMCT GGE; moves action items on FMCT to OP16.
- PP33 moves reference to stalemate in the CD to PP34 and focuses just on OEWG.
- PP34 is the language on stalemate in the CD.
- PP35–37 on CTBT are reformulated, removing urgency of CTBT EIF and moratorium on nuclear testing.
- PP38 takes out reference to UNSC resolution 255; elaborates on the relevant protocols to NWFZs; and recognises the conditionality of some NWS negative security assurances.
- PP41 is a new para welcoming the increased and positive interaction with civil society during the review cycle and in the context of the review process of the NPT and in pursuit of ND and NP.
- PP42 is a new para acting as chapeau for forward-looking actions. This language was in explanatory note of original MC I report.
- OP1 now says the HINW “underpin and should compel urgent efforts by all States leading to a world

without nuclear weapons” rather than “should underpin and lend urgency to efforts by all States leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons”.

- The language on never using nuclear weapons again has been re-included (was deleted in second draft), though “under any circumstances” has not been reinserted.
- OP2 is the old OP11, which now calls for (rather than welcomes) pursuit of all effective measures for the full implementation of article VI. It moves the reference to “pending the establishment of the necessary legal framework” and endorsement of “the accelerated pursuit of various intermediate practical building blocks that can be realized simultaneously” to a new OP20.
- OP3 previously “affirmed need” for all NWS but now “calls upon” all NWS to reduce further and eliminate.
- It also removes “pending the establishment of a legal framework to achieve and maintain nuclear weapons”.
- OP4 reinserts “including strategic and non-strategic” (was deleted in second draft).
- OP5 is a new para that moves language on further encouraging the NWS to engage over the course of the next review cycle with a view to achieving rapid reductions in the global stockpile.
- OP7 inserts word “substantively” regarding reducing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in security doctrines.
- OP8 adds “all efforts necessary” instead of “further efforts” to address risk, but has taken out language “that are greater than many states parties previously understood”.
- OP9 takes out “in the view of many states parties” regarding the operational status effects on international stability.
- OP13 moves to OP2 the language on pursuit of effective measures. It has new language encouraging parties of the SEANWFZ and NWS to continue engaging to resolve outstanding issues.
- OP14 removes the call upon the eight remaining states to ratify the CTBT.
- It adds “the use of new nuclear weapons technologies” to list of actions states should cease and refrain from.
- OP15 is a new para on contributing to the international monitoring system and building on integrated field exercise in Jordan in 2014.
- OP16 adds “verifiable and non-discriminatory” to description of FMCT to be negotiated in the CD.

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### Drafts review, continued.

- OP18 moves education from last para and adds local governments; “in the field of education”; and “leaders, disarmament experts and diplomats”.
- OP19 removes language “noting that many States parties believe that a legal framework is necessary for the full implementation of article VI” to “encourages all States to”.
- It adds “effective measures for the full implementation of article VI”.
- OP20 is the old OP11.

### Main Committee III

- The revised draft, MC III’s CRP.3, includes a new section on technical cooperation and multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.
- The new draft has slightly changed language on para 1, no longer noting previous efforts but stating that they “have reviewed the operation of Article IV”.
- Para 8 now includes reference to “and technology” and “all state parties”.
- Paras 10 and 18 now includes “in particular the needs of developing countries”.
- Para 11 is a new paragraph and deals with providing more assistance in order to enhance access to nuclear science and technology.
- Para 12 (previously 28) has been moved on the grounds that it applies to all PUNE activities; the language has also been amended with action 57 of the 2010 outcome document.
- Para 13 is new and refers to the obligations under article IV with regards to exports.
- Para 14 is also new and welcomes the IAEA Renovation of the Nuclear Application Laboratory.
- Para 20 now includes reference to the Millennium Development Goals and post 2015.
- Under the heading nuclear power only paras 31 and 32 have been changed with minor edits.
- Para 33 in the older draft have now been split up into two separate paragraphs 36 and 38.
- Para 37 now includes “should be carried out within IAEA”.
- Para 39 has been amended to reaffirm developing multilateral norm “should be negotiated multilateral in a gradual, inclusive and transparent manner”.
- Para 40 now includes language “be in conformity with relevant articles under the treaty...”

- Para 47 and 48 have been joined.
- For para 48 delegations are still discussing the Vienna Declaration language and this para might therefore be amended further.
- Paras 50 and 51 on emergence response was moved to the nuclear safety section.
- Para 53 is new and encourages states to strengthen national and multilateral efforts to cover orphan sources.
- Para 54 now includes the word “civilian” in front of stocks.
- Para 55 has been amended to include “as promoted by the IAEA” in relation to best practices of uranium mining.
- Para 62 on radioactive material and MOX fuel now recognises positive developments.
- Para 64 is new and welcomes the entry into force of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage.
- Para 67 includes new references to the LEU reserve established in Russia and the IAEA LEU bank that will be hosted by Kazakhstan. •



## NEWS IN BRIEF

Mia Gandenberger and Gabriella Irsten | *Reaching Critical Will of WILPF*

The News in Brief is not a comprehensive summary of all statements. It highlights positions on a few critical issues covered during plenary discussions.

#### Main Committee I

- Austria, Algeria, Chile, Ecuador, Indonesia, Ireland, Mexico, NAC, Philippines, Thailand, Uruguay called for strengthening the language on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons.
- Austria, Ecuador, Mexico stressed that consensus must be built around the majority, not the other way around.
- Ireland stressed that the outcome document at the very minimum should acknowledge the facts of developments during the last review cycle.
- Brazil stressed that language referring to the humanitarian consequences debate should not be weaker than the reference to the FMCT.
- Spain sought the inclusion of the 70th anniversary.
- Chile suggested reversing PP 3 and 4.
- NAC and Costa Rica regretted the deletion of "slow pace" of implementation of nuclear disarmament in PP8.
- Ecuador called for "lack of advancement" to be re-included.
- China regretted the deletion of the reference to "the principle of increased and undiminished security for all."
- Chile, Indonesia welcomed the inclusion of a reference to Palestine to PP10.
- ROK expressed the wish for clarification which Committee was dealing with universalization.
- Costa Rica welcomed PP12 and suggested replacing "promoting" with "ensure."
- US thought PP13 and 14 were redundant.
- Japan suggested adding to PP17 that the common reporting framework agreed to was not the standard reporting form the NPT nuclear-armed states were encouraged to use in the 2010 Action Plan.
- Chile stressed that the text should not welcome results of NPT nuclear-armed meetings.
- France regretted that the signing of the CANWFZ was not welcomed.
- On PP20, NAC worried about the precedent set in the NPT context by giving recognition to policies that have been determined unilaterally and subjected only to self-assessment.
- Austria suggested including the current number of NW in stockpiles in PP21.
- On PP26 the Netherlands, Spain regretted that there was not a clear separation between the HLM and the follow-on resolution.
- NAC, Costa Rica regretted the deletion of references to new information that has emerged from the three conferences and called for it to be re-included.
- France reiterated that the HINW process had not garnered any new information.
- France suggested deleting PP 29 and 30.
- With regard to PP27 France and the US reiterated that there was no increased risk of nuclear weapons being used.
- Uruguay stressed that the risk is greater than originally perceived.
- Netherlands did not think that was the case.
- Austria, NAC, Thailand welcomed the inclusion of a reference to the joint statement on behalf of 159 states.
- On PP29 NAC regretted that "a large number of States that attended" was used when it was "overwhelming majority," more than 80%, of NPT states parties.
- Chile, NAC said not just the number of states supporting the 159-state joint statement on the HINW was significant, but the core message that nuclear weapons must never be used again "under any circumstances" needed to be highlighted.
- Spain did not think adding all points of the humanitarian initiative into one paragraph would foster consensus.
- Slovenia said it could not support the reference welcoming the Austrian Pledge in PP29.
- Netherlands suggested moving the reference to the Austrian Pledge to a separate paragraph.
- Ecuador highlighted the multifaceted nature of the consequences of a nuclear weapons detonation in PP30.
- Egypt called for replacing "use" by "detonation".
- France suggested returning to agreed language on the Ps on the CTBT.

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*News in brief, continued.*

- On PP32 Japan, ROK, Netherlands, Australia suggested welcoming the work of the GGE on FMCT.
- NAM reiterated that a future FMCT should include existing stocks and be in line with the non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament commitments under the Treaty.
- Netherlands suggested referring also to UNGA resolution 66/66 in PP33.
- Slovenia suggested welcoming the OEWG in PP33.
- Algeria called for strengthened language on PP38 and 39.
- Chile welcomed the reference to civil society in PP41.
- Japan suggested welcoming the statement on behalf of 75 states on disarmament education in PP41.
- NAC stressed the need to recognize that a multilateral legal framework will be needed to meet obligations under Article VI.
- France suggested deleting references to concrete benchmarks and timelines and the end of PP42.
- Austria, Cuba, Mexico, NAM regretted the small number of timelines and benchmarks and called for the inclusion of more concrete ones.
- France disagreed with “underpin” in OP1.
- Ecuador, Costa Rica called for including “under any circumstances” after “used again” in OP1.
- Ecuador called for replacing “over the course of the next review cycle” with “urgently and without delay”.
- Egypt highlighted that the current language in OP7 was a step back from the 2000 outcome document.
- On OP7 NAC requested reporting by both NWS and those in nuclear military alliances.
- Costa Rica suggested inserting “human error”.
- France suggested deleting OP19 and 20.
- Brazil stressed OP19 must be retained and reinforced.
- Brazil suggested replacing “encourages” by “urges.”
- Thailand suggested replacing “encourages” by “calls” and “engage” with “begin” in OP19.
- Philippines expressed support for this suggestion.
- Costa Rica suggested replacing “endorses” with “recognize” in OP20.

- Philippines would like to have OP20 removed.
- Thailand called for a process to begin on a legally-binding instrument.

*Main Committee III*

- The Chair presented the new updated draft NPT/CONF.2015/MC.III/CRP.1/Rev.3.
- Most delegations said they need more time to look at the new draft but some initial comments were shared in the morning session.
- Egypt reiterated its two main priorities when it comes to the draft: the draft needs to identify and highlight that PUNE is not an objective of the treaty but a right; and Paras 1-6 seem to indicate that it is ok to have cooperation with non-NPT members, which is fundamentally against the Treaty. Cuba and Morocco supported this.
- NAM highlighted that its main priorities concern the issues of restrictions in the field of cooperation; multilateral approaches to fuel cycle; and armed attacks against facilities under safeguards.
- Iran called for the deletion of the reference to UNSC resolutions in para 39.
- Singapore and Switzerland said they have consulted with delegations on para 48, concerning the Vienna declaration, and believe they have a text that will be accepted, which they will provide to the chair.
- Canada supported that paragraph 19 dealing with the Technical Cooperation Fund stay like it is, “encouraging states in a position to do so to make contributions to the cooperation fund”.
- Australia and Saudi Arabia stressed that the language safety and security should be used in a complementary way throughout the document and including in para 39.
- US noted that the substance in paragraph 1 is also mentioned in MCII and MCIII reports so the language should be checked to ensure they are coordinated.
- US believed that valuable and important text has been deleted in para 43 in the new draft.
- South Africa stressed that the language on technical cooperation is particularly important for developing countries and should therefore stay and the Conference should now put its effort into finding solutions for how resources can be allocated. Para 19 should therefore exclusively be on the technical cooperation funds. •



## EVENT: EU AS A GLOBAL ACTOR IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR SAFETY AND SECURITY

Emily Watson | *Reaching Critical Will of WILPF*

Organised by the EU and Latvian Mission, this event brought together Caroline Cliff, European Union Delegation in Vienna; Saïd Abousahl, European Commission Joint Research Centre; Geoffrey Shaw, Director of IAEA Office to the UN; Ambassador Jānis Mažeiks, Permanent Representative of Latvia to the UN; and moderator Judit Körömi of the European External Action Service. Speakers discussed how the EU coordinates with states and international organisations to improve the global security of nuclear materials. The speakers noted that nuclear security is a crucial issue for all states and that, as the Fukushima incident highlighted, security mechanisms must constantly be updated.

Caroline Cliff emphasised the continued cooperation between the EU and IAEA, including through meetings of senior officials, high-level safety groups, and assistance with drafting resolutions. The Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Vienna Declaration for Nuclear Safety are key guiding documents. 126 countries benefited when the EU supported the IAEA nuclear security fund. Nuclear security can be further improved by strengthening human resources and training.

Examples of EU initiatives, according to Saïd Abousahl, include safeguard cooperation in South America, nuclear waste treatment in Eastern Europe and clean-

up following uranium mining in Central Asia. Discussions related to uranium mining in Africa are underway. The Centre of Excellence initiative established focal points in partner countries to enable cooperation with the EU and IAEA. CoE supports training programmes, regional meetings, and national action plans.

Since 2005, EU funding has enabled the implementation of over 600 tasks, said Geoffrey Shaw. These tasks include creating security support centres, responding to illicit trafficking and developing training courses. The EU-IAEA partnership has evolved over the last five years. Nuclear safety has improved, but much remains to be done. Too many facilities are inadequately protected, nuclear material often goes missing, and border security remains lax.

In the Latvian language, the word for security and safety is the same, Jānis Mažeiks explained. Latvia takes its nuclear security responsibilities seriously. It emphasises working alongside the UN and reducing the smuggling of nuclear materials across borders. Latvia's national legislation is consistent with IAEA standards and Latvia ensures that its security system is constantly upgraded. Nuclear energy, Latvia argued, provides states with an opportunity to gain energy independence, but this privilege comes with great responsibilities that must not be underestimated. •

## CALENDAR OF EVENTS

When	What	Where	Who
9:00-9:50	Government briefing for NGOs: Sweden	Conference Room C Conference Building	Reaching Critical Will
10:00-13:00	Main Committee I	Trusteeship	
10:00-13:00	Main Committee II	ECOSOC	
10:00-11:30	Film screening: Hibakusha, Our Life to Live	Conference Room C Conference Building	WILPF US
13:15-14:30	Global actions mobilising for nuclear abolition	Conference Room C Conference Building	Peace and Planet and Global Wave 2015
13:15-14:30	Promoting Multilateral Disarmament Negotiations (tbc)	Trusteeship	Japan
13:15-14:30	Negative Security Assurance	Conference Room D Conference Building	Poland, Sweden and Norway
15:00 -18:00	Main Committee II	ECOSOC	
15:00 -18:00	Main Committee III	Trusteeship	