



NPT News in Review

*Civil society perspectives on the
2010 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference
3–28 May 2010*



We hail concrete, transparent, irreversible, verifiable action

Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

During Monday's Main Committee I (MCI) deliberations, the delegations of France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States led a concerted attack against the remaining progressive or concrete elements contained in both the MCI and Subsidiary Body I (SBI) drafts. Their interventions indicated their views on nuclear disarmament at this Review Conference—to receive lavish praise for their arms reduction measures since the end of the Cold War (France specifically requested the Review Conference “hail the gestures” they have made) while refusing to commit to any concrete or progressive steps leading to actual nuclear disarmament.

For example, all four delegations objected to paragraph I.B.3., which “affirms that the final phase of the nuclear disarmament process and other related measures should be pursued within a legal framework with specified timelines.” This paragraph already constitutes a pained compromise from the majority view, which holds that article VI should be pursued within a timebound framework. France, UK, and US called on the latest revision to be

further reduced by “noting” rather than affirming that nuclear disarmament should be pursued within a legal framework and by deleting “with specified timelines”. Russia called for the paragraph to be deleted altogether.

Despite the Chair's calls on delegations to focus on the MCI draft rather than the SBI action plan, upon which deliberations closed on Friday, the P4 and two states with nuclear weapons on their territories made comments on the action plan, which prompted a few non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) to respond to their interventions.

The French delegation said it didn't mind keeping a reference to the UN Secretary-General's five-point plan in the outcome document but said it needed to be moved from the action plan to the review portion of the text because it doesn't have anything to do with future actions. However, the five-point plan is by definition a *plan of action* and, as it has not yet been implemented, it is completely appropriate for the action portion of this document. Russia said the reference

continued on next page



**25 May 2010
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In this issue:

3 | News in Brief

7 | Drafts in Contrast

**10 | Conversation with
*hibakusha***

11 | NGOs criticize restart of Japan's fast breeder reactor

12 | Calendar of Events

12 | Nuclear Word Search

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Editorial (cont.)

to the five-point plan should be deleted altogether.

France, Russia, and the US rejected Action 5, which stipulates that the nuclear weapon states (NWS) “commit to cease the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and to end the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons.” France and the US argued that this action should be couched in the language of the CTBT preamble, probably in attempt to link modernization exclusively to nuclear testing, which would leave them free to continue their current modernization plans that do not necessarily involve testing via nuclear explosion. Russia demanded the deletion of the Action 5 altogether.

The US called for the deletion of nuclear sharing from Action 6b, arguing that the concept of stationing nuclear weapons and related infrastructure on the territories of NNWS doesn’t fall within the scope of this document. Italy and the Netherlands, which host such weapons on their territories, supported this proposal. It is unclear where exactly these states think nuclear sharing should be discussed. Despite the NAM’s repeated calls for nuclear sharing to be addressed in MCI or MCII, it is not sufficiently addressed in either of the Committees’ drafts. It is also important to note that no other NATO states supported the deletion of the nuclear sharing reference, including the three other NATO states that host US nuclear weapons on their soil.

France, UK, and US called for Action 7 to revert back to the language of CD/1864 with its absurd number of caveats, which calls for the establishment of a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament to provide a forum for exchanging “views and information on practical steps for progressive and systematic efforts to *reduce* nuclear weapons with the *ultimate* goal of their elimination, including on *approaches toward potential future* work of multilateral character [emphasis supplied].” This “mandate” is so far removed from concrete measures that it undermines any value such a subsidiary body could potentially add to a nuclear disarmament process.

Regarding negative security assurances, France, Russia, and US called for the deletion of the last sentence in Article 10, which calls for the removal of reservations or interpretative declarations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of NWFZ treaties. Russia and US also called for deletion of Action 16 on closing down nuclear test sites.

France argued that in Action 23, providing information on the size of nuclear arsenals should be sufficient without also having to report on the composition of the arsenals. France also rejected the suggestion that NWS would provide information

on their stocks of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons. Russia rejected Action 23 altogether.

In effect, the P4 have attempted to re-write the MCI text and the SBI action plan to fit their “vision” of a nuclear weapon free world—a world which apparently permits the continued existence of their nuclear weapons. Most disingenuously, they continue insisting that it is the responsibility of all other states to “create the conditions” for nuclear disarmament, while they systematically undermine the achievement of such conditions and ignore the will of the very states they say are responsible for disarmament—not to mention the will of the overwhelming majority of the world’s citizens. In this vein, the French delegation called for the first paragraph of the action plan’s principles and objectives to be changed from resolving “to achieve a peace and security with a world without nuclear weapons” to committing to “creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons”. Despite the fact that the original language is *based on President Obama’s Prague speech*, the US delegation welcomed France’s suggestion to highlight the role of all states “in moving toward disarmament” and did not object to France’s proposal to change this language.

It is indeed now up to the NNWS—the states that neither possess nuclear weapons nor rely on them in security doctrines or shelter under a nuclear umbrella—to truly create the conditions for a nuclear weapon free world by insisting on the preservation of all concrete and progressive elements in the MCI and SBI texts. The texts as they stand already represent a carefully balanced compromise that arguably gives too much leeway for the NWS to forestall meaningful disarmament. If any of these additional P4 demands are met, nothing real will remain in terms of action on nuclear disarmament at this Review Conference except lofty rhetoric that serves only to disarm the hopes of the international community.

At the same time, civil society in each of these states needs to hold their governments accountable for their actions. If their governments say they seek a world without nuclear weapons, civil society must insist that these governments take specific and concrete actions toward this end. And when their governments do accept commitments, civil society and other governments need to hold them accountable for the *implementation* of these agreements.

Instead of “hailing the gestures” of nuclear weapon states (for they are at this stage gestures rather than concrete undertakings to eliminate nuclear weapons), the rest of the world needs to make it clear that rhetoric is not enough to placate our determination to achieve a peaceful, secure, and equitable world without nuclear weapons. •



News in Brief

Ray Acheson and Beatrice Fihn | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

Main Committee I

Procedural issues

- MCI could not agree to a consensus document, so the Chair instead forwarded his latest draft report to the President of the Review Conference, together with the comments he had received during the final meeting.
- MCI adopted a procedural report.

MCI document

- NAM called for the document to emphasize the importance of: the abolition of nuclear sharing; changing security doctrines; beginning negotiations on the total elimination of nuclear weapons with a clear timetable; achieving progress on universality; negotiating a fissile material ban including stockpiles based on Shannon mandate; and negotiating legally-binding NSAs.
- China said the document should better reflect: NWS resolve to work toward a complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and that they undertake not to seek permanent possession; the necessity to prepare an appropriately long-term plan for nuclear disarmament to be implemented in phases; that NWS undertake no first use policies and NSAs; that the policy and practice of nuclear umbrella and sharing should be abolished; and that missile defence systems that will harm global strategic stability should be abandoned and that a multilateral negotiation process should be pursued for PAROS.
- Iran said the document should emphasize concern over nuclear sharing and irrational nuclear

doctrines; the need for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a legal framework with specified timeline, in particular through NWC; that any development of new nuclear weapons should be stopped immediately; that nuclear weapons stationed on other territories should be withdrawn; that legally-binding NSAs should be pursued; and that nuclear disarmament must be the core of the mandate of the NPT.

- Libya called on the document to highlight the importance of achieving universality of the Treaty and calling all non-states parties by name and of establishing a mechanism to ensure full implementation of NWS commitments.
- Indonesia expressed concern with the lack of expression on security doctrines.

A. Articles I and II; pp 1–3

- The US called for the language in A1 to be made “more affirmative” by replacing “without hampering” peaceful uses with “facilitating” peaceful uses.
- The US called for A2 to reflect the notion of “reciprocity” by adding “and vice versa” to the end of the paragraph.
- NAM called for the order of the trade between NNWS and NWS to be switched in A2.
- NAM called for a new paragraph after A3 expressing deep concern about security doctrines that include nuclear weapons.
- Algeria called for the third line of A6 to include a direct reference to the negotiation of a NWC.
- Indonesia and Malaysia supported this proposal.
- France called for A7 to state that responses to concerns over compliance should be pursued “in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter” rather than the provisions of the Treaty, arguing that the Treaty does not have any provisions for such responses.
- The UK and US delegations supported this proposal.
- NAM called for the order of disarmament and non-proliferation to be switched in A8.
- NAM called for A9 to emphasize that the DPRK shall not have any special status accorded to it and for the deleting of references to the UN Security Council resolutions.

B. Article VI; pp 8–12

- NAM and South Africa called for a paragraph reaffirming the unequivocal undertaking to be brought back.
- France called for B3 to “note” rather than affirm

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Reaching Critical Will

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News in Brief (cont.)

that the final phase of nuclear disarmament process should be pursued within a legal framework, and called for the deletion of “with specified timelines”.

- The UK and US delegations supported this proposal.
- Russia said that B3 is superfluous because its goal is contained in the principles and objectives of SBI.
- NAM reiterated its proposal that B3 “affirm that the nuclear disarmament process and other measures related to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons” should be pursued within a legal framework with specified timelines.
- Syria, Cuba, Libya, the New Agenda Coalition, and Mexico emphasized the importance of clear timelines for disarmament.
- NAM proposed adding to B8 on the ICJ opinion language reaffirming that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only guarantee against their use and calling for the pursuit of legally-binding NSAs as a matter of priority.
- France argued that paragraphs B11–14 should better “hail the gestures” by NWS and specifically welcome France’s efforts to bring international experts to see its closed fissile material production facilities.
- The UK and US delegations supported this proposal.
- The UK also said B14 should reflect that the UK and Norway have established a “system for nuclear warhead dismantlement” not nuclear disarmament verification.
- South Africa suggested this paragraph could welcome or note efforts toward developing nuclear disarmament verification capabilities and then go on to welcome the Norway/UK initiative.
- The UK called for a new paragraph noting the P5 confidence-building conference held in September 2009.
- NAM proposed a new paragraph agreeing that the development of new types of nuclear weapons and the lack of significant progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policy undermine the objectives of the Treaty.
- NAM proposed a new paragraph recognizing that NNWS under the NPT have already agreed to legally-binding commitments not to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.

C. Article VII and security of NNWS

- The US expressed hope that affirmation could be added of the important role that legally-binding NWFZ protocols provide as NSAs.
- NAM proposed a new paragraph agreeing that legally-binding NSAs strengthen the nuclear non-

proliferation regime.

- NAM called for C2 to note with concern the continued insufficient nature of NSAs and note the reiterated calls by NNWS for unconditional, legally-binding NSAs.
- Libya said the document should include a call for legally-binding NSAs with a note that the best guarantee is the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
- Indonesia, Malaysia, and Mexico called for stronger language on NSAs.

II. Role of the Treaty

- NAM proposed the Conference to call rather than urge non-state parties to accede to the Treaty as NNWS.
- NAM proposed a new paragraph calling upon all states parties to exert all possible efforts to achieve universality and not to undertake actions that undermine the prospects of doing so.
- NAM proposed a new paragraph reaffirming the integrity of article IX.

SBI document

- Despite the Chair’s calls on delegations to focus on the MCI draft rather than the SBI, upon which deliberations were closed on Friday, the NWS and states with nuclear weapons on their territories made comments on the action plan, which prompted a few other delegations to reply to their interventions.
- France and the US called for the “harmonization” of the action plans across all three committees so that each has the same “degree of obligation” associated with it.

I. Principles and objectives

- France called for the first paragraph to replace the Conference’s “to achieve a peace and security with a world without nuclear weapons” with a reaffirmation of the commitment to “creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons,” as the EU has proposed.
- The US welcomed France’s suggestion about highlighting “the role of all states in moving toward disarmament”.
- France indicated that its capital is “appraising” the new paragraph on humanitarian consequences and international humanitarian law.
- Russia said that paragraph 3 should support all the decisions of 2000, not just the practical steps.

II. Disarmament of nuclear weapons

- France said it didn’t mind keeping a reference to the UN Secretary-General’s five-point plan in the outcome document but said it needed to be moved from the action plan to the review portion of the text because it doesn’t have anything to do

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News in Brief (cont.)

- with future actions.
- Russia said the reference to the UNSG's five-point plan should be deleted altogether.
- Russia called for the deletion of the reference to related materials in Action 3, arguing it is superfluous and incorrect.
- France and the US argued that Action 5 language on ceasing modernization or developing new weapons should be based on the preamble of the CTBT that recognizes "that the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects."
- Russia said it does not agree with Action 5 and called for its deletion.
- Indonesia opposed the deletion of this paragraph.
- The US complained that the concept of stationing nuclear weapons and related infrastructure on the territories of NNWS doesn't fall within the scope of this document and asked for that part of Action 6b to be deleted.
- Italy and the Netherlands supported this proposal.
- South Africa questioned why NNWS want to keep nuclear weapons on their territories, arguing that it is not safe. South Africa proposed strengthening Action 6b by calling for the immediate withdrawal of all such weapons.
- Russia asked the "authors" of Action 6e to tell Russia what is meant by "further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems".
- South Africa suggested suggested Action 6 should include an item on consideration of no first use policies.
- France called for Action 7 to revert back to the language of CD/1864 in calling for a body in the CD to deal with nuclear disarmament.
- The UK and US supported this proposal.

III. Security assurances

- France called for the deletion of the last sentence in Article 10, which calls for the removal of reservations or interpretative declarations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of NWFZ treaties.
- The US and Russia supported this proposal.

IV. Nuclear testing

- The US and Russia called for deletion of Action 16 on closing down test sites.

V. Fissile materials

- France called for Action 20 to specify that this relates to material the NWS have declared excess.

VI. Other measures

- France called for the deletion of the words "as well as stocks of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons" in Action 23 on reporting.
- France argued that including information of the "size" of arsenals is sufficient, without also the "composition".
- Russia said it does not support the proposal for formalized reporting in Action 23.
- Japan suggested rephrasing part of Article 23 to read "of their nuclear arsenals, including the number of nuclear weapons".
- France called for a new paragraph calling on all states to advance general arms control and disarmament processes.

Main Committee II*Procedural issues*

- MCII could not agree to a consensus document, so the Chair instead forwarded his latest draft report to the President of the Review Conference, together with the comments he had received during the final meeting.
- MCII adopted a procedural report.

General comments on the draft

- NAM argued that the new draft still lacked appropriate language on crucial issues like additional protocol and export control.
- Russia hoped that the new draft could reach consensus, as it contained compromise language.
- The United States and the EU appreciated the action-oriented section of the text.
- Iran reiterated that the NAM had 116 member states, well over the majority of NPT parties, and proposals from such a large group should carry significant weight.
- Algeria called for balance between NWS and NNWS obligations, and stated that if the document calls for compliance and accountability, it should be expected from both sides.
- Japan noted a gradual weakening of the text, and argued that while balance is important, such balance must be aimed at the highest level possible, and not the opposite. This was echoed by Canada.
- France wanted to add a paragraph that stipulated that states should report regularly on the implementation of the action plan, in order to provide harmony between the different texts from the Main Committees.

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*News in Brief (cont.)***Safeguards agreement**

- NAM argued that the reference to the AP as of “vital importance” in paragraph 22 must be deleted.
- NAM requested the deletion of paragraph 16 in which a reference to the AP as the new verification standard was contained.
- Brazil argued that it acceded to the NPT with a certain understanding of what the Treaty means, and stated that it would not accept any language that would imply that the IAEA, without an AP, does not have the means to carry out the mandate entrusted them through article III.
- Argentina argued that a Review Conference could not change the nature of an obligation.
- Singapore supported the language on the AP as the new standard in paragraph 16 as well as the term “of vital importance” in paragraph 22.
- The US argued that the RevCon needs to recognize that the IAEA safeguards are in evolution and wanted to retain the paragraph that calls upon states to strengthen this.
- Iran wanted to include language on the importance of IAEA safeguards on verifying nuclear disarmament.
- NAM argued that the document should “invite” or “encourage” states to sign the AP, rather than “call” upon them to do so.
- Australia preferred to retain “call” and argued that this was an important paragraph and did not cut across any particular views on the AP.
- Norway argued that it was clear by the evolution of safeguards that states parties consider the AP an increasingly important part of the verification standard, and suggested that the document could emphasize the AP as an importance tool for fostering nuclear confidence.

Compliance

- In paragraph 21 on non-compliance, the NAM insisted on highlighting that the paragraph refer to non-compliance with “any provisions of the treaty” and by “all states parties,” both NNWS and NWS.
- Singapore wanted to retain this paragraph the way it was.
- The US wanted to highlight the fact that the IAEA has found states in non-compliance and reported this to the UN Security Council, and wanted the original language from the Chair on this matter.
- The UK also argued that there was a need to add something on compliance.
- France and the US wanted the Conference to consider automatic penalties for violating safeguards obligations, such as terminated cooperation, until compliance has been restored.

- The US reiterated that it is refraining from naming names in such cases of non-compliance.
- Iran argued that if names should be mentioned, it should include the US and other NWS, as there has been serious non-compliance with article I of the NPT.

Export controls

- NAM and Syria argued for the deletion of paragraph 49 and 50, as these are “non-starters”.
- NAM argued that the language in paragraph 24 could be a smarter way to deal with export controls, but wanted “international export control frameworks” to be replaced with “multilaterally agreed export control guidelines”.
- The US reiterated that its nuclear cooperation deal with India was a unique situation and did not set a precedent for the future. The US also wanted to retain and strengthen language on the matter of export controls.
- Iran and Algeria argued that the draft should include a call on NWS to refrain from nuclear cooperation with non-parties to the NPT.
- Australia recognized that export regimes do provide important services and argued that this should be reflected in the document.

Nuclear security

- Russia was disappointed that the new draft did not contain any reference to the Global Initiative to combat nuclear terrorism.

Nuclear weapon free zones

- Mexico argued that the new article 64 did not include crucial elements from its proposals, and wanted to amend the article to include a decision to hold meetings of states parties to NWFZ within the framework of the Review Conference. This was supported by Malaysia.

Main Committee III**Procedural issues**

- MCIII could not agree to a consensus document, so the Chair instead forwarded his latest draft report to the President of the Review Conference, together with the comments he had received during the final meeting.
- MCIII adopted a procedural report. •



Drafts in Contrast

Beatrice Fihn and Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

Main Committee I

- The new draft reinserts the paragraph from the 2000 outcome document recalling the grand bargain of the NPT.
- A5 now reaffirms states parties commitments to the provisions as well as the objectives of the Treaty.
- A7 no longer includes text on nuclear sharing.
- A8 no longer refers to the importance of consequences for breaches of the Treaty's obligations but simply recognizes that such breaches undermine its three pillars.
- B1 now notes with concern that "despite achievements" in reductions instead of "despite some achievements"; it also estimates the number of nuclear weapons as "several thousands".
- B2 has removed the phrase "the vision of" in relation to achieving a nuclear weapon free world.
- B4 now "notes" instead of "expresses" concern that any development of new types of nuclear weapons may result in the resumption of nuclear test explosions.
- A5 now welcomes pursuit of CTBT ratification by Iraq and Thailand as well as Papua New Guinea.
- A8 returns the reference to the ICJ opinion back to the text.
- A10 changes "alert levels" to "operational status".
- A14 notes rather than welcomes the UK-Norway cooperation.

Main Committee II

- The forward-looking action plan has been modified in order to appear similar as the drafts from MCI and MCII.
- Paragraph 1 has been amended to only concern implementation of the Treaty, instead of "the objectives of the Treaty".
- Paragraph 5, which calls upon India, Pakistan, and Israel to accede to the Treaty, now specifically requests them to accede as non-nuclear weapon states.
- Paragraph 12 on the welcoming of 166 comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSA) now states that the CSA is "in accordance" with article IV instead of "in compliance" with article IV.
- In paragraph 15, the reference to the relationship between the additional protocol (AP) and the CSA which is set out in article I of the Model AP has been deleted.
- Paragraph 21 is new and expresses concern with

cases of non-compliance and calls on states in non-compliance to move promptly to full compliance with their obligations.

- Paragraph 25 is new and notes the importance of physical protection of all nuclear material and strengthened international cooperation in physical protection.
- Paragraph 30 has been amended from only recalling the declaration by Mongolia of its nuclear-weapon free status, to adding that the conference "supports the measures taken by Mongolia to consolidate and strengthen this status".
- In paragraph 38 about compliance challenges, the notion that such challenges "pose a significant threat for the Treaty" has been deleted.
- Paragraph 39 no longer points out the threat posed to international peace and security by nuclear weapons and their proliferation.
- Paragraph 40 is new and calls on states to seek solutions to issues related to non-proliferation in accordance with the obligations, procedures, and mechanisms established by the relevant international legal instruments.
- Paragraph 41 has been shortened and now only includes a call on all parties to conclude and bring into force the AP. The reference to AP as new verification standard is deleted.
- In paragraph 46, the reference to financial constraints of the IAEA has been deleted and the paragraph now only calls upon states to ensure financial, political, and technical support for the IAEA.
- Paragraph 49 is new and encourages states to make use of guidelines and understandings developed by supplier arrangements in developing their own national export controls.
- Paragraph 52 is new and calls on states to maintain the "highest possible standards" of security and physical protection of nuclear materials.
- Paragraph 54 has been amended to call on all states parties to the Convention on the physical protection of nuclear materials to ratify it as soon as possible.
- Paragraph 57 no longer notes the entry into force of the international Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and instead only urges states that have not yet done so to become parties.
- Instead of welcoming the efforts of the IAEA to assist states in strengthening their national

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Drafts in Contrast (cont.)

regulatory controls of radioactive materials, paragraph 58 now encourages the organization to carry out such assistance.

- There is a new paragraph 64, which acknowledges the initiative to hold a meeting of states parties to NWFZ within the framework of the forthcoming Review Conferences of the Treaty.

Main Committee III

- The new draft adds that activities in peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be pursued in "conformity with all the provisions of the Treaty" in paragraph 3.
- Paragraph 7 in the old draft has been deleted.
- Instead of strongly encourages active cooperation between states themselves and the IAEA, paragraph 8 "positively notes" such cooperation.
- In paragraph 10, the importance of transparency has been replaced with importance of public information.
- In paragraph 11, environmental protection has been added to a list of uses of peaceful nuclear technology.
- In paragraph 12, the Technical Cooperation programme is now referred to as "one of the main vehicles" instead of the main one.
- In paragraph 16, the words "take practical steps" have been deleted.
- The reference to national requirements and relevant international obligations has been deleted in paragraph 19.

Answers to yesterday's Nuclear Crossword

- In paragraph 21, nuclear fuel suppliers are "encouraged" to work with recipient states in safety and security, rather than "should".
- In paragraph 22, the word "standards" has been deleted.
- Paragraph 24 has been shortened and the reference to GNEP has been deleted.
- In paragraph 26, the reference to the Global Threat Initiative has been deleted.
- The reference to a LEU bank in paragraph 28 in the old draft has been deleted.
- Paragraphs 29 and 30 have been deleted.
- Paragraph 33 has been deleted.
- Paragraph 31 now concerns both safety and security of nuclear installations, instead of only safety as in the previous draft.
- Instead of calling upon states to join the treaties mentioned in paragraph 32, the new draft only encourages states to join.
- Paragraph 36 no longer notes the Communiqué and the Work Plan adopted at the Washington Nuclear Security Summit.
- Paragraph 37 is new and welcomes states' efforts to minimize the use of HEU on a voluntary basis.
- Paragraph 41 is new and deals with contamination problems related to facilities previously associated with nuclear weapons programmes.
- In paragraph 42, "calls upon all states" has been modified to "encourages all states".
- In the forward-looking action plan, states are no longer encouraged to transfer nuclear technology in conformity with article I, II, and III, but instead should facilitate such transfers.
- In the action to ensure that IAEA's resources are sufficient, the new draft adds a call on states to take practical steps towards that.
- In the action on developing a national infrastructure for nuclear energy, the reference to IAEA standards and guidelines has been deleted.
- Instead of addressing proposals for supply assurances, the new draft states that states should "continue to discuss further" such initiatives.
- Instead of becoming a party to nuclear safety conventions, the new draft suggests that states consider becoming parties.
- A new action has been added, which encourages states to further minimize HEU.

Subsidiary Body III**Article IX**

- In paragraph 1, the word "regional" has been added to describe peace and security.
- In paragraph 2, a reference to the 1995 Middle East resolution has been added.

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Drafts in Contrast (cont.)

- Paragraph 4 further clarifies that India, Pakistan, and Israel should accede to the treaty as NNWS.
- Paragraph 5 from the previous draft calling on non-states parties to maintain moratoriums on nuclear testing and to become parties to the CTBT has been deleted.
- Paragraph 5 from the new draft no longer stresses that NPT states parties should reverse any nuclear cooperation with non-parties, and instead points out that transfers of fissionable material or equipment should only be granted to countries with full safeguards and a legally-binding commitment to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons.

Article X

- In paragraph 2, the reference to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is removed.
- The paragraph that called upon the IAEA to verify compliance of the state withdrawing is deleted.
- The reaffirmation of the role of the UN Security Council as provided for in Article X is deleted.
- Instead of recommending that nuclear supplying states consider dismantling and/or return clauses in export agreements in case of withdrawal, the new draft only encourages such action.

Institutional reform

The revised SBIII text includes the first language on further strengthening of the review process. The draft makes three proposals: that the President

of the Review Conference and the Chairs of the Preparatory Committees consult amongst each other and their counterparts from previous review cycles; one dedicated staff officer at the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs should support the NPT; and that further strengthening should be on the agenda during the next review cycle.

However, the draft does not pick up on the Canadian proposal to hold annual meetings of the Conference, a proposal that has gotten widespread and cross-regional support. Such annual meetings would allow for more focused meetings with decision-making powers, and therefore could be more efficient in responding to developments and challenges. To only have the opportunity to make concrete progress on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation once every fifth year adds a significant amount of pressure on the Review Conferences. An annual meeting process could depoliticize some of the issues and allow states parties to focus on solving practical problems associated with the implementation of the treaty, without risking disagreement to result in 10 years without progress.

Annual meetings and adequate support staff are necessary elements for the successful implementation of other key disarmament treaties, such as the BTWC and CWC. If the NPT is going to be able to make concrete and stable progress in all areas, an institutional strengthening far beyond what is proposed in this draft is needed. •

*Action outside the Philippines Mission
where delegates picked up the first draft of
the final document
12:00 AM, 25 May 2010*



Conversation with *hibakusha*

Sameer Kanak | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

On Monday, Peace Boat held an event in conjunction with *hibakusha* Story Project and BANg Europe entitled "Conversation with *hibakusha*". Moderated by Akira Kawasaki of Peace Boat, the event consisted of a film and a series of discussions with the audience and *hibakusha*.

The film, entitled "Flashes of Hope: *hibakusha* Traveling the World," was a documentary about Peace Boat's recent trip taking 100 *hibakusha* around the world to tell their stories. In the film, *hibakusha* described the bombing itself as "a bluish-white flash," loud as "a thousand thunders all at once," followed by silence. As they spoke, an animated reenactment of their stories portrayed the bombing, with victims' eyes melting, hair and clothes melting away, and then skin and flesh as well. The silence after the impact showed piles of bodies and corpses buried under rubble.

Setsuko Thurlow (who was also in the audience) said of the victims, "parts of their bodies were missing, and their skins were burned and just peeling down, and the flesh was hanging down from the bones. Some people had their eyes popping out of the eye sockets. And some of the people on the ground had parts of the body just bursted, like intestines hanging out there, and nobody was running or yelling. Nobody had that kind of physical and psychological strength." She cited how they escaped out of town, sat, and watched the city burn.

The death tolls, 140,000 in Hiroshima and 74,000 in Nagasaki, were followed by graphic real footage of victims, both dead and alive, with radiation diseases, or damage from the bombing. Following this, discrimination and press censorship was discussed; because of the lack of knowledge of radiation, survivors and aid workers who developed illnesses led to a belief that *hibakusha* were contagious.

The Peace Boat then traveled to Da Nang, Viet Nam, where the survivors met survivors of Agent Orange. At over 20 stops, the *hibakusha* held posters with pictures of the bombing victims, raised awareness among students, and gave a message of peace at the UN. The Pacific Islands stops gave a chance to discuss France's 193 nuclear tests in the islands, protecting their own citizens but not the islands', from radiation. The film, and the journey, concluded in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, showing *hibakusha* returning and paying their respects in both cities.

Following this was testimony from two present *hibakusha*. Kunihiro Bonkohara survived Hiroshima at age 5 and is President of the *hibakusha* Peace Association in Brazil. He cited the "procession of

people, almost like ghosts, from downtown [to the hillside], and the piles and piles of dead bodies." Bonkohara said that it was only "the selfishness, the ego of the countries that own nuclear weapons" that held back the abolition movement, and that he was ashamed his generation had handed off the problem to the next. He concluded by mentioning that the Japanese government is planning to build nuclear power plants in Da Nang, Viet Nam; Bonkohara hoped Japan would reconsider the nuclear plants, instead building a biomass energy production facility.

Michiko Tsukamoto evacuated Hiroshima when she was in fourth grade to another island. Her father died trying to get to the family; her mother survived and after being denied passage, finally made it to Tsukamoto on the island. She survived long enough to see her children marry; three months after Tsukamoto married, her mother died of liver cancer. Tsukamoto described the aftermath: "the doctor [...] said that the cancer was all over, not just in her liver—and even her bones were affected by radiation and turned red in color." Tsukamoto concluded by discussing her reasons for telling her story, saying, "it was just by a chance that we lived in Hiroshima [...] It could have been you."

The question of whether or not genetic damage was passed down between generations was raised; Thurlow said that in her discussions with other *hibakusha*, she found that they were anxious, and often felt responsible when their descendants acquired cancer. Bonkohara said his work with 140 *hibakusha* in Brazil showed numerous examples of genetic effects. *Hibakusha* Keiko Murakami, who interviewed survivors 15 years after the bombing, stated that she knows that the effects carried on, and that as a result of this knowledge, many survivors either didn't marry or chose to marry but never have children.

Discussion also focused on the reception of *hibakusha* by students worldwide. Bankohara said that in Brazil, the most frequently-asked question is why the US government has not apologized to survivors of the bombings. *Hibakusha* Shigeko Sasamori noted that younger students were opposed to war, and told of one girl who gave her a bracelet which Sasamori wears to every school she speaks at. Kawasaki highlighted the visit to Singapore, where there is a belief that the bombings liberated Singapore from Japanese occupation. A Korean *hibakusha*'s story shocked one student, who came to realize that rather than an issue of war between countries, nuclear weapons are an issue of all humanity. •



NGOs Criticize Restart of Japan's Monju Fast Breeder Reactor Call on NPT Review Conference Delegates to Support an End to Civil Use of Plutonium

A letter criticizing the restart of Japan's Monju Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor, endorsed by leading peace, non-proliferation and disarmament, and environmental NGOs from around the world, was delivered on Friday, 21 May to government officials at the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. The letter was endorsed by 29 NGOs from Japan, Korea, Europe, and the USA, and international NGOs including International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.

The letter highlighted the dangerous implications of the May 6 restart of Monju for nuclear proliferation, nuclear safety and energy supply, saying, "It is a great irony that a plutonium-fueled fast breeder reactor was restarted at a time when unprecedented international attention is being given to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and security."

Implications for nuclear proliferation and nuclear security of Monju and Japan's nuclear fuel cycle program include the following:

- The bulk-handling facilities needed to support the operation of fast reactors like Monju (reprocessing plants and plutonium fuel fabrication plants) cannot be effectively safeguarded against diversion.
- Japan has over 47 tons of separated plutonium. If the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant operates as plan, 8 tons will be added to this each year. There is little prospect that this stockpile of weapons-usable plutonium will be eliminated any time soon.
- The example set by Japan encourages other countries to pursue plutonium-based nuclear power programs, but the use of plutonium in the civil nuclear fuel cycle increases nuclear terrorism and proliferation risks.
- Any country that possesses separated "civil" plutonium could be only a short time away from producing nuclear weapons should it choose to break out of its NPT obligations.

In regard to nuclear safety and energy supply, the letter noted that fast reactors have been highly unreliable in providing energy and that continuing to pour money into research and development will only prevent other safe, secure, and economically viable alternatives from being developed.

The letter urged delegates to the 2010 NPT Review Conference to:

1) Call upon the Government of Japan to abandon its fast-breeder and reprocessing program.

2) Support a Comprehensive Fissile Material Ban that includes civil plutonium programs.

The full letter, along with a list of endorsing groups can be found on the following web site:

<http://cnic.jp/english/topics/cycle/fbr/restartnpt21may10.html>

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What's On Today's Calendar of Events

Abolition Caucus

Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building

When: 8:00–8:50

Government Briefing: Ambassador Susan Burk of the United States

Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building

When: 9:00–9:50

Contact: Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will

Plenary

Where: Conference Room 4, North Lawn Building

When: 10:00–13:00

Implementing the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building

When: 13:15–14:45

Contact: Amelia Broodryk, Institute for Security Studies

Achieving a world free of nuclear weapons

Where: Conference Room B, North Lawn Building

When: 13:15–14:45

Plenary

Where: Conference Room 4, North Lawn Building

When: 15:00–18:00

Fear, Faith and Nuclear Weapons: An Interfaith View on the NPT

Where: Conference Room A, North Lawn Building

When: 15:00–16:30

Contact: Dave Robinson, Pax Christi USA

H W Y M U S N C T X K S C U Q
G S D U X T G O A L O M H N A
H P O S K A I R N Q V R I K R
X Y Y H S R A V H O H H E E R
D Q A R Q T E R R O R I S M T
I F R O H E O V N C M E Q X S
C D A O B L R P J S A N A C I
U B M M V C E M I R E N G R V
C H M C A I G N C N U W A C I
L T A L P T I H D H I W B N T
C F G O Y R M A E F D O J Q C
V E V U X A E Q O L C E N A A
N J N D T N B W O N O I T C A
J L R U X T O C U P A H D B I
Y T I R U C E S N A M U H I C

ACTIVIST
GOAL
START
COLDWAR
TERRORISM
ICAN
GAMMARAY
ACTION
RESEARCH
HUMANSECURITY
MUSHROOMCLOUD
ARTICLE
REGIME
OPINION