



NPT NEWS IN REVIEW

Civil society perspectives on the 2012 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee 30 April–11 May 2012



Reaching Critical Will

**8 May 2012
No. 6**

IN THIS ISSUE

- 1 | Editorial**
- 2 | News in Brief**
- 4 | IAEA safeguards**
- 4 | Nuclear wordsearch**
- 5 | Whither a fissile material ban treaty?**
- 6 | State obligations and humanitarian obligations**
- 7 | Nuclear famine**
- 8 | Nuclear weapons and climate change**
- 9 | Scientific/technical experts**
- 10 | Today's calendar of side events**

The *NPT News in Review* is a daily publication produced by the Reaching Critical Will project of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom during meetings of NPT states parties.

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Editorial: Integrity and the rule of law

Ray Acheson | *Reaching Critical Will of WILPF*

On Monday delegations delivered statements on the cluster two theme of non-proliferation, safeguards, and nuclear weapon free zones. Most delegations highlighted the importance of strengthening the safeguards regime, with the main division occurring between those that consider the comprehensive safeguards agreement to be sufficient and those that argue the additional protocol must also be in force in order to meet the new “verification standard”. While the additional protocol undoubtedly provides the International Atomic Energy Agency with valuable additional capacity to determine states’ compliance with their safeguards agreements, some countries are becoming increasingly concerned that the goalposts for Treaty implementation are changing without their consent. This has broader implications, of course, for a Treaty that is already rife with double standards and cases of discriminatory application.

For example, while the arguably extra-legal decision of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to grant an exemption to India for nuclear trade received scant attention this year, most countries taking the floor on Monday expressed concern with Iran’s nuclear programme. Several delegations, primarily from Western countries, essentially argued that the onus is on Iran to prove a negative—to prove that it is not developing a nuclear weapon and to restore the international community’s confidence in its intentions. The UK delegation, for example, called on Iran to implement “practical steps to build confidence around the world that Iran will implement its international obligations and does not intend to build a nuclear weapon.” The French delegation argued that Iran must “take urgent and concrete measures to establish trust, in compliance with the resolutions of United Nations Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors”.

This is an interesting approach to non-proliferation, considering that in Western courts of law, the onus is not on the accused to prove her/his innocence but rather on the prosecution to prove her/his guilt. Furthermore, it is unclear specifically what is

meant by non-proliferation obligations in the case of Iran. The countries that say Iran is in non-compliance with such obligations reference among other things UN Security Council resolutions, which call for the cessation of all uranium enrichment, which does not comport with NPT states parties rights to develop civilian nuclear programmes.

It is difficult to adequately address the complexity of this situation in a brief editorial; these initial comments are meant merely as responses to some of the statements made in plenary in Monday. Few delegations take the opportunity to comment directly on each other’s statements, which would make for more interesting plenary debates.

The Brazilian delegation, which is one of very few that have engaged interactively so far this session, argued that when states decide to become party to a treaty, they have to analyze the consequences flowing from undertaking the treaty’s obligations. Creating new obligatory provisions after a treaty has been ratified “doesn’t make much sense,” argued Ambassador Guerreiro. This logic applies to many elements of Monday’s discussion, from the additional protocol to civilian nuclear programmes. But it also applies to the expectation that all parties to the treaty will fulfill the obligations that they agreed to undertake when they ratified it. In terms of the NPT this of course applies to both non-proliferation and disarmament.

As the US delegation said, the NPT is only as strong as the parties’ willingness to maintain its integrity. It is this that should guide the discourse on cases of proliferation concern. No country should be able to hide behind the letter of the Treaty to develop a nuclear weapons programme, and all countries should adopt the additional protocol in order to strengthen the safeguards regime. At the same time, however, no country should be subject to discriminatory reinterpretations of state party obligations. Furthermore, the desire to maintain the integrity of the Treaty should also guide comprehensive investigations into nuclear weapon states’ (non-)compliance with article VI, which is just as critical for the integrity of the Treaty.

News in Brief*Beatrice Fihn | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF***Safeguards agreements**

- Canada, the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), New Zealand, Norway, Indonesia, Algeria, and Australia urged the 14 states that do not have comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) to ratify them as soon as possible.
- The US, Canada, Japan, the UK, New Zealand, Norway, and Australia encouraged more states to conclude an additional protocol (AP).
- The EU, the UK, the US, France, Republic of Korea, Japan, Canada, Australia, Ukraine, Austria, and Norway argued that the CSA together with the AP constitute the verification standard today.
- Malaysia announced it was currently revising domestic legislation in order to ratify the AP.
- South Africa, Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Brazil, Argentina, Malaysia, Russia, and Egypt reminded states that the AP is a voluntary measure.
- Egypt voiced concerns about efforts to re-define obligations under the NPT and impose new restrictions. Egypt argued that the AP is not obligatory and attempts to force more commitments onto NNWS can undermine the universality of the CSA.
- South Africa noted that while an AP is a voluntary measure, it still is relevant as a confidence-building measure.
- Indonesia believed that a strengthened safeguards system including the application of the AP can serve as essential element to ensure the “peaceful uses” of nuclear energy.
- Switzerland argued that more substantial progress on nuclear disarmament could make the AP more acceptable, but noted that lack of such progress must not justify failures to comply with non-proliferation obligations.
- Malaysia noted that the AP can be an important tool for enhanced verification, but states must be assured that the information and access received by the IAEA is held in confidence.
- Iran also expressed concern with leakage of confidential information from the IAEA.
- The US emphasized the scope of its voluntary offer agreement and noted that since the 2010 RevCon it has hosted two complementary access visits by IAEA inspectors.
- Switzerland highlighted its work on optimizing the IAEA safeguards system.

Nuclear security

- Canada announced that it has introduced proposed legislation in Parliament to ratify the 2005 amendment of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts on Nuclear Terrorism and urged all states to ratify these treaties.

- The EU, the US, Canada, the Republic of Korea, Russia, and Japan expressed support for UNSCR 1540 and reported on activities to facilitate implementation of this.
- Norway argued that minimizing HEU will further strengthen overall non-proliferation efforts, especially in reference to non-state actors.

Export controls

- The EU supported the existing export control regimes and welcomed the strengthening of the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines in 2011.
- Japan and Canada argued that states should establish and implement efficient export controls and encouraged states to use the existing guidelines in strengthening its national legislation.
- Australia argued that export controls are legitimate and necessary for the implementation of obligations under article III of the NPT.
- Australia argued that enforced national legislation that is consistent with the major export control regimes foster the environment for nuclear cooperation.
- Russia argued that an AP and membership in the NPT should be conditions in nuclear exports decisions.
- Malaysia supported export control systems that don't infringe on the right to develop nuclear energy for “peaceful” purposes.
- Cuba rejected that a selective group continues to prevent the inalienable right of states to develop nuclear energy for “peaceful” uses.

Universalization

- France and NAM believed that universalization of the NPT should be a priority.

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- The UK urged non-NPT states to ratify the NPT as NNWS.
- Switzerland argued that nuclear cooperation with non-parties to the NPT undermines efforts to achieve the universalization of the NPT and might give the impression that more can be gained by remaining outside the regime rather than joining it.
- NAM and Philippines called on Israel to accede to the NPT as NNWS, and to place all facilities under safeguards.
- Syria called on the NWS to exert pressure on Israel and demanded it accede to treaty as NNWS without restrictions or conditions.

Syria

- The EU, the US, France, and Canada believed it was essential that Syria fully cooperate with the IAEA to resolve questions about its nuclear facilities.
- New Zealand noted that Syria's lack of meaningful cooperation with IAEA and argued that Syria should ratify the AP.
- Syria said it had an agreement with the IAEA and that it expected that it would be implemented in line with its timetable in order to close the issue and remove it from the Board of Governor's agenda.

DPRK

- The EU, the US, UK, Canada, France, New Zealand, Norway, and Philippines called on the DPRK to return to full compliance with the NPT.

Iran

- France argued that Iran has pursued an enrichment programme without credible civilian purposes.
- The EU expressed concern over Iran's nuclear programme and argued that Iran has to suspend its enrichment activities and its work on heavy water-related components; bring into force its AP; and resolve all outstanding issues related to its nuclear programme.
- Australia and Norway shared concern about Iran's "violations of its non-proliferation obligations" and called on all states to fully implement the relevant UNSC resolutions.
- Canada argued that it was essential for Iran to provide full access to the IAEA to verify the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.
- The United Arab Emirates argued that Iran should fully cooperate and implement its international obligations.
- The EU, the UK, France, New Zealand, and the US welcomed the recent talks between Iran and the P5+1 in Istanbul, and argued that urgent practical steps to build confidence are necessary.
- China and the US called for reciprocity in talks moving forward.
- The US noted that Iran's engagement with the P5+1 is separate from the urgent obligation for Iran to cooperate fully with the verification efforts of the IAEA

and stressed the need to resolve all outstanding issues between IAEA and Iran.

- Iran criticized the forging of documents and dissemination of false information about its nuclear programme.
- Iran proposed the establishment of a legal mechanism to rectify political and economic damages inflicted on relevant states parties to the NPT and the provision of a framework for compensation.

Nuclear sharing

- Iran argued that nuclear sharing arrangements through military alliances, joint research on nuclear warheads between two NWS, and transferring of nuclear technology to non-parties of the NPT are all activities that violates the NPT.
- NAM argued that NWS must refrain from nuclear weapon sharing with states that are part of military alliances, in line with articles I and II of the NPT.

Nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs)

- Argentina noted that the reasoning behind the creation of NWFZs is based on the principle that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in response to conventional weapons isn't backed by international law, in particular the principle of proportionality in the UN Charter.
- Indonesia argued that states parties to NWFZs must prevent nuclear trade with states lacking CSAs.
- Argentina, NAM, and Mongolia called on NWS to withdraw reservations or unilateral declarations from NWFZ.
- South Africa called on all remaining African states to ratify the Pelindaba treaty.
- The US reminded states that it has submitted the protocols of the Rarotonga and Pelindaba treaties to its Senate for ratification and plans to sign the protocol of the Bangkok treaty.
- Ukraine welcomed the decision by the US to submit the protocols to Pelindaba and Rarotonga to its Senate and called on all other NWS to do the same.
- Mongolia welcomed recent progress by NWS on NWFZ protocols and reported from the first preparatory meeting for the 2015 conference on NWFZ.
- Indonesia announced that it will chair the 2015 conference of NWFZs.
- Mongolia stated that it is working to institutionalize its status and is engaging with the P5 on this issue.
- The UK, the US, Indonesia, and Philippines drew attention to the negotiations between the P5 and the members of the Bangkok treaty and hoped that the protocol will soon be signed.
- Japan welcomed the recent progress between P5 and the members of the Bangkok treaty.

Middle East

- Most speakers voiced support for a WMD free zone in the Middle East.

continued on next page



News in Brief, cont'd

- The UK welcomed the progress and efforts by the facilitator of the 2012 ME conference and noted that it has provided funding for his outreach programme and supported events in connection with chemical and biological weapons meetings.
- The European Union stated it supports the implementation of the 1995 resolution and reported on a seminar organized in Brussels in 2011 in order to promote confidence-building measures in the Middle East.

Withdrawal

- The UK said it supports the right of countries to withdraw from the NPT but urged them to consider the ramifications for individual and collective security.
- The UK and France argued that a state that has withdrawn from the NPT should not be able to continue using technology it acquired under the Treaty.
- France said any state withdrawing from the Treaty should be held responsible for any violations committed even after withdrawal.
- Brazil noted that most discussions regarding withdrawal assume that only NNWS would withdraw, and highlighted that any future discussion on this topic must include the notion that also NWS are capable of withdrawing.

Reporting

- Australia noted that action 20 requires states to report on implementation and announced that it had submitted a national report on the implementation of each action of the 2010 action plan. Australia encouraged other states to do likewise.

Compliance

- Iran noted that no mechanism exists for establishing compliance by the NWS with their obligations under the Treaty and called for the 2015 Review Conference to find ways of addressing this. •

Side event report: The application of IAEA safeguards

Mia Gandenberger | *Reaching Critical Will* of WILPF

At this side event, Ms. Jill Cooley, Director of the Division of Concepts and Planning, Department of Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), gave an introduction to the existing safeguard programmes and the different verification tools available for the Agency.

Ms. Cooley briefly outlined the different programmes currently in place: comprehensive safeguard agreements; small quantities protocol with its amendment and additional protocols for non-nuclear weapon states; voluntary offer agreements for nuclear weapon states; and the item-specific safeguards agreement for non-members of the NPT. After this, the presentation mainly focused on IAEA verification activities.

By evaluating available information, the IAEA tries to determine whether a state's nuclear material and other items placed under safeguards remained for peaceful activities. The IAEA mainly relies on states reporting on their activities and its own various verification programmes ranging from cameras for remote monitoring to environmental sampling as part of on-site inspections. Satellite images and other open sources are used to fill the gaps and contribute to the collaborative, all-source analysis of a state's nuclear activities.

Ms. Cooley also highlighted both the technical and legal assistance the IAEA offered to member states trying to improve their nuclear energy programme.

Questions after the presentation focused on the expertise of IAEA personnel and the future of the safeguards programme, especially with regard to the shift towards a more differentiated state-level approach of IAEA verification. •

Nuclear wordsearch

Puzzles by Lily Gardener

H E D I P A B O L I T I O N Y
D M S E J I F I S S I O N I D
O I U Y S D K H Z S H E E X E
D S S P Z T J A C L N A E C T
R S K T C H A I S I L T W B E
O I D B R D E B R A M H O K R
G L P A T U G T I H G B C I R
O E E A J U C L S L M A Q R E
M J A Y E O N T I R I Q N Z N
A B C I D F U S I O N Z B P C
L N E M Z Q M Z X O Q J I X E
A P L U T O N I U M N U N N C
G P R O L I F E R A T I O N G
M O D E R N I Z A T I O N B P
T S T A T E M E N T Z H A D S

DESTABILIZING
PLUTONIUM
DOCTRINE
PEACE
DETERRENCE
ALAMOGORDO
NAGASAKI
MISSILE
MODERNIZATION
PROLIFERATION
DISTRUCTION
STATEMENT
ABOLITION
FISSION
FUSION



Whither a fissile material ban treaty?

Paul Meyer

NPT States parties assembled at this PrepCom have repeatedly voiced their support for the immediate commencement of negotiations of a treaty to prohibit the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. This comes as no surprise given that such a ban has been an agreed goal of UN member states for over fifty years. In statements and submissions frequent references have also been made to Action 15 from the 2010 NPT Review Conference's action plan which stated that "...the Conference on Disarmament should, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, immediately begin negotiations of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other explosive devices in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein".

The formula is an old and respected one; the only problem with it is that it has proved impossible to put into effect. Not since a couple of weeks in the summer of 1998 has the Conference on Disarmament (CD) been able to undertake official work on a fissile material ban. Fourteen years of idleness on this as all the while certain states continue to add to their stockpiles of fissile material and the nuclear weapons fashioned from them. It doesn't take a deep student of diplomatic affairs to discern the link between the consensus-based CD's inability to agree on a programme of work including a fissile material ban and the fact that amongst its member states it counts those still actively producing this essential nuclear weapon material. The more puzzling question is why has the vast majority of states supporting a fissile material ban put up with this situation for as long as they have?

Normally in the realm of international nuclear security affairs one might expect the leading nuclear powers under the NPT to take the initiative to overcome the impasse and ensure that negotiations begin. This would seem relatively easy for them to do so, given that none of the NPT nuclear weapon states currently are producing fissile material for nuclear weapons. Regrettably, as shown in their group statement to this PrepCom, the P5 have not been able to move beyond the threadbare formula of supporting the initiation of immediate negotiations of a fissile material ban at the CD. To be repeating this formula in the face of almost fifteen years of inaction would seem to represent the triumph of hope over experience—or to put it more bluntly, of convenience over commitment. In diplomacy as in any other area of human endeavor if your preferred approach to achieving a given objective is not possible, you try another approach. Applying another approach to get work underway on a fissile material ban is overdue. The effort made to identify other options will be a reflection

of the seriousness in which states hold the goal of such a treaty.

More encouraging is the position adopted by the ten non-nuclear weapon states forming the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative grouping. In their working paper introduced at this PrepCom the NPDI states declared that in light of the failure of the CD to agree on a programme of work that included a fissile material cut-off treaty, "we are currently consulting on options for such negotiations, taking into account the venues of past treaties". These states are signaling their refusal to take the CD's failure to commence negotiations as the last word on the subject. They are supporting both further scientific experts' meetings being organized by the Netherlands and Germany in May and June as well as laying the groundwork for initiating negotiations under other diplomatic auspices. As suggested by the Canadian-led resolution at last fall's General Assembly (66/44) that body, with its decision-making based on majority vote rather than consensus, could play a role in ensuring that work on a fissile material ban actually gets underway. Other forums for launching such a negotiation (e.g. IAEA or NPT) could also be envisaged. The key point is that the great majority of states, which support the negotiation of a fissile material ban treaty, must move beyond paying lip service to this goal and agree to arrangements to get actual work underway. To a considerable extent, the credibility of the multilateral nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament enterprise centered on the NPT depends on this being done.

Paul Meyer is a former Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament and currently a Senior Fellow at the Simons Foundation and Fellow in International Security, Simon Fraser University Vancouver. •



Using existing state obligations in the debate on “catastrophic humanitarian consequences” of using nuclear weapons

Mathew Truscott and Katja van Hoorn | Students from South Africa and the Netherlands

Norway has announced that it will be holding a conference on the humanitarian consequences of using nuclear weapons. The concept was first officially recognized by NPT members in the 2010 Final Document, and since then, it has been picked up not only by NGOs but as we now notice also by States as an opportunity to address the disarmament and non-proliferation debate from a new perspective.


This conference allows for a two pronged examination on the legal nature of nuclear weapons; firstly from the perspective of humanitarian law as the law of armed conflict, and secondly from the perspective of international human rights law, which is increasingly being used in complementarity with humanitarian law in areas affected by conflict.

What are examples of humanitarian consequences?

By addressing these issues from a humanitarian perspective, civil society is given a chance to really make a strong argument for abolishing nuclear weapons by relating the concept of “catastrophic humanitarian consequences” to existing obligations under human rights instruments and humanitarian law. Recent developments in international humanitarian law have increasingly emphasised the need to comply with international human rights standards in applicable situations. This synergy provides an excellent opportunity for NGOs operating in the field of nuclear disarmament to use both systems of law to demonstrate the illegality of the use of nuclear weapons. The linkages are manifold and can be

used to strengthen the arguments for non-proliferation and abolishment. A clear example is the incompatibility of nuclear weapons with the right to life. The right to life found in Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is the highest-ranking human right; it states, “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his [sic] life”. It is important to note that the distinguishing line between humanitarian law and human rights law is diminishing and that the right to life may also apply in certain circumstances as well as in wartime. As the ICJ confirmed in its 1996 advisory opinion on the use of nuclear weapons, humanitarian law prohibits using weapons that fail to discriminate between civilians and combatants. This means that using nuclear weapons will not only violate humanitarian law but will also constitute a mass violation of the highest-ranking human rights, the right to life.

The essential fact about nuclear weapons is that they make a civilized, peaceful life impossible. By referring to existing obligations such as the ones mentioned above, the argument that the existence of nuclear weapons has catastrophic humanitarian consequences can be strengthened and is of incredible importance in ensuring that the NPT is not only implemented but also enforced. And at the same time working together with the human rights and humanitarian movements in trying to realize the full arsenal these complimentary norms provide to advance us closer to a world free of nuclear weapons. •



ASSURING DESTRUCTION FOREVER

NUCLEAR
WEAPON
MODERNIZATION
AROUND
THE
WORLD

EDITED BY RAY ACHESON

JOHN AINSIE • JOHN BURROUGHS • MERAV DATAN • HANS KRISTENSEN
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Reaching Critical Will
a project of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

Assuring destruction forever: nuclear weapon modernization around the world

This new, groundbreaking study by Reaching Critical Will explores in-depth the nuclear weapon modernization programmes in China, France, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and analyzes the costs of nuclear weapons in the context of the economic crisis, austerity measures, and rising challenges in meeting human and environmental needs.

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Side event report: Nuclear famine: unacceptable humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons

Lily Gardener | *Reaching Critical Will of WILPF*



Ambassador Benno Laggner from the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs together with Inga Marie Nyhamar from the Norway's Foreign Ministry co-hosted Monday lunchtime's session on nuclear famine. Dr. Ira Helfand, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Professor Tilman Ruff, Medical Association for Prevention of War, and Mr. Lou Maresca, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) participated in the session exploring the unacceptable humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons.

Dr. Ira Helfand spoke about his report, *Nuclear Famine: A Billion People at Risk—Global Impacts of Limited Nuclear War on Agriculture, Food Supplies, and Human Nutrition*. The report, which had received financial support from the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, investigated the climate effects of a hypothetical nuclear war between India and Pakistan. The reason for examining these two countries underscores that smaller nuclear powers, not just the United States and Russia, also pose a threat to the safety of the entire planet. Nuclear war, he explained, would affect food production, since sudden cooling, decreased sunlight, and rainfall (thus shortened growing seasons) would significantly reduce crop yields. He spoke about the 925 million people already chronically malnourished (baseline consumption of 1,750 calories or less per day) who would be at most risk in the event of a nuclear war. Furthermore, countries that currently grow food would likely suspend export thereby threatening the food supplies of several hundred million additional people who have adequate nutrition today, but who live in countries that are highly dependent on food imports. He argued that this would increase the potential for war and civil conflict.

Dr. Helfand used the example of a Russian attack on New York City (NYC) to illustrate the effects of nuclear warfare. While Russia and the United States may no longer be adversaries, they continue to have thousands of weapons aimed at each other. So regardless of intent or mistake, in this scenario NYC would be blanketed by

radioactive fallout with the industrial, transportation, and communication infrastructures of most of the US destroyed. Many who survived the initial blast would die in the succeeding months from radiation sickness, epidemic disease, exposure, and starvation. The Russian population would face a similar outcome because of retaliation strikes. In his presentation, Dr. Helfand provided many shocking facts, such as "a single US nuclear-armed submarine could kill as many as a billion people," all of which illustrated that the humanitarian costs of nuclear weapons are immense.

Similarly, Professor Ruff spoke about the humanitarian imperative for disarmament, from a global health perspective. He explained that fissile materials have half-lives that dwarf human institutions. One of the many toxic byproducts produced is ionizing radiation, which has the capacity to damage the core genetic blue print (our DNA). He spoke about the effects of nuclear testing, providing statistics on poor health outcomes and higher rates of cancers for local communities. Almost 30 years after the World Health Organization made its assessment that no health system could adequately cope with nuclear warfare, Professor Ruff argues the evaluation is still true. From a medical perspective, primary prevention is the only solution. He lamented the lack of evidence-based policies surrounding nuclear weapons and concluded by stating that even if nuclear weapons are never exploded, there is a large opportunity cost and enormous persistent global health and environmental harm.

Mr. Maresca stated that nuclear weapons raise profound questions about when the rights of states must yield to the interests of humanity. He spoke about Dr. Marcel Junod, an ICRC WWII delegate, who was one of the first foreign doctors to arrive in Hiroshima, witnessing first-hand the devastating effects of the atomic bombing and bringing aid to the survivors. He argued that nuclear weapons raise fundamental questions, which go to the very heart of international humanitarian law and of ICRC assistance activities. He explained that ICRC is deeply concerned about the destructive power of nuclear weapons, the unspeakable human suffering they cause, the difficulty of controlling their effects, the threat they pose to the environment and to future generations, and the risks of escalation they create.

The Q&A saw discussion on international humanitarian law and prospect of further research, especially looking at the effects on society and long-term health effects.

The *Nuclear Famine* report can be found at www.ip-pnw.org/pdf/nuclear-famine-ippnw-0412.pdf. •



Nuclear weapons and climate change

Katherine Prizeman | *Global Action to Prevent War*

On Monday morning, representatives of civil society met to discuss key linkages between the security dangers posed by nuclear weapons and climate change. Rob van Riet of the World Future Council and Aaron Tovish of Mayors for Peace presented on the climate-nuclear nexus and the implications for catastrophic climate change of nuclear weapons. The panel was chaired by Lucas Wirl of the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA). Both panelists advocated for a comprehensive approach to nuclear disarmament by incorporating an environmental vantage point and, therefore, the climate implications of such weapons. Mr. van Riet aptly noted that sometimes specialization disregards the interplay among diverse security threats to sustainable peace.

Mr. van Riet presented the findings from a report by Dr. Jürgen Scheffran on the interplay between climate change, nuclear risks, and nuclear disarmament. He outlined several security threats associated with nuclear weapons and climate change, both of which are existential threats to humanity. Armed conflict over dwindling resources as a result of climate change and competition over nuclear power, which thus leads to less cooperative climate policies, are just two examples of direct linkages between these two security threats. Discussion also focused on the challenges of nuclear power and the fact that it is not a safe, clean, plentiful, and cheap solution to fossil fuel dependence. Furthermore, it was noted that nuclear power is neither required nor capable of solving the climate change crisis. Among the many threats of nuclear power, Mr. van Riet mentioned proliferation potential, stockpile risks, health and safety issues, limited production capacity, lack of economic viability, and waste disposal problems. Nuclear waste disposal proposals and climate engineering ultimately represent failed attempts to deal with these striking challenges of nuclear power. Mr. van Riet argued for utilizing an international law framework to address both nuclear disarmament and climate change, which would therefore improve the political climate for negotiations on both these issues.

Mr. Tovish of Mayors for Peace focused his remarks on

nuclear ‘deterrence,’ explaining that this gamble is simply too high. The two scenarios offered by Mr. Tovish were that of ‘nuclear winter,’ the result of an exchange of on-alert weapons, and ‘nuclear famine,’ the result of a limited nuclear war between any two nuclear-armed states. Both scenarios would offer dire consequences related to climate and human security including the possibility of Ice Age conditions lasting decades, the extinction of animal species, and a major reduction of the food supply. Moreover, it goes without saying that these consequences would affect the whole of humanity and not just those actors directly involved in deterrence ‘gone wrong’.

A participant from the audience also noted the effectiveness of linking climate change to nuclear disarmament for garnering larger constituencies in the campaign to abolish such weapons. Mr. Tovish argued that governments, however, have not engaged in direct talk around this linkage and few scientists are directly working on the climatic implications of nuclear weapons. Much of the scientific community is engaged in research on global warming and, therefore, much of the funding remains tied up in other initiatives. Mr. van Riet called for civil society to continue to pressure governments to take up this linkage. John Burroughs of the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy suggested a greater advocacy push at the annual conference of the

United Nations Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and encouraged advocates of nuclear disarmament to explore the legal framework for climate protection.

In his closing remarks, Mr. van Riet expressed concern that very few individuals engage on the issue of nuclear disarmament and noted that the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, including climatic implications, are important for raising awareness and securing widespread support for the abolition movement. Mr. Tovish noted that in light of the upcoming Rio Conference on Sustainable Development, it is important to reinforce the synergies between various large-scale security threats and called for catastrophic climate change to be incorporated into the work done by all advocates of nuclear disarmament. •



NUCLEAR
is not tender

Silvia Scuttari, Italy



Side event report: Scientific/technical experts briefing on nuclear weapons practices and policies

Wilbert van der Zeijden | IKV Pax Christi

This session focused on technical successes and failures in bringing about a global regime eliminating nuclear weapons. Moderator Jonathan Granoff of the Global Security Institute started by reminding the audience that the technological means for verifiably eliminating nuclear weapons exists—we know how to do it. The panelists then highlighted three different parts of the process of nuclear disarmament in order to show where successes can be found and where things are stuck.

The most hopeful message was found in the presentation of Ambassador Tibor Tóth, Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), on banning nuclear testing through the CTBT. While the Treaty is still waiting ratification by a number of states before it can enter into force, Ambassador Tóth argued that the near universality of the Treaty and the establishment of the CTBTO already makes it a success story since it has managed to end almost all live testing.

Ambassador Tóth identified several contributing factors to the success of the CTBTO. Most importantly, the Treaty only includes one category of states. There is no division between haves and have-nots as are seen in the NPT, not even on the verification side, where all states have the same rights and obligations. In addition, he noted that the work of the CTBTO can be seen as confidence building through practical forms of cooperation between nuclear weapon states.

The big remaining problem the CTBT faces is that it cannot enter into force until several non-NPT states with nuclear weapons, such as the Pakistan, the DPRK, India, and Israel sign and ratify the Treaty (as well as NPT nuclear weapon states China and the US). Ratification would be seen as a sign of goodwill; it could be a testing ground for future disarmament steps and would in any case not lead to very intrusive consequences until the treaty eventually enters into force.

The second speaker, Princeton professor and International Panel on Fissile Material chair Frank von Hippel, had a more troubling story to share on the spread of fissile materials and the attempts to establish some form of global regime for registering materials and disposing of excess stockpiles. Both highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium have become available in abundance over the past decades. Dr. von Hippel's numbers were mind-blowing: plutonium still out there is enough for 50,000 warheads and US and Russian HEU used in navy propulsion reactors would be enough for another 8,000 weapons. He also noted that the physical protection of US sites where HEU and plutonium are stored or used costs more than US\$1 billion annually. However, he noted that many states are already phasing out the use of HEU and plutonium and most states have already given up on the idea of reprocessing.

The honour of the gloomiest contribution this time fell to IAEA inspections veteran, Dr. Tariq Rauf, who looked at verifiable dismantlement of warheads. He argued that the biggest problem is that there is no clear or credible starting point from where to start reporting. Many warheads so far fall outside the existing treaty regimes—for example, tactical nuclear weapons. Older treaties often had no verification measures, which means that reports on compliance have been unverified. While more recent treaties do often have verification measures, the definition of what is a warhead or a nuclear weapon comes into play. Dr. Rauf noted that verification of dismantlement obviously goes hand in hand with issues of transparency on numbers of deployed, stored and dismantled warheads. Therefore, he argued that the growing push for transparency and the declaratory statements by the US and the UK are positive steps in this respect.

This session showed that while the technical means to achieve a world without nuclear weapons exist, we are still quite far off from generating the necessary political will to make it all happen. •

Multilateral Verification of Nuclear Disarmament: Who, How and Why? **The Advantages of Involving Intergovernmental Organisations and Non-Nuclear-Weapon States**

A Discussion Meeting, hosted by VERTIC and ISS Africa

To be held from 10:00am to 12:30pm, on Tuesday 8th May 2012 at the Vienna International Centre, Room M2 (NGO Room)

*The chairman of this meeting will be Noel Stott, ISS Africa.
Speakers are from VERTIC and the New Agenda Coalition.
Presentations will be on:*

The advantages of a multilateral approach to verification of future nuclear disarmament activities –
David Cliff, VERTIC

Multilateral nuclear disarmament verification: applying the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency – New Agenda Coalition

Technical challenges and opportunities for multilateral verification of future nuclear disarmament activities: the technology and the gaps – David Keir, VERTIC



NPT NEWS IN REVIEW

Calendar of side events for Tuesday, 8 May 2012

See www.reachingcriticalwill.org for a complete listing of events and regular updates

When	What	Where	Who
7:30	Interfaith prayer vigil	Square outside the VIC	Christian CND UK
8:00–8:50	Abolition Caucus	CR M2	Abolition 2000
9:00–9:50	Government Briefing for NGOs: Switzerland	CR M2	Reaching Critical Will
10:00–12:30	Nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament: Ideas from Russia, Ideas for Russia	Vienna Centre for Disarmament and Non-proliferation	Russian Centre for Policy Studies
10:00–13:00	Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Verification	CR M2	Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC)
13:15–14:45	Tour of the CTBTO <i>Reservation required</i>	Meet: MO1 Exhibition Area 2	RSVP to pablo.mehlhorn@ctbto.org
13:15–14:45	Member States Assistance for IAEA Safeguards Implementation	CR M3	US Mission to International Organizations in Vienna
15:00–18:00	Implementation of the Treaty of Pelindaba	CR M2	International Network of Emerging Nuclear Specialists



Time to negotiate a nuclear weapons ban?

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