



# NPT NEWS IN REVIEW

Civil society perspectives on the 2015 Review Conference of the  
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 27 April–22 May 2015



Reaching Critical Will

13 May 2015  
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The *NPT News in Review* is a daily publication produced by the Reaching Critical Will programme of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom during meetings of NPT states parties.

See [reachingcriticalwill.org](http://reachingcriticalwill.org) for information, statements, papers, reports, archived *NPT News in Reviews*, and more from the NPT.

## EDITORIAL: THE GLOBAL INJUSTICE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Ray Acheson | *Reaching Critical Will* of WILPF

The new draft released from Subsidiary Body 1 on Tuesday morning significantly weakened an already minimalist text. This, together with the ongoing debate over the Review Conference's outcome on nuclear disarmament, further accentuates the global injustice at the heart of nuclear weapon possession and deployment.

The new draft eliminates the demand, made by at least 159 NPT states parties to this Review Conference, that "it is in the interest of the very survival of humanity that nuclear weapons never be used again under any circumstances." It instead focuses on the nearly seventy-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons, as if the status quo is acceptable and "that we should contemplate a world with nuclear weapons indefinitely," as the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) warned.

The new draft also weakens the calls on Russia and the US for further reductions. It weakens the language against modernisation and addressing the risks of nuclear weapons. While the call on states to abandon first use policies in security doctrines has rightly been removed, the text now only calls on concerned states to "continue to review" their nuclear weapon policies and doctrines rather than change them.

On the humanitarian consequences, the new text suggests that some states might have just been previously ignorant about the consequences, rather than new evidence becoming available. The new draft also cynically removes the reference to the importance of recognising the voices of survivors of nuclear weapons and recalling the 70th anniversary of their use on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

In some paragraphs the new text attempts to reframe effective measures in the context of building blocks, suggesting that business as usual could somehow fulfill the overwhelming demand by the majority of states for new concrete efforts to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons. The text

also continues to suggest that unilateral actions constitute effective measures envisioned by article VI, which is not the case. As the NAC argued on Monday, multilateral negotiations are necessary to fulfil article VI.

Overall the new draft continues to frame the legal framework for a nuclear weapon free world as a longer-term goal and does not contain any serious or concrete commitments to move towards this framework.

Yet the nuclear-armed states say even this is too strong. They have pushed back against references to a legal framework and have objected to the inclusion of benchmarks and timelines for nuclear disarmament. They have demanded that their "security interests" be put in "balance" with humanitarian concerns about the devastating effects of nuclear weapons use. They do not want to make any new commitments, or, as the last few decades have shown, implement their existing ones.

While demanding flexibility to reach consensus, the NPT nuclear-armed states and some of their nuclear-dependent allies are articulating positions at odds with actually achieving nuclear disarmament. They are in fact revealing their true positions, which support the maintenance, modernisation, and continued deployment and threat of use of massive nuclear violence.

Only a handful of mostly wealthy countries possess and control a monopoly on nuclear weapons, the maintenance and modernisation of which benefits elites in those countries. The governments of these countries have chosen to risk the annihilation of entire cities, populations, or even our planet. And it is these governments which participate most actively in meetings about nuclear weapons, including this NPT Review Conference.

A new paper published today by the civil society group Article 36 reveals the significance of low-income country underrepresentation.

*continued on next page*

## Article36



Reaching Critical Will

# Banning nuclear weapons

Wednesday, 13 May, 13:15-14:30  
Conference Room C

**Speakers:**

Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

Elizabeth Minor, Article 36

*Editorial, continued*

tation in nuclear disarmament forums. These countries could be more vulnerable to the negative impacts of a nuclear weapon detonation on economics, the environment, and development objectives, even though a high proportion are part of nuclear weapon free zones. Yet they are less likely to send representatives to multilateral meetings on nuclear disarmament and generally make fewer statements on average than high-income countries—a high proportion of which are part of a nuclear alliance.

Nuclear weapons represent a grave global injustice. This injustice is on full display at the NPT. The NPT nuclear-armed and nuclear-dependent states, representing the vast majority of the world's wealth, will only accept an outcome document that reinforces their continued possession and deployment of weapons of terror that they wield over the rest of the planet. They say that their weapons do not pose a risk to world security but rather that they prevent nuclear weapon use. But as the Non-Aligned Movement has been saying for decades, as the three conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons have found, and as the joint humanitarian statements in the NPT and General Assembly have asserted, the only way to prevent the use of nuclear weapons is to eliminate them. This is the position of the majority. This is the position of justice. And it is the only position that responsible actors can take "in the interests of the survival of humanity". •

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*The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom or the Reaching Critical Will programme.*



## DRAFTS REVIEW

Ray Acheson and Mia Gandenberger | *Reaching Critical Will of WILPF*

This brief review highlights the revisions in the draft texts.

### *Subsidiary body 1*

- In PP2 the text has changed from: "It is in the interest of the very survival of humanity that nuclear weapons never be used again under any circumstances" to "It is in the interest of the very survival of humanity that the nearly seventy-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons be extended forever."
- A new PP4 urges the NWS to comply with their nuclear disarmament obligations.
- In PP5, "substantive" has replaced "some" in reference to NWS compliance with nuclear disarmament.
- In PP5, "Including through the specification of concrete benchmarks and agreed timelines" has been changed to "including through the specification of concrete benchmarks and timelines, as agreed in the present document."
- In PP7, the reference to effective measures being multilateral, plurilateral, bilateral, or unilateral has been replaced with a reference to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.
- In OP1, the reference to a "unifying concept" has been removed.
- OP3 now "encourages" rather than "calls upon" Russia and the US to undertake further reductions. The inclusion of non-strategic nuclear weapons has been removed.
- OP4 adds "designed to support" regarding new military capabilities in relation to modernisation.
- OP5 changes "encourages all States that have not yet eliminated nuclear weapons from security doctrines to abandon" policies that envision the first use of nuclear weapons to "encourages all States concerned to continue to review" their nuclear security doctrines.
- OP6 changes "ensure their policies address fully" the risks of nuclear weapons to "undertake further efforts" in regards to addressing risk.
- OP6 now describes the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons as being "greater than many States parties previously understood" rather than "greater than previously assumed".
- OP7 adds "in the view of many States parties".

- OP11 has added effective measures but in the context of building blocks. It also asserts that effective measures can be multilateral, plurilateral, bilateral, and unilateral.
- OP15 deleted the call for a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.
- OP17 changes "the majority of states" to "many states".
- OP17 adds a reference to the building blocks approach.
- OP18 deletes all of the language regarding the 70th anniversary of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

### *Main Committee III*

- The revision of MC III's CRP.1 includes a new section on the discussions on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (PUNE) and nuclear power.
- It is still missing language on technical cooperation and multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle.
- The language in paragraph (P) 7-14 is based on WPs, statements delivered during the debate, and language from the 2010 outcome document, in some cases with small modifications.
- The new Ps 15-24 on nuclear power were developed in a similar fashion.
- The title for the section on nuclear safety and related issues has been shortened as "and related issues" has been deleted.
- The first sentence in P25, former P7, was replaced by language from the IAEA General Conference (GC) resolution on nuclear safety as contained in document IAEA GC(57)/RES/9.
- P27 includes a reference to the "central role" of the IAEA on nuclear security and an additional reference to "the UN, through instruments such as UNSCR 1540, also have an important role."
- Additional P31 focuses on the activities of the IAEA directed to nuclear safety.
- Additional P35 includes reference to the Fukushima accident, IAEA activities in the follow-up, and the IAEA Ministerial Declaration on Nuclear Safety.
- P36, former P15, was extended to include "for further improvement of global nuclear safety" after March 2011.

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*Drafts review, continued*

- Additional P38 refers to the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety as many delegations had suggested.
- P41, former P20, includes the insertion “where technically and economically feasible,” after non-highly enriched uranium technologies.
- P49 includes additional language on the dialogue process between shipping and coastal states. The reference to the IAEA has been deleted.
- P50, former P30, has the addition of “with a view to” establishing a global nuclear liability regime.
- Additional P53 focuses on emergency preparedness and response mechanisms. •

agreed language, which the UK does not believe should be changed.

- Egypt, Argentina, and Iran noted that the agreed language taken from 2010 was only the Action Plan; the rest was summited as a Chair’s summary.
- Egypt also stressed that many of these suggestions had also been made in 2010 and in its WP.
- Iran stressed that the language agreed in 2010 had in this new text been taken out of its context and put together with new/other language, which has changed the balance and its meaning.

**Non-compliances**

- Iran suggested adding language in para 6 saying the lack of compliance with nuclear disarmament obligations breaches also the non-proliferation obligations and undermines confidence in the Treaty.
- ROK, US, and Russia stressed the importance of stronger language on non-compliance.

**Safeguards**

- Cuba and Egypt supported specifying in para 8 that the IAEA is the sole verification organ.
- The US opposed the above and said that while it recognises the IAEA has a special role, this suggestion would delegitimize the IAEA board of governors, UNSC, and national governments.
- Brazil and Egypt reiterated their call to delete the word “system” in relation to safeguards in the draft as the AP is voluntary and therefore not part of the IAEA system per se.

**Verification standard**

- Egypt wanted to delete para 17, on the issue of including the AP in the verification standards, as it does not reflect the 2010 outcome.
- Japan stressed that para 17 is one of the most important texts in the draft, which was supported by Australia, France, Norway, Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, and Canada.
- New Zealand stated that the increase in signed APs since 2010 shows that they together with safeguards represent the current verification standard.
- South Africa argued that the word “standard” might not be there right words to use in relation to the AP.

*Main Committee III***Technical cooperation**

- Jamaica highlighted the importance of safe transportation of nuclear and radioactive materials.

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**NEWS IN BRIEF**

*Mia Gandenberger and Gabriella Irsten | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF*

The News in Brief is not a comprehensive summary of all statements. It highlights positions on a few critical issues covered during plenary discussions.

*Main Committee II***General**

- The morning session in MCII continued hearing from delegations on the Chair’s first draft NPT/CONF.2015/MC.III/CRP.2.
- Most states reiterated similar points and views as during yesterday’s meeting. The main disagreements concerned the status of the Additional Protocol (AP) and language taken from the 2010 outcome document.
- Brazil, Egypt, Argentina, Algeria, Yemen, Cuba, and Syria called for the draft to make it clear that the AP is voluntary and should not be included in the safeguards legal obligations reference, while Canada, Czech Republic, Japan, France, Finland, UK, US, Japan, Sweden, Slovenia, and Germany believe the AP is a part of the safeguard system and should therefore be included in the text.
- Egypt and Iran suggested that the phrase nuclear disarmament should be added to paragraph 1, in front of non-proliferation.
- Iran suggested to add a reference in paras 2 and 3 on the NWS to end their forward deployment of the NW in non-NWS in compliance with article 1 of the NPT.
- UK, Canada, and Finland highlighted that many of Iran and Egypt’s suggestions include changing 2010





## News in brief, continued.

- Japan reiterated the importance of increased accessibility to nuclear science and technology.
- The Vienna Group of 10 referred to recommendations contained in P4 and 5 of WP.1.
- Chile, Japan stressed the importance of communication between shipping and coastal states and highlighted a table-top exercise on that matter planned for June.
- Japan and Nigeria highlighted the important role of the IAEA in addressing the recent Ebola outbreak.

## Multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle

- UAE stressed that other, e.g. regional approaches to the fuel cycle should not be precluded.
- France highlighted the need for cooperation in dealing with waste reduction.
- France hoped to see progress on the IAEA fuel bank, with tangible results about implementation, and information about the assurances that it will include.
- US suggested being more specific with regard to storage and disposal of nuclear material.

## Comments on the outcome document

- NAM gave preliminary comments on based on its WP, the general debate statement, and Main Committee statements, but reserved the right to submit more comments later.
- China, Russia will submit comments in writing.
- Brazil reiterated their point about the majority of HEU and separated PU stocks are in military stocks of nuclear-armed states and therefore these should be included.
- Russia highlighted the importance of differentiating between nuclear safety, nuclear security, and physical security.
- Iran commented on P3, 5, 7, 10, 21, 23, 24, 25, 27, 29, 34, 37, 40, 42, 47 and will submit these comments to the chair.

## Decisions and recommendations of previous conferences

- In P3 Canada suggested to not deviate from references to the IAEA statute.
- Iran suggested that P3 and 5 be inline with Article 4, P2 of the treaty.
- UK suggested using "one of the core objectives" rather than "the core objective."
- Canada and Japan suggested deleting P14 as it duplicates P4.

- Japan called for strengthening P11 and highlighting the laboratories' importance for increased accessibility to nuclear applications. Further the P should welcome contributions already pledge and encourage other states parties to provided the necessary support to the IAEA.
- Canada suggested changing "developing countries" to "least-developed countries" in Ps 4, 5, 10, 12.
- Portugal and Nigeria strongly disagreed with that suggestion.
- For P10 Canada suggested replacing "for all" by "member states, in particular least-developed countries".
- With regard to P12 Canada suggested moving up PUNE from the end of the paragraph to after "public communication activity."
- Japan suggested deleting P22 or reformulating it as the CNS is not a new development.
- UK made a similar point.
- UAE suggested welcoming the progress in implementation instead of the entry into force of the CNS.

## Nuclear safety

- Brazil and Russia commented on the changed title of this section.
- For P25 Switzerland suggested considering clear indication, which aspects of nuclear safety are subject to IAEA standards and the IAEA should play key role where nuclear safety and security overlap.
- The US suggested using GC language in P26 and 27 as it deals with the IAEA's activities.
- UAE had some concerns with P26 and P27.
- In P27 Japan suggested taking out "pursued within the framework of IAEA, should be driven by Member States."
- Japan suggested that P28 should be in line with the text of the treaty and that "without discrimination" should be deleted.
- Iran suggested returning to the original language of P27.
- Japan suggested moving the reference to the Fukushima Ministerial Conference of P35 to P36.
- Japan, Switzerland welcomed the reference to the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety in P38.
- Japan suggested making the language in P38 more concise.

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*News in brief, continued*

- For P42 UAE suggested including a reference to the role of industry in developing best practices and basic principles.
- France reiterated its concern with the language in P44.

**Transport**

- Japan suggested including a reference in P49 to the table-top exercise for the communication between shipping and coastal states.
- Portugal, NZ welcomed that suggestion.
- France suggested using positive language on welcoming the progress made on improving communication.

**Attack against nuclear installations**

- The US suggested using agreed language from the 2010 outcome document and urged that language in P50 not go further.
- France referred to Action 64 of the 2010 NPT Action Plan in that context, highlighting it was consensus language.
- Iran stressed that the current language was not strong enough.

**Liability**

- Germany suggested amending P51 to replace the last subclause with "with a view to strengthen the global nuclear liability regime" and further language it will submit to the chair.
- For P52 Switzerland suggested that the Conference call on states parties strengthen the civil nuclear liability regime by becoming party to "one of" the relevant international instruments.
- The US stressed that states could join all conventions.
- Ireland in speaking also for Austria and NZ, and Portugal, suggested replacing "welcome" in P51 with "takes note of".
- UK stressed to retain welcome.
- Ireland in speaking also for Austria and NZ suggested adding a P52 bis using language on liability as contained in GC(57)/RES/9 OP65.
- Luxembourg, Portugal suggested replacing the current P52 with that language.
- Iran suggested replacing call upon with encourages in P52. •

**EVENT: THE ROLE OF UMBRELLA STATES IN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT***Emily Watson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF*

Organised by Prague Vision, the Basel Peace Office, and PNND, this event discussed ways for nuclear alliance states to fulfil disarmament obligations. Panellists included Michiru Nishida of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Michal Smetana of the Czech Republic's Charles University, Erika Simpson of Canada's Western University, and Jana Jedlíková of Prague Vision.

This month, Prague Vision produced a draft policy paper on the role of umbrella states in nuclear disarmament. The paper argues that options for umbrella states are not limited to either rejecting nuclear weapons unilaterally or following the status quo. There are other means for umbrella states to pursue disarmament. For instance, states can insist that nuclear weapons are "sole purpose", i.e. used solely to deter nuclear and not conventional threats. Furthermore, if they refuse to support a convention or treaty, states can pursue the "building blocks" approach from the open-ended working group. Although it falls short of a comprehensive approach, she asserted, building blocks is "an improvement" on the "step-by-step" approach, as it includes "the possibility of parallel and simultaneous steps."

Erika Simpson discussed her perception of the psychology of NATO allies. NATO members are convinced that nuclear weapons prevent conventional warfare. They are concerned about nuclear terrorism and proliferation: dirty bombs and weapons smuggling. They want a weapons free world, can't see this happening soon, and in the meantime show little regard for vertical proliferation. Members are quick to point out Russia's "complete disregard of international law" whilst ignoring their own violation of the NPT through nuclear-sharing agreements. Michael Smentana added that the US sees little military value in European missiles, yet it tolerates these weapons as part of the alliance.

Erika explained that she often finishes her presentations with a photo of a mountain climber. Disarmament must be framed not as a process of giving something away, but as a process of gaining something. For instance, by relinquishing nuclear alliances with the US, New Zealand actually increased its international standing. NATO members must appreciate the security and diplomatic benefits that would arise from them rejecting extended nuclear deterrence. •



## EVENT: PROMOTING PEACEFUL USES—DEVELOPING THE STRATEGY AND VISION FOR THE CIVIL NUCLEAR INDUSTRY IN THE UK

Gabriella Irsten | *Reaching Critical Will of WILPF*

The United Kingdom's Foreign Office and Department of Energy and Climate Change held a side event presenting the UK's industrial nuclear strategy for the next upcoming years.

A representative from the Department of Energy and Climate Change argued that the UK's new plans are secure, affordable and a reliable source of energy. She suggested this will also help the UK reach its environmental obligation to reduce carbon emissions. She noted that this programme is a long-term project and no construction has started. The government will not be giving any additional support for this project, instead it will be the private sector that will construct, operate, and decommission the power plants. Mr. Robin Grimes from the Foreign Office stressed that this is in line with the UK vision of having its nuclear industry as a global leader in nuclear energy, with key companies. Therefore the government is developing the nuclear Supply Chain Action Plan together with industry. The programme also includes academic components to promote new educational opportunities in the nuclear energy sector.

During the question and answer section the UK was asked whether it has located a site for storage of

nuclear waste from the new plants and if so, whether they are intended to be on UK soil? The government representative confirmed that no site has been located yet, but that they are very confident that they will. Mr. Grimes stressed that he personally favours the so-called concept of volunteerism, where a local community, through a process, volunteers to have a disposal site in their community.

The event took place at the UN in New York, 50 miles north of the Indian Point nuclear power plant where an explosion resulted in a fire just a few days before this event took place. With this in mind, together with Fukushima and the European Union's stress test from 2012 which identified safety and security concerns all over Europe, it is difficult to see how states can reasonably continue to assert that nuclear power is a secure and safe energy resource. It is even more alarming that plans can move forward without such an essential problem as waste management having been solved. Finally, the so-called volunteerism approach has been widely criticized, with both Sweden and Japan having difficulties identifying communities that are willing to establish a nuclear waste ground in their own backyard. •



## THE UNDERREPRESENTATION OF LOW-INCOME AND NON-WESTERN COUNTRIES IN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT FORUMS

Elizabeth Minor | Article 36

Lower-income countries are less likely to send representatives to meetings of multilateral forums on nuclear disarmament, a new discussion paper from Article 36 has determined. These countries also tend to field smaller delegations and make fewer individual statements on average than richer countries with an equal right to participate.

These are clear trends in available attendance and participation data on meetings of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Conference on Disarmament, and conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons.

The underrepresentation of low-income and non-Western countries—and civil society—in these forums is significant. Nuclear disarmament is a global concern: the interests of all countries must be represented in any successful attempt to achieve the most equitable outcomes for populations worldwide. Low-income countries may, overall, have different perspectives on nuclear weapon issues compared to richer countries. This is suggested by the high proportion of low-income countries that are part of a nuclear weapon free zones, in comparison to the considerable number of high-income countries that are part of a nuclear alliance. Given this, discussions and outcomes may currently be skewed in favour of certain framings and technical perspectives that place more value on nuclear weapons.

The extent of low-income country underrepresentation varies across forums and across the different sessions within particular meetings, increasing for sessions that


address more specific topics in comparison to general debates. For example, the percentage of low-income states parties to the NPT making a statement to the main committees, clusters, and specific issues was only 1% on average across all NPT meetings between 2010 and 2014. At several of these individual sessions, no low-income countries contributed at all.

The factors that may inform the trend of low-income country representation—ranging from the technical and material capacities needed to attend to the perceived utility of different forums—require further investigation. More equal participation among countries would not necessarily mean that the global discussions on nuclear disarmament would develop in a progressive direction. However, greater equity between countries in multilateral forums is important in principle— and has the potential to change dynamics.

Future initiatives to advance nuclear disarmament, such as the commencement of negotiations on a nuclear weapon ban treaty, must proceed on this principle. Such processes must also not be blockable by any particular country or group of countries. Requiring complete consensus can induce deadlock and is not the same as upholding open inclusion. Where better representation is achieved, in terms of both quantity and quality of participation, discussions may have a greater chance of generating a more balanced debate and a larger range of proposals to address global disarmament concerns.

The paper can be found at [www.article36.org](http://www.article36.org). Hard copies will be distributed at the NPT Review Conference. •

Fig 1.  
Countries' interests:  
membership of nuclear alliances  
and Nuclear Weapons Free Zones





## THE NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES, HUBRIS AND BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Thomas Nash | Article 36

In their response to the draft elements for the NPT outcome on nuclear disarmament, the nuclear-armed states have been generally dismissive of recent scholarship and research on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. They have also been determined to prevent any indication that effective measures for nuclear disarmament should include a legally-binding instrument to prohibit the weapons.

Their dismissiveness, expressed in particular by the French ambassador on Monday, was directed at the 159 states that have highlighted the evidence on the humanitarian impact and risk of use nuclear weapons through the joint statement delivered by the Austrian Foreign Minister during the first week of this meeting.

Meanwhile, their increasingly frantic opposition to any discussion of a legally-binding instrument on the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons is directed at the 80+ states that have joined the pledge from the Vienna conference to fill the legal gap, as well as the New Agenda Coalition, which has sought to advance thinking on how to fill this gap.

On one level, a strategy of dismissing the evidence on humanitarian impact and risk and blocking discussion of a new legally-binding instrument makes sense from the point of view of preserving the status quo of nuclear possession and use. It sets one up to resist any policy considerations that might flow from such evidence and it prevents movement within the NPT on work towards new legal measures - work that would expose the hypocrisy of nuclear-armed states and their nuclear-dependent allies.

More subtle political operators seeking to preserve the status quo on nuclear weapons probably recognise, though, that this is an unwise and potentially high risk

strategy for the nuclear-armed states to pursue. The states that wield nuclear weapons are fully aware of the push for states to begin negotiations on a treaty banning nuclear weapons, even without their participation. Dismissing the humanitarian initiative and preventing discussion within the NPT on options for a legally-binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons will only strengthen the resolve of those seeking to initiate dedicated standalone negotiations on such an instrument.

It is almost as if the nuclear-armed states are daring other states to start such a process. Perhaps they are confident that, as the self-styled most powerful countries in the world, they can rely on their capacity for political arm-twisting to prevent the initiation of a diplomatic process to prohibit nuclear weapons and in so doing kill the momentum of the humanitarian initiative. Perhaps they feel that they can safely taunt the rest of the world in the way that they have within the NPT for so many years. Given the depth and breadth of international engagement in the humanitarian initiative, however, a more cautious adviser to these states might warn them against such hubris.

At this stage though, it may already be too late to prevent such a diplomatic process. Pushing for the deletion of references to the voices of survivors of nuclear weapons in the outcome document of the NPT is callous and myopic. It is also unnecessary. These sorts of decisions suggest that at least some of those responsible for diplomatic engagement in this area are not really capable of assessing the political terrain with the kind of judgment that would be required to prevent a large-scale international diplomatic process to prohibit nuclear weapons. That should give some confidence to those states and organisations that are determined to make progress on precisely such a diplomatic process. •



# NPT NEWS IN REVIEW

## CALENDAR OF EVENTS

When	What	Where	Who
9:00-9:50	Government briefing for NGOs: Japan	Conference Room C Conference Building	Reaching Critical Will
10:00	Plenary	Trusteeship	
after Plenary	Main Committee I	Trusteeship	
after Plenary	Subsidiary Body III	ECOSOC	
10:00-13:00	Arctic nuclear weapon free zone	Conference Room C Conference Building	Canadian Pugwash
13:15-14:30	Banning nuclear weapons	Conference Room C Conference Building	Reaching Critical Will and Article 36
13:15-14:30	Ballistic missile defense system	Trusteeship	Russian Federation and China
13:15-14:30	Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism	Conference Room D Conference Building	Finland
13:15-14:30	Film Screening: Countdown to Zero	DHL Auditorium	Office for Disarmament Affairs
15:00 -18:00	Main Committee II	Trusteeship	
15:00 -18:00	Subsidiary Body III	ECOSOC	
15:00-18:00	INENS Young Experts Dialogue	Conference Room C Conference Building	International Network of Emerging Nuclear Specialists



*International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons*