

NPT NEWS IN REVIEW

Reaching Critical Will

Civil society perspectives on the 2014 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee 28 April—9 May 2014

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IN THIS ISSUE

- 1 | Editorial
- 3 | Facing the dangers of a 21st century great power war
- 4 | Recommendation review
- 5 | Calendar of events
- 7 | Belief in the WMDFZ
- 7 | Nuclear Security Summit 2014
- 8 | Advancing UN approaches to nuclear disarmament
- 9 | NPT and NATO
- 9 | NWC simulation part II

The NPT News in Review is a daily publication produced by the Reaching Critical Will programme of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom during meetings of NPT states parties.

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EDITORIAL: THE IMPERATIVE OF PROGRESS

Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

The draft recommendations to the 2015 NPT Review Conference released today by the Chair of the PrepCom fall woefully short of a credible plan to address the continued existence of nuclear weapons. While some of the recommendations move beyond the 2010 NPT action plan, a much bolder vision is necessary at this crucial stage. Action that supports the negotiation of a treaty to facilitate implementation of article VI, as demanded by a growing number of states parties, will be necessary to sustain the NPT's credibility and to achieve its objectives.

The recommendations on disarmament ask the 2015 RevCon to take stock of the national reports and working papers that outline the nuclear-armed states' fulfillment (or not) of their commitments from 2010. It also suggests that the RevCon should encourage more detailed and specific reports.

These reports, however, are unacceptable and have already received criticism from many quarters. The nuclear-armed states should have reported to the 2014 PrepCom on their efforts to implement action 5 of the 2010 action plan. Instead, their reports rehash previously released information about the status of their arsenals and other nuclear weapons related activities, none of which actually address their obligations under action 5. As for a standard reporting form as per action 21, the nuclear-armed states actually only got as far as a table of contents. There is no consistency in terms of substance or level of detail.

This PrepCom had a mandate to review the progress that nuclear-armed states had made on action 5 and to make recommendations to the RevCon about next steps. But the only such recommendations contained in the draft basically repeat those contained in the 2010 action plan. Consistency with the NPT, ceasing modernization or new development, reducing the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines, and taking note of the

UN Secretary-General's five-point plan were all steps agreed upon in 2010. None have been implemented.

The draft contains a few new or updated items that build upon and strengthen the 2010 action plan. It suggests that nuclear-armed states accelerate the implementation of their unequivocal undertaking for disarmament. It suggests the same for the implementation of concrete and measurable steps to reduce the alert status of nuclear weapon systems and to reduce the risk of their accidental use. It calls for "prompt and full" implementation of any remaining commitments from 2010, especially action 5 and it recommends agreed timelines for their completion.

Timelines were the biggest challenge in 2010. The nuclear-armed states consistently and systematically resisted all attempts to set deadlines for their responsibilities. A key challenge for article VI has been the lack of measurable, time-bound commitments. Achieving an agreed timeline in 2015 would be an important achievement—but this should be for article VI of the 1968 treaty, not for action 5 of the 2010 action plan.

The only other novel language in the draft recommends that the RevCon "further consider the devastation that would be visited upon all humankind by any use of nuclear weapons". It also asks the meeting to note that there is no competent international capacity to address the resulting catastrophic humanitarian consequences. In so doing, the draft rightly reflects the key finding from the conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. But it fails even to take note of either of these conferences, despite the fact that a vast majority of NPT state parties participated in them.

Instead, the draft reverts to the decadesold "step-by-step" process. As the recent


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Editorial, continued

report by Reaching Critical Will and Article 36 on *A treaty banning nuclear weapons* sets out, continued insistence on the step-by-step approach is problematic. It prevents progress, especially when lack of agreement on one step is used as pretext for no progress at all. It also serves to legitimize the continued possession of nuclear weapons in the meantime.

Rather than insisting on the same deadlocked "stepby-step" agenda, bolder action is urgently needed. A growing number of states have called for the development of a new legal instrument to implement article VI. A number have suggested a framework treaty prohibiting and eliminating nuclear weapons as the most practical, feasible, and meaningful way forward in the current context. Embarking on a process to develop a treaty banning nuclear weapons would not prevent or compete with continued work on other aspects of the established disarmament and arms control agenda. As the RCW/A36 paper notes, "It might even help to unlock some of the impasses that have appeared so intractable in the recent past by motivating states to take action and demonstrating that progress is in fact possible." Crucially though, it would also change the context in which nuclear weapons exist, reducing both incentives and capacities for their continued existence and facilitating their elimination.

The 2015 Review Conference will be a turning point for the NPT. Will states parties continue to accept opaque transparency, a retreat from the unequivocal undertaking, aggressive modernization of nuclear arsenals, and straightforward refusals to negotiate nuclear disarmament? Or will those that are committed to the imperative of nuclear disarmament exercise greater political agency to begin negotiating a ban treaty as the next step towards a nuclear weapons free world? •



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The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom or the Reaching Critical Will programme.



REPORT: FACING THE DANGERS OF A 21ST CENTURY GREAT POWER WAR

Andrew Lichterman | Western States Legal Foundation

On Saturday, 3 May, a conference took place at the Judson Memorial Church in New York on the centenary of World War I, titled Facing the Dangers of a 21st Century Great Power War. The all-day conference was well attended, with about 90 people present.

The conference brought together academics and activists to reexamine the history of WWI and its aftermath, and to consider what we might learn that is useful in peace and disarmament work including similarities and differences between the forces that led to catastrophic great power war a century ago and those that threaten extinction today. The conference was sponsored by the American Friends Service Committee Peace and Economic Security Program, the International Peace Bureau, the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung New York Office, and the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms and its US affiliates, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy and the Western States Legal Foundation.

The first two panels looked back at WWI and forward to the risks of great power war in the coming decades. One speaker noted that it was not a "world war," but rather a war among European empires, with the fighting mainly in and around Europe, but which affected people's lives and the structures of global society for generations. Panelists also identified multiple causes of WWI. These included massive arms buildups, misreading of each-other's intentions by decision makers, and an increased propensity for risk-taking by ruling elites who saw their relative power in the international order threatened both from without by rising new powers and from within by unrest sparked by an economic system that disrupted traditional ways of life and drove an increasingly inequitable distribution of wealth and power.

A number of the speakers agreed that we are entering a period of heightened risk of war among nuclear-armed great powers. At the same time, no nuclear-armed countries show any evident intent to make meaningful reductions in their nuclear arsenals in the foreseeable future. All of the states that have established nuclear arsenals are modernizing them to a greater or lesser degree, allowing them to keep their nuclear weapons deployed into the middle of the 21st century and perhaps beyond. Conventional arms racing is intensifying, with powerful, accurate, stealthy, long-range strike systems facing sophisticated defensive systems, amidst electronic and now cyberwarfare, creating new dangers that military confrontations among nuclear-armed high tech militaries may escalate out of control.

Participants identified a number of forces likely to drive conflict in the coming years, including competition for diminishing resources such as oil and minerals, general social conflict due to lack or maldistribution of resources essential to human survival such as food and water, exacerbated by climate change and general ecological decline, and an increasingly inequitable distribution of wealth. While a number of speakers mentioned the dangers that might arise from the US/NATO vs. Russian confrontation over Ukraine, it was recognized that major wars could be sparked in a number of ways, ranging from US-China competition and confrontation to crises involving regional powers in East and South Asia or the Middle East.

Speakers on the panel on arms control and disarmament efforts before and between the world wars and other speakers throughout the day noted that legal efforts to control armaments and war before and after WWI had for the most part proved ineffective. Legal mechanisms for the resolution of international disputes failed to prevent WWI. Interwar negotiations to control the strategic arms of the day did not prevent rapid arms buildups and the Second World War was more expansive and destructive than the first. Despite signing the Kellogg Briand Pact, a "General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy," a few years later the world's great powers were back at war with unprecedented intensity, culminating in the atomic bombing of cities.

There was general agreement that to accomplish goals as large as eliminating nuclear weapons or, more broadly, ending war, that legal mechanisms are not sufficient; there must also be significant supporting change in underlying social reality. There was no common approach to this, but there were some recurring themes. One is that both of these goals likely will require movements whose focus is not limited to peace and disarmament, and which make connections with people and organizations working for economic justice and an ecologically sustainable ways of life. Another is that we need to look at the structures of society and the forces driving conflict anew, in this particular moment, to understand how to go forward. •



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RECOMMENDATIONS REVIEW

Ray Acheson and Mia Gandenberger | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

This review summarizes the draft recommendations to the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

Disarmament

- The disarmament recommendations are divided into recommendations for the disarmament of nuclear weapons, practical steps and building blocks for a world without nuclear weapons, and other measures in support of nuclear disarmament.
- The chapeau reaffirms the importance of full implementation, especially by nuclear-armed states (NAS) of article VI and the principles and objectives of 1995.
- It also reaffirms the importance of building upon practical steps from 2000 and 2010.

Disarmament of nuclear weapons

- The draft recommends that the 2015 RevCon take stock of NAS national reports and working papers on their fulfillment of 2010 commitments.
- It also suggests possible next steps for the full implementation article VI and the steps/actions from 1995, 2000, and 2010, including:
 - Pursuit of policies fully compatible with the NPT and objectives of a world without nuclear weapons;
 - Accelerated actions by NAS in implementing their unequivocal undertaking for elimination as well as concrete and measurable steps to reduce the alert status of nuclear weapon systems and to reduce the risk of their accidental use;
 - Prompt and full implementation of any remaining commitments from 2010, especially action
 5, and including the specification of agreed timelines for their completion;
 - Encourage NAS not to develop new types of weapons and further minimize role and significance of nuclear weapons in policies and doctrines;
 - Take note of reports submitted by the NAS in a common standard format and encourage more detailed and specific reports building upon their continuing efforts to further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence including through regular meetings;

- Further consider the devastation that would be visited upon all humankind by any use of nuclear weapons and not that there is no competent international capacity to address the resulting catastrophic humanitarian consequences;
- Reaffirm the language from 2010 about complying at all times with international law, including international humanitarian law; and
- Take note of the UNSG's five-point proposal for nuclear disarmament.

Practical steps

- The draft recommends that the 2015 RevCon should reaffirm the importance of various multilateral measures that can and should be taken, including:
 - Entry into force and measures consistent with the CTBT;
 - Negotiations of FMCT at the CD;
 - NSA discussions at the CD; and
 - Establishment of NWFZs.

Other measures

- The draft recommends the 2015 RevCon should consider additional measures, including those that would enhance confidence through improving transparency and developing efficient verification capabilities.
- It specifies implementation of relevant education initiatives and stresses the importance of regular reports.

Nuclear non-proliferation

• The nuclear non-proliferation recommendations are divided into recommendations for safeguards, export controls, and nuclear security.

Safeguards

- The draft recommends that the 2015 RevCon should underline the importance of further promoting nonproliferation commitments by:
 - Calling on the 12 remaining states to bring safeguards into force;
 - Calling on states with Small Quantities Protocols to amend or rescind them;
 - Calling on states without an Additional Protocol in place to conclude and bring it into force as soon as possible;



- Support the IAEA and provide political, technical, and financial support;
- Ensuring that CSAs are applied on all source or fissionable material; and
- Reaffirming the importance of addressing compliance matters for the integrity of the NPT and the authority of the IAEA safeguards system.

Export controls

- The draft recommends that the 2015 RevCon ensure that nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons in line with Articles I, II, and III of the NPT and the 1995 decision on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, including by:
- Encouraging states parties to make use of international guidelines for national export controls and

- to consider whether the recipient state has IAEA safeguards in force; and
- Encouraging the development and application of measures regarding nuclear exports in a transparent manner.

Nuclear security

- The draft recommends that the 2015 RevCon should consider measures intended to enhance effective physical protection of all nuclear material and nuclear facilities, including by:
 - Encouraging states to maintain the highest standards of security and physical protection;
 - Recognizing the central role of the IAEA;
 - Calling on states to adhere to and implement existing nuclear security instruments;

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CALENDAR OF EVENTS

When	What	Where	Who
8:00-8:50	Abolition Caucus	Room C Conference Building	Abolition 2000
9:00-9:50	Government briefing for NGOs: NPDI	Room C Conference Building	Reaching Critical Will
10:00-13:00	Change in Action: Over- coming Barriers to Non- Proliferation in the Middle East	Room C Conference Building	Heinrich Böll Foundation North America, James Martin Center for Non- proliferation Studies, and Nuclear Threat Initiative
11:00	Plenary	Trusteeship Council Chamber	
13:15-14:45	Nuclear disarmament through inter-parliamen- tary forums	Room C Conference Building	Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
13:15-14:30	International cooperation for the implementation of the United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)	Room B Conference Building	Permanent Mission of Spain to the UN and the Permanent Mission of Mexico to the UN
13:15-14:30	Innovating verification – briefing on the findings of NTI's verification pilot project	Room 7 North Lawn Building	Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) and the US Department of State
15:00-17:50	New ideas and initiatives	Room C Conference Building	Canadian Pugwash and Western University



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NPT NEWS IN REVIEW

Recommendations review, continued

- Promoting the entry into force of the 2005 CPPNM amendment; and
- Calling on states to join and participate in the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database.

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

- The PrepCom reaffirms that the NPT fosters the development of the so-called peaceful uses of nuclear energy and recalls that all states should act in conformity with all provisions of the treaty. It further reaffirms the outcomes of the 2010 RevCon and recommends that the 2015 RevCon should call on states parties to:
 - Respect each country's choices and decision in the field of so-called peaceful uses of nuclear energy;
 - Undertake to facilitate, and reaffirm the rights of stats parties to participate in exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information;
 - Cooperate in the further development of nuclear energy for so-called peaceful purposes;
 - Strengthen the IAEA technical cooperation programme and ensure its resources are "sufficient, assured and predictable;"
 - Ensure that the use of nuclear energy is accompanied by the implementation of safeguards as well as the highest level of safety and security;
 - Consider multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle;
 - Become party to the relevant nuclear safety conventions and instruments.;
 - Encourage steps to minimize stockpiles of HEU;
 - Transport radioactive materials consistent with international safety standards;
 - Bring into force a civil nuclear liability regime; and
 - Refrain from an armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under construction.

Regional issues

Middle East

 The draft indicates that the PrepCom reaffirms the importance of convening the 2012 conference

- without further delay—it subsequently specifies that it should be held later this year as soon as agreement is reached among states of the region on practical arrangements, with help from the facilitator and nuclear-armed states.
- It welcomes the letters from League of Arab States and Iran confirming their support for this issue.
- It notes disappointment on the postponement of the conference.
- It recommends that the 2015 RevCon reaffirm the implementation of the 1995 resolution in various ways and establish a subsidiary body in MCII.

Other regional issues

 The draft recommends the 2015 RevCon address the DPRK including by expressing concern and urging no more tests, a return to NPT and IAEA, fulfillment of obligations, and calling for resumption of diplomatic dialogue.

Other

Universality

 The draft recommends the 2015 RevCon should renew the call on India, Israel, and Pakistan to accede to treaty as NNWS, call upon DPRK to resume adherence to NPT, and call on South Sudan to accede.

Strengthened review process

 The draft recommends the 2015 RevCon should continue to examine ways and means of improving effectiveness and reducing costs.

Withdrawal

The draft recommends the 2015 RevCon should further discuss issues and consider responses regarding notice of withdrawal.



REPORT: BELIEF IN THE WMDFZ

Arianna Framvik Malik | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

Organized by PAX, BASIC, and the Israeli Disarmament Movement, this seminar discussed the obstacles and opportunities to holding the Helsinki conference and establishing the WMD free zone. Moderated by Wilbert van der Zeiden, senior researcher of disarmament and security at PAX, the panel consisted of Lianet Vazquez from BASIC, Ward Wilson, of the Rethinking Nuclear Weapons project, and Sharon Dolev of the Israeli Disarmament Movement.

Sharing an analytical perspective on the progress and challenges of the process, Lianet Vazquez stated that while the Glion meetings have been successful in getting key parties to come together and discuss the prospect of the conference, several challenges remain towards establishing the WMDFZ. One of these is the Israel's unwillingness to take part in a conference that only discusses disarmament and not other regional issues that are of Israel's concern. At the same time, the Arab states' unwillingness to meet the Israel demands of talking about conventional weapons and regional security concerns mirrors this problem. Another challenge is posed by Israel's argument that the conference is within the NPT framework and therefore does not apply to it.

Ward Wilson discussed how nuclear weapons operate as symbols. Because nuclear weapons are actually clumsy and messy weapons that leave a trail of poison behind whether you use them or not, the world needs to be reminded of this fact in order to be able to disarm. In reaching a WMDFZ, Wilson argued that the Middle Eastern parties needs to be reminded that nuclear weapons are symbols and that the value of symbols, much like money, can change overnight.

Sharon Dolev spoke of the need for a public discourse that questions and demands explanation as to why Israel keeps nuclear weapons. The discourse on these weapons today is being held by decision-makers in closed rooms where civil society is not able to critique it.

This lack of discourse is what led the Israeli Disarmament Movement (IDM) to conduct a roundtable discussion with the Israeli government. Through these talks, civil society was able to learn what the government officials had to say on the issue and to map out obstacles. Moving forward, IDM has more roundtable talks in the making. Civil society needs to think about what carrots can be given to make the zone attractive, while at the same time ardently show that business as usual will not be tolerated. •

REPORT: NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT

Mia Gandenberger | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

The Permanent Mission of the Netherlands held a briefing on the Nuclear Security Summit 2014 that had been held in The Hague, Netherlands, from 24–25 March.

Ambassador Piet de Klerk of the Netherlands explained that since the number of possible participants in the actual summit had been so limited, the Netherlands has obligated itself to reach out as much as possible to states that could not participate.

During the briefing, Ambassador de Klerk gave his assessment of the Summit and highlighted five aspects that enabled success. According to the Ambassador, the meeting had been well organized and no disturbances had occurred; the programme of the meeting had been organized in a wide-ranging manner that included a scenario based policy discussion and an informal plenary; a joint communiqué could be agreed on that developed the ideas of the first two summits; and the participants could agree on a set of joint initiatives they will work on until the next summit in 2016.

Another focus of the briefing was possible ways the NSS could feed into strengthening the NPT regime. Ambassador de Klerk, in particular focused on the 2010 NPT Action Plan and laid out how actions Action 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 60, 61, 62, and 63 had been addressed directly or indirectly by the communiqué or so-called gift baskets by groups of participating states.

After the briefing, several questions were raised by participants. Among other issues, the matter of including military stocks in the focus of the meeting as well as addressing nuclear disarmament were highlighted. In response to the latter, Ambassador Clerk reminded participants that if disarmament is achieved there will be an increased stockpile of nuclear material as a result from extracting it. Therefore, nuclear security remains vital also in that context. With regard to the inclusion of military stockpiles, he pointed towards diverging views of the states participating in the summit. The Ambassador also highlighted a gift basket that had been initiated by Brazil that tried to create linkages to nuclear disarmament.

The next summit to be held in the US in 2016 will most likely be the last summit of its kind. •



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REPORT: ADVANCING UN APPROACHES TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Gabriella Irsten | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

The event was the official launch of the joint initiative Unfold Zero, established by Prague Vision, PNND, Basel Peace Office, Mayors for Peace, and Aotearoa Lawyers for Peace. The initiative is a platform for United Nations (UN) initiatives and actions with the aim to unfold the path to zero nuclear weapons through effective steps and measures facilitated by the UN General Assembly, UN Security Council, UN Secretary-General, and other UN bodies.

The panel consisted of Virgina Gamba, Director of the UN office for Disarmament Affairs, Daniel Simanjuntak, Permanent Mission of Indonesia, and Alyn Ware of the Basel Peace Office. The event discussed the different UN processes, how they have developed over the years, and how the processes taking shape outside the UN can contribute or replace the lack of progress within the UN.

Ms. Gamba emphasised that the UN's disarmament processes have been more focused on regulating armaments then actual disarmament. She said that nno legislative policy or planned deadlines from the nuclear-armed states (NAS) exist. This, Ms. Gamba emphasised, could not be blamed on the UN, as that would be like "blaming the thermostat when it is too warm". She argued that banning nuclear weapons without the nuclear-armed states will help stigmatize these weap-

ons though she concluded that the NAS are necessary for elimination. She argued that in order to change the status quo, the process will have to be more focused on the domestic then on the diplomatic level, where citizens of NAS can demand their governments disarm. This last point was also echoed by many in the audience during the Q&A session, where NAS-based organizations explained what they were doing to change the discourse in their respective countries and what more is needed to pushing their governments to disarm.

Mr. Simanjuntak agreed that civil society has a great role to play, including in encouraging stocks in any future fissile material treaty and to promoting the CTBT's entry into force. He also stressed the importance of civil society's work to prevent NAS solidarity. He explained that a NAS unified position helps maintain the status quo. He also highlighted the ideas for non-NAS to criminalize nuclear weapons, meaning that any funding or support of nuclear weapons programmes would be illegal.

Alyn Ware emphasised the importance of the NAM resolution UNGA 68/32 on convening a high level meeting (HLM) on nuclear disarmament. He also highlighted any follow- up to the open-ended working group as a potential interest for the platform important for nuclear disarmament. •

Nuclear disarmament through

inter-parliamentary forums

Parliamentarians play key roles to adopt legislation, shape policy, decide on budgets and ensure government accountability on issues relating to nuclear disarmament. This event will focus on follow-up to **resolutions in the Inter Parliamentary Union** and **Parliamentary Assembly of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe**, the relevance for governments and the opportunities for civil society.

Thursday May 8 | 13:15-14:45 | Room C, United Nations

Chair: **Jonathan Granoff**, Global Security Institute Speakers:

- > **Paddy Torsney**, UN Representative of the Inter Parliamentary Union
- > Hedy Fry MP (Canada), Member of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly
- > Bill Kidd MSP (Scotland), PNND Co-President
- > Alyn Ware, PNND Global Coordinator



Sponsored by Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (PNND), World Future Council and the Global Security Institute

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REPORT: NPT AND NATO

Alexandra Hiniker | PAX

Four presenters addressed NPT and NATO: The Implications of Alliance Membership for the NPT at the session organized by Canadian Pugwash and Western University on Thursday afternoon.

On behalf of Hon. Douglas Roche, O.C., who was not able to attend, moderator Erika Simpson of Canadian Pugwash delivered remarks examining NATO's conduct in the context of the commitment made by NATO countries to the NPT, asserting that NATO's doctrine has in fact not budged. Hon. Roche referred to the double standard of reaffirming commitments to the NPT goal of nuclear disarmament while also maintaining dependence on nuclear weapons. He highlighted that waiting for the world to become a perfectly peaceful place before abolishing nuclear weapons misses the point that it is precisely the maintenance of nuclear weapons that prevents conditions necessary for this peace to happen.

Paul Meyer from the Simons Foundation next spoke about how NATO in its policy and practice supports the fundamentals of the NPT, but that this was undermined by having an ethos that has long favoured military over political interests. He also suggested that NATO should look into remedial steps to enforce compliance across all three pillars, and must prepare itself to carry out the role it says it wants to play in the NPT.

Wilbert van der Zeijden of PAX addressed how NATO member states approach the NPT. He presented the tension between the NATO consensus agreements and the national debates in some NATO countries on tactical nuclear weapon and on the humanitarian approach. He challenged the idea proposed by some NATO states that a ban treaty would be incompatible with NATO policy. Mr. van der Zeijden clarified that NATO countries are individually accountable to the NPT. He finished with the point that a world without nuclear weapons would benefit NATO members' security in two ways, vis-à-vis potential adversaries and in terms of security of the alliance citizens.

Rick Wayman of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation argued that NATO nuclear practice conflicts with nuclear disarmament and ending the nuclear arms race because it encourages proliferation by others. He referenced the huge expense of new nuclear-capable delivery vehicles, which creates the incentive to keep the weapons, since states will naturally want to use items in which they have invested money. Mr. Wayman added that policies such as simply letting current aircraft expire are insufficient and that more good faith efforts are required. •

REPORT: NWC SIMULATION PART II

Regina Hagen | INESAP

On Tuesday, students from two German universities continued the simulated negotiation of Article I, Obligations, of the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) (see yesterday's NIR, page 7, for a report on the first day.) Under the chairmanship of Alyn Ware, who was succeeded by Erika Simpson in the afternoon, the delegates of 13 countries revisited some of the most contentious issues.

In particular the draft obligation to destroy stragetic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles provoked heated debate. A technical expert briefed participants on the inherent dual-use capabilities of ICBMs, ways to convert them, e.g. for use as space launchers, verification methods for such conversion, the problem of re-conversibility for military use, and the associated costs. Some states voiced concerns about the implications of destruction, stating the obligation to destroy all strategic delivery vehicles would invalidate a large part of their military investments at home, in international waters, and at military bases around the world. In the end, the conference agreed "to negotiate in good faith a treaty aimed towards the destruction or conversion of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, led by a commission of experts" in parallel to NWC negotations.

The WMD-free zone in the Middle East and the lack of trust among countries from the region also played a major role. Egypt caused some confusion with its demand that Israel must first join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state before an NWC could enter into force. Other countries brokered a compromise, and it was decided "to establish a regional agency to supervise the disarmament process in the Middle East."

Delegates agreed on the need for a comprehensive verification mechanism and deplored the lack of techniques to i.e. verify non-existence of small numbers of nuclear warheads and small quantities of proscribed nuclear material. They therefore decided to "establish a standing conference in order to promote resesarch on new and enhanced verification mechanisms."

Very realistically, the delegations further agreed that all obligations "shall not be interpreted to prohibit the peaceful use of nuclear energy, therefore, ways to limit threats of proscribed fissionable material from civil reactors should be sought in the process of nuclear disarmament."

Who would have expected that students with no prior knowledge of nuclear weapons or the NPT would internalize countries' positions so realistically after only one week of participation in the NPT PrepCom? •



MEMO TO ALL UMBRELLA DWELLERS: BE A PART OF THE SOLUTION, NOT THE PROBLEM



