Rhianna Tyson, Project Associate
The Conference on Disarmament’s 2004 session opened in Geneva on January 20th. Kenya holds the presidency with Ambassador Amina Mohamed presiding. She is the second consecutive female CD president, taking up the arduous task after Japan’s Ambassador Kuniko Inoguchi.
In addition to adopting by consensus its agenda for the 2004 session (document CD/WP.533) and approving the requests from Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Georgia, Greece and Jordan to join the work of the Conference as non-members, the Conference also heard a statement from Syria’s Ambassador Mikhail Wehbe on its opening day.
Invoking the recent GA resolution 58 of December 2003, Ambassador Wehbe reiterated the call for a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East. He also reiterated the widely held desire for a binding instrument for Negative Security Assurances (NSAs) for Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS).
It is hoped that if the long-idle CD begins substantive work this year, it will begin negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. One of the longstanding points of contention on an FMCT is the issue of “existing stocks.” Some States, mainly Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), believe that any treaty that works to ban fissile materials should first concentrate on halting their future production. In the words of U.K. Ambassador David Broucher, we must “first shut off the water tap" of production, before we can start negotiating ceilings on stockpiles. In its statement to the CD on January 20, Syria stated the opposing view, held by many NNWS, that a future treaty on fissile materials should also include capping the existing stockpiles of such materials.
On Thursday, January 29, Iran, France, Morocco, Colombia, Slovakia and Algeria took the floor.
Faced with the ongoing inactivity of the CD, many Member States are sending high-level delegates to Geneva, with the intent of raising the political visibility and pressure on that august body. The Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Kamal Kharazzi, delivered Iran’s first statement to the 2004 session.
Mr. Kharazzi outlined the current political climate, defining it as one marked by a “change in the nature of threat perceptions” and a “further militarization of the international arena.” It is an appropriate reminder to the world’s sole body for disarmament negotiations that, as Mr. Kharazzi flatly stated, “Increased militarism does not necessary translate into increased security.” At a time when measures to combat weapons proliferation are increasingly failing to incorporate disarmament measures as an integral part of nonproliferation efforts, Mr. Kharazzi argued that, “Militarization has a decisive role in the existence and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It threatens international peace and security.”
“Nuclear disarmament,” said the Minister, “should necessarily be the focus of any attempt here. It is an embarrassment that nuclear weapons still exist in defiance to human civilization’s quest.” He claimed that the 13 Steps of the NPT 2000 Review Conference have been "put on ice," and that the “unverifiable, limited” bilateral agreements between NWS are “devoid of effective international guarantees for irreversibility.” While recognizing that his call for “political will” in the CD was just one of many, he urged the “introduction of new ideas” so that we can “comprehend the prerequisites of such a political will.”
Mr. Kharazzi concluded his statement by asserting Iran’s “inalienable right to nuclear technology” as a Party to the NPT. He maintained that Iran is working with the fullest measures of transparency possible, despite the “illegal active campaign to deprive Iran of its right” to nuclear technology. The December signing of the IAEA Additional Protocol is just one more demonstration of Iran’s commitment to “the NPT to protect our supreme interests in a secure environment while ensuring our sustainable development.”
Where Mr. Kharazzi saw a “change in the nature of threat perceptions”, France’s Ambassador François Rivasseau asserted that the present international situation has indeed changed and necessitated new issues and methods of work. Terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are “two asymmetrical menaces which have changed the strategic equation.” Nonetheless, he insisted that new measures taken in the field of disarmament should not be underestimated.
Morocco’s Ambassador Omar Hilale deplored the CD’s infamous stalemate, and asserted that his country would not “resign itself to this fate.” In addition to terrorism and WMD proliferation, Morocco added “the double standard of the perception” of WMD to the list of “new and complex threats.”
Ambassador Clemencia Forero Ucrós of Colombia, made her statement from “the modest perspective of a NNWS,” one that is a member of a continent-wide Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. She noted Colombia’s participation in the Ottawa Process, the Small Arms Plan of Action, as well as the past contributions to the CD made by her predecessor, Ambassador Reyes.
Ambassador Kalman Petocz stressed Slovakia’s prioritization of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty as a starting point for the CD’s work in the new year. He also noted that Colombia’s national instrument of ratification of the Convention on the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) is in transit to the Secretary-General.
Finally, Ambassador Nassima Baghli of Algeria, as one of the Five Ambassadors whose proposal for an agenda is ever closer to adoption, voiced her pleasure at the “great support” that the A5 proposal has received.
This is the first advisory on the Conference on Disarmament for the 2004 session. All available statements are posted at:http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches04/index04.html.
At the moment, not all statements delivered are available in English. We are trying to obtain English-versions of all of the statements delivered since the CD’s opening on January 20th. In the meanwhile, we apologize for any inconvenience.
All CD Advisories are archived at: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches04/advisories.html. All advisories from last year’s sessions, including a summary of statements by topic, are available at:http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/alerts.html.
All press releases from UNOG are available at: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/press04/pressindex.html.
To read a summary of the A5 proposal see: http://www.unog.ch/news2/documents/newsen/dc0304e.htm.
For more on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty see:
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com03/FCM/finalreport.html#fissmat
For more on Nuclear Weapon Free Zones see: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/politicalindex.html andhttp://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com03/FCM/finalreport.html#NWFZ
For more on Negative Security Assurances in the First Committee see:http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com03/FCM/wk4.htm#NSA
See also the Reaching Critical Will Guide to the Conference on Disarmament, updated in September 2003:http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/cdbook.pdf.
As always, we welcome all comments, questions, concerns, or suggestions.
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The Conference on Disarmament (CD) held a plenary discussion on compliance and verification of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) on the 19th of May, followed by two informals on the same subject. The Democratic Peoples’s Republic of Korea, Mexico, theUnited States, Japan, Iran, Australia and South Africa made plenary statements, primarily on verification and compliance.
Following their introduction of a draft treaty on fissile materials on Thursday, the United States introduced a white paper outlining their policy on the FMCT on Friday. US Charge d'Affairs Thomas Cynkin made it clear that the US is ready to start negotiations with an ”aim to conclude a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty as soon as possible.”
Unfortunately, the US is still at odds with nearly the entire Conference on verification and compliance, reiterating that ”so-called effective verification of an FMCT cannot be achieved.” Reportedly during the informal sessions, experts from around the world tried to convince the US otherwise. However, in its public statement, the US held that ”Even with extensive verification mechanisms and provisions – so extensive that they could compromise the core national security interests of key signatories, and so costly that many countries would be hesitant to implement them—, we still would not have high confidence in our ability to monitor compliance with an FMCT.” Later in the white paper, the US said that not only would negotiating verification provisions prolong ”a difficult enough task”, it would actually be ”dangerous” by providing ”a false sense of security”.
In the plenary session South Africa asserted verification of a treaty on fissile materials would be realistic and effective, and identified three elements of a potential verification system. These three elements would deal with 1) facilities previously used for production of fissile materials, 2) weapons grade materials that have been declared as excess, and 3) non-weapons materials, including down-blended materials and materials for non-weapons purposes.
South Africa also promoted the Internatioanl Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the most logical entity to be entrusted with the Treaty's verification because it has expertise and experience in dealing with safeguards and verification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It would also probably be more costly to create a new verification entity than to utilize the IAEA. Because the effectiveness of a treaty on fissile materials would depend on sufficient funds for verification, ”One could therefore argue that the willingness of State Parties to provide funding for the verification of an FMT will be a real test of its practical effect,” said South Africa's Mr Johann Kellerman.
Japan offered two approaches to dealing with verification, looking first at what type of verification is required, dependent on the type of fissile materials ban, and second at whether such verification is feasible. Japan also mentioned that many CD members, including Japan, would have more questions for the US experts that explained the US position on verification in the CD two years ago.
Iran's Mr Hamid Eslamizad quoted their Minister of Foreign Affairs, HE Mr. Mottaki, from his March 30 statement to the CD: ”A treaty on fissile materials should be verifiable in order to be capable of creating confidence. By the term verifiable we mean that the treaty needs to have sufficiently elaborated provisions on its verification mechanism.”
Mexico pointed out that verification is essentional in any treaty, but most important in a disarmament treaty. The sole outcome of an instrument without an effective verification mechanism is a norm that may or may not be observed. Ambassador Pablo Macedo also recalled the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference's call for the CD to initiate negotiations on this matter, meaning ”This mandate is not an option, it is an obligation.”
Australia suggested a step by step approach to the issue as a compromise. Mr. Russel Leslie said the first step is to secure the acceptance of the norm against the new production of Fissile Material for use of weapons by the recognized Nuclear Weapon States and the non members of NPT. The next step would be in the context of verification discussions.
Some of the states also commented on exsisting stocks. The US firmely stated what they made clear in their draft treaty, that ”stocks of already existing fissile material would be unaffected by the FMCT”. Mexico shared South Africa's May 18 concern that ”Even banning future production of fissile material, one could use exsisting ones to build new weapons.” Mexican Ambassador Pablo Macedo said a treaty not covering existing stocks would only be an arms control measure, not a disarmament one. Iran had ”serious doubts on how a treaty on fissile materials could serve the nuclear disarmament cause without covering the vast stocks which could easily be used for development of new and new types of nuclear weapons.”
Iran also stated that a program of work should include all four core issues (FMCT, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, nuclear disarmament, and Negative Security Assurances) and enjoy consensus.
The Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea made a statement primarily focused on their nuclear situation, not the FMCT. ”It is not that we put our fate at all on the Six-Party Talks. We defend our security ourselves. We have possesed the nuclear deterrence commensurate with the character of the threat against us.” However, the DPRK stated that if the US demonstrates the political will to abide by the Joint Statement (9.19 Joint Statement by the Six-party Talks) and puts it into action, they will rejoin the NPT. ”We withdrew from the NPT, not because there is any problem with the NPT itself, but because the US misused it as a tool to infringe upon our supreme interests.”
On the FMCT, the DPRK appropriated the May 18 US terminology accussing some CD members of taking the FMCT hostage to other issues, when it responded, ”The CD is not the forum serving unilateral interests of one country. The CD can’t be a hostage to one country.”
The conference will hold its next plenary meeting on Monday 22 May at 3 pm.
-Jennifer Nordstrom, Reaching Critical Will and
Beatrice Fihn, Disarmament and Economic Justice Intern
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
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Still nothing. Attending Conference on Disarmament (CD) sessions is comparable to watching an animal slowly bleed to death, complete with delegates' eyes rolling back in their heads. At this morning’s plenary, CD President Ambassador Bonnier of Sweden again summarized the situation before the Conference. CD Document L.1, the outcome of the lengthy process of substantive discussions during the first session, has now been on the table for three months. Most delegations are ready to proceed, but others continue to ask for “clarity, more clarity and again more clarity,” she said. Ambassador Bonnier pointed to the Complementary Presidential Statement (CRP.5) and the Draft Decision clarifying the relationship between CRP.5 and L.1 as examples of clarity given, and asked delegations with reservations to respond to this package with similar clarity. “Decision-time is upon us,” Ambassador Bonnier said.
Out of respect for delegations that still require more time, Ambassador Bonnier did not ask the Conference to take a decision today. Out of respect for delegations that are eager to move forward, however, Ambassador Bonnier will ask the Conference to take a decision on the L.1 proposal and the accompanying CRP.5 in a special plenary session, this Thursday, June 21.
India was the only delegation to speak at this morning’s plenary. While India felt that L.1, CRP.5, and the additional Draft Decision had addressed some of the concerns expressed by delegations, India stated that the “creative” way of linking the documents proposed by Ambassador Bonnier in the Draft Decision “falls somewhat short of integrating them fully.” India said it preferred a single, unitary document containing L.1, CRP.5, and the Draft Decision, “arranged logically and sequentially in a simple, neat, coherent, and integrated text, articulating a unitary and unified understanding.” This would have “the additional merit of avoiding a multiplicity of documentation and unnecessary speculation regarding the comparative import of the three elements,” India added.
India emphasized the need for clarity and for a “clear understanding of fundamentals, so as to ensure the smooth conduct of negotiation once the Conference has adopted its decision.” India stated it has sought clarification on the mandates being assigned to various coordinators, in particular with regards to an FMCT, and emphasized the need for a universal, non-discriminatory, internationally verifiable instrument.
As we wait impatiently for a decision on Thursday, we wonder if the CD will go out with a bang, a whimper, or a surprise miraculous recovery.
The next plenary meeting will be Thursday, June 21 at 10am.
-Katherine Harrison, Disarmament Intern, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
See the Reaching Critical Will website for:
- all statements delivered to the CD;
- all CD Reports, including this one;
- press releases from UNOG;
- the Reaching Critical Will Guide to the CD;
- Other background information on the Conference
and more
