Incoming rotating President Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü of Turkey opened the Conference on Disarmament (CD) session and gave a general outline of the schedule of activities for the Conference during Turkey’s term. Germany’s delegate was the only representative to deliver a statement during the session; he spoke about the draft treaty on preventing the placement of weapons in outer space introduced by the Russian Foreign Minister last week.
Ambassador Üzümcü welcomed the second round of informal discussions on the CD’s agenda items, scheduled to begin today under in the organizational framework introduced during Ambassador Labidi’s presidency. He intends to devote the final week of his term to an evaluation of progress by the agenda item coordinators. He also explained that he plans to “pursue intensive consultations” toward “the possibility of a consensus building on the Presidential Proposal crafted by last year’s Presidents.” Ambassador Üzümcü also mentioned that the Human Rights Council will hold its high-level segment in Geneva during the first week of March, during which time he would like senior political figures, who will already be in the city, to address the CD.
Ambassador Bernhard Brasack of Germany welcomed the draft treaty on preventing the placement of weapons in outer space introduced by Russia’s Foreign Minister. He argued, “Clear delimitations between purely peaceful uses and distinct military uses have become a meaningless fiction. Just as an example: Space tracking and surveillance capabilities for monitoring debris, following satellites for avoiding potential collisions, inherently also have a potential for offensive space applications.” With this in mind, Ambassador Brasack suggested elaboration through discussion on three issues “not yet sufficiently covered by the draft”: the relationship between a potential new instrument and the existing ones, particularly the Outer Space Treaty; the dangers posed by the development and testing of anti-satellite weapons; and compliance and verification mechanisms. He also remarked, however, that “meaningful discussions” in the CD on space security issues “will only be possible if the CD agrees to a Programme of Work.”
Although little has been said in the formal sessions of the CD on the draft treaty submitted by Russia, discussions on agenda item three, prevention of an arms race in outer space, will be held during the informal session on Thursday.
The upcoming US anti-satellite maneuver
Delegates to the CD have also not yet mentioned the US announcement to disable a failed satellite carrying a half-ton of hydrazine rocket fuel (a toxic chemical) by shooting it down with a Standard Missile-3, whose primary vocation is interceptor for the US Navy’s missile defense system. This incident highlights one of the deficiencies of the draft treaty proposed by Russia and China, which does not address attacks from ground- or sea-based interceptors such as the SM-3. It has also evoked criticism from many space security experts, who have vocalized two primary concerns.
One concern is the debris. While Marine Corps Gen. James E. Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said most of the debris will come down within two orbits, Jeffrey Lewis of the New America Foundation said, “modeling of debris creation isn’t an exact science,” arguing, “the debris that the light-weight interceptor will kick into higher orbits when it hits the massive (bus-sized) satellite” will remain in orbit, posing a risk to the International Space Station.
The second, but no lesser, concern is the political implications of conducting what amounts to an anti-satellite test. The US administration has argued the test is not the same as the Chinese anti-satellite test in January 2007, which it condemned. The US government says the Chinese test was “designed specifically” to test the ability to destroy satellites, and argues that its own plan is only aimed at protecting civilians on the ground. However, the Russian Defence Ministry asserted the US plan is “in many ways close” to China’s test, arguing, “The impression arises that the United States is trying to use the accident with its satellite to test its national anti-missile defence system as a means of destroying satellites.” Bruce Gagnon, Coordinator of the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space, likewise argued, “The Bush administration is magnifying the risk to justify the testing of new dangerous and provocative offensive space warfare technologies.” Jeffrey Lewis also argued that the “deck is stacked” in favour of shooting down the satellite, pointing out the administration’s worst case scenario for intercepting the satellite is that they miss, “not that they are wrong about the debris estimates or how much debris would reenter with a successful intercept,” while they have considered the worst case for the tank of hydrazine coming down into a populated area from which people cannot evacuate.
For a government that pours millions of dollars into its potential dual-use missile defense and space technology each year and is openly hostile toward a ban on attacks against space objects and on weapons in space, the decision to use some of that equipment, on grounds which have been described by most experts as ill-considered at best, gives the impression that the US military is just looking for an excuse to test its offensive space capabilities and demonstrate its military dominance.
Informal discussion on nuclear disarmament
During informal discussions today on nuclear disarmament, Ambassador Hans Dahlgren of Sweden delivered a statement on behalf of Chile, New Zealand, Nigeria, Sweden, and Switzerland on de-alerting nuclear weapon systems. During the 2007 General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, these five states introduced a draft resolution called “Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems,” inspired by the recommendations of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission. The resolution was adopted by the First Committee (124-3-34) and the General Assembly (139-3-36), with France, the United Kingdom, and the United States voting against it each time. Ambassador Dahlgren emphasized that de-alerting is was one of the thirteen practical steps agreed to at the 2000 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, that it would signal the nuclear weapon states take their obligations seriously in the lead up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference, that it “can be achieved easily,” and that it “brings us further on the path to reducing nuclear dangers.”
Ambassador Dahlgren indicated that his group has carefully considered the views of those states who were not ready to support the initiative last year. He said they are looking forward to constructive dialogue on the issue, but “would prefer not to repeat a debate on terminology.” He explained, “What we ask for is a change of deployment practices. With a view to today’s security policy threats, we would see a significant increase in security and confidence if none of the States possessing nuclear weapons would have the capacities or policies to launch its missiles within a few minutes.”
Cluster munitions
The plenary was less-attended than usual, as many CD delegates are currently in Wellington, New Zealand for the latest preparatory conference of the Oslo Process, an international initiative to ban cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians, to assist survivors and affected communities, and to ensure clearance of their land. More than 150 representatives from 50 countries are there along with over 100 non-governmental organization representatives from 42 countries. The conference will result in a draft treaty text that states will agree to negotiate in Dublin, Ireland during the next stage of the Process from 19–30 May 2008. See the Cluster Munitions Coalition, www.stopclustermunitions.org, for more information. The issue of a ban on cluster munitions was taken out of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in early 2007 when it became clear that progress on the issue would be painstakingly slow.
On Wednesday, informal sessions will focus on agenda items one and two, and Thursday’s informal session will focus on agenda items three and four. There will be no formal sessions on Thursday.
The next formal plenary is scheduled for Tuesday, 26 February at 10am.
- Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will
- Sandra Fong, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom
States parties to the Ottawa Convention, or Mine Ban Treaty, will meet for the 18th Meeting of States Parties (18MSP) from 16-20 November in Geneva, Switzerland. Visit the website of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines for more information and coverage.
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The United States introduced a draft Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty and a draft mandate for negotiating it in this morning's May 18th discussion on existing stocks during the week of the Conference on Disarmament's focused debate on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). US Acting Assistant Secretary of International Security and Nonproliferation Stephen Rademaker traveled to the Conference topresent the draft treaty. Following the introduction, the CD paused its speaking list to give delegations an opportunity to react to what Ambassador Landman of the Netherlands called “possibly the most important statement in 3/4/5/6 years.” India, United Kingdom, Iran, the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, Australia, Italy, Japan, Spain, France, Pakistan, Germany, Venezuela, Chile, Belgium, China, Russia, Bulgaria, Algeria, and Canada reacted to the draft treaty, mandate and statement. All welcomed the statement and text as a sign of US engagement with the CD, even if many were not fully satisfied with its content.
The Text
The draft treaty does not include existing stocks or provisions for verification. The draft mandate is “to negotiate a non-discriminatory and multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devises,” leaving out “internationally and effectively verifiable” from the previously agreed-upon Shannon Mandate for an FMCT. The draft treaty requires the ratification of the five recognized Nuclear Weapon States (China, France, Russia, the UK and the US) to enter into force and includes a withdrawal provision. Interestingly, Assistant Secretary Rademaker proposed either an ad hoc committee, or this plenary, begin negotiations. He also suggested they aim to approve a text by the end of this 2006 CD session.
As delegations only received the text this morning, most were not able to officially comment on specifics because they must send the draft to their capitols, but were interested in further discussions. Algeria, Australia, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Pakistan, and Russia hoped the negotiating mandate and draft treaty were a flexible starting point for negotiations that “will help us to strike a balance” among differing positions, as Algeria said. Germany was “happy about some elements of flexibility in the mandate and draft proposal.” Pakistan hoped neither the text nor the US statement were “intended to support the notion that it is a take it or leave it document” and Russian said the draft treaty was “not the final word” on such a treaty, hoping it was open for comments and ideas.
Australia, Belgium, and the Netherlands were particularly concerned about the lack of verification in the draft treaty, although all agreed with the Netherlands who said “it seems we should, can and will discuss that” in negotiations. Even Pakistan, who has long held that “the agreed upon negotiating mandate [Shannon Mandate] cannot be called preconditions”, today said that “we believe all issues can be raised once negotiations start.” Although Australia holds that an effective FMCT should contain verification measures, it believes the treaty could contain states' commitments, followed by secondary agreements on verification, similar to the process of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty's initial commitments followed by secondary agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Possibilities for Beginning Negotiations
As discussed yesterday, the CD must agree by consensus on a program of work to establish the Ad Hoc Committees that negotiate treaties, and has been unable to agree for ten years. Many delegations expressed hope today that the draft text and mandate would provide momentum and/or the opportunity to “bring the Conference back to negotiating mode” in the words of Italy. Some, like Spain and the UK, recommended dropping the links among the CD's four core issues in order to begin work, while others, like China, suggested the CD “speedily begin work on an FMCT, the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), nuclear disarmament, and Negative Security Assurances.” Belgium, Bulgaria and France were ready to begin negotiations “immediately”, “right away”, and “today”, respectively. Russia said the introduction of a draft FMCT text “cannot serve as an obstacle to our work on other issues”, and Venezuela said that if a program of work is to be adopted it “must address the concerns of all States Parties.”
The compromise Five Ambassadors' proposal for a program of work with Ad Hoc Committees on each of the four core CD issues has been rejected by the US, who only wants to work on a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty. Although all the other CD members agreed to the Five Ambassadors' compromise, Rademaker said, “a package approach will never work.” He called the linkage among the issues “unconscionable hostage-taking... by proponents of less worthy ideas”. The US saw no need for new agreements on outer space, nuclear disarmament, or security assurances.
Canada and the Netherlands both suggested a more compromising attitude. The Netherlands, reacting to the US characterization of linking issues as hostage-taking, advised that “in practice... insisting on not talking about anything but an FMCT is exactly the same approach as insisting on multiple subjects.” Canada reminded the Conference that the Five Ambassadors' proposal contains a negotiating mandate for an FMCT, but only discussion mandates for the other three subjects. “Americans do not usually shy away from a good debate,” said Canadian Ambassador Meyer. “If the US would signal a willingness to engage, secure in the knowledge they would not advance to negotiations without explicit US approval, it would make an important contribution to bringing this body back to productive channels.”
The text is indeed an opportunity. Although the Conference may not be able to agree by the end of the session, it should be able to use this text, in combination with the timetable of scheduled discussions on all the issues, to find a way to begin working.
The US and Iran
Rademaker's speech also accused Iran of having less than peaceful intentions with its nuclear program, and said “the US expects Security Council to live up to its responsibility to address the threat posed by Iran's nuclear program. It will be a defeat for effective multilateralism should the Council fail to live up to this responsibility.” Iran responded to Rademaker's list of reasons why Iran's nuclear program is not logically about energy independence by recalling the timeline of US accusations about weapons of mass destruction leading up to its invasion of Iraq, telling the Conference “not to take [the US's] words as real facts, and recalling that the International Atomic Energy Agency had found no diversion of nuclear materials to weapons purposes in Iran.
New US Ambassador to the CD
Assistant Secretary Rademaker announced the new US Ambassador to the CD as a sign of the US intention to begin negotiations, and followed it with the veiled threat that hopefully the former Assistant Secretary of State for Asian Affairs Christina Rocca would not “be the last US Ambassador to the CD.”
Back to Our Regularly Scheduled Speakers
Following the discussion of the draft treaty and negotiating mandate, South Africa, Brazil and Nigeria spoke. Egypt addressed the Conference at its afternoon session devoted to “any other FMCT matters”.
South Africa offered that its experience destroying its nuclear program and the following International Atomic Energy Agencyinvestigations would give some insights for FMCT verification. Egypt said compliance must be strict and with guarantees, requiring a complete inventory of stockpiles in all states, including Nuclear Weapon States and states that are not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Nigeria pointed out that “In other disarmament instruments stockpiles, verification and compliance mechanisms have been incorporated because of their importance in achieving the set of objectives of such instruments. Why should these elements not be considered in our work on fissile material?”
All four supported including existing stockpiles in an FMCT as a step towards nuclear disarmament. South Africa said because stockpiled material could be used for the production of future nuclear weapons, in order for an FMT to be truly credible, in should include stockpiles in its scope: “It is clear that a complete halt in the production of fissile material would leave enough of the material available to further increase – and not decrease – the number of nuclear weapons.” Egypt said not including existing stocks in an FMCT would not reflect the majority of states' wish to reach complete nuclear disarmament. “The fact that certain countries insist on excluding stockpiles from the scope of the treaty is not in conformity with the spirit of the NPT,” they added.
Brazil stated that the scope of an FMCT must clearly be defined in order to preserve the inalienable right of States to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
Next Meeting
The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held tomorrow morning, with a focused debate on compliance. The afternoon session will address verification.
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