Editorial: Getting from rhetoric to reality
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will
Editorial: The humanitarian pledge
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF
The Conference on Disarmament (CD) held a plenary discussion on compliance and verification of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) on the 19th of May, followed by two informals on the same subject. The Democratic Peoples’s Republic of Korea, Mexico, theUnited States, Japan, Iran, Australia and South Africa made plenary statements, primarily on verification and compliance.
Following their introduction of a draft treaty on fissile materials on Thursday, the United States introduced a white paper outlining their policy on the FMCT on Friday. US Charge d'Affairs Thomas Cynkin made it clear that the US is ready to start negotiations with an ”aim to conclude a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty as soon as possible.”
Unfortunately, the US is still at odds with nearly the entire Conference on verification and compliance, reiterating that ”so-called effective verification of an FMCT cannot be achieved.” Reportedly during the informal sessions, experts from around the world tried to convince the US otherwise. However, in its public statement, the US held that ”Even with extensive verification mechanisms and provisions – so extensive that they could compromise the core national security interests of key signatories, and so costly that many countries would be hesitant to implement them—, we still would not have high confidence in our ability to monitor compliance with an FMCT.” Later in the white paper, the US said that not only would negotiating verification provisions prolong ”a difficult enough task”, it would actually be ”dangerous” by providing ”a false sense of security”.
In the plenary session South Africa asserted verification of a treaty on fissile materials would be realistic and effective, and identified three elements of a potential verification system. These three elements would deal with 1) facilities previously used for production of fissile materials, 2) weapons grade materials that have been declared as excess, and 3) non-weapons materials, including down-blended materials and materials for non-weapons purposes.
South Africa also promoted the Internatioanl Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the most logical entity to be entrusted with the Treaty's verification because it has expertise and experience in dealing with safeguards and verification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It would also probably be more costly to create a new verification entity than to utilize the IAEA. Because the effectiveness of a treaty on fissile materials would depend on sufficient funds for verification, ”One could therefore argue that the willingness of State Parties to provide funding for the verification of an FMT will be a real test of its practical effect,” said South Africa's Mr Johann Kellerman.
Japan offered two approaches to dealing with verification, looking first at what type of verification is required, dependent on the type of fissile materials ban, and second at whether such verification is feasible. Japan also mentioned that many CD members, including Japan, would have more questions for the US experts that explained the US position on verification in the CD two years ago.
Iran's Mr Hamid Eslamizad quoted their Minister of Foreign Affairs, HE Mr. Mottaki, from his March 30 statement to the CD: ”A treaty on fissile materials should be verifiable in order to be capable of creating confidence. By the term verifiable we mean that the treaty needs to have sufficiently elaborated provisions on its verification mechanism.”
Mexico pointed out that verification is essentional in any treaty, but most important in a disarmament treaty. The sole outcome of an instrument without an effective verification mechanism is a norm that may or may not be observed. Ambassador Pablo Macedo also recalled the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference's call for the CD to initiate negotiations on this matter, meaning ”This mandate is not an option, it is an obligation.”
Australia suggested a step by step approach to the issue as a compromise. Mr. Russel Leslie said the first step is to secure the acceptance of the norm against the new production of Fissile Material for use of weapons by the recognized Nuclear Weapon States and the non members of NPT. The next step would be in the context of verification discussions.
Some of the states also commented on exsisting stocks. The US firmely stated what they made clear in their draft treaty, that ”stocks of already existing fissile material would be unaffected by the FMCT”. Mexico shared South Africa's May 18 concern that ”Even banning future production of fissile material, one could use exsisting ones to build new weapons.” Mexican Ambassador Pablo Macedo said a treaty not covering existing stocks would only be an arms control measure, not a disarmament one. Iran had ”serious doubts on how a treaty on fissile materials could serve the nuclear disarmament cause without covering the vast stocks which could easily be used for development of new and new types of nuclear weapons.”
Iran also stated that a program of work should include all four core issues (FMCT, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, nuclear disarmament, and Negative Security Assurances) and enjoy consensus.
The Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea made a statement primarily focused on their nuclear situation, not the FMCT. ”It is not that we put our fate at all on the Six-Party Talks. We defend our security ourselves. We have possesed the nuclear deterrence commensurate with the character of the threat against us.” However, the DPRK stated that if the US demonstrates the political will to abide by the Joint Statement (9.19 Joint Statement by the Six-party Talks) and puts it into action, they will rejoin the NPT. ”We withdrew from the NPT, not because there is any problem with the NPT itself, but because the US misused it as a tool to infringe upon our supreme interests.”
On the FMCT, the DPRK appropriated the May 18 US terminology accussing some CD members of taking the FMCT hostage to other issues, when it responded, ”The CD is not the forum serving unilateral interests of one country. The CD can’t be a hostage to one country.”
The conference will hold its next plenary meeting on Monday 22 May at 3 pm.
-Jennifer Nordstrom, Reaching Critical Will and
Beatrice Fihn, Disarmament and Economic Justice Intern
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
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Still nothing. Attending Conference on Disarmament (CD) sessions is comparable to watching an animal slowly bleed to death, complete with delegates' eyes rolling back in their heads. At this morning’s plenary, CD President Ambassador Bonnier of Sweden again summarized the situation before the Conference. CD Document L.1, the outcome of the lengthy process of substantive discussions during the first session, has now been on the table for three months. Most delegations are ready to proceed, but others continue to ask for “clarity, more clarity and again more clarity,” she said. Ambassador Bonnier pointed to the Complementary Presidential Statement (CRP.5) and the Draft Decision clarifying the relationship between CRP.5 and L.1 as examples of clarity given, and asked delegations with reservations to respond to this package with similar clarity. “Decision-time is upon us,” Ambassador Bonnier said.
Out of respect for delegations that still require more time, Ambassador Bonnier did not ask the Conference to take a decision today. Out of respect for delegations that are eager to move forward, however, Ambassador Bonnier will ask the Conference to take a decision on the L.1 proposal and the accompanying CRP.5 in a special plenary session, this Thursday, June 21.
India was the only delegation to speak at this morning’s plenary. While India felt that L.1, CRP.5, and the additional Draft Decision had addressed some of the concerns expressed by delegations, India stated that the “creative” way of linking the documents proposed by Ambassador Bonnier in the Draft Decision “falls somewhat short of integrating them fully.” India said it preferred a single, unitary document containing L.1, CRP.5, and the Draft Decision, “arranged logically and sequentially in a simple, neat, coherent, and integrated text, articulating a unitary and unified understanding.” This would have “the additional merit of avoiding a multiplicity of documentation and unnecessary speculation regarding the comparative import of the three elements,” India added.
India emphasized the need for clarity and for a “clear understanding of fundamentals, so as to ensure the smooth conduct of negotiation once the Conference has adopted its decision.” India stated it has sought clarification on the mandates being assigned to various coordinators, in particular with regards to an FMCT, and emphasized the need for a universal, non-discriminatory, internationally verifiable instrument.
As we wait impatiently for a decision on Thursday, we wonder if the CD will go out with a bang, a whimper, or a surprise miraculous recovery.
The next plenary meeting will be Thursday, June 21 at 10am.
-Katherine Harrison, Disarmament Intern, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
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Incoming rotating President Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü of Turkey opened the Conference on Disarmament (CD) session and gave a general outline of the schedule of activities for the Conference during Turkey’s term. Germany’s delegate was the only representative to deliver a statement during the session; he spoke about the draft treaty on preventing the placement of weapons in outer space introduced by the Russian Foreign Minister last week.
Ambassador Üzümcü welcomed the second round of informal discussions on the CD’s agenda items, scheduled to begin today under in the organizational framework introduced during Ambassador Labidi’s presidency. He intends to devote the final week of his term to an evaluation of progress by the agenda item coordinators. He also explained that he plans to “pursue intensive consultations” toward “the possibility of a consensus building on the Presidential Proposal crafted by last year’s Presidents.” Ambassador Üzümcü also mentioned that the Human Rights Council will hold its high-level segment in Geneva during the first week of March, during which time he would like senior political figures, who will already be in the city, to address the CD.
Ambassador Bernhard Brasack of Germany welcomed the draft treaty on preventing the placement of weapons in outer space introduced by Russia’s Foreign Minister. He argued, “Clear delimitations between purely peaceful uses and distinct military uses have become a meaningless fiction. Just as an example: Space tracking and surveillance capabilities for monitoring debris, following satellites for avoiding potential collisions, inherently also have a potential for offensive space applications.” With this in mind, Ambassador Brasack suggested elaboration through discussion on three issues “not yet sufficiently covered by the draft”: the relationship between a potential new instrument and the existing ones, particularly the Outer Space Treaty; the dangers posed by the development and testing of anti-satellite weapons; and compliance and verification mechanisms. He also remarked, however, that “meaningful discussions” in the CD on space security issues “will only be possible if the CD agrees to a Programme of Work.”
Although little has been said in the formal sessions of the CD on the draft treaty submitted by Russia, discussions on agenda item three, prevention of an arms race in outer space, will be held during the informal session on Thursday.
The upcoming US anti-satellite maneuver
Delegates to the CD have also not yet mentioned the US announcement to disable a failed satellite carrying a half-ton of hydrazine rocket fuel (a toxic chemical) by shooting it down with a Standard Missile-3, whose primary vocation is interceptor for the US Navy’s missile defense system. This incident highlights one of the deficiencies of the draft treaty proposed by Russia and China, which does not address attacks from ground- or sea-based interceptors such as the SM-3. It has also evoked criticism from many space security experts, who have vocalized two primary concerns.
One concern is the debris. While Marine Corps Gen. James E. Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said most of the debris will come down within two orbits, Jeffrey Lewis of the New America Foundation said, “modeling of debris creation isn’t an exact science,” arguing, “the debris that the light-weight interceptor will kick into higher orbits when it hits the massive (bus-sized) satellite” will remain in orbit, posing a risk to the International Space Station.
The second, but no lesser, concern is the political implications of conducting what amounts to an anti-satellite test. The US administration has argued the test is not the same as the Chinese anti-satellite test in January 2007, which it condemned. The US government says the Chinese test was “designed specifically” to test the ability to destroy satellites, and argues that its own plan is only aimed at protecting civilians on the ground. However, the Russian Defence Ministry asserted the US plan is “in many ways close” to China’s test, arguing, “The impression arises that the United States is trying to use the accident with its satellite to test its national anti-missile defence system as a means of destroying satellites.” Bruce Gagnon, Coordinator of the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space, likewise argued, “The Bush administration is magnifying the risk to justify the testing of new dangerous and provocative offensive space warfare technologies.” Jeffrey Lewis also argued that the “deck is stacked” in favour of shooting down the satellite, pointing out the administration’s worst case scenario for intercepting the satellite is that they miss, “not that they are wrong about the debris estimates or how much debris would reenter with a successful intercept,” while they have considered the worst case for the tank of hydrazine coming down into a populated area from which people cannot evacuate.
For a government that pours millions of dollars into its potential dual-use missile defense and space technology each year and is openly hostile toward a ban on attacks against space objects and on weapons in space, the decision to use some of that equipment, on grounds which have been described by most experts as ill-considered at best, gives the impression that the US military is just looking for an excuse to test its offensive space capabilities and demonstrate its military dominance.
Informal discussion on nuclear disarmament
During informal discussions today on nuclear disarmament, Ambassador Hans Dahlgren of Sweden delivered a statement on behalf of Chile, New Zealand, Nigeria, Sweden, and Switzerland on de-alerting nuclear weapon systems. During the 2007 General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, these five states introduced a draft resolution called “Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems,” inspired by the recommendations of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission. The resolution was adopted by the First Committee (124-3-34) and the General Assembly (139-3-36), with France, the United Kingdom, and the United States voting against it each time. Ambassador Dahlgren emphasized that de-alerting is was one of the thirteen practical steps agreed to at the 2000 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, that it would signal the nuclear weapon states take their obligations seriously in the lead up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference, that it “can be achieved easily,” and that it “brings us further on the path to reducing nuclear dangers.”
Ambassador Dahlgren indicated that his group has carefully considered the views of those states who were not ready to support the initiative last year. He said they are looking forward to constructive dialogue on the issue, but “would prefer not to repeat a debate on terminology.” He explained, “What we ask for is a change of deployment practices. With a view to today’s security policy threats, we would see a significant increase in security and confidence if none of the States possessing nuclear weapons would have the capacities or policies to launch its missiles within a few minutes.”
Cluster munitions
The plenary was less-attended than usual, as many CD delegates are currently in Wellington, New Zealand for the latest preparatory conference of the Oslo Process, an international initiative to ban cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians, to assist survivors and affected communities, and to ensure clearance of their land. More than 150 representatives from 50 countries are there along with over 100 non-governmental organization representatives from 42 countries. The conference will result in a draft treaty text that states will agree to negotiate in Dublin, Ireland during the next stage of the Process from 19–30 May 2008. See the Cluster Munitions Coalition, www.stopclustermunitions.org, for more information. The issue of a ban on cluster munitions was taken out of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in early 2007 when it became clear that progress on the issue would be painstakingly slow.
On Wednesday, informal sessions will focus on agenda items one and two, and Thursday’s informal session will focus on agenda items three and four. There will be no formal sessions on Thursday.
The next formal plenary is scheduled for Tuesday, 26 February at 10am.
- Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will
- Sandra Fong, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom